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Abstract: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOUTH STAFFORDSHIRE IRON AND STEEL
INDUSTRY, 1850 - 1913, IN THE LIGHT OF HOME AND FOREIGN
COMPETITION.
When Ebenezer Parkes was discussing the question of foreign comp-
etition as it affected the local iron and steel industry at the turn
of the century, he stressed that it was a 'many sided thing'. Beside~,
if South Staffordshire was to reassert itself, then improvements
would have to come about in a number of areas - in education, use
of labour-saving machinery, practices in the blast furnace and rolling-
mill departments, labour relations, canal and rail transport,
structure of industry, state support and Colonial trade. This thesis
is an attempt to look at the various 'sides' of the South Stafford-
shire iron and steel industry as it faced up to increasing competition
both from other United Kingdom districts and from abroad. The im-
portance of physical factors is considered in conjunction with human
ones.
Clearly, South Staffordshire could do nothing to prevent the growth
of new centres of iron and steel production; furthermore, other older
centres of production, notably South Wales and Scotland, fared better
in the second half of the nineteenth century because of their tidal
locations. Iron ores from Spain or steel 'semis' from the United
States or the European Contiment tended to emphasise the shift away
from a land-locked centre of production. Abroad, tremendous growth
was experienced by the iron and steel industries of the United States
and Germany, a development which made all the apparent disadvantages
of South Staffordshire appear that much more significant. Of these
disadvantages, South Staffordshire's almost total dependence on outside
supplies of metallurgical coke ranks very high. So, too, do the
numerous shortcomings of the j)ransport facilities of the area. On
the human side, the failure of the local ironmasters to take full
advantage of the proximity of East Midland iron ore supplies was
crucial. Their reliance upon outside supplies of iron are, which
remained largely out of their control, put them in sharp contrast
with producers on the Continent or in the United states.
To add to the difficulties being experienced by the local industry,
Birmingham and the Black Country proved a very attractive market
for foreign producers. The so-called 'dumping' policies of the
Americans and Continentals are pursued at some length in the last
chapter.
Despite the many changes which took place in the district, South
Staffordshire remained a very important part of the United Kingdom
iron and steel industry. The fortunes of Round Oak, and especially
those of Sir Alfred Hickman's Spring Vale Works, illustrate the fact
that overall the situation in South Staffordshire was never a totally
hopeless one.
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Introduction.
In presenting an account of the South Staffordshire iron trade in the
period 1850 - 1913, 1 am conscious of the fact that aspects of the subject
have been told time and again. In one sense, this is proof of the importance
of South Staffordshire's position. Too often, however, people writing
about the district have done so solely from the point of view of local
histor,y, sometimes from local pride. Consequently, an inadequate and
incomplete account has been given, with wrongly placed emphasies on the
causes of change or decline resulting. By looking at events in South
Staffordshire against the background of growing foreign competition, it
is possible to gain a more balanced and accurate picture. Indeed, South
Staffordshire had for years occupied a very important position in the
international iron trade; this was as true in 1900 as it had been in
1850, al though, inevitably, the nature of the posi tion had changed enor-
mously. The reasons for this change were many - they concerned "the
employer, the workman, the scientist, the engineer, the Consul, the
Bri tish agent, and last, but not least, 'the Government of our oountry' (1 ) -
and to a very great extent, indeed, there was little that South Stafford-
shire could have done to have influenced the changing si tua.tion.
Originally, the local iron industry of South Staffordshire was based
on the availability of easily accessible raw materials - iron ore, coal
and limestone - and a very adequate canal system. Rapidly, after 1850,
the district lost these advantages: first, the ore was either worked
out or became too expensive to mine, followed soon afterwards by the
exhaustion, or loss through flooding and careless mining methods, of
the best coal seams; secondly, the canal system, upon whose banks the
great majority of works were situated, together with the railways, proved
(1) Ebenezer Parkes,Foreisn Competition, Proc. S. Staffs., 1901 - 2,
pp. 84 et seq.
increasingly inadequate and expensive as far as the ironmasters were
concerned. It is only when a detailed look at the management of the
railway/canal system is taken that these shortcomings emerge in their
entirety. Besides, no transport system could have surmounted all the
disadvantages of an inland location. In the face of these growing
difficulties, there was an obvious human failure. For whatever reason,
the majority of ironmasters proved unable to react positively to the
changed circumstances. That a minority did so only goes to show that
the overall situation in South Staffordshire was, at no stage, a totally
hopeless one. Sir Alfred Hickman, a man surprisingly neglected by
writers on the local scene (one eye-witness account of Hickman's funeral
spoke of 50,000 people lining the streets of Wolverhampton to pay their
last respects), survived every disaster which hit the district, and
his steelworks at Bilston remain in operation to this day as part of
the British Steel Corporation.
Clearly, South Staffordshire could do nothing to prevent the growth
of new centres of iron production in the the United Kingdom, chief
of which was the north-east. Older centres, notably South Wales and
Scotland, also fared better because of the near-tidal locations. When
the local South Wales iron ores became exhausted, the district's
ironmasters were in the position to receive cheap ore from Spain.
Similarly with the finishing departments; steel semis were imported
into South Wales in ever-increasing amounts and sold to the local re-
rollers at a price which did not include the cost of transit to the
sheet producers, etc. in the Black Country. Abroad, tremendous growth
was experienced by vigorous new industries in the United States and
Germany. All the disadvantages of South Staffordshire appeared that
much more significant in the light of the progress made in the United
States and on the Continent. Changed physical conditions, together
with totally different politico-economic systems, inevitably
altered the nature of the world's leading iron and steel industries.
When Ebenezer Parkes was discussing the problem of foreign competition
at the turn of the century he stressed that it was a "many sided" thing.
If South Staffordshire and, for that matter, the United Kingdom industry
as a whole, was to reassert itself, the following trends would have to
come about: better education, primary, secondary, technical; utilisation
of labour-saving machinery; improved practices in the blast furnace and
rolling mill departments, especially by the use of electricity; better
understanding, and greater freedom and cooperation between managers and
men; better trained managers and greater push and hard work on the part
of the masters; payment by results; greater sobriety amongst the men;
improvement of canals and waterways; lower railway rates and better
railway management; the adoption of the trust structure; Protection and
the growth of closer trading links with the Colonies. My thesis, indeed,
consists of an attempt to look critically at these various 'sides'. The
final chapter is an account of the nature of foreign competition as it
was felt in South Staffordshire; it shows just how much the district
had become dependent upon imported steel semis and that without the so-
called "economic dumping" by the Americans, Germans and Belgians the fin-
ishing departments would have found things even more dlifficult.
My sources for this thesis include some primary material which has not
preViously been used, especially the documentary evidence relating to
the firm of Alfred Hickman, Limited now in the possession of the British
Steel Corporation. Other interesting material came f~om the offices of
Patent Shaft (1969) and Bradley and Foster (1969); the Minutes Books of
the Wolverhampton Chamber of Commerce were of considerable importance.
as were the 'Accounts Books' of Lloyds, Fosters and Company and Alex.
Smith's 1897 Valuation of the Round Oak Iron and Steel Works.
Chapter 1 The structure of the Iron and Steel Industry ,
Although there\·rere examples of fully integrated works to be found
at various stages in the development of the industry, it is perhaps
preferable to separate the various departments of the Black Country
iron trade for individual attention. Four major departments are considered:
blast furnace operators,
wr-o ught iron manufacture,
steel-darks,
finished iron and steel.
As ,rill become clear in the narrative, ~,hilst there was a certain homo-
genei ty about the Black Country iron trade, it was also the case that
the fortunes of the various departments were not the same. Very simply,
the rise of the steelmaking industry in the Midlands came in a period
of rapid decline for the wrought iron sector. The finishing departments
often experienced spells of steady progress \~hilst the smelters and
bar iron makers were suffering from outside competition.
Jhe Pig Iron Department.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, pig iron production in the
Black Country was centred chiefly on Bilston (42 blast furnaces built)
and Dudley (40 blast furnaces), although there were smaller areas of
some importance. To some extent, these details added up to a shift
away from the Tipton area (21 blast furnaces); in 1823, for example,
whilst the Bilston area accounted for 30 per cent of the total pig iron
output of the Black Country, Tipton had produced 25 per cent, but seven
years later this had fallen to 17 per cent. No blast furnaces were located
off the coalfields and both West Bromlfich and Smethwick, whilst being
important centres of the finishing trades, possessed few pig iron manu-
facturers. No fewer than 55 different firms were engaged in the
production of pig iron in the district, many of which were
similar in every aspect. In size, the average blast furnace plant con-
sisted of h:o or three furnaces; Izons and Company (Izons Furnace) and
S. Evers and Sons (Parkhead ) 'Jere tvro firms ·dhich possessed only one
furnace and are scarcely forth mentioning. (1 ) A small number of firms
fere, in fact, in possession of more than five furnaces, but in the
mid-century Black Country this was because they owned two or more sep-
arate units. Later on, indeed, there were eXQmples of single plant having
six blast furnaces - Hickman's Spring Vale Works at Bilston for one.
The Earl of Dudley in 1860 possessed no fewer than seven blast furnaces,
four at the New Level works, Brierley Hill, and three at Coneygre,
Tipton. The Chillington Iron Company, vmose Wolverhampton works were
designed by John Urpath Rastrick, also had seven blast furnaces, four
at Chillington and three at Moseley Hole. In addition to the Earl of
Dudley's large concern, the southern half of the district had a number
of other very important works, notably the Old Hill Works (Badgers),
New Corbyn's Hall (Gibbons') and Old Level (Hall, Holcroft and Pearson).
In the northern part, J. Bagnall, _uth the Goldshill Ironworks and mines
in the Great Bridge-Tipton district and the Capponfield works and
various other mines, was most important.
In the 1840's, the pig iron department had experienced very mixed
fortunes and prices had fluctuated wildly.(2) In 1841, for example,
pig iron was fetching £5 per ton, but ,;ithin less than two years this
figure had fallen to 50/-. By 1846, following a brief period of intensive
railway building, pig iron had again reached £5 per ton, although it was
clear that the Black Country was not enjoying the same degree of pros-
perity as elsewhere in the United Kingdom. One reason for this was that
the district could not compete ~dth South Wales in the manufacture of
._--------- - _.- - ---
(1) W.K.V. Gale, The Black Country Iron Industry, 1966, po 77.
(2) G.~. Morton & M. Le Guillou, The Ris~~d Fall of the South Stafford-
.:3.hi!:e Pig Iron Industry, The British Foundryman, vol , LX, Part 7,
July 1967, p. 277.
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iron rails. Trade improved greatly in the early 1850's, and in 1852,
127 of the 159 furnaces in the district were in blast producing 725,000
tons of pig iron. Building of new furnaces went on in an attempt to meet
the ever growing demand for iron. Pig iron prices rose, to settle around
£6 per ton, and for almost the last time in the hiS~ry of South Stafford-
shire pig iron production all but a small percentage of the eXisting
furnaces were in blast:
Year No. of furnaces built In blast Tonnage
1854 175 145 743,600
1855 178 146 754,000
1856. 171 147 777,171
1857 180 153 657,195
The national crisis of 1857, whilst short-lived, greatly disrupted the
trade of the district, and by this time leadership in blast furnace
practice was clearly passing to the Cleveland district, whence came
severe competition. Numerically, however, the Black Country did not
reach its peak in terms of blast furnaces built until 1863, although
of the 200 furnaces said to be in existence by Jones in that year only
110 were actually in blast.(3) Indeed, the figure of 200 is very mis-
leading because included in that number were many furnaces dating back
to the Wilkinson era which were simply not capable of producing pig iron
to sell at the prices which prevailed in the 1850's and 1860's. In one
sense, nearly 50 per cent of the productive capacity of the area was in-
operative. Professor AlLen has termed this the "surplus capacity" of the
Black Country. 'which came into use only in short periods of very active
trade. It was a legacy of the earlier prosperity of the district and
"could not be worked profitably during the lean years" 0 (4) In fact,
quite a number of the older furnaces were scrapped in the 1860's and
1870's, an example being the "Hot Holes", or the "Bilston Blast Furnaces",
(5) S. Timmins (ed.), The Birmingham and the Midland Hardware District,
18$6, section on the Iron Trade by J. Jones, pp, 65 et seq.
(4) G.C. Allen, Industrial Development of Birmingham and the Black
CountrY, 1929, p. 195. See also the graph on page Sa of this script for
a pictorial presentation of Allen's "surplus capacity".
-A pair of Black Country blast furnaces in the early nineteenth century, The barron' in-
clines, bridge, tunnel heads and cast houses are clearly cisible
\
DLAST-YURNACES NEAR DUDI.I;Y.
\ F, Ct- . 1,
bough t by Alfred Hickman in October 1866 from John Jones.(5)
For much of the 1860's, there were bursts of prosperity followed by
short depressions. After two fairly satisfactory years, 1866 was something
of a crisis year for the district for by the end of it only 92 out of
the 170 furnaces built were in blast. Strikes and lock-outs be-devilled
the industry, and at least two blast furnace urri ts disappeared for
good, Russell naIl and the Oak Farm works. Perhaps the most notable
failure of this period, although the blast furnaces were afterwards
continued in operation by the new ownera , vas that of Lloyds, Fosters
and Company, owners of the Old Park Furnaces, Wednesbury. The main
bulk of the pig iron produced at Old Park had been consill1ed by that
company, which still had to 'import' large amolillts from outside the dis-
trict. In 1863, for example, Lloyds, Fosters and Company conslmed 16,474
tons of pig and 14,206 tons in the folloWing year; of these amounts,
11,460 and 7,188 tons came in from outside the district in 1863 and 1864
respectively.(6) In fact, it cost the company more to produce its own
pig iron - £3/10/2 to £3/17/5+ - than it did to purchase supplies from
elsewhere at £3/9/8+ and £3/12/9+. Another pig iron producer to go out
of business about this time was the family concern of the Gibbons',
owners of works at Millfields, Ketley and Level; very little was done by
the family after the death of Benjamin Gibbons in 1865. The state of the
iron trade in 1868-69 was described by Griffiths as "as flat ••• as can
well be remembered"(7), but in the very next year the Black Country
was caught up in the excitement of a boom. Prices of pig rion rose
sharply and in December 1871 an average quality pig iron cost £5/10 per
ton in the district, hot air all-mine pig £8 and cold-blast pigs touched
£9 to £9/10. Production of pig iron stood at 728,000 tons and amounted to
(5) G.R. Morton & M. 18 Guillou, Alfred Hickman Ltd, 1866 - 1932,
Journal of West Midland Studies, vol. 3, 1969, p. 5.
(6) Accounts Books, Lloyds, Fosters & Co., entry for June 1865.
(7) H.W. Griffiths, Guide to the Iron Trade of Great Britain, pp. 12-13.
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nearly 11 per cent of the total British output. 114 furnaces 'Iwre then
in blast, but the f'o Ll ovring anaIys i s of the district hints at a
disturbing point: Area
1;lolverhampton
Rilston
Wednesbury
Tipton
Oldbury
~'iest of Dudley
PercentaGe of furnaces "at
of blast
50
20
36
23
50
30
Over the entire district, something like 41 per cent of the furnaces
(100.5 out of 171) were lying idle even in this period of feverish
activity.
Despi te the general insecurity whi.ch seemed to characterise the
district's smelters after the boom of 1871-73, the period did witness
the start and subsequent gro,·rth of' the firm belonging to one of the
district's leading ironmasters of the years 188G to 1910, Alfred Hickman.
By the mid-1870's, Hickman was making a variety of pig irons, the
quality of which depended upon the combination of ores placed in the blast
furnace. For the best quality mine pig the mixture was made up of six skips
Mine, two Pottery and one Northampton (Muck), whilst the charge for the
production of common pig was pottery, Northampton and Taps. The Spring
Vale Works was slowly building up a very good reputation for both
Hydrate Iron ("S.V.H. hydrate") and the Bilston Furnace Mine ("B.F.M.
all-mine). In 1880, the monthly make of pig iron from Hickma.n's four
furnaces was as follows:
Furnace Nos. 1 & 3 *Common, made from Pottery, Northampton and
taps. This iron contained 3 per cent of
phosphorus and was used mainly for making
tubes for the gas industry.
Furnace No. 2 Hydrate Iron, made from red or brOlffi hydrate
ore from the Churnett Valley in North
Staffs., Pottery and a little 'flue'
(flue dust). It was used for making best
marked bars of 'I~ought iron, which contained
less than 0.75 per cent of phosphorus.
* See Glossary of Black Country terms at end of thesis.

Furnace No. 4 Bilston Furnace Mine, which was made from Flue,
Pottery and Northampton ores. It was used for
manufacture of good unmarked wrought iron bars.(8)
~.
Elsewhere in the district, the makes of pig iron were much the same,
although each firm tried to establish for itself a certain reputation
for one or more of the better qualities of pig:
Main Types of Pig Iron Made in Black Country
Staffordshire cinder (forge & foundry)
pa.rt-mine
all-mine (ordinary & best)
cold blast
I. & J. Bradley, for example, had a very good reputation for their
Capponfield forge pig and their Darlaston foundry pig, although not in
the same class as those made at the Spring Vale works.
In 1881, cinder pig was selling in the Black Country for 35/- a ton (9),
whilst common foundry cost between 37/6 and £2 a ton to make.(10) Such
prices left very little room for profit; nevertheless, except in brief
periods of severe depression, the locally produced pig iron found a ready
(8) The Ingot (newspaper of Alfred Hickman Ltd.) vol. 1, No.1, July
1919, p. 7. See Glossary for definition of terms used.
(9) Select Committee on Railways, 1881, M.E. 4467.
(10) Production costs varied enormously in the Black Country, much de-
pending on the price of coke and ore, as well as wages. Hickman's costs
for 1866 and 1873 were as follows:
1866 1873
Mine Common Mine Common
£ s d £ s d £ s d e s d
Coal 15 6-!- 15 0;- 1 10 7+ 2 0 1*
Materialf 11.L 15 014 10 0 2 12 5gtLime 3 52 3 5 2 1 . 2 10*
Wages 7 81 7 8* s 1 1 9 1qSundries 6 7 4 6 7t 8 3"t 8 3t
Total
3 8 3 2 5 ~ 5 3 11t 3 16 0;:
q.
market in the district. Hickman correctly informed the 1881 Select
Committee that although Cleveland production costs for foundry pig
were about 38/- it cost a further 12/- to transport the pig to the
Black Country; this left the district's producers, despite their com-
plaints about high production costs, a fair amount of leeway in which
to operate.
Disappearing Works in the Black Country. (See ~~ps 1,2 & 3).
Year
1870
1870
1875
1876
1877
1879
1879
1881
1882
1882
.1883
1884
1886
1886
1887
1894
1897
1809
1911
Firm
Oak Farm Ironworks (Glynne & cs.)
Ed~mrd Cresswell & Sons, Tipton
Messrs. Evers & Martin
Bloomfield Ironworks (Barrows &Hall)
Dudley Port (J. & G. Onions)
Tipton Grange Ironworks (Barrows &Hall)
J. Bagnall's wo rks at Tipton and Wednesbury
closed (West Bromwich works continued)
Furnaces of Earl of Dudley, formerly leased
to Messrs. Evers & }mrtin, dismantled
Jones Brothers
Darlaston Iron & Steel Compan~
Monway Ironworks (J. ~mrshall)
Chillington Ironworks
David Rose of Moxley
Messrs. John Rigby & Sons
Bromford Ironworks (John Dawes) unsuccessfully
put up for auction
New British Iron Company~ Ltd. (Corngreaves
Ironworks, Cradley Heath)
Gospel Oak Iron Company
Failure of Benjamin Bunch & Sons, Walsall
(owners of Bloomfield Ironworks)
H.B. Whitehouse & Sons, Ltd., Tipton.
By the late 1880's, a much greater threat to the B'lack Country smelters
was coming from the blast furnaces situated in neighbouring counties,
especially those in Northamptonshire, Derbyshire and Lincolnshire. The
first 150 tons of pig iron made in Wellingborough in 1863 were, after
some hesitation, purchased by a Black Country firm, Messrs. Hipkins of
West Bromwich, and from that point on the flow of Northants pig iron to
South Staffordshire increased. (11 ) Much of the early pig came into the
district by canal (Junction & Oxford and Coventry Canals), 1600 tons
- --- ---------------
(11 ) Mining Journal, 1/2/68.
10
being sent by this method of transport in 1856. In the period of ex-
pansion for the Northants industry, 1864-73, the L&NWR, in fact, carried
substantial quantities of pig iron as well. The South Staffordshire
iron trade tended to display this early preference for Northants pig
rather than the ore. Production costs in these experimental years
for the Northants smelters were lower than in the Black Country; good
rail facilities enabled Durhan)coke to be used in the blast furnaces,
with the result that in 1859-60 when the production costs in South
Staffordshire were about 64/- per ton, Northants pig could be made for
45/-. By the early 1890's, in fact, Black Country blast furnace prop-
rietors were extremely anxious at the way the 'newer' centres were
competing wi th them.
With a greatly reduced number of blast furnaces, the Black Country
Was still producing the same variety of pig irons as in the earlier
years, and separate prices were quoted for each of the local varieties)
in addition, the three main markets of the Black Country, Dudley, Wolver-
South Staffordshire Blast Furnaces, 1892-1912.
Year lfo. Built lfo. in Blast *
1892 79 29
1893 79 25
1894 76 22
1895 69 21
1896 69 23
1897 63 23 ~26 in March~
1898 60 23 25 in March
1899 59 22
1900 47 20
1901 43 18 (16 in March)
1902 39 18
1903 37 19
1904 37 16
1905 39 18
1906 32 18
1907 31 21
1908 34 18
1909 34 21
1910 34 19
1911 30 19
1912 31 20 (June)
* 30 September each year
II.
hampton and Birmingham gave separate quotations for 'Lincolns', Northants
and Derbyshire pig irons.
Prices of Pig Irons Quo.ted In Wolverhampton, .January 1893.
'Lincolns'
Northants
Derbyshire
Staffs. cinder
Part-mine
All-mine (hot blast)
" "(cold")
Price
(per ton)
48/6 - 48/9
43/-
44/-
36/-
44/- - 45/-
60/-
95/- 100/-
Competition for sales of pig iron in the Black Country had entered a
bitter stage in the early and mid-nineties: local producers, throughout
1893, 94 and 95,were often forced to blowout one or more of their
furnaces rather than permit stocks to build up which merchants would
then take only at reduced prices. Only 18 furnaces Tiere actually in blast
in April 1894, and the sale reason for this poor state of affairs ,vas
the competition from smelters in Northants and Derbyshire. Agents were
then offering pig iron from those two counties at only 37/- and 37/6
per ton, whereas local producers could not ask less than 40/- for
pig iron of similar quality (forge). Eight of the furnaces in blast
were either fully engaged in producing pig iron for steelmaking or
were making cold blast pig. Staffordshire cinder pig, momentarily,
had disappeared from the markets and was superceded by 'imported' makes.
With Northants makers having to pay at least 5/- per ton carriage on
the pig iron sent into the Black Country, it was clear that their pro-
duction costs had been greatly reduced. As far as South Staffordshire
was concerned, it was a case of the Northants blast furnaces being
located nearer to the iron are. By May 1895, with sales of Derbyshire
and North Staffordshire pig up on previous totals, the Black Country was
reported to be importing at least two-thirds of the quantity of crude
metal consumed, i.e. about 710,000 tons per year.
In 1896, the pig iron department at last showed signs of improvement,
although not to the same extent as some sections of the finished iron
department. In the early part of the year, weekly production was main-
tained at aroud 6,000 tons, with very little metal going into stock.
Pig Iron Production in South Staffordshire, I894-99.
Year Tonnage
l~~~ ~~~:~3~ * ~35,532 in stOCkS~* 22,329 " "1896 308,459
1898 332,869
1899 338,283
* includes Wores.
Production of cinder pig had recovered some of its lost importance, and
the good quality South Staffordshire part-mine was holding its own
against both Northants and Derbyshire pigs. The decline in the number
of "list houses" in South Staffordshire and East Worcestershire meant
that there ~ms a much lower local demand for all-mine pig with a
resulting lowering in price in relation to other varieties. As trade
continued to improve in the last quarter of 1896, there was much specu-
lation as to just how many blast furnaces would be blown in by the end
of the year; in fact, the number rose to 23. By March 1897, 26 furnaces
were in blast, the last time in the history of the Black Country that
the total exceeded 25. All the Midland districts were doing well, as
the follo~dng table indicates:
~umber of Blast Furnaces in Midland Districts, 16/10/98.
Distrrct Built In blast
Northants 26 13
Lincolnshire 21 14
Derbyshire 52 34
Shropshire 10 5
It was clear to contemporary observers that the Black Country had sur-
vived the phase of severe competition from the neighbouring counties
fairly well although, inevitably, there had been casualties. The Gospel
Oak Iron Company actually went in 1897, the first year of recovery. The
largest casualty of the 1890's, however, was the New British Iron Company,
Limited, of the Corngreaves Ironworks, Cradley Heath in 1894. (12) The
(12) Catalogue of Sale of Plant, quoted by W.K.V. Gale, op cit, p. 117.
sale of plant took place in June 1894, and it was estimated by a contem-
porary ironmaster, Jno , W. Hall, that "the proprietors lost half a
million of money". A few years earlier, the New British Iron Company
had possessed six blast furnaces, but only two of which (the New Plant
furnaces) had been of modern Black Country design. Obviously, too,
some of the furnaces which remained out of blast in the district were
obsolete and would never be blown in again, but it is interesting to
note that in May 1897 two improved furnaces at Tipton, belonging to
Messrs. Roberts and Company, were reported to have produced 825 tons in
one week - "probably the largest output recorded in the Black Country".
Furthermore, a large new blast furnace was then under construction for
the Earl ot Dudley at his Level Works, Brierley Hill.(13) In that year
the following firms were still engaged in the production of pig iron:
G.&: R. Thomas, the Earl of Dudley, Messrs. Ringley and Sons, Messrs.
Whitehouse &: Sons, Sir Alfred Hickman, P. Willis &: Son, the WillingsWQrt h
Iron Company, Messrs. Grazebrooks, Cochrane, J.H, Pearson, Roberts &:
Company, Tipton, Bassano, Barbor's Field Works and Dudley Port Furnaces.(14)
In addition, there were the furnaces at Capponfield and Darlaston.
Throughout the next few years, the Black Country pig iron department
experienced near boom conditions; in 1898, it was agreed by the blast
furnace proprietors that production had once more become a profitable
business. The weekly output of around 7,000 tons was quickly snapped up
and the wharves of the smelters were reported to be "bare of stock".
In Iovember 1899, prices for all types of pig iron were realising the
highest levels for twenty-five years(15), and even the lowest quality
( 13) Colliery Guardian, 7/5/97.
(14) The last three were definitely out of operation in December 1903.
(15) Colliery Guardian, 17/11/99.
of pig metal had risen from under £2 to over £3. Nevertheless, there
was not a great deal of expansion in the local industry, despite the
fact that well over 7,000 tons of pig iron had to come in from other
Midland districts each week. This inability of the local producers to
meet the requirements of local consumers was obviously a very serious
weakness and had disappointing repercussions for the other sections
of the Black Country iron trade. Finished iron manufacturers were
hampered by delays in delivery of pig iron, and in periods of full
demand they stood little chance of early supply unless they had been
old customers of the smelters. Besides, artificially high prices for
pig iron, whilst naturally pleasant to the smelter, meant that common bar
makers, faced with still higher production costs, were less able to
compete with the industries in Europe and the United States. Apart from
the steel makers, only two firms were prepared to risk capital and take
the opportunity of high prices to expand. In November 1899, Thomas
Cooper, of Bradley, and F.D. Docker, of Birmingham, purchased the new
Priestfield furnaces at an auction, formerly owned by Messrs. W. Ward
and Sons, whilst a few months earlier James Sparrow had restarted one
of his Ffriod blast furnaces at Wrexham which had been standing id~e for
r~1
ten years. Neither venture survived very long after 1900. One of the
most notable features of this boom period was the heavy demand for
Staffordshire cinder pig for forge purposes, production of which had
earlier almost ceased.
Significantly, the first signs that the pig boom was coming to an
end came when the Black Country markets were disturbed by news of the
unsettled markets for Scotch and north of England warrants. The favourable
situation deteriorated rapidly and even large producers like Patent Shaft
decided to cut back on the production of pig iron and their Willenhall
furnaces were blown out in October 1900.(16) The total number of furnaces
(16) Colliery Guardian, 19/10/1900.

in blast in the district fell to 18 (as against 23 a few months before),
and hro more had been put out by J"lme 1901. One or bra blast furnace
proprietors had a Ll osed their stocks of pig iron to grol" rather than
blowout a furnace, but others hp.d taken the opportunity of the lull
in demand to repair and modernise their furnaces after what had amounted
to a period of very hard driving. This situation had the effect of
creating temporary shortages in supply, and complaints of irregular
delivery were reported from a number of consl.lmers.(17)
With the partial recovery in the fortunes of the iron trade elsewhere
in the country in 1902, Black Country smelters proved sluggish in meeting
the increased demand for pig. There was a serious scarcity of pig iron
reported in August and September 1902, '.vith the resul t that various
manufacturers complained that they woul.d be unable to ,vi thstand foreign
competition even more, especially as the prices of what pig iron act-
ually came on to the market had risen sharply. Not until October were
supplies of pig iron in the district equal to demand, and even then
there was very little room for manouvre. As had happened so often in the
past, demand for pig iron was not sustained and by May 1903 the market
was reported to be "less buoyant". By the last quarter of the year, the
situation was extremely dull and the number of furnaces standing idle
vas thought to be the largest for a considerable time. One observer lrrote:
"••• a great deal of the plant is antiquated and might well be
dismantled but few ironmasters have sufficient faith in the future
to incur the expense of re-modelling". (18)
Over the next few years, the pig iron trade continued with its ups and
downs, but it would be wrong to give the impression that very little
(17) Colliery Guardian, 14/6/01.
(18) ICTR, 5/1/04.
Distyict Break-down in State of Blast Furnaces, December 1903.
Name In Blast
Capponfield 1
Darlaston 1
G. & ry. Thomas 1
E. of Dudley 2
Ringley & Sons 1
\Vhitehouse & Son 2
Sir. A. Hickman 4
P. Willis & Son 1
WillingHorth Iron 1
Grazebrooks 1
~~~e 1
J.H. Pearson 1
Roberts & Co. 2
Out
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Total
2
1
2
4
2
3
5
2
2
2
2
2
3
BluldingJ?epair
2
T
1
(only firms ~Qth at least one furnace in
blast included)
was happening to this sector. In some respects, the period from 1905 to
1914 saw the Black Country smelter at his most efficient (see section
on technological progress), for those ,'rho had survived into the Edwardian
years were the most for,mrd-looking of the nineteenth century ironmasters.
The district's two large steelworks, Round Oak and Spring Vale, were
spending large amounts of capital on expansion and modernisation pro-
grammes as, indeed, on a smaller scale, were T. and I. Bradley, Ltd., and
R.B. Whitehouse and Sons, Ltd •• Those works which had not gone over
to steel production, and clearly they were in the majority lnth regard
to furnace proprietors, found things harder. With the change-over from
iron to steel in the finishing trades well advanced by 1903-5, the
number of firms engaged in the manufacture of bar iron had greatly de-
clined. High-class foundry pig for railway castings nearly always command-
ad a high price, with the result that a few blast furnace proprietors
were able to find a good market for their cold blast and hot air all-
mine pigs. The local chilled and grain roll makers, for example the
stonehouse Works, Ltd., of Perry Bar, were customers for this high-
quality raw material, but not all of the remaining blast furnaces were
engeged in this line of business. Messrs. T. and I. Bradley, at Darlaston,
even beer-m the production of some hematite pig iron in 1908, the first to
be produced in the district; for this purp')se high-class Spanish ore
was imported.(19) One notable failure in the period was that of Messrs.
'vI. Ba'rrot.. and Sons, of the Bloomfield I'ronvorks , Tipton, most famous,
indeed, for the celebrated BBR brQnd. It has been suggested that the
actual vorks we re dismantled in 1904 but, in fact, they were purchased
by r1essrs. Benjamin Bunch and Sons of l'lalsall in April 1904 (reported
purchase price a little over £20,000); the new owners kept the blast
and puddling furnaces going until ':heir own failure five years later. (20)
1905 ~as a satisfactory year for the pig iron department; all metal
produced was soon purchased. It was noticed that the Midland counties,
and especially Shr0pshire, Derbyshire and Staffordshire, fared better
than other pig iron pr')ducing areas; the difficulty remained, however,
that whiLs t the smelters were unable to meet all the requirements of local
consumers there was still not the confidence amongst furnace proprietors
eeneralJy to encourage large expansion programmes. To have appreciably
increased the district's output wo ul d have taken time and would have
necessitated the expenditure of a large amount of capital. Early in
1906, the situation deteriorated again; weakness was first felt in the
warrant markets of Scotland and the north of England. Stocks began to
(19) Colliery Guardian, 24/7/08.
(20) Colliery Guardian, 8/4/04 and 14/5/09. The failure of Benjamin Bunch
in 1909 caused a sensation in the district. When a meeting of creditors
met in May it was declared that the firm had liabilities to unsecured
creditors of £10,000 and a liability to the bank for a further £17,000.
It vms further estimated that if the firm was sold as a going concern
it woul d produce a surplus of £5,000; if there was a forced realisation
it could mean a deficiency of £5,000. A committee of three was, in fact,
set up to try to keep the works going, but in 1911 it had obViously
failed. The works vias then bought by Thomas Smith and Sons, Ltd., of
Saltley Mill, Birmingham, but not for smelting or marked bar purposes.
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build up and Hickman's Spring Vale works was reported to have 20,000
tons of pig iron on hand. Messrs. Whitehouse's Priorfield works decided,
instead, to restrict make by blowing out a furnace. The latter firm
argued that if merchants knew that there were large stocks of pig iron
throughout the district, they would simply try to force prices down still
further. Fortunately for the smelters, the dullness in the trade did not
last much beyond the summer period and, with Northants pig being exported
to Germany and Belgium rathen than sent into the Black Countr,y, some-
thing of a 'boom' in pig iron took place. Conditions proved so promising
in the early months of 1907 that at one or two places, such as Darlaston,
entirely new blast furnaces were being erected. (21 ) Reports were even
circulated in the district that "one well-known local firm of pig iron
makers have been drawing at least £2,000 per week profit". (22) However,
the high prices of pig iron clearly handicapped the finished iron trade
and, in one sense, this was a factor which undermined the continued pros-
perity from the point of view of the smelters. By the late spring of
1908, a definite downward trend had set in and a number of blast furnaces
blown out; this situation lasted for something like nine months before
a renewed burst of activity took place. Messrs. Wm. Roberts Ltd., of
Tipton, made a profit of only £6,834 in the year ending April 1907,
but in the following twelve months profits reached nearly £20,000.
Whereas ordinary shareholders had received a 10 per cent dividend in
1907, in 1908 they received 20 per cent, including a bonus of 10 per
cent. (23)
It came as something of a shock to the district when, in April 1911,
a creditors' meeting of H.B. Whitehouse and Son, Ltd. was held. The
(21 ) Colliery Guardian, 31/5/07.
(22) Colliery Guardian, 22/2/07.
(23) Colliery Guardian, 28/5/09.
J.e
firm had a very good reputation for a high-class Staffordshire foundry
pig and until very recently had been blowing two out of three furnaces
at their works in Bilston. Liabilities totalled £13,000 and, although
if kept as a going concern assets were thought to total around £16,000,
the situation proved to be beyond recovery. (24) The departure of another
pig iron producer, coupled with the fact that the Spring Vale works
had not been selling pig on the open market since August 1910, enabled
some of the remaining smelters to enjoy satisfactory conditions. Early
in 1912, the Darlaston Blast Furnaces, the Tipton Green Blast furnaces,
the Wednesbury Oak Ironworks and the firm of Messrs. M. & W. Grazebrook
of Dudley were all reported to be doing well. Conditions somewhat wor-
sened late in 1913 and 1914, and something like six furnaces were blown
out, mainly because of the slackness in the finished branches of the
iron trade.
(24) CollieEY Guardian, 7/4/11. H.B. Whitehouse & Son, Ltd., clearly
fi tted the following description: " ••• most of the pig- or finished-
iron makers owned nothing but their own plant, and brought all their
raw materials in the open market". (Handbook for Birmingham & Neighbour-
hood, British Association Meeting, 1913, p. 13.
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\'lrought Iron P-Y>odu~.
By the mi.ddLe of the n1neteenth century, the Black Courrtry ':as firmly
as t abl i shed as one of the leading centres of wrought iron production
in the United Kingdom. Some 100 independent firms existed in the dis-
trict, many of vmich were small in size. Puddling was not a capital-
but rather a labour-intensive process, and much depended upon the skill
of the puddlers themselves. Over the years, the district had acquired
a reserve of highly-skilled labour for the production of wrought iron,
.md these hro fa,ctors had encouraged the growth of small units of pro-
duc t i cn , In 1852, there was a small number of firms "ri th as few as six
puddling furnaces, although the average size was probably somewhere
be tween ::'0 and 30 furnaces. The Bloomfield Iromrorks of Barrows and
Hall was the largest single "lvrought iron unit in the district with 46
furnaces; in addition, Barrows and Hall had a further 25 furnaces at
their two other works. Other important producers in 1853 included Th.
Davies and Company of Cookhay, West Bromwich, with 38 furnaces, and
George Jones of Spring Vale and W. Williams of the Albion Works, West
Br-omwi.ch , both 1'li th 32 furnaces each. By 1860, the New Br-i tish Iron
Company was very much up with the leading producers, with 62 puddling
furnaces, whilst the Earl of Dudley had 45 furnaces at Round Oak, and
a smaller number at Coneygre. Many of these larger firms continued to
grow over the next ten years or so, although some did fall by the way-
side or excha~ged o"l'lnership. In 1872-3, when, numerically, the Black
Country reached its peak(25) ,nth regard to puddling furnaces, the
following were the leading works:
William Barrows & Sons of Tipton
Patent Shaft & Axletree Company •••••
G.B. Thorneycroft, Wolverhampton
100 puddling furnaces
86 " "
74 'I "
(25) The next most important district about this time ~~s the north-east;
in 1869, there were 1300 puddling furnaces in the district, some of which
were owned by concerns larger than those to be found in the Black Country.
J.J...
J. Jones had recorded the existence of over 100 works in the boom of
1871-73, with a total number of 2,115 puddling furnaces. (26)
The larger works, wi, th the notable exception of William Barrows and
Sons, were all integrated back to smelting and some right back to the raw
materials for the blast furnaces. The Tipton firm was probably the most
famous manufacturer of wrought iron in the country, and yet it purchased
nearly all of its pig iron requirements from the Earl of Dudley or the
Lilleshall company in Shropshire. Over 1000 workers were, nevertheless,
employed by the firm. The New British Iron Company had six blast furnaces,
at Cradley Heath, and others at Dudley Wood, together with coal mines and
fireclay mines at Stourbridge, and 71 acres of land leased around
Wolverhampton. The Earl of Dudley, in addition to his blast furnaces,
had limestone quar-r-i os , iron and coal mines as well as a large finishing
department at Round Oak. All told, in the early 1870's, he employed
nearly 5,000 persons. Patent Shaft, which bought up Lloyds, Fosters and
Company in 1867, itself an integrated firm, possessed blast furnaces
at Willenhall and elsewhere, but it was a large purchaser of pig iron
and remained so even in its days as a steelworks. In 1873, nearly 4,000
persons were on the company's pay-roll. G.B. Thorneycroft, the leading
ironmaster in WOlverhampton in the 1860's and 70's, was a rare example
amongst Black Country wrought iron producers of displaying the charact-
eristics of horizontal integration as well as being a vertically inte-
grated firm. G.B. Thorneycroft owned both the Shrubbery and the Swan
Garden Ironworks, where some 1000 po~ple were employed at this time.
Long before the industry reached its peak it had been showing signs
of stagnation. In the 1840's, accusations had been levelled at the
industry that its productivity rate was not equal to that of South
Wales. There, the puddling furnace was worked for about 140 hours per
week and produced, on average, about 18 tons per furnace. The Black
(26) Ed. S. Timmins, op cit, p. 69.
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COlmtry furnace was 'larked for something like 100 hours ~Jer week, and
produced 10 1;ons of iron. This figure does not seem to have been improved
")pon by the mid-sixties, because Jones esti.mated then that the 2,115
furnaces in cperation had a po t snt i a I output o f' 20,000 tons of iron
per \·reek. The '"reekly make in 1~he noz-tb-eas t was 12 tons per furnace;
in the Sheffield D.rea the puddLing Yurriacee at John Br-own ' s Atlas Works,
numbering t~lelve, produced on average a 'Ieekly make of 100 tons in. the
early 1860' s , (27) i'lhere the Black Country scrred over all its rival
districts was in quality.
All the proprietors of puddling f'u rna.cee Here engE:.ged in the production
of bar iron and this sec t.i on of the Black Country iron trade is covered
under the present h ead.ingv Yhat happenad to the bloom ::ftcr leaving the
puddling furnace very largely determined the quality of bar produced
and it 'Jas upon the prJcess of re-worktng the bloom that a good deal
of South Staffordshire's high repubtion rested. It has frequently been
remarked that an interesting feature of wrought iron is that "L ts
physical properties, particularly its tensile strength, can be improved
by doing mechanical'·rork on i til. (28) By careful selection of pig irons,
together IIi th a series of re-rollings (including a system of re-heating
in a small mill furnace), various qualities of bar iron could be
produced from the puddled blooms. To produce a ~uddled bar or muck
bar the b.l oom was simply passed through ~;he forge train or primary
rolling mill. Very few firms actually sold muck bar and certainly
it Has never listed by the more reputable firms. Cro~ or ~chant iron
'.'ras, in fact, the Im'rest grade bar iron for general sale and ",'Jas the
result of the muck bar being re-heated in a mill furnace and then re-
rolled once. A re-'I1orking of crown iron produced the next grade Best
(27 Sir Allan Grant, Steel and Ships, 1950, p. 16.
(28) \'l.K.V. Gale, The British Iron and Steel Industry, 1967, p. 77.
iron, and so on to produce Best Best (BB iron) and, finally, Best Best
Best (BBB iron). Very few firms, again, produced BB or BBB bar iron,
and those who did came from a number of fims temed list or marked
bar house~. The number of Marked Bar houses was, obviously, limited
and throughout the period unde r discussion that number 'las declining.
The BBH brand of the Tipton fim was particularly famous as, so too,
was the Earl of Dudley's LWRO and "HURST" brands. The five longest
surviving Marked Bar houses ve re the f'ol Lovn.ng t
Brand
"Lion" brand of Netherton
I ronworks
"L Crown WRO"
"Crown HB"
"Crown BEll"
"Crown JB Bagnall"
"J Bradley & Co" and
"Crown SC"
List House
N. Hingley & Son Ltdl
Round Oak Iron & Steel Works
Bloomfield Ironworks
Lea Brook Ironworks,
Wednesbury
Stourbridge Ironworks
An important feature of the Marked Bar houses was that, as near as
possible, they marketed their goods on a united front. Generally
speaking marked bars fetched upwards of £1 per ton more than the other
bars (Round Oak did produce unmarked bars as well from the second half
of the 1890's~. Between 1890 and 1895, marked bars gradually declined
in price until they had reached £7 per ton; to some extent this reflected
the gradual take-over of steel. However, at the end of 1896 an improve-
ment began and by April 1898 marked bars had recovered to £8/10; by
February 1900, prices had soared to £11/10, the highest recorded price
since 1875. Over the next ten years or so, there were falls in the
price level but the average price was about £8/10 to £9 which, considering
the very severe foreign competition in the common bar trade, is a tribute
to the high quality of the South Staffordshire product. It was described
in 1905 "as a beautiful fibrous iron which is in great demand".(29)
The majority of firms with puddling furnaces and rolling mills in the
(29) Colliery Guardian, 3/11/05.
Black Country concentrated on the production of common bar iron (crown
or merchant iron). Because there were so many firms engaged in the manu-
facture of bar iron there was intense competition. Again, too, it was
a section of the Black Country iron trade which had to face the heaviest
competition from outside sources. In the period up to the 1890's, com-
petition to the Black Country producers came largely from South Wales,
the north-east and Scotland. South Yorkshire provided some stiff com-
petition in the higher quality bar trade. Continental competition
predominated in the period after 1900, especially from the Belgians.
To try and preserve as much of the trade as possible, a number of Black
Country producers set up the Unmarked Bar ~lakers' Association (discussed
in detail elsewhere). Only in periods of good trading conditions,
however, did the Association succeed and, overall, its influence on
preserving the industry in the district was probably only slight. In
one other area, too, did this section of the iron trade show initiative,
and this was with regard to ironworkers' wages. Although not without its
ups and downs, the Wages Board was a serious attempt by management and
labour to deal with the difficult issue of the puddler's wages; very
simply, individual firms were affiliated to the Wages Board, the prices
which they obtained for their products (wrought iron) were checked by
accountants bi-monthly and the ironworkers' wages were then regulated
on a sliding-scale. Apart from many obvious shortcomings, the main
weakness of the system was the fact that less than half the number of
firms in the district were affiliated. In 1910, for example, out of 40
or 50 firms engaged in the bar trade, only 17 were members. (30)
(30) Colliery Guardian, 26/2/04.
~.
Apart from the very brief periods when the downward trend was arrested,
the wrought iron section of the Black Country iron trade was declining
throughout the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The reason for
this was simple; one by one the main finishing departments went over
to steel and, in the case of the Black Country, imported steel 'semis'
became the life-blood of the re-rolling mills. Despite its decline,
however, the manufacture of bar iron remnined the chief output of the
district's iron trade; for example, in May and June 1904, of the 26,000
tons of manufactured iron produced in the district, 19000 tons were
I
of bar iron. Then, again, as late as 1910 out of the total output of a
little over 200,000 tons of manufactured iron made by the 17 firms
affiliated to the Iron Trade Wages Board, 131,000 tons were made up of
bar iron. (31 ) Of the 2000 or so puddling furnaces which had existed
in the late 60's and 70's, less than 1200 remained in 1895. By 1913,
that total had been almost halved again, and only 660 furnaces were
still in operation.(32)
(31) Colliery Guardian, 19/5/10. Except on rare occasions of heavy
demand, something like 15 per cent of the puddling furnaces were idle.
(32) British Association Handbook for Birmingham, 1913, p. 417.
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Steelworks.
Apart from the Old Park Works of Lloyds, Fosters and Company,
Bessemer's discovery of making steel in the convetter found little
sympathetic support in the Black Country. A number of points can be
made at this stage. There was no particular reason why Bessemer steel
should not be made in the area, as the Lloyds showed when their plant
came into full operation in 1864, provided the area's ironmasters had
been prepared to experiment and innovate. The local ores were not satis-
factory, but for some time very few local firms had been making pig iron
without ores imported into the district from a wide field, including the
very suitable ores from the Cumberland region. Furthermore, Bessemer
steel did not materialise as a major threat to the local wrought iron
department until the eighties. The iron-rail trade was the first section
of the industry to feel the cold blast of competition from this direction,
and the South Staffordshire area had only momentarily remained concerned
.rith the production of rails. Steel sheet began to rival the wrought
iron product only in the eighties, although it is interesting to note
in passing that the first steel sheet was produced by the Bilston firm
of Hatton & Company in 1876 from a steel slab made at Panteg Steelworks,
Monmouthshire. Cost, and the possible heavy investment in puddling
furnaces, mattered only marginally more so in the case of the Black
Country than in other areas; besides, it is doubtful if there had been
much new investment in puddling furnaces in the decade or so immediately
before Bessemer's discovery. Over 20 per cent of furnaces existing in
1872 had been built within the previous three-year period, and a great
deal of investment went into tbe older technique even after this date.
Besides, although within a year of the Cheltenham speech the Birmingham-
Wolverhampton area was hit by a sustained financial crisis, it would not
be correct to take the view that the larger producers in the area were
prevented from in$talling converters because of a lack of capital. Why,
;...1.
then, did not more Black C01.IDtry ironmasters follow the lead taken by
Samuel Lloyd? In the short term, the answer could lie within the very
slow growth in the demand for steel. Before embarking on the new venture,
the Old Park Works had carried out a little primitive market research;
nevertheless, their four 3-ton converters could not be operated at full
capacity for some time because of insufficient demand. In the long term
view, however, there are two very important factors to be considered.
For that school of thought which holds the view that physical factors
determine the location and subsequent growth of a particular industry
it can be stressed that Bessemer's process, by lessening the arno1.IDt of
fuel required, reduced the advantage of a coalfield location for the
finishing trades. The Black Country iron trade was, after all, essent-
ially a coal-based industry. For those who hold that the personal factor
predominates, the over-riding reason for the lack of interest displayed
was the conservatism both of the Black C01.IDtry ironmaster and of the
available work force. One of Bessemer's main opponents and critics was
Joseph Hall (1789 - 1862), born in Tipton and the man who perhaps made
the most valuable contribution to the working of the puddling furnace
in the nineteenth century. Hall very largely misunderstood the nature
of Bessemer steel, but found that his views were readily accepted by
the majority of his fellow iranmasters in the Black C01.IDtry. After all,
in its day the firm of Barrows and Hall at the Bloomfield Ironworks,
Tipton, with its renowned BEH brand of bar iron, was one of the leading
centres of iron manufacture in the world. Added to the known and often
commented-upon reluctance to accept change on the part of the South
Staffordshire puddler was the very relevant fear of the puddler that
Bessemer's process was aimed at cutting down on the labour force in
general and reducing the need for a skilled force in particular. In his
Cheltenham speech, Bessemer did stress that his process required "no
other fuel than is contained in the crude iron" and "no manipulation
or particular skill, and with only one workman". (33) U 1 f 11
ness care u y
supervised (and how much of the South Staffordshire management of the
1860's and 70's was capable of this function?), a possibly hostile
labour force, used to dealing with iron in any case, could easily spoil
Bessemer steel and yet put the blame on the defective process. For his
own part, Bessemer found obvious satisfaction in proving the superiority
of his metal over "best Staffordshire iron plate" (34) for the making of
cylinders. He had carried out tests to this effect With Ebenezer Parkes
of the Birmingham Corrugated Iron Company, but ther~ is no evidence
to suggest that in general Black Country users of Staffordshire iron
plate were prepared to accept the superiority of Bessemer steel in the
manufacture of cylinders or boiler tubes. Again, there were few prepared
to follow the lead taken by "a Mr. Thompson of Bilston" who chose
Bessemer mild steel in 1862 in the making of barrels for the Enfield
Despite the fact that Siemens' "Sample Steel Works" was set up in
Birmingham in 1866, no Black Country iron finn showed sufficient faith
in the open-hearth process to lay down the necessary plant until much
later in the century. This was also the case with both the Sheffield
area and the north-east. Undoubtedly, a relevant factor in this period
which kept the more conservative and, possibly, patriotic, ironmaster
from using the open-hearth process was the fact that the French firm
of P. and E. Martin at Sereuil was the first successfully to produce
open-hearth steel. Earlier experiments at Ebbw Vale, Barrow, Sheffield
(:'3) Sir Henry Bessemer. An Autobiography, 1905, p, 159 •
(34) The Engineer, May 1862.
(35) Sir Henry Bessemer. op cit, p. 204.
and Towlaw had all failed. Whilst the acid open-hearth process still
failed to deal with the phosphorus problem, the fact that both scrap-
iron and cheap low-grade coal could be used should have made it an
attractive proposition for the South Staffordshire area.
One of the brands of pig iron made in South Staffordshire was known
as "Common Cinder"; Hickman's Numbers 1 and 3 blast furnaces were given
over to the production of this type of pig in 1880, which was the cheapest
in the district and was made largely for customers who were engaged in
the manuf'ac t ur-e of tubes for the gas Lndus t ry , The" tap cinder" used
in the blast furnace was the slag (often termed the refuse) of the
puddling furnace, and had been in use since John Gibbons had first
sho\~ the way in the 1830's. South Wales and the Forest of Dean were two
other areas where the cinder had been used, but because of the large
size of the local wrought iron industry Black Country supplies of the
product were abundant. ~~ny Black Country ironmasters had continued to
view its use with suspicion, despite the fact that it contained 45 per
cent of iron, which amounted to a higher metallic content than many of
the local and 'imported' ores, and could be obtained in 1880 for the
cost of carriage or 3d. per ton. Sidney Gilchrist Thomas quickly recog-
nised the value of tap cinder for his basic process - the pig iron
produced from it was "high in manganese and phosphorus and low in
sulphur" (36) - as did the German steelworks. He was deeply disappointed
to hear that Lowthian Bell was actually shipping large quantities of
from the Tees
cinder~to the Continent. Fortunately, one of the newer ironmasters in
the Black Country, Alfred Hickman, showed a little more initiative;
Hickman realised that although the Black Country had no special attraction
for the production of acid steel basic steel was a much different prop-
osition. Hitherto, Hickman's experience had been with blast and puddling
(36) Paper read before the Chemical and Physics Section of the Society
of Arts, April 27, 1882. Thomas referred specifically to Staffordshire
cinder pig as being "a very good example of basic Bessemer pig iron".
furnaces - his father had possessed 28 puddling furnaces at Groveland
and Stonefield - so he was in a position to gllage the practical advantages
of the one process over the other. Accordingly, at his e~pense and
under his ovm direction, Hiclanan arranged for a trial of the basic
process to be carried out using the local cinder pig.(37) The Patent
Shaft and Axletree Company, ofvners now of the first acid converters
in use in the Black Country at the Old Park 1!forks, allowed Hickman use
of their disused pit at the MomTay Works. Both Thomas and Gilchrist
were present to supervise operations when between 70 and 80 tons of pig
iron "were blown in a pit uhich had been out of use for some years, and
lacked all the special appliances for the efficient working of the de-
phosphorisation process". The results were good and confirmed the many
excellent performances 'ilhich the basic process 'lTaS then giving in Germany
and Austria. It Nas the view of both Thomas and Hickman that cinder pig
vo ul.d give a steel that was "well adapted for the manufacture of tin
plates, sheet, wire, tubes, plates, &c., as well as for rails, axles,
tyres, &c •• " Accordingly, Hickman went ahead with his plans for the
erection of plant for making steel alongside his blast furnaces at
~pring Vale, Bilston. No praise can be too high for Hickman because it
must be remembered that outside of Scotland very few members of the
Uni ted Kingdom indnstry were prepared to take this step. A subsidiary
company was formed for the purpose, the Staffordshire Steel and Ingot
Iron Company, Ltd.; three of the four converters formerly owned by the
Mersey Steel and Iron Company of Liverpool, ,·/hich had gone into liquid-
u,..
ation in 1881, were purchsed by Hickman. Rolling mill equipment was
/.
also put down. To finance much of this move, Hickman wa s forced to sell
off some recently acquired land. Some rationalisation of his works had
been necessary. In October 1881, he had purchased the Cappon Field
(37 J.1.S.1., 1882, pp. 195-97.
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Furnaces and Colliery from 'uchard Bagnall for the sum of £9,500. (38)
Ho vevez-, in 1885 he decided to sell off Bagnall's old furnace plant
to T. and I. Foster f'o r the sum of £10,000, and "Ti th this money he wa s
able in part to finance his venture into steel production.(39)
Hickman continued to display outstanding qualities of leadership in
a nev industry ,chen, 8. little later in the dece.de, he experimented lolith
the use of different basic open-hearth furnaces. The Directors of Patent
Shaft had 'i1a tched Hiclanan' s pr'1gress with interest and they, too, took
the decision to go over to the produc t Lon of basic steel. Some £20,000
were spent on "steelmaking plant suited to modern requirements", but it
is clear that the move did not go 1:;i thout difficulty because in 1892/3
the same Directors had to announce a loss of £10,265 and that no dividend
was possible on either class of shares.(40) The Earl of Dudley's Round
Oak Works had also taken the decision to become a steelmaking plant;
perhaps because of Hiclanan's experience, Round Oak put down open-hearth
plant. According to R.. Smith-Casson(41), by the end of 1890 one Siemens-
11artin furnace was in operation with a production capacity of 3,000
tons per year. He thought it of interest to tell the South Staffordshire
Institute that "only slack was burnt in the works", which thus mad e the
whole process extremely economical as far as fuel was concerned. It was
extremely unfortunate that just when the steelmaking process was beginning
at Round Oak the Earl of Dudley should have sold the wo rks for £110,000.
(38) (Property Deeds in the possession of the British Steel Corporation.
\See also Map 4, p.31a)
(39) Documents in the hands of Bradley & Foster Ltd ••
(40) Colliery Guardian, 24/2/93.
(41) Proc. S. Staffs., 1890-91, pp. 22-26. G.A. Millward tPatent Shaft)
expressed concern that the appearance of a third steelmaking firm in the
Black Country might lead to "competition which would lead to losses
rather then profits". Ibid, p. 27.
The new company, the Earl of Dudley's Round Oak Works Limited, continued
with the steelmaking venture and, in fact, some £40,000 to £50,000 were
spent on plant extensions. However, serious financial weaknesses brought
the company into difficulty; a loss of £18,000 was made in the financial
year 1891 - 92(42) and, after further losses in 1893, it went into
voluntary liquidation in Decmmber 1893. The Earl of Dudley once more
found himself with an iron and steel works; progress in the steel de-
partment had continued and in August 1894 reports were given in the trade
journals of steel production at Round Oak. By October, Round Oak had
already commenced cogging and rolling down ingots and they were ready
to place upon the market "mild steel in the shape of bars, angles, tees
and other sections sui table for light engineering work". (43)
Although previous writers have tended to skip over developments in
the Black Country steel industry, and to suggest that very little of
interest took place, the three large steel producers in the district
were extremely active and successful from 1894 onwards. By 1894, in fact,
the consumption of steeLin the Black Country had grown considerablYJ with
a steady, and sometimes heavy, demand for steel for the making of boilers.
gasometers, bridges, stamping and roofing sheets, etc•• Having greatly
extended their plant in recent years, Scotch and north of England steel
firms had tended to dominate the Black Country market. Siemens steel
plates for tube-making purposes were offered by these nothern steelmakers
at "about £2 a ton below Staffordshire plates produced by the list
houses"(44), whilst steel strip was offered delivered at 5/- per ton
below local prices(45). Nevertheless, Hickman's works were said to be
"among those firms who keep busy in supplying large sections of con-
structive steel"(46) All three Black Country steelworks benefited from
(42) IOTR, 16/9/92.
(43) Colliery Guardian, 12/10/94.
(45) Colliery Guardian, 15/6/94.
(44) Colliery Guardian. 2/3/94.
(46) Colliery Guardian, 8/6/94.
domestic railway development in 1894 - 95; Patent Shaft and Round Oak
were busily engaged in extensive contracts in connection ;dth the
Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire L1ailway extension, whilst Hickman
was said to have an order for 6,000 tons of steel plates arising out of
the new line from Sheffield to London.(47) Open market quotations for
basic material in 1894 were as follows:
Bridge plates ·..... £5/10 per ton
boiler " £6/5 " "·.....
ordinary bars ·..... £5/5 - £5/10 per ton
round bars ·..... £6 per ton
Despite the fact that Hickman had taken pains to point out in 1881 that
the basic steel produced was suitable for rolling into sheets, neither
he nor the other two steel makers supplied the local re-rolling sections
with blooms and billets from which to manufacture sheets and bars.
Before it got into financial difficulties, the Chillington Iron Company
in 1881 had considered the possibility of sponsoring a venture into the
manufacture of steel 'semis' for the district's finishing trades. The
idea was raised again and again over the next twenty years but, as is
shown elsewhere in this script, no new steelworks ever materialised.
However, in the discussions which took place on this subject in the
1890's a number of points were made which go some way towards explaining
why the Black Country was, indeed, a very suitable district for the
manufacture of steel. In 1898, and again in 1902, when La Neve Foster,
president of the South Staffordshire Institute of Works' Managers, took
an interest in the idea of a new steelworks, the Black Country had become
almost memerised by all things American. He stressed that given suffic-
ient capital to build a works of "large producing capacities", South
Staffordshire could match the actual price of £3 per ton for mematite
steel in America" (48). La Neve Foster was naturally not suggesting that
(47) Colliery Guardian, 5110/94.
(48) Proc. S. Staffs., 1898-99, pp. 39 - 40 and 1901-02, p. 101.
the district should try to produce acid steel; he was pointing out that
South StQffordshire had an advantage over the American industry in that
they could sell a by-product from the production of basic steel, Le.
basic slag as a fertiliser at between 35/- and 30/- per ton. Hickman,
in fact, sold something like 300 tons of basic slag a week, much of it
being exported to GeTITlany.(49) Other advantages possessed by the
Black Co untry for the production of basic steel were listed by 18
Neve Foster: " ••• cheaply raised ore deposits in Northants and Oxford-
shi re in a ddf. tion try the tap cinder of the ••• ironworks ••• large
limestone deposits ••• together ':;-i th Stourbridge fire-brick ••• " Although
the bulk of the coke used by the iron trade had to be imported from
outside the district, there were Good rail links with South Yorkshire,
Durham and North and South Wales. For small production figures, 18
Neve Foster advocated the installation of open-hearth plant; the Bessemer
method was essential for works of 1500 to 2000 tons per week upwards.
(49) Le Neve Foster was only too aware of Hickman's need to export his
basic slag to Germany. As yet, the British farmer had not realised the
value of the material, although one expert (probably G. Redgrave in the
Journal of the Society of Arts, xxxviii, pp, 221-234) had pointed out
that "every ton of basic slag exported out of the count ry at £2 per ton
is a loss of £5 per t on to the communi, ty at large". The Germans were
only too willing to purchase British phosphates; they used over 300,000
tons of basic slag annually by 1889, and a third of that came from
England and Austria. (C.M. Aikman, Basic Slag as Manure, pamphlet pub-
lished by National British Agriculturist, 1889). Le Neve Foster further
stated: "Some ironmasters had been faced wi th the prospect, which had been
raised 15 or 16 years ago and then ridiculed, that, taking the cost of
production into consideration, steel will be the by-product and phos-
phorus the main object". It waa certainly true in the 1930's that S. & L.
made a bigger profit (through their contracts with Tarmac, r.ea.) out
of their slag as a road-making material than out of steel production.
Although this could be thought of as an optimistic view of the situation
in South Staffordshire, it was one shared by a number of those actually
engaged in setting up steelmaking plant in the district. F.'d. Harbord
stated in January 1891:
" in this district ve are very favourably si tua ted for making basic
pig. We have large accumulations of cinder which can be got cheaper
than in any other district, and we have the means of getting Northamp-
tonshire are very readily and cheaply, and this are is exceedingly
free from sulphur, which is a most vital point in the making of
basic pig. Then we have coal free from sulphur and low in ash;
and given a pure ore and fuel, we have the two essentials for the
manufacture of basic pig".(SO)
Purcell, the manager of the steel department at Round Oak, also shared
this view. He saw no reason why South STaffordshire "should not be as
pre-eminent for the manufacture of basic material as it has been for
iron". (S1 ) Purcell just as strongly agreed Inth Smith-Casson and Le
Neve Foster that many of the stated advantages would be wasted unless
"the thing is taken up with energy and enterprise". "If we are to make
steel economically", said I.e Neve Foster, "it must be made by large
installations and mechanical labour-saving appliances, coming with ore
raising and not finishing until the steel leaves the works". J.S. Jeans,
on a number of accasions, argued that lower production costs, together
with greater productivity, could only be brought about through capital
expenditure.(52) He was well aware that the existing structural weak-
nesses of the Black Country industry would prevent the adoption of
American methods unless some radical line was taken. He therefore suggested
(so) Proc , S. Staffs. , 1890-91, p, 28.
(51) Ibid, p. 29.
(52 ) Proc. S. Staffs. , 1902-3, p, 44.
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that the South Staffordshire Institute would be well rewarded if it
"were to appoint a Commission to consider what would be the effect on
the local iron industry of merging the many small concerns now carried
on in the district into a smaller number of larger ones ••• The average
capi talization of the works of Staffordshire unque at i onabLy falls much
bel ON" the United states figure of £200,000." The Institute did not take
up the idea of a commission, although Jeans did have supporters in the
district. James Roberts, for example, echoed the latter's ~TOrdS when he
spoke of a lull in the danger arising from American competition which
the area must take full advantage of:
"We have nON- before us ••• a period of two or three years in whtch ,.,e
shall have comparatively little competition from America. In these
two or three years we shall have to put our house in order and get
ready for re-newed competition. We must spend money like the Americans
do, and we can only do that by effecting combinations such as will
give us control of large amolillts of capital".(53)
Meanwhile, the three steel producers in the district were experiencing
satisfactory trading conditions. Frequently in these years, competition
from the north of England and Scotland almost ceased completely; 1Vhilst
ROlilld Oak and Patent Shaft were said to be managing well, the Stafford-
shire Steel and Ingot Iron Company's turn-over WaS reported to be larger
"than it has ever been since the wo rks were built". (54) An increasing
demand for open-hearth steel was, in fact, the main reason for the
decision of the Earl of Dudley to go public in 1897. Alexander Smith,
consulting engineer and valuer of Birmingham, carried out a valuation
of the ROlilld Oak Works in May and June 1897. On "a current going concern
basis", Smith valued the concern at £174,061/5/11.(55) In July of the
(53) Proc. S. Staffs., 1901-02, p. 160.
(54) Collie~ Guardian, 28/8/96.
(55) Valuation of Round Oak Ironworks, 30 June 1897, by Alexander Smith,
M. Ins t , C.E., Birmingham. (Document in Dudley Public Library, copy
in my possession).
same year a new company - the Earl of Dudley's Round Oak Works Company,
Limited - was registered ,nth a capital of £100,000 in £5 shares; it
was to aoquire and take over the iron and steel-making business of the
former company and "to carry on the business of ironmasters, steelmakers,
steel converters, colliery proprietors, coke manufacturers, miners,
smelters, engineers, tin-plate makers and ironfounders".(56) According
to Alexander Smith's valuation of 20 October 1897, the new company had,
in fact, acquired 'stocks, loose plant etc.', together with a goodwill
valued at £9,222/15/0, for £65,000. Subscribers to the new company,
in addition to the Earl of Dudley, were G.R. Claughton (agent), J.
Tryson (solicitor), C.H. Saltwell (solicitor), G. Hatton (manager),
E.B. Stead (cashier) and Alexander Smith (engineer).
An indication of the success being experienced by the new steel in-
dustry of the Black Country was the fact that in 1897 the £5 shares of
the Staffordshire Steel and Ingot Iron Company stood at £18 to £20. At
all whree works new steel plant was being laid down, a fact that led
some observers in 1898 to feel "that the district has a prosperous
future before it".(57) 'Phroughout that year and the next, Hickman
was able to raise his prices to new levels; instead of having to face
competition from the north of England, the district's steelworks found
themselves in receipt of orders from that direction. In April 1899,
Hickman's quotations were as follows although, in actual fact, he was
already fully booked to the end of June:
£7/15 - £8/5
£6/15 - £7
£7 - £7/5
£6/17/6 - £7
£7 - £8
£7
£6/15
Product
plates
angles
tees
flats
rounds
channels
girders
Price per ton (terms 2t% f.o.t. at makers'
works)
By the early years of the present century, a number of people spoke
(56) CollierY Guardian, 3/7/97.
(57) Colliery Guardian, 24/6/98.
(58) CollierY Guardian, 14/4/99.
with admiration for the efforts of both Sir Alfred Hiclanan and the Earl
of Dudley. The president of the South Staffordshire Institute in 1904-
5, H.B. ~ny, remarked:
"This district has benefited by the enterprise of Sir Alfred Hickman
and the Earl of Dudley to a very great extent, and it is very evident
from the enormous amount of money they have recently spent, and are
to-day spending, that they at tach very great importance to the necess-
ity of keeping abreast of the times, as a means of maintaining our
trade".(59)
Certainly, both ~ound Oak and Spring Vale had reacted to fierce foreign
and domestic competition by seeking new production processes in an effort
to reduce their costs. In 1907, indeed, the latter works embarked on
a fresh programme of expansion; between £50,000 and £100,000 was re-
portedly spent on new plant to enable Sir Alfred Hickman, Limited to
take on the Continental firms in supplying the local re-rollers with
small sizes of steel bars. Hitherto, the local sheet manufacturers had
not been able to buy their steel requirements locallyo Round Oak em-
barked on a further round of expansion in 1909, but when it was remarked
in the trade press that billets could be made in South Staffordshire
"at a price which would, if necessary, defy all legitimate competi tion
in the Midlands markets"(60), it was Sir Alfred Hickman who was given
I
the credit for bringing "a new lease of life" to the district s steel
industr,y. Although figures can only be guessed at, the Black Countr,y
had for some time being producing around 300,000 tons of steel per
year, with twice as much being produced by the open-hearth method as
the Bessemer process.(61)
(59) Proc. S. Staffs., 1901-02, p. 166.
(60) Colliery Guardian, 29/10/09.
(61 ) The totals for 1904 are given by S. Jeans, The Iron Trade of Great
Britain, 1904, p. 38.
Apart from the three major steel producing firms in the Black Country,
several others made steel for a brief period, if only on a very limited
scale. The New British Iron Company and the Smethwick engineering firm
of Tangyes Ltd both worked open-hearth furnaces for a time, whilst
Hatton Sons and Company at Bilston, with side-blown converters, made
250 tons ingots a week. (62) In 1911, the Weldless Steel Tube Company
was reported to have started laying down a Siemens plant "for making
their own blooms". (63)
The Finishing ~rades.
10 attempt is made here to cover all the finishing trades in depth;
the products made of wrought iron in the Black Country were legion. By
tracing the development of one or two works, and by the selection of
one or two major finishing departments, some explanation is given of
the more important trends which were taking place in the district's
iron trade. With the occasional exception - there were no finished
ironworks at the Priorfields Furnaces at Coseley for example - all the
proprietors of blast furnaces an~or puddling furnaces were engaged
in the finishing branches of the iron trade. However, there was a much
greater number of firms engaged solely in the operation of rolling mills;
in 1862, the earliest date for accurate records being available, there
were 219 rolling mills, 289 in 1869 and, in the boom of 1872, 329.
Numerically, however, the peak was not reached until 1882, when the
number of mills had grown to 353. Gale (64) lists no fewer than 36
different "Typical Rolled Sections" to illustrate the vast range ot
material which was produced by the Black Country mills in the nineteenth
(62) .K. Warren, The British Iron and Steel Sheet IndustrY Since 1840,
1970, p. 53.
(63) Colliery Guardian, 3/11/11.
(64) W.K.V. Gale, The Black CountEr Iron Industry, 1966, Appendix 13,
pp. 158-60.
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century. Even then, he is not exhausting the subject. His sections,
numbers 1 to 12, were termed merchant iron, that is, "they were all of a
type likely to be stocked by an iron merchant for sale to both regular
and casual customers". (65) No mill-owner attempted to roll all the
different types of material; in fact, there was a pattern of district
specialisation throughout the Black Coun~ry, a situation which applied
equally to the makers of sections, sheets and plates, hoops and strips,
and skelps for tube-making. For example, works in the Wolverhampton-
Bilston area concentrated on sheet production - a further specialisation
was to be found in that firms produced either tinned or galvanised
sheets - whilst the Cradley-Heath and Old Hill area had the rollers of
bar rod catering for a very large chain and cable industry. The Darlaston
and Wednesbury districts could boast of possessing some of the finest
producers of nut and bolt iron.
Reference has already been made to the number of Black Country firms
which went out of business in the closing decades of the nineteenth
century. However, there were two points of special interest: first,
the heavy financial losses which occurred when the plant and equipment
of firms went up for public auction and, secondly, the frequency with
which firms changed hands. Forges and mills belonging to the Darlaston
steel and Iron Company, for example, were sold in the early 1880's for
a mere £3,750, a loss of just over £21,000 from their original cost.
John Dawes' Bromford Ironworks, valued at something like £120,000 in
1882, was withdrawn from auction in 1887 when the bidding ceased at
£11,000, whilst the Tipton properties of the old Gospel Oak Companyf..-
were sOldL£10,000, despite a previous valuation of ten times that amount.
Benjamin Bunch and Sons of Walsall, indeed, paid the small sum of £20,000
(65) Ibid, p. 159.
for the Bloomfield Ironworks, Tipton. Each time, too, that a firm went
bankrupt the whole district felt the effects: when the misfortunes of
Tupper and Company, Limited became clear in March 1911, a number of
pig iron and steel producers were amongst the creditors. A local steel-
works was owed £5,000, whilst one merchant firm was still awaiting
payment for £7,000 worth of foreign steel; an American steel firm was
owed a further £15,000.(66) At one time, Tupper and Company, Limited
was thot~ht to have liabilities totalling £219,000, but when the dust
had settled the figure was nearer £100,000.
Very few completely new ironworks were laid down in the Black Country
after 1850; growth in the finishing department of the local iron trade
usually took place at the expense of blast furnace and puddling furnace
owners, that is, ironworks changed hands and were adapted for different
purposes. The trend was definitely away from the production of the raw
material (pig iron) towards the finishing sections. The change from one
owner to another was also a trend which had been well established by
1850, especially in those sections of the finishing department where
large amounts of capital were not necessary for an individual wishing
to make a start. The Ettingsall Works (puddling furnaces and sheet mills)
were owned by Morewood and Company until 1876; they were then run by
the Barbor's Field Company (Davies ~rothers) until 1899 before passing
into the hands of G. Summers of Coseley who ran them for some years
after that date. Similarly with the Capponfield Works of John Bagnall:
they were acquired by Alfred Hickman who kept them for a short time,
before he, too, sold them (not the complete works) toT. and I. Foster
in 1885.
The existence of so many small units of production throughout the
Black Country, and their frequent change of ownership, enabled some
(66) CollieEY Guardian, 31/3/11.
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firms to grow by the acquisition of other sites; for example, Tupper and
Company, Limited had originally started from Berkeley street and Lime-
house, Birmingham, but by the time it collapsed the firm controlled
five large works in the Black Country - Batman's Hill Works, Bradley,
Pyramid Works, Regent Works, Britannia Works and the Albion Works of
West Bromwich. (67) There was some logic in the way the various works
had been purchased - Batman's Hill Works were brought for their gal~anised
sheet mills and the Albion Ironworks for their black sheet mills -
but it meant that the various concerns of Tupper and Company, Limi ted
Were scattered over a wide area of the Black Country. The Albion Works,
for example, were located five miles by canal from the works at Bradley,
and 5t miles from the Berkeley street Works.(68) Because of the inade-
quacies of the canal and railway systems in the Black Country for local
traffic, not least the heavy cost, firms like Tupper and Company, Limited
unnecessarily penalised themselves by growing in size in this way.
The firm would have been better advised to have purchased and then
fully developed on an integrated basis, an entirely new site. Few
Continental or American firms, with assets (book value) in excess of
£216,000 and an annual turn-over of over £1,000,000, would have remained
in such a fragmented state as Tupper and Company, Limited.
The management of Tupper and Company, Limited was also at fault in
depending for too long on the production of iron sheets when steel sheet
production was obViously more profitable. Clearly, in the period from
1880 onwards, one of the most important decisions facing any finishing
(67) Colliery Guardian, 31/3/11.
(68) This point is pursued in some depth with regard to the local sheet
industry by K. Warren, op cit, pp. 45 et seq. The concentration of so
many firms engaged in the finishing trades of the Black Country (see 1'1ap 5)
may have hindered firms from beginning anew on a fresh site.
works in the Black Country iron trade was the point at which the change-
over from wrought iron to steel was made. Fortunately for the re-rollers,
steel could be used in mills designed to roll wrought iron of comparable
size, and some of the old wrought iron makers were not slow to take
advantage of this fact. A large trade in small bars and sections was
rapidly built up, and the Bilston firm of Hatton and Son had, indeed,
shown as early as 1876 that steel could be used in the sheet mills.
In the early 1880's, too, steel became the chief raw material in tin-
plate manufacture. Technically, there was no reason why steel should
not be used for the great majority of goods previously manufactured
from wrought iron; where this was not the case, for example, where
special corrosion-resisting properties were essential or where welding
by hand was practised, wrought iron remained in use. Indeed, the hand-
made chain industry "remained a good customer of wrought iron until
quite recent times and this was the metal's last real stronghold".(69)
The growth of the Black Country as a market for steel 'semis' was stag-
gering and amounted to a major change in the industry; by 1883, about
one-fifth of those firms engaged in this department of the iron trade
were reported to be rolling steel as well as iron. The bulk of the steel
billets and sheet bars were, of course, coming in from outside the
district; by the late 1890's, this was estimated to amount to some
3,000 tons each week. Not surprising, in the period of intense foreign
competition after 1898 the Continental and United States steel firms
sought to win the Black Country market for themselves. One significant
result of this move towards the greater use of steel was that any degree
of vertical integration which had existed in the way of puddling furnaces
and rolling mills was lost. Just as the district's puddling furnace
(69) W.K. V. Gale, a'pecBr;t. ttshi Tron and Steel Industry, p. 115.
proprietors had gone outside for their supplies of pig iron, so, now,
the rolling mills were becoming increasingly dependent upon outside
supplies of their "raw material". The whole character of the Black
Country iron trade was thus changing.
Dr. Warren suggests that the years 1894-95 were the "transition years
from iron to steel in the sheet trade" (70), although, as he frankly
admits, not all the Black Country firms engaged in the trade would have
agreed with this assessment. Even two of the district's large producers -
the Wolverhampton Corrugated Iron Company and John ~saght's - had recently
expanded their wrought iron capacity. What was true of the sheet trade
was also very largely the case with tube-making. Iron strip had been
the raw material of the tube-makers, whether they were making gas or
steam tubes (the wall thickness needed to be heavier for steam and was
painted red). The metal used in the manufacture of tube fittings was
also wrought iron (known in the trade as socket iron), and since welding
played a large part in the manufacturing process there was a tendency
to persevere with wrought iron. What broke the resistance to the use of
steel in the local industry was the increasing amount of foreign steel
strip being made available in the 1900's. In 1907, for example, an
average-sized firm was reported to have received 1000 tons of steel strip
in one order(71), whilst early in the following year Ger.man steel strip
for gas tube manufacture could be obtained for £6 per ton delivered.
Even the largest works in the district - Stewarts and Lloyds - took
advantage of the cheap foreign steel to teach the Gas Tube Strip !ssoc-
iation a lesson about high prices. 16,000 tons of Belgian strip was
purchased in one order.
(70) "K;. Warren, op cit, p, 55.
(71) Collie;r Guardian, 1/11/07.
Obviously, the change-over to steel from wrought iron did not take
place without serious disturbance in some sections of the finishing
department of the Black Country iron trade. Perhaps the most importan~
factor was a locational one. Dr. Warren has recently traced the effects
on the sheet industry and emphasises, as, indeed, numerous contempol'ary
observers pointed out, that the change-over to steel encouraged a move
by the sheet-makers to a coastal site. The need for this move was
accentuated with the arrival in this country of so much imported semi-
finished steel although, for some time, imported steel 'semis' also
had the effect of maintaining the competitive nature of the Black
Country firms. It is, indeed, the case that a number of local firms
abandoned the area altogether, the most important being John Lysaght
and Sons, the Wolverhampton Corrugated Iron Company and the Birmingham
Corrugated Iron Company. Other firms sought alliances with their counter-
parts in other districts - notably South Wales - through a process of
horizontal or vertical integration. Both Nettlefolds and E. & P. Baldwin,
for example, obtained works in South Wales, whilst retaining important
interests in the Birmingham-South Staffordshire district.
Chapter 2. The Plant.
For convenience in handling the details, the plant necessary for the
production of iron and steel has been divided into its various sections:
1. Blast Furnace Development;
2. Puddling Furnaces;
3. steel Equipment;
4. Rolling and Sheet Mill Equipment.
However, it cannot be too greatly emphasised that the more efficient
production of iron and steel was carried on in an integrated works and
that much of the ancillary equipment performed more than one function.
Ko aspect of the iron and steel industry after 1850 was more international
in scope than the details relating to technological advance, and for this
reason the treatment of Black Country iron and steel plant is made in
the light of best iron and steel practice regardless of its place of
origin. Unfortunately, the Black Country contributed little to what
was perhaps the most exciting development in the industry in the period
1850 to 1867. Kelly in the United States; Bessemer and Mushet in England;
the brothers Siemens, natives of Germany (if British by adoption and
experience); Emile and Pierre Martin in France and G~ransson in Sweden
firmly laid the foundations of the age of steel. (1 )
Blast Furnace Developments.
After the numerous changes to furnace design made in the Black Country
in the 1830's, an excellent account of which is given by W.K.V. Gale(2),
very little additional progress was made. Furnacemen saw no reason why
they should risk loss of production and possible serious damage to the
furnace structure in experimenting with new ideas. By the mid-century
(and probably not more than twenty new furnaces were erected in the
(1) H.R. Schubert, The Steel IndustrY, p. 67, HistorY of Technology, iV,
(2) W.K.V. Gale, The Black CountrY Iron Industry, pp. 58 - 82.
next fifteen years or so), the average Blaok Country furnace stood about
45 to 50 feet high. Examples of small, isolated furnaces were to be
found, produoing from 75 to 100 tons of pig iron per week, but, acoording
to Jones, it was oommon praotioe for most plants to have two or more
furnaoes produoing from f'O to 150 tons per week. (,). Slightly larger
furnaoes existed whioh, in faot, produced between 200 and 250 tons of
pig iron in the same space of time. The size of the furnace was regarded
as being the "most suitable" bearing in mind "the quali ty of ores used
in South Staffordshire': Even the very partisan W.K.V. Gale has to admit
that Blaok Country blast furnaoe practioe in the 1850's and 1860's was
not altogether satisfaotory. S.H. Blackwell wrote in the Midland Counties
Herald in June 1861 that looal ironmasters "certainly must not blind
themselYes to the progress which the manufaoture of iron has made during
the last twenty-ftve years".
What, in fact, was the progress being made in blast furnace design
and praotioe outside of the Black Country? Abroad, Continental producers
were imitators of British desie (frequently that of South staffordshire)
rather than innovators. However, it is olear from the public furore
over the Paris Exhibition(4) that best Continental blast furnaoe practice
had begun to differ from that to be seen in the United Kingdom. It is,
indeed, the case that one of the reasons w~ Northants ore never found
favour in the Black Country was because 1 t was 'different' from the
local clayband ores; furthermore, the district could boast of no chemist
wi th practical knOWledge of the industry who milht bave been able to
offer a soientific solution to the local ironmaster. South Staffordshire
blast furnaoe practioe vas, in faot, governed by routine, espeoial~
(,)
Editor S. Timmins, op oit, p. 67. See Figures 1 & 2.
(4) The flimes, '0/5/67 and .Azm:ual Report of the BriUsh .Association,
1867, pp. '4 - 42.
the routine habit of using adjacent ore and coal supplies. Should any-
thing occur to upset this routine (oolitic ores instead of clayband for
exampI e) then there was every possibili ty that the pig iron thus produced
would be of doubtful quality. At Ie Creusot, in France, however,
scientific control of the blast furnace process virtually guaranteed
the production of a uniform quality of pig iron regardless of the
varieties of ore used.(5)
Fuel economy in the production of pig iron was not something that,
hitherto, had greatly concerned the majority of Black Country ironmasters;
the cheapness of local coal supplies was no doubt sufficient reason for
this state of affairs. Jordan, indeed, singled out South Staffordshire
for criticism with regard to its wasteful fuel practices; as many as
30 to 40 hundredweights of coke per ton of iron made was consumed. The
reluctance on the part of Black Country ironmasters to use lfeilson's
hot blast is illustrative of the two factors already referred to; as an
innovation it interfered with routine practice and, in any case, coal
was cheap. But even by the early 1850's, it must, indeed, be a doubtful
point that fuel was cheap in the Black Country; hot blast had become
general throughout the district but it had not brought the same degree
of fuel economy there as had occurred in Scotland. What amazed Jordan
even more, however, was the fact that Black Country blast furnaces re-
mained open-topped; little or no attempt had been made to take off the
waste gas for firing either the stoves or the boilers. W.K.V. Gale, after
outlining early attempts in the district to take the gases from the
furnace top(6), suggests that the reason why Black Country furnacemen
had left their furnaces open was the difficulty of the task together
with the fact that so much slack was available for firing boilers and
(5) Samson Jordan, Revue de l'Exposition de 1867. iii, 1869. See D. Burn,
op cit, pp. 5 - 8, for discussion on this.
(6) W.K.V. Gale, The Black Country Iron Industry, pp. 83 - 84.
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stoves etc •• Jones and Blackwell are the sources for this information;
many "practical men" were, indeed, of the opinion that "the economy in
slack is not sufficient to compensate for the heavy expenditure in
putting up and in maintaining the apparatus in working order". (7).
Equally important, too, was the lay-out of the average Black Country
works; for effective use of the blast furnace gases some reorganisation
(including re-building) would have been necessary. It was not simply a
question of fixing apparatus to the top of the furnace. By refusing to
reorganise their works, many Black Country ironmasters were, in effect,
hastening their own downfall. Such an attitude, too, meant that the
district was falling further behind best Continental and United Kingdom
practice.
In the twenty years after the mid-century, blast furnace design and
practice underwent what amounted to a minor revolution. The key area
as far as the United Kingdom was concerned was in the north-east - the
Cleveland district. The firm of Bolckow Vaughan opened up the Cleveland
district in 1850-51 with the construction of three blast furnaces at
JUddlesbrough, quickly followed by the Clarence Iron Works of Messrs".
Bell Brothers. Furnaces designed on the South Staffordshire model were
Year Company lfo. of H(igh) Width of CubioFUrnaces ft. hoshes Capaoity
1851 Bolckow Vau. , 42 15 4,566
185' Bell Bros. 6 471- 16t 6,174
" Bolokow Vau. 6 54 15 7,1661854 Coohrane a: Co. 4 55 16 7,175
1870 Bell Bros. 4 80 25 25,000
" Coohrane a: Co. 2 90 '0 41,149
" B. Samuelson& Co. 2 85 28 '0,000
1871 Bolckow Vau. 2 95-!- 24 28,950(8)
(7) Editor S. fimmins, op cit, p. 67.
(a) Katerial extraoted from tJre'S' Diotionary of Arts. lIanufactures and
Kines, edited by Robert Huat, 1878 edition, vol. 2.
at first erected in the new areas - the first in the Cleveland district
was a mere 42 feet in height ... but in the 1860's some important changes
came about. Thomas Whitwell built three furnaces at Thornaby in 1861
60 feet high, and the following year Bolckow Vaughan increased the height
of one of their furnaces to 75 feet, but with a capacity of only 12,000
cubic feet, nearly 1,000 less than Whitwell's furnace. However, a few
years later, Bolckow Vaughan built a furnace 96 feet high and without
further alteration achieved a capacity of 29,000 cubic feet. Cochrane
went on to surpass this; his 92 feet high furnace had a capacity of
42,500 cubic feet. (9) At Ferr,- Hill, in Durham, one furnace reached
a height of 106 feet.
In ten years, therefore, the height of the blast furnace had virtually
doubled and a tremendous increase in the cubic capacity had been achieved.
Although not in the same proportion to the increased capacity, the average
make of the furnace, nevertheless, rose from 400 to 500 tons of pig iron
per week. The furnaces also worked more readily and tremendous sayings
were achieved with fuel consumption - Gjers estimated a 10 owt. BaTing
per ton of iron made in the Cleveland district as a whole. It was possible
to make a ton of pig iron with as little as 17 ovt. of coke.(10) Because
Ole'Veland furnaces were buHt so high changes had to be made to their
form. The old form of furnace, built of massiTe masonry, "with an external
shape of a truncated cone resting on its base", was unsuitable for such
large structures; a lighter form of construction, with a wrought-iron
cylindrical casing, supported upon cast-iron pillars, was adopted.(11)
The walls of the furnace and the lining of the hearth were made much
thinner than before, "the internal shape of the lining being to a great
extent preserved by the cooling effect due to the atmosphere, and
ItA..
radiation through the inner walls of the furnace".
L
(9) J.I.S.r., 1871, p. 202 - the drawings are especially good.
(10) Ure, op cit, p. 977.
(11) T. Turner, Iron. The Metallurgy of, 1908, 3rd. edition, p. 49.
$".2.
Of the subsidiary improvements in blast furnace practice which occurred
in the 1860's, perhaps the most important was the Cowper hot-blast stove.
In the older forms of hot-blast stove the air was heated by passing
through a series of cast-iron pipes, and only a moderate temperature could
be obtained owing to the danger of melting the pipes. E.A. Cowper, the
friend of Siemens, indeed, invented a fire-brick stove on the regenerative
principle, heated by the waste gases from the blast furnaces; in other
words, the furnace was made to heat its own blast. T. Whitwell also
achieved the same result, though with a different construction. As in
the case of increased height the main effect of the hot-blast stove was
a great saving on fuel consumption. Besides, "an increased yield was ob-
tained corresponding to the diminished fuel consumption"(12); this
amounted to almost a 20 per cent incre~se in output.(1,) J.S. Jeans
estimated, hQwever, that in 1882 a mere 112 out of a total of 968 furnaces
erected had either Cowper or Whitwell stoves. Only a minorit,y of British
ironmasters had accepted the benefits of increased hot blast. Sir
Lowthian Bell, from the start, had strenuously opposed the economy aspects
of hot blast and, later, supported his assertions on spurious scientific
grounds.(1.) Other ironmasters, for example T.I. Smith of Barrow, had
found it difficult to work at high temperatures on account of the valves
giving way. Vhitwell took pains to point out that such difficulties
were unnecessary because "at the Clarence Works four furnaces were in
full blast with 80 of his water valves and seals. Of these 40 had been
at work for nearly a year and a half, with blast from his fire-brick
stoves at a temperature of from 1,200 degrees to 1,450 degrees wi. thout
any failure of the apparatus". (15)
(12) T. Turner, op cit, p. 32.
(13) J. I .S. r., i, 1882, p, "5.
(14) J.r.S.I., ii, 1872, pp. 185-202 for full discussion on the subject
by members of the Institute.
(15) Ibid, P• 19'.
Meanwhile, there was not a great deal of new building in the blast
furnace department in the Black Country - the notable exception being
the erection of the Round Oak Works - but some works were modernised
or extended following a change of ownership. Here and there throughout
the district half-hearted attempts were made to bring the ironworks
into line with some of the more progressive ideas of the period. Indeed,
one contemporary furnace manager listed the following improvements in
his note-book - new and improved blast engines, collection of waste
gases which were then used for raising steam and heating the blast, etc.
(note Addenbrooke and Millward's patent), calcining of iron ore in vertical
running kilns, slag run into tubs (instead of into a pit, a practice
which had led to the congestion of materials near the blast furnace),
larger and improved stoves for heating the blast to temperatures of 8000
to 1000oF, and closed foreparts(16) used in furnaces.(17). Whilst it is
true that some, if not all, of these improvements could be found in the
district, they were definitely not widespread, and the list on its own
can be misleading. For example, only three of the 126 furnaces in blast
in 1860 made use of the waste gas(18}; in 1866 twenty furnaces were
(16) W.K.V. Gale believes that the closed forepart was the "greatest
innovation in blast furnace practice to be intoduced between 1850 and
to
1900", op cit, p. 111. It was not a British innovation - patented in the
United Kingdom in 1867 by Carl Holste on behalf of F. LOrbmann - but was
first used in the Black Country at the Willenhall Furnaces of Fletcher,
Solly and Urwick in 1869. In fact, only a minority of ironmasters adopted
the closed forepart.
(17) F.W. Hackwood, Wednesbur:y Workshops, 1889, p. 119.
(18) Froc. Inst. Mech. Eng., 1860, pp. 25 et seq.
equipped for the purpose and as late as the 1880's only the same number
were completely closed.(19) Jno. W. Hall's description of the Black
Country emphasised this poor performance:
"For many years to come, indeed, nearly every blast furnace in South
Staffordshire was a huge torch floWing to the heavens, making the
Black Country almost as light by night as it was by day".
Where the Black Country furnace differed most from those in the Cleveland
district was in size; only John and George Onions had attempted to
follow the Cleveland lead and try to achieve economy of production
through greater size. In 1870, they erected a blast furnace 74 feet
high and 13 feet in the boshes, which was charged by an inclined plane
110 feet long. Furthermore, most of the ancillary equipment for the
effective running of the blast furnace was of recent design.(20) Unfort-
una tely, the Onions' brothers had to go into voluntary liquidation six
years later, "a fate", writes WoK.V. Gale, "of many others whether they
tried to modernise or not". (21 ) With the South Staffordshire district
becoming so dependent on outside supplies of coal and coke - and iron
ore- there was no reason why blast furnaces should not have been built
along the larger lines.
It might be thought that because the Black Country industry chose not
to follow Cleveland's lead and build large furnaces it did not give
itself either the opportunity to employ the new ancillary machinery
which was so essential to up-to-date blast furnace practice or to bring
in innovation. However, if we look at developments on the Continent in
the early 1870's we can see that this need not have been the case.
Before doing this briefly, though, it is worth pointing out that the
(19) In fact, the Black Country, with about 16 per cent of its furnaces
closed, slightly bettered the national figure of 11 per cent.
(20) The Engineer, 20/5/70.
(21) W.K.V. Gale, The Black CountrY Iron IndustrY, p. 117.
Cleveland district also gave the impression of stagnation in blast furnace
practice after the mid-70's:
"With their attention focussed on these two elements of blast furnace
practice (furnace dimensions and heat of blast), and perhaps with a
tendency to place economy in coke consumption on too isolated an
eminence, the progressive ironmasters of Cleveland failed to experiment
seriously in these years in other elements of blast-furnace work, so
that, apart from the adoption of a German system of slagging (with
Bell in charateristic opposition), the form and proportions of the
best blast furnaces remained little changed in the decade".(22)
In Europe, many new furnaces were built in the 1860's and 70's but, in
general, they followed the Cleveland pattern except with regard to the
height of the furnace. In fact, very few Continental furnaces exceeded
65 to 70 feet in height. Where they differed so greatly from united
Kingdom - and especially South Staffordshire - furnaces was in the use
of "superheated blast". Whereas the blast was heated to teaperatures of
800 to 1000 degrees F. in the Black Count17, temperatures well in excess
of 1400 degrees were common on the Continent. British visitors to iron-
works in France, Belgium and Qerma~ in the 1870's were "surprised" to"
find that weekly makes were on average higher than those in the Cleveland
district and coke consumption lower.(2,) In 1874, two new blast furnaces
came into operation at Maizieres-les-Metz close to the Lorraine border(24);
described as "1aimetres in height ••• provided with Cowper's regenerative
hot-blast stoves, and all modern improvements"(25), they were very soon
producing between 70 and 80 tons of pig iron per day. In the Esoh-sur-
(22) D. Burn, op cit, p. 45.
(23) J.l.S.I., 1873, pp. 433-4.
(24) The area was very similar to the lforthants district (sandstone ores);
besides, with so much lforthants ore going into the Black Country, there
were similarities with that district as well.
(25) J.r.s.r., 1874, p. 437.
· .l'Alzette district, Luxembourg, using' "unealcined small Minette ore",
the Societe Anonyme des Hauts Fourneaux was getting from 700 to 770 tons
of pig iron per week from a blast furnace 65 feet high by 24 feet across
the boshes.(26) Using a Whitwell stove the blast was supplied at a
temperature of 1,400 degrees F., and the amount of coke required to the
ton of pig iron produced was only 20 to 25 cwts. M.E. Fischer, manager
of the blast furnaces, was so delighted with their performance that he
wrote to Whitwell with some additional information. Between 2' July and
5 August, 1874, furnace 10. 1 produced 15e2 tons of pig iron, a fact
which led Whiwell to comment: "It is probable that this example ot iron
smelting has not been excelled in any part of the world".(27)
In 1898, Horace Allen spoke to the South Staffordshire !nstitute on
"The Blast Furnace as a Source of Power". Introducing his subject, Allen
said that the blast furnace was "a symbol of industrial progress":
" ••• if one desired to determine the comparative position in the
scale of industrial supremacy of any given nation, an interrogation
as to the yearly output of its blast furnaces would, in the answer
given, prOVide all the data for comparison".(2S)
He went on to review the stages "in the evolution ot the modern furnace" -
the introduction of hot instead of cold blast by 5eilson, the perfection
of the system by Cowper, Whitwell, Crook and others; the utilisation
"of the waste blast furnace gases in the flues of steam boilers". Then
he said:
"More recently the scene ot experiment in blast furnace practice has
been removed to the United States, and the plant at Duquesne, in
Pennsylvania, contains, in its gigantic equipment, many improvements
(26) Ibid, p. 438.
(27) J.I.S.I., 1875, p. 620.
(28) Prec. s. Statfs., 1898-9, p. 2.
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of detail that have led to a cost of production, that is, in its
possibility of economic rivalry at the place of manufacture, qUite
above the plane of European competition."
Indeed, changes brought about by the United States industry to blast
furnace design and practice after 1870 exceeded those which had been
made by Oleveland ironmasters to the Black Country furnace in the twenty
years before 1870. Conditions in the United States were different from
those in the United Kingdom, particularly in the nature of the rich
Lake ores; tremendous expansion occurred, stimulating innovation and
creating an entirely new atmosphere in blast furnace practice. As early
Blast Furance Practice in Britain and the U.S.
Britain
Mostly within 20 miles
of sea
Furnaces of small di-
mensions
Average furnace output
8er year = c.25,000 tons
sual pressure of blast
4-6 lbs.
Average ore consumed per
ton of iron made = c.2t tons
Small volume of blast
Furnaces have long life
A.verage %of iron in
home ore = :58
United States
Mostly in W. Pennsylvania,
400 - 500 miles from sea
Generally of large dimension
60,000 tons
10-12 Lbs,
1t tons
Large volume of blast
Furnaces have short life
50
as 1871, the Struthers furnace in Ohio had attracted attention in the
United States for what was then a very large make - 1602 to 1642 tons
per month, or just in excess of the furnace managed by Fischer on the
Continent. By March 1876 the production had increased to 2032 tons per
month, and the only change to the plant had been the addi tion of a
second blOWing machine. (30) Sir Lowthian Bell had grudgingly admired
American blast furnace practice on his visit to that country in 1875;
he believed that former American visitors to Britain had "known how to
(29) Proc. S. Staffs., xviii, 1902, PP. 39-59.
(30) J. Gayley, '!'he Developnent of American Blast Furnaces. with special
reference to large yields, J.r.s.r., 1890, ii, p. 18.
profit by the results of our experience in the counties of Durham and
Yorkshire". (31) The Isabella and Lucy furnaces of Carnegie, Phipps and
Company were then producing on average 600 tons and above a week, which
"was 200'ltons more than the average make in Cleveland". Bell believed
that the American secret lay "in forcing in the air at a high pressure,
8 - 9 1bs , , and in immense volume". (32) He was cri tical of the fact that
"a sacrifice of five cwt. and more of fuel" per ton of iron was necessary
"for this unusually large production". Bell had, indeed, hit upon the
sharpest difference between English and American practice. The Cleveland
ironmaster had been concerned with fuel economy; the American manager
was in pursuit of a high make even if it meant heavier fuel costs than
were customary in England and a shorter life for his furnace stack. This
latter point proved extremely troublesome over the next twenty years or
so, but most of the problems were eventually overcome.
Julian Kennedy, man~r of the Edgar-Thomson works, was the first person
t:
to construct a furnace on "a liberal basis" with the prime intention
of going for large yields. To enable the furnace to withstand the rigours
of hard running, Kennedy strengthened the brickwork of the stack with
"eight-inch bands supported by staves ot !'-iron, toming a crinoline". (33)
The bosh walls received the same treatment and the "walls of the hearth
were surrounded b,y solid cast-iron plates, securely bolted, no oooling
pl.a tes of &n'1 kind being used" • .111 the fu:maoe anoillary equiPllent
was carefully adapted for the purpose in hand; fire-briok stoves of the
most recent design were erected, strongly built blowing engines were
prOVided, together with "an ample supply of boilers - a point in which
other furnaces were then sadly lacking". Finally, "all the flues and mains
were constructed sufficiently large, and in the most substantial way".
(,0 J.r.s.r., 1875, pp. 117-8.
(:~2 ) Ibid, p. 118.
('3) J .I.S.I., 1890, 11, p. 22.
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All previous records of production, now a very important issue amongst
the American ironmasters and their managers, were eclipsed by Kennedy's
furnace, "thus fully justifying the claims of its designers".(34) Monthly
makes of between 2536 and 2811 tons of pig iron were achieved between
April and October of the same year. The increased rate of driving - the
volume of air blown was increased to '0,000 cubic feet - made fuel
consumption high; this was largely expected but what was disappointing
was the rapid wear of the furnace walls. The upper brickwork of the
stack gave way and the furnace was blown out after a blast of two years
and five months. ffin that time, 112,060 tons of iron had been produced
on an average coke consumption of 3,149 lbs. per ton of iron. ('S) ~o
some extent, Kennedy had underestimated the strains placed upon a furnace
as a result of the rapid driving, and when next a furnace was built at
the Edgar-Thomson Works the crinoline structure around the stack was re-
placed by "an iron jacket", the bosh walls were further strengthened
and the hearth surrounded with water-cooled plates. Having planned for
the strengthening of the furnace the problem of weight had to be overcome;
the hearth would not be able to support the heavier furnace lining and
the superstructure. The weight problem had, indeed, led to changes in
the Cleveland district in the 1860's and 70·s. In the United states in
the 80's and 90's the best method of dealing with the weight problem was
found. To relieve the lining of the weight of the bell, hopper and plat-
form the following structure was added:
" ••• consists of three rolled joists bent to the circle of the furnace,
and which supports an ordinary flat lintel plate upon the tops of
the columns, and which easily carry any extra weight likely to be
thrown upon them b.Y accident, or uneven settlement".(36)
In order to preserve the internal shape of the furnace, brickwork was
(34) Ibid, p. 23.
(35) Ibid, p. 24.
(36) Froc. S. Staffs., 1891, p. 9.
".
as thin as possible. H. Pilkington, when President of the South Stafford-
shire Institute, believed that the Americans had "as usual" come first
in this practice: "their brickwork in no case exceeds ,6 inches, and it
is often only 24 inches thick".(37) Pilkiugton was also most impressed
by the' way the Americans had solved the problem of "cutting ••• at or
about the tuyeres"; they had not followed the European practice of over-
hanging the tuyeres, but by "an elaborate system of water cooling, by
means of tuyere breasts and blocks". Only the very best English practice
could match the Americans on this point. Problems had always been en-
countered in keeping the bell of the furnace in the centre, so that when
it was lowered an equal distribution of material was made all round the
furnace. On this point, Pilkington again felt that the Americans had
achieved more success than the English in working the bell "by an over-
head steam or hydraulic cylinder".(,a)
By the mid-1880's, even the Americans themselves were beginning to
question whether or not too much was being sacrificed in the interests of
high yields. E.C. Potter of Chicago was the first to tackle the problem
with any degree of success; he showed that it vas possible to have large
Yields and a low fuel consumption at a time when "it was thought well
nigh impossible to produoe a ton of iron with 2,600 lbs. of ooke".(39)
Gayley attempted to follow Potter's lead and by reducing the blast from
as much as ",000 to 28,000 cubic feet per minute he vas able both to
increase the monthly make and reduce the coke consumption of the furnaces
under his control. He went on to make further modifications, especially
in the use of water-cooled plates to protect the shape of the hearth;
the volume of air blown into the furnace was steadily reduced although
the temperature of the blast was increased. Xuch to Gayley's satisfaction,
he was able to improye on all previous furnace makes at a greatly reduced
average coke consumption. lfot surprisingly, he concluded his address
('7) Ibid, p. 10. See Figures 5, 6 & 7.
(38) Ibid, p. 11.
('9) J.I.S.I., 1890, ii, p. 25.
to the Iron and Steel Institute on the occasion of the latter's meeting
in the United States in 1890 thus:
"In the period covered by the last decade there are three steps in the
development of American blast furnace practice that might be mentioned -
first, in 1880, the introduction of rapid driving, with its large
outputs and high fuel consumption; second, in 1885, the production
of an equally large amount of iron, with a lower fuel consumption,
by slow driving; and third, in 1890, the production of nearly double
that quantity of iron, on a low fuel consumption, through rapid
driving". (40)
In fact, the occasion of the 1890 meeting brought the United Kingdom
industry face to face with the progress made in the United States.
Following the presentation of Gayley's paper on American blast furnace
practice a long discussion took place on the topic between American,
Bri tish and European manufacturers. During this discussion many of the
reasons why the British industry could not match the American methods of
production became clear. Bell, as usual guarded in his praise of a foreign
competitior, admitted that perhaps the English "had oTerlooked some of
the conditions involved in smelting the ores of iron, for we have not
only to consider the low consumption of fuel ••• but the hitherto un-
paralleled large production of iron from one furnace". (41) The basic
difference in furnace practice centred on the following formula:
English practice Economy of fuel, First; Production, Second
American" large Production, :P'1rst; Fuel Economy, Second
Crucial to this difference were the contrasting characteristics of
American and English attitdues to management problems, especially with
regard to the utilisation of labour. G.J. Snelus, perhaps the most
obvious admirer of American methods, admitted that he had always been
(40) J.I.S.I., 1890, ii, p. '5.
(41) Ibid, p. '7.
an advocate of rapid driving but his difficulty had been that "he could
not drive quickly":
" ••• the men would not be driven, the manager would not be driven,
and the furnace would not be driven, because they had not got the
plant, and could not get it".(42)
He thought that the "life of the furnace ••• should be a short and merry
one", particularly if you could save, as the Americans had done, four
hundredweights of coke to the ton of iron in the process:
"this amounted to about £25,000 a year on this particular furnace;
surely that was enough money to re-line the furnace two or three
times over:"
Unlike E. W. Richards of Ebbw Vale, who had criticised Carnegie and other
Americans for trying" to beat the record ••• with more water-blocks,
more fire-brick stoves, more blast engines, more batteries of boilers"(4'),
Snelus found nothing wrong with "the wonderful spirit of emulation among
the proprietors, the managers, and the men":
" ••• he, for one, would only be too glad, as an Englishman, if
English managers, proprietors, and men could get contaminated with
the same spirit, and he might add that he should be very pleased to
carry the influence away wi th him".
Twelve years passed before the British industry made another full
report on the American industry. On behalf of the BlTA Axel Sahlin had,
indeed, undertaken to study, amongst other things, American blast furnace
practice. It was soon abundantly clear to him that the Americans had
made further great improvements since 1890. More than fifty per cent of
blast furnace plants in operation in 1892 had since been blown out -
their places taken by a smaller number of giant furnaces "equipped re-
gardless of cost, but with the strictest eye to economy and efficiency
(42) 3.I.S.I.,1890, Special Volume on the United States,p. 61.
(43) Ibid, p. 51.
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of operation". The cost of a furnace stack and its equiJlllent was between
£160,000 and £300,000. The Americans were working on the assumption that
"a blast furnace lining is good for a certain amount of wear, that is,
a certain number of tons of iron, and that the sooner this quantity of
iron is made, the better the furnace will pay for itself".(44) Many
furnacemen maintained that the amount of blast forced into a furnace
had not yet reached its limit, though Sahlin found that some of the
larger furnaces were working under an average pressure of between 18 and
22 lbs. and receiving from 50,000 to 70,000 cubic feet of air per minute.
The high volume of blast, claimed the Americans, "has the effect of making
the furnace work uniformly allover, and prevents dirt troubles, slips
and irregularities". Full instrumentation - "self-registering pyrometers,
recording gauges and instruments" - placed before the manager at all
times "graphical reports of cold blast pressure, back pressure in the
furnace, temperature of blast from each stove, temperature of outgoing
gases at the top of the furnace, steam pressure, volume of blast, number
of skips hoisted, and height of stock line in the furnaoe".(45) A most
important development concerned the use of the "mud gun", or tap hole
closing machine, with which the iron was cast without taking blast off
the furnace - "from 40 to 60 minutes per day are saved, and the output
from the furnace is correspondingly increased". Sahlin recorded that
at one of Carnegie's plants - the Carrie Plant Purnaces - a single furnace
had produced as much as 790 tons of iron in one day. (46)
In the period when the Americans vere setting the pace, nothing like
the same amount of progress was achieved by the Bri Usb industry. Iron
and steel works visited by the Iron and Steel Institute in the 1890's,
including those at Consett, 7udhoe, Dovlais and Cyfarthfa, seemed to be-
(44) BITq Report, 1902, p. 48'.
(45) Ibid, p. 484.
(46) Ibid, pp. 488-90.
long to a different era. Many of the furnaces inspected by the Institute
visitors were over thirty years old - some were built on early and mid-
eighteenth century foundations - and none possessed anoillary equipment
to match that to be found in general use in the United States.(47) Blast
pressures varied between 4t to 6 lbs. per square inch and temperatures
between 1300 and 1400 degrees F•• At Consett, the weekly average make
was around 750 tons for each furnace - from 'pure' Spanish ores - though
a single furnace had once produced 919 tons of Bessemer pig iron, whilst
at the Cyfarthfa works the average output was 800 tons of hematite iron.
Even allowing for the many differences which existed in the nature of the
two industries, admirably discussed by Duncan Burn, the United Kingdom
was sadly behind American blast furnace practice.(48)
Developments in Black Country blast furnace practice within the same
period and up to 1914 have been sadly neglected by writers on the industry.
Even W.K.V. Gale passes briefly over the subjeot with the exception of
his rather extavagant claims for the closed foreplrt - "the greatest
innovation in blast furnace practice to be introduced between 1850 and
1900". (49) However, a great deal was going on and a fev of the remaining
furnacemen at the turn of the century had achieved considerable success,
which they tended to maintain until 1910 at least. As with many other
aspects of the local scene, Sir Alfred Hickman vas veIl to the front.
Hickman ignored the large constructions, either on the Cleveland or the
American pattern, largely because he wished to produoe a variety of pig
irons; consequently, he opted for a number of smaller furnaces. In 1895,
when visitors from the Iron and Steel Institute looked at his Spring
Vale works, he had some of the most up-to-date blast furnaces in the
district:
"The blast furnaces which are in two groups, are among the largest
(47) J.I.S.I., 1893, ii, p. 152; 1897, ii, p. 230 and pp. 237 - 8.
(48) D. Burn, op cit, pp. 188 - 192.
(49) W.K.V. Gale, The Black Country Iron Industry, pp. 111 - 114. See
also Figures 8 and 9 •
--
Three lat e- nineteenth -century blast fu rnaces, These tcer« charged hy a rrrticat lift (in the
l(lferr ) in stead of an incline, T o the riglu and left of th e lifl " If!"rr are "i~ slot',s f a, blast
",atinl( and on the right the cast Imllsrs
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in the district, being 65 feet high, 18 feet in the boshes, and 9
feet in the hearth, working with closed tops and Cowper hot-blast
stoves". (50)
The furnaces were of the iron-cased type, with a cup and cone arrangement
to close the top; the waste gases were used to heat the Cowper stoves
and the waste heat boilers and blast temperatures of up to 1500 degreesF.
were used. The outstanding feature of Hickman's blast furnace management
was undoubtedly the care and attention which was given to the twin
problems of fuel economy and the recover,y or utilisation of by~roducts.
'!'he economy-from-large--makes was not Hickman's way; rather did he plug
away at what might, at first sight, have appeared as minor issues. In
the early 1890's, for example, B.H. Thwaite took out patents for cleaning
the blast furnace gas and making it suitable for use in the internal
combustion engine. In many ways, he was working in the traditions of
leilson, Cowper, Whitwell, Crook and others; like so many pioneers before
him, when Thwaite put his ideas before the ironmasters of the day "they
simply ridiculed the idea that gas, that would fail occasionally to
light in large volumes in the flues of steam boilers, would enflame
wi th the rapidi ty required in the water-cooled cylinder of a gas engine".
(51) Hickman vas to be found among the few who did not laugh, but instead
he installed one of the earliest gas engines in the United Iingdom.(52)
The gas was passed through large cylindrioal towers where the heavy
partic;J.es fell, then through a series of water sprays generated in
rapidl;r revolving fans. As well as driving the engines which forced air
to the blast furnaces at a pressure of 5 Lba , per square inch, the gas
was used to generate sufficient electricity for lighting the works,
driving rolling mills and other types of machinery. Hickman had gone
(50) J.I.S.I., 1895, ii, p. ''4.
(51) Proc. S. Staffs., xiv, 1898, p, 4.
(52) T. Turner, op cit, p. 188.
a long way towards meeting Horace Allen's description of new blast
furnaces:
"Instead of these industrially centred blast furnaces having totbe
blown out by the rival and modern colossal furnaces, which are
magnificent examples of American enterprise, the smaller furnaces
well distributed in centres of power demand will be able to continue
their useful existence proving in addition to the democratic metal -
pig iron - all the power and light requirements of a manufacturing
centre and under the most satisfactory conditions; so that although
the great lights from the mouths of our blast furnaces have been ex-
tinguished by the hand of science, the light will still be given in
a better way to all the homes and workshops - wi thin a radius of 25
miles from the ironworks".(53)
Hickman not only put to good use "upwards of 120 million cubic feet of
gas per week" from each of his furnaces, but he also found a use for
the potash from the dust in the furnaoe gas. Together with that which
settled under the boilers and in the Cowper stoves, this "flue dust"
was sold to farmers as a fertiliser. So, too, with the sale of basic
Bessemer slag as a fertiliser; as early as 1886, Hutchinson stated in a
paper to the British Association that the basic slag from the South
Staffordshire Ingot Iron Company "bids fair to become an important
manure".(54) Finally, Hickman's unfailing ability to turn vaste materials
into capital - and so reduce the cost of producing his pig iron - was
well illustrated by his solution to the continued problem caused by
slag accumulation. He turned some of the slag into a suitable railway
ballast, whilst the other was turned into a valuable road-making material.(55)
(53) Proc. S. Staffs., xiv, 1898, p. 13.
(54) J.I.S.I" 1886, 11,p. 963.
(55) G.R. Morton and M. La Guillou, loc cit, p. 19.
Towards the turn of the centu~, something of the American methods in
blast furnace practice began to rub off on Black Country furnacemen.
Not for one moment is it being suggested that the gigantic makes of
the American furnaces were matched by those in the Black County, but it
is interesting to note that within the space of a few years the average
make in that district more than doubled. Much talk was heard of the
"new" practices in the district; the temperature of the blast was in-
creased and the pressure was raised to 8 to 10 lbs. per square inch.(56)
IBefore the 1890 s, very few Black Country blast furnaces produced more
than 350 tons per week. In 1897, two furnaces belonging to Messrs. Roberts
and Company were reported to have produced 825 tons of metal in one week -
"probably the largest output recorded in the Black Country"(57) - whilst
in the following year a new blast furnace was erected at the Earl of
Dudley's Level Works which would produce in excess of 600 tons of metal
per week. By the early 1900's, when local furnacemen were said to be
spending "large sums" in keeping their plant "right up to-date by the
erection of new or additional hot-air stoves, calcining kilns, new blowing
plant, increased railway siding facilities eto ••"(58), furnaces were
producing between 600 and 700 tons of pig iron per week. In 1910, it
was remarked in the trade press:
" ••• pressure of blast blown into the furnaces has enormously in-
creased, with the result that ironmasters are getting much more iron
through the furnaces than formerly. It is the height of ambition
of blast furnace management at the present time to produce large
outputs, which lessens the dead charges and so increases profits
and diVidends. In this connection, Alfred Hickman Lim!ted, Volver-
hampton, are putting in a duplicate gas-blowing engine plant to
(56 ) Colliery Guardian, 26/.,/09.
(57) Colliery Guardian, 7/5/97,
(58) Colliery Guardian. '31/5/rn.
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render themselves independent of accidents and also to increase
their consumption of gas from the blast furnaces, and so cheapen
output. The plant, which will run entirely on furnace gas, will be
of the most modern description, and will have a free air capacity
of not less than 43,400 cubic feet per minute. It will administer
to the blast necessities of five furnaces".(59)
One serious shortcoming that remained among Black Country blast furnace
plant concerned the assemblage and further handling of the raw materials.
The whole district was very congested and the lay-out of individual
plant really warranted the complete re-building along modern lines. At
Spring Vale, for example, the site appeared congested and some visitors
found it difficult to move about amongst the furnaces, railway sidings,
stock bins, kilns and numerous other buildings and pieces of equipment.
All the materials had to be man-handled from railway wagons or canal
boats and taken to the furnace tops in hand barrows up inclined hoists.(60)
(59) Colliery Guardian, 22/7/10.
(60) Frederick Scopes, The Development of Corby Works, 1968, Appendix vii.
70.
Puddling Furnaces.
The puddling furnace (or reverberatory furnace), dating back to Henry
Cort (1740-1800), together with Hall's pig boiling or wet-puddling
technique, was used throughout the Black Country, as elsewhere, in the
production of wrought iron. (61 ) In its simplest form, the reverberatory
furnace can be considered as two boxes made of refractory bricks; the
success or failure of the process depended almost entirely upon the
puddler who worked the furnace with a paddle and raddle.(62) Before the
Bessemer era, there had not been any great urgency to bring about tech-
nical change; there was no rillal product to wrought iron and by far
the heaviest expense involved in the production process was the labour.
So long as the puddler could produce a high quality material there
appeared to be little need for change. Occasionally, though, attempts
were made "to imitate by machinery the movements of the hand-operated
tools", that is, to create a mechanical puddling instrument. In June,
1836, for example, Charles Shafhautl patented a machine for the puddling
process, and it was tried out at the Tividale Ironworks near Dudley.
From reports of the machine made a number of years after the trials, it
would appear that Shafhautl's apparatus was far too complicated for
successful operation.(63) Much greater importance was attached to attempts
to improve upon the puddling process following the invention of the new
steel-making processes by Bessemer (et al) and Siemens; there was in-
creased attention given to the high wastage rate of fuel, pig iron and
labour especially as the price of steel gradually got nearer that of
wrought iron. Members of the Black Country industry played a part in
what amounted to an unsuccessful prog~e.
(61) See W.K.V. Gale's two works - The Black Country Iron Industry and
The British Iron and Steel IndustrY - for the simplest description of the
process.
(62) W.K.V. Gale, The Black Count~ Iron Industry, p. 156 for other tools.
(63) The Engineer, 5/8/64.
Because the first half of the 1860's saw great unrest amongst the
puddlers as a work force, rather than because of any reaction to the
Bessemer process, attention was focussed on efforts to mechanise the
labour of the puddler. Two firms in the West Midlands, Lloyds, Fosters
and Company at the Old Park Ironworks, Wednesbury, and the Wombridge
Ironworks of Wellington in Shropshire, introduoed mechanical prooesses
but, after some early success, they were not prooe~ed with. This was the
..
fate of another experimental mechanioal puddler at the Regent Ironworks,
Bilston,(64) although Clough's modifioation of the patent mechanioal
rabble of James Eastwood did have some limited success and a few machines
on this plan were used in the Blaok Country.(65) Menelaus, the manager
at Dowlais, had by now established a reputation for himself in this field;
in 1865, he tried a rotating furnaoe at Dowlais. Onoe again, however,
the rotating furnace was only half sucoessful, although Menelaus was
oonvinced that the numerous problems encountered during the trials would
soon be ironed out.
It was largely due to the efforts of Menelaus that the newly-formed
Iron and Steel Institute established a committee to look into the
question of meohanical puddling in 1870. Xo Black Country ironmaster
was on the Committee, whioh was made up of Menelaus and Edward Williams,
both at that time from Dowlais, Lowthian Bell from the Clarence Works,
Sir John Alleyne of Butterley, William Fowler of Sheepbridge and F.W.
Kitson of Monk Bridge. At the Dudley meeting of the Institute an American
from Cincinnati, Samuel Danks, gave a detailed aocount of his Rotary
Puddler, which was a revolving puddling furnace, and for which he olaimed
a saving in both labour costs and fuel consumption in addition to a
bigger yield of high quality iron. Institute members were impressed
(64) The Engineer, 15/4/64.
(65) W.K.V. Gale" The illapk COUAtn Iron Industry, p. 106.
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and it was decided that a three-man team should visit America and see
the rotary puddler in operation. 'Armed' with no less than 40 tons of
pig iron from the major iron producing districts of the United Kingdom
(including South Staffordshire), in addition to various types of fattling
materials, the three-man team visited the Railroad Mill, Cincinnati.
A little surprisingly, for Danks was still encountering difficulties
both with the fettling of the furnace and mechanical weaknesses, the
team returned to the United Kingdom with glowing reports of the rotary
puddler.(66) Messrs. Hopkins, Gilkes and Company, of Middlesbrough,
was the first company in the United Kingdom to give a practical test
to Danks' machine,(67) followed soon afterwards by another north-east
firm, the Erimus Iron Company, Limited. J.A. Jones was managing director
of this company and he tried desperately to find a solution to the
"chief drawbacks to the success of rotary puddling":
"They were stated to be the education of the men, and the removal
of prejudice from amongst them; the difficulty with the fettling
of the furnace and the mechanical weakness of the Danks machine".(68)
Heath, Crampton and Sir John Alleyne were among a small minority of
ironmasters who, by 1872, owned the 74 Danks furnaces in the United
Kingdom. Alleyne, in fact, tried a number of different machines, in-
cluding a modification of Maudsley's machine and a Siemens' Rotator.
This latter machine, referred to as a "soup plate", was described thus:
"The machine consists of a pan, which rotates on a vertical axis,
and the puddler, which is fixed over head, and which works the rabble
to and fro is at right angles to the front of the furnace. When the iron
(66) J.I.S.I., 1872, i, pp. i-xxxv.
(67) J.I.S.I., 1875, p. 17. ~ 1879, Hopkins, Gilkes and Company were
bankrupt; the firm had supplied the iron for the Tay Bridge.
(68) Ibid, pp. 17 - 21.
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is ready to ball up, the puddler is stopped, but the pan continues
to revolve. The work of balling is done at the door, and it is
never necessary to reach across the furnace". (69)
An earlier version of a Siemens gas furnace had, in fact, been tried
at the Round Oak Ironworks, although there is no information on how it
perfomed. In the early 1870's, Smith-Casson, then manager at Round
Oak, experimented with a gas-fired furnace - the so-called Casson-Dormy
furnace. It was not a suocess, and the significance of the installation
of this machine was that it ocoasioned a serious labour dispute in the
Black Country. It would appear that Round Oak was the chief centre in
the distriot for carrying out trials to find a mechanical puddler. FOr
whatever reason, no attention was wasted on the Danks machine. Three
Griffiths 'Double Puddling Machines' and two 'improved Puddling Machines'
were later acquired by Round Oak, and a description of the latter was
as follows:
"Two improved Puddling Machines with cast iron frames ••• revolving
discs, wheel gearing fast and loose pulleys, and straps. One small
pair of Vertical Engines for driving machines." (70)
Attempts to achieve mechanical puddling were no more successful on
the Continent, although for a short time it did appear as if the French-
man, Pernot, had made a significant improvment to Kaudsley's furnace.
Whilst the ContLnental experimenters, indeed, fell short of creating
a wholly mechanical process, they did suooeed in bringing about greater
economies in labour and fuel than their oounterparts in the United
Kingdom. As to why there was so much failure both in the United Kingdom,
the United States - Bell knew of only one other works besides the Railroad
(69) Ibid, p. 2'.
(70) Alexander 8mith 's Valuation of the Round Oak Ironworks, 1897. Io
mechanical puddler was then in operation at the works•.
Mill to persevere with a Danks machine - and on the Continent with regard
to mechanical puddling furnaces: there is no one answer. Mr. Gale is
probably correct in saying that they failed "for one of two reasons":
"Either they were unreliable mechanically and so impossible to keep
in operation, or else they were not capable of producing good iron
consistently". (71 )
Metallurgical science of the 1870's and 1880's was not sufficiently ad-
vanced to match the inherited skill or 'intuition' of the puddler; when,
perhaps, this could have been achieved there was no longer the commerical
justification for the expenditure of capital on a material that had only
a limited demand.(72) In the period 1867 - 76, no less than '89 applicat-
ions were made to the British Patent OffiCe in this field(7'), and yet
in 1882 J.S. Jeans told the Iron and Steel Institute:
"The puddling furnace of a generation ago is in all its essential,
features the puddling furnaCe of to-day. Both have been condemned as
crude, barbarous and wasteful, and yet both continue to enjoy a measure
of vitality and appreciation to which their merits have certainly
not entitled them".
(71) W.K.V. Gale, The.:Black.CoUntry Iron Industry, p. 107.
(72) It is of interest to note that as late as 1885 Britain was turning
out more puddled iron than steel, whilst in Germany "the curves of output
•do not cross until 1887; and in Franoe not until 1894".(D.S. :umd~:
The Unbound Prometheus, 1969, pp. 259-60).
(73) J.C. Carr and W. !aplin, History of the British Steel Industry, 1962,
p.56. Although interest in mechanical puddling all but died out after
1880, Ebenezer Parkes was greatly impressed by Roe's gravity puddler
which he saw at Pottsdown, near PhiladelPhia, in 1901. (1902 BI'rC Report,
pp. 577-580.)
steel-making Equipment.
Henry Bessemer in the summer of 1855, at Voolwich Arsenal, succeeded
in converting iron into steel. His researches had led him to try a
refractory-lined and pear-shaped cylindrical vessel, open at the upper
end for the escape of gases. Air would be blown into the cylinder through
tuyeres, situated at or near the bottom. The oxygen of the air blast
would cause the oxidation of the impuri ties contained in the pig iron,
namely silicon, manganese and carbon.(74) When, in the following year
at Cheltenham, Bessemer disclosed his findings the excitement was in-
tense(75); however, the many difficulties which were then encountered
led to a great deal of disappointment and scepticism. As a result, si%-
teen years later the Bessemer steel industry in the United Kingdom was
still in its infancy. There were just in excess of 90 converters throughout
the entire industry with a total capacity of 449 tons. (76) Apart from
the Barrow Hemsti te Steel Company, with 106 - 114 tons, and the Sheffield
firm of In. Brown and Company, with 65 tons, there vas no firm with
'vessels' of more than '0 tons. Besides, the capacity of individual
converters was small with the majority ranging from three to six tons.
Jno. Brown and Company was alone in having tvo ten-ton converters. It
would appear from Bessemer's wri tinge that he was especially anxious to
see his process accepted by the Black Country ironmasters. In general,
he was, of course, to meet with disappointment as far as this area was
concerned. The one person to come forward from South Staffordshire to
seek a licence from Bessemer was Samuel Lloyd of Vednesbur,y. Four three-
(74) "The Manufacture of Iron Vithout Fuel", quoted verbatim in §i!:
Henry Bessemer F.R.S., AnAutobiograph.y, 1905, pp, 156-7.
L
(75) The Times, 14/8/56.
(76) Ura, op cit, p. 10'0. The material given by Robert Hunt in this
volume does differ slightly from the list of converters given in the
J.I.S.I.,i, 1872, p. lxi%.
ton converters were installed at the Old Park Works. The Patent Shaft
and Axletree Company continued with the Bessemer plant when they purchased
the works from Lloyds, Fosters and Company, but there were no further
developments in the district with regard to the Bessemer process until
the introduction of basic steelmaking b,y Alfred Hickman in the early
1880's.
Meanwhile, of course, a great deal happened on the steel scene, and
especially outside of the United Kingdom. A Bessemer steel industry was
established first in France by the firm of James Jackson and Son at
their works near Bordeaux; it then spread to other districts, notably
in the Centre, at the Imphy and Montlucon Works; in the Loire district,
at the Terrenoire, Creusot, st. Etienne and Givors Works; and in the
Gard district, at the Besseges Ironworks.(77) Belgium also was not far
behind her neighbour, the first Bessemer converters being set up at
Liege. In Germany, Alfred Krupp erected a Bessemer plant at Essen which
first came into operation in 1862. The Bochum Works had four three-ton
converters; the Hoerde Company, near Dortmund, had two converters; a
steelworks in Dusseldorf was completed with two converters. In 186', a
Bessemer converter was set up at Turroch, in Sty-ria. In fact, in the
1860's, the Habsburg Government was one of the bodies which made the
fullest use of the process, with very good results. What was especially
interesting about the production of steel at leuberg, in the province of
Styria, was that the metal was run directly from the blast furnaces
into the converters.(78) Speaking as late as 1875 a contemporary observer
remarked that as far as he knew the running of metal direct from the
blast furnace into the converters had not been put into practice in
(77) J.I.S.I., ii, 1889, p.24.
(78) A.S. Hewitt's Report on the Universal Exposition at Paris, 1867,
to the United States Government.
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Great Britain. (79) It was so in Austria, Sweden, Belgium, and Germany,
and in 1867 Terre Noire, in France, had employed the direct run :from
the :furnace, followed b,y the Creusot works. In the discussion which
followed Deby's paper to the Iron and Steel Institute it was, indeed,
con:firmed that the direct process was not used in Britain - at a Barrow
meeting of the Institute "it was said on the highest authority, that it
could never succeed"(SO) - but Edward Williams, from the Cleveland
distrrot, hoped that the process would soon become widespread there. One
dif:ficulty would be what to do "with the iron made between Saturday at
mid-day and Monday morning". 10 doubt, as at Terre Noire, such iron
would have to be cast into pigs and remelted.
The spread of the Bessemer process to the United States was largely
due to the efforts o:f Alexander Lyman Holley, although it was HeWitt
who built the first converter (on an experimental basis) in that country.
(81) By 1866, a number of steelworks were in operation, one of them being
the plant at the Pennsylvania Steel Company designed by Bessemer; the
Manchester firm of Galloway and Sons had made the converters and the
hammers by 'lhwai ts and Carbutt of Bradford. (82) American steel plant
was small, with nothing bigger than the :five-ton converters o:f the :firm
belonging to Hassrs. Winslow, Griswold and Holley at Troy (I.Y.). In
1868, when the 21 fi rms in the United Kingdom were producing 11 0,000
tons of Bessemer steel the American industry had a total output of
8,500 tons. Over the next twelve years, however, the latter industry
greatly expanded, mainly to meet the growing market for steel rails
whioh had been stimulated originally by salesmen of British steelworks.(8')
(79) JUlien Deby, The lanufacture of Bessemer Steel in Belgium, J.I .S.L,
1875, p, 195.
(80) Ibid, p. 205.
(81) W.F. Durfee, The Xanufacture of Steel, Popular Science Monthly. 39,
Oct. 1891, pp. 729-749, quoted by Peter Temin, Iron and Steel in line-
teenth Centu;r America.
(82) H. Bessemer, op cit, p, "9.
(83) a.a. Casson, The Romanoe of Steel, 1907, p. 24, quoted by P. TeDlin,
op cit, p. 1'0
HOlley was the outstanding figure of the American steel industry in this
period of growth; he held frequent meetings with John Fritz (Bethlehem
Iron Company), George Fritz (Cambria Works), R.W. Hunt (Troy Works) and
W. Jones (Edgar-Thomson Works, e&rnegie's plant). A series of confident-
ial reports passed amongst these men in which the many aspects of steel
production were analysed, especially with the question of large makes
uppermost. Of the eleven Bessemer plants in operation by 1880, Holley
had designed six. He was responsible for at least two major developments;
the first of these - the so-called "American" or "Holley's floor plan" -
saw the converters raised high off the ground. However, Lowthian Bell
was most impressed by Holley's "duplicate bottom", which was aimed at
solving the problems encountered in the Bessemer process arising from
the lack of durability of the tuyeres and the refractory bottom. Both
tuyeres and bottom might last only for five to ten heats and7 because
standard American practice aimed at 30 heats in 24 hours out of one pair
of converters, it was necessary "to put in and dry three and frequently
four sets of tuyeres during the day". General practice in the United
Kingdom (and on the Continent) entailed waiting for the vessel to cool
sufficiently for a workman to enter it and do the necessary repairs.
This would take some hours and then a further half day for the new
bottom to be thoroughly dried. Holley experimented with duplicate
bottoms - an idea first conceived by Bessemer himself - and gradually
overcame all the difficulties. By 1874, he could have the old bottom
out and a new one in in under one hour - at no extra cost and, naturally,
with a tremendous saving in "lost" production. With improvements such
as these, the Americans were, indeed, able to increase their production;
in 1878, when 21 Un!ted Kingdom works were producing BOO,ooo tons of
Bessemer steel, ten active American firms made 650,000 tons. Fortunately,
some of the leading English firms decided to follow the American lead,
foremost among them being Snelus at the West Cumberland Works, Bolckow
Vaughan's and Brown, Bayley and Dixon's.
7,.
Both the American and British industries clearly remained some way
behind leading Continental firms with regard to the direct process.
Once again, Bessemer had thought of the "direct metal" plan but had not
worked it for the very good reason that at his Sheffield works he had
no blast furnace. Furthermore, "English" cupola practice came to accept
the need to mix pigs of a known quality in order to obtain a uniform
charge for the converter. Whilst the Continental industries had all
taken the direct process "beyond the experimental stage"(84), the Barrow
Works (Sir James Ramsden and J.T. Smith) believed that "it was a very
doubtful undertaking". Fortunately, this attitude was slowly changed,
especially when Bell gave his blessing to those "economies introduoed
on the Contient". For their part, the Americans introduced the use of
an "intermediate ladle" between the cupolas and the converters:
"The plan in all the works of America was to melt in a cupola
continuously, and then to run the iron into a ladle, which was bal-
anced, and held from 10 to 12 tons. From that the 6-ton charge was
run direct into the converter".(85)
John Fritz, at the Bethlehem works, erected a 3o-ton ladle to receive
blast furnace metal, to obtain a good mixture, and hold it in readiness
for the converter; it was the first "mixer".(86)
Throughout the 1880's, the Americans continued to increase their levels
of production from the acid Bessemer process until, in the early 1890' a,
American Bessemer practice was characterised by its "large output and
its low initial silicon and initial temperature".(87) Crucial to the
rapid practice of the Americans were factors typically American in
(84) J .LS.I., 1874, p. 356.
(85) Ibid, p. 362.
(86) D. Burn, op cit, p. 50.
(87) J.I.S.1., 1890, ii, p. 95.
concept - "powerful machinery, efficient organisation, and extreme
specialisation and subdivision of labour, which can be profitable only
when the output is large". By 1890, in fact, some American works were
capable of achieving colossal production totals: one works, with two
ten-ton vessels, had raised its annual production level from 123,303
to 318,635 tons in ten years.(ae) One of the major British criticisms
of the rapid American practice was that it did not produce a cheaper
end product; in fact, it was suggested, it resulted in tremendous losses
to both men and machinery. For their part, the Americans refuted the
charge of excessive wear to the machinery. It was pointed out that some
of the original equipnent in the earliest Bessemer works - of the 1864 to
69 period - was still in use twenty or thirty years later. The items
of machinery which had been replaced were not necessarily worn out but
were, indeed, never intended to do the work which would be demanded of
them in new conditions:
"In this day of rapid mechanical progress, it must often happen that
machinery becomes antiquated long before it is worn out".(89)
A further criticism made of the Americans, sometimes by members of
their own industry - was that they sacrificed quality for quantity:
"The desire for tonnage, tonnage, nothing but tonnage, by both manager
and men, leads to slovenly, careless work". (90)
laturally , this was hotly denied by those engaged in the pursuit of
large makes; it was argued that the rapidity of the blow itself did not
"injure the quality of the metal" and neither did the shortening of the
intervals between blows.
(ae) Ibid, p. 97.
(89) Ibid, p. 109.
(90) Ibid, p. 149.
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Enoch James, "formerly of Dowlais, and General Manager of the Patent
Shaft and Axletree Company, Wednesbury", was the member of the BITC
which drew up the 1902 report on the American industry to look at the
steel sector. His findings clearly show the continued growth which
the American industry experienced in the last decade of the nineteenth
century was based on the principles developed in the 1870's and 80's.(91)
The size of the plant, together with the speed of operations, were the
fea tures of American practice which most impressed James. The four
Bessemer works which had been started from new after the 1890 visit
of the Iron and Steel !nstitute to America - Sparrows Point,Duquesne,
Lorain, and Youngstown - were superbly laid out with "more room and
better railway facilities to suit the improved methods of working".
'l'he Jones metal mixer, which had only just been introduced in 1890,
was found in 1901 at all the works visited. The mixers were of 200, 250
and even 300 tons capacity; the molten iron was conveyed in ladles from
the blast furnaces carried by electric-powered overhead travelling cranes.
The mixers themselves were mounted on rollers and could be titted.(92)
Further improvements noted by James included the casting of ingots upon
cars, and stripping them outside of the converter house. They had first
been introduced by the Edgar-Thomson works in 1890, and by employing
this method of casting, the Americans had done away with "the diffi-
culties attending pit casting in England". James was oonvinced that the
constant "attention to weak points and the readiness with which applianoes
are provided to meet new methods" were the most admirable features of
American practice. This had often meant expensive and extensive recon-
struction of eXisting plant:
" ••• at one of the best known and most sucoessful Bessemer shops it
was stated that the whole plant had been re-constructed four times
(91) BITe Report, 1902, pp. 510 - 519.
(92) Ibid, p. 514.
during the last 25 years, down to the very foundations, and this,
too, under the supervision of the same engineer".
Because of their "immense command of money", American engineers had
been able to construct Bessemer shops in which each section was ade-
quately suited for the work-load expected of it. James gave a good
example to draw a comparison with general English practice:
"Take for example the number of converters employed. At two works
only, those of Cambria and Edgar-Thomson Works, were four converters
used. Three were in operation at the same time, and one was undergoing
repairs when necessary. The blowing power prova.ded is sufficient to
deal with three casts at the same time, and tvo casts were constantly
going together. At one works in England haVing five converters in use,
the blOWing power is not sufficient to blow more than one cast at a
time. The proportions between converters and blowing engines are
clearly in error here. This is not a solitary case, for at some other
English works the blowing power is not capable of blowing two casts
at once".
It was James' undoubted opinion that the .Americans made certain that
no section or department of their Bessemer plant was asked to do more
work than it was adequately equipped to do.
In 1856, the year Bessemer spoke at the Cheltenham meeting, Frederick
Siemens (1826 - 1904) obtained a patent for his method of heat-regenerat-
ion. Together with his brother Charles, later Sir Charles William Siemens
(1823 - 1883), he made progressive research which led to their develop-
ment of the regenerative gas furnace. So successful had they been that
in 1861 Charles Siemens proposed that he apply the furnace to the manu-
facture of steel in the open hearth. By progressing from the use of solid
fuel to the conversion of solid fuel into gas in a gas-producer entirely
separate from the furnace, Siemens was able to use a low-grade coal in
his experimental open-hearth plant which he erected in Birmingham in
1865, but it was not until 1867 that the initial difficulties were
overcome. Temperatures of about 1650 degrees C in the hearth were possible.
At the request of Pierre Martin and his father, Siemens' engineers had
built a regenerative furnace at the Martins' small steelworks at Sireuil,
near Angouleme, and by adding scrap metal to the bath of molten iron
steel was produced. Detween the Siemens' and Martins' experiments,
therefore, a steel-making process had come into being which had much to
offer the manufacturer:
"The possibility of treating large quanti ties of metal at a very
high temperature and of keeping it molten throughout the process,
combined with the economic advantage of using scrap-iron and cheap
low-grade coal, ensured the success of the open-hearth process"(93).
The two sides made a contract in 1867 which laid the foundations of the
future success which Schubert speaks of. By 1873, the United Kingdom
alone produced 77,500 tons of open-hearth steel and, in 1882, 354 open-
hearth furnaces had been erected throughout the world producing 1,442,000
tons.
However, open-hearth production in the United Kingdom tended to advance
very slOWly in the 1870's, largely because of the doubt felt by producers
over costs. James Riley, formerly of the Siemens Steel Works at Landore,
admitted in 1884 that the Landore plant could not then compete with the
Bessemer works in the manufacture of steel rails - the only large market
for open-hearth steel. It was a Widely held view that Siemens had simply
presented the industry with the means of producing "Bessemer metal II by
"an entirely different process". (94) As yet, few believed that the open-
hearth process resulted in a superior metal, despite the added scope
(93) Schubert, loc cit, p. 59.
(94) J.r.s.r., 1875, p. 27; J.r.S.I., ii, 1884, p. 443.
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for quality control over the Bessemer process.
About the time when the open-hearth industry was languishing in Britain,
progress was being achieved in France. Following on the work of the
Martins' at Sireuil, three metallurgists at the Terre Noire, St. Etienne
(Euverte, Gautier and Pourcel), sought ways of producing high-quality
steels. They achieved their aim by increasing the percentage of man-
ganese to their ferro-manganese compound to 75+ - manganese had long
been added to both Bessemer and Siemens processes in the form of spiegel-
eisen (a compound of iron and manganese), but in such cases the percentage
varied between 10 and 20. In fact, the French metallurgists were improving
upon a British invention, but one which had not been a commercia]success
i
initially. What brought the French achievements firmly before the eyes
of British producers was the fact that the English Director of Naval
Construction, Nathaniel Barnaby, was much impressed by the French use
of their mild steel for ship and boiler plates. On his return from
France in 1875, Barnaby asked if any British manufacturers could make a
similar product. There were only two immediate takers, the Bolton Steel-
works (Bessemer) and the Landore open-hearth plant. Riley admitted in
1884 that it was the French invention which enabled the Landors works
to recover from its "miserable existence". By the end of the 70's, in
fact, the Terre .oire method of producing "extremely soft steel" was'
prOVing beneficial to a number of works in both the north of England
and Scotland.(95) The Steel Company of Scotland was, perhaps, the second
company using the open-hearth process to obtain Admiralty orders for
"plates for some Government gun-boats".(96) Riley had gone there in
1878 from South Wales and his presence in the Glasgow area coincided
with a considerable expansion there of the open-hearth process. Rail-
(95) J.I.S.I., 1876, p. 47.
(96) Ibid, and J.l.S.I., 1885, ii, pp. 399 - 401.
manufacture was largely abandoned, to be replaced by "the production
of boiler and ship plates, with angles, bars, etc." Siemens himself paid
tribute to the "new material" in 1878, no doubt relieved that at long
last his process for producing steel was at least as cheap as the
Bessemer process.
The first people to try the open-hearth process in the United States
were Cooper and Hewitt. They built an open-hearth furnace at Trenton in
1868, but it was not successful. Present as an assistant at this experi-
ment was S.T. Wellman, "who played a role in the int-roduction of the
open-hearth process similar to that played by John Fritz in the rail
mill and Holley in the Bessemer steel mill". (97) Wellman was determined
to overcome two problems: the maintenance of the furnace in the face
of the high heat attained and the cost of labour for charging.
Both the Bessemer converter and the open-hearth furnace were, of course,
heavily reliant upon high quality ores; the former, with its acid lining
formed of ganister, prevented the elimination of phosphorus, whilst
the silica brick used in the construction of the walls, roof, hearth and
posts, prevented the removal of sulphor and phosphorus in the open-
hearth furnace. It was not long before interested parties were engaged
in finding a way to eliminate "this objectionable element" (phosphorus)(ge),
although it must be admitted that many British attempts were half-
hearted. (99) G.J. Snelus, of the Dowlais Ironworks and then of the West
(97) Peter Temin, op cit, p. 139.
(98) T. Turner, op cit, p. 47.
(99) Britain was less affected by the shortcomings of the two steelmaking
processes than some Continental countries; her favourable resource
position (the availability of hematite ores in the Barrow district together
with the near-coastal situations on the Tees and South Wales to receive
Swedish and Spanish ores respectively), especially in comparison with
the German industry, enabled her to establish a heavy lead in the production
of acid steel.
Cumberland Works, perhaps, came nearest to identifying and solving the
problem prior to Sydney Gilchrist Thomas. He showed that the retention
of phosphorus was "intimately related to the slag":
"when the slag is highly basic, as in puddling, the phosphorus gOes into
the slag. He substituted dolomite bricks for the ganister lining, and
proved that steel could be made from iron containing 2 per cent phos-
phorus, and the phosphorus reduced to 0.1 per cent ••• "(100)
Although Snelus did, in fact, line a small Bessemer converter with lime
and produce a hundredweight or more of dephosphorised iron from Cleveland
pig, he did not publish the results. However, he did take out a patent
for the basic process in 1872. Several French metallurgists and iron-
masters, including Professor Jordan, believed that as early as 1869 a
Parisian engineer had come near to a solution using a basic lining but
that the Franco-German war had interrupted his experiments.(101) When,
in 1875, Thomas offered a paper to the Iron and Steel Institute on the
subject, it was, in fact, refused. Thomas had to wait another three
years before he obtained a brief opportunity to present his ideas to
the Institute during the discussion which followed Bellis paper on the
phosphorus problem. It must go almost without saying that Bell was
dubious about the Thomas proposals; he himself had met with considerable
encouragement in experiments with molten cast iron and fluid oxide of
iron at comparatively low temperatures.(102) 'rhis so-called "washing"
process Was adopted by Krupp at Essen, for the partial dephosphorisation
of pig iron before using it for other purposes.
Thomas was promised the opportunity to present a paper of his own at
the next meeting of the Institute which would be held in Paris. Again,
he was to be disappointed because priority was accorded to foreign papers
(100) A.H. Hioms, The Basic Bessemer Process, paper read to the Iron and
Steel Institute's Scientifio Society, 12/12/83.
(101) J.1.S.I., 1889, ii, p. 38.
( 102) J.1.S•1., 1878, i , p, 17 •
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and there was no time for the basic process. Windsor Richards of Bolokow
Vaughan, however, had not shared Lowthian Bell's scepticism, and he
had offered to give Thomas' ideas a try-out on a much larger scale than
hi therto. (103) As a result, when Thomas did address the Institute in
1879 both technical and commercial success seemed assured. Assisted by
his cousin, Percy Gilchrist, Thomas had succeeded in eliminating phos-
phorus in the process of making steel. The phosphorus in the pig iron,
which was found in the converter in the form of phosphoric acid, was
brought into contact with limestone (a cheap basic material) with which
it combined to form a slag easily separable from the steel. The linin~
of the converter was particularly vulnerable but the calcined dolomite
suggested by Thomas would have a longer life than anything used prev-
iously.(1Q4) Nevertheless, the basic process as suggested by Thomas,
would be more expensive than the acid process. The great redeeming
factor was that the Thomas process could use the cheaper phosphoric'
pig and relieve steel-makers from haVing to rely on the very expensive
hematite. A valuable agricultural fertilizer could be processed from the
lime-stone slag as an added incentive. Richards, formerly of Ebbw Vale,
(10') Experiments had been carried out at Blaenavon, whence Thomas t young
cousin, Percy Gilchrist, had gone as a chemist to work under the manage-
ment of E.P. Martin. IneVitably, they had to be on a small scal~, the
quantities used varying between six pounds and six hundredweights,
Turner, op cit, p. 49.
(104) The lining was composed of well-bumed or "shrunk" lime, made from
dolomite or magnesium limestone, which was firmly ground and mixed with
dry tar, as suggested by E. Riley, so as to allow of being pressed into
bricks which were afterwards baked, or of being rammed, so as to form a
lining to the converter, Ibid.
but now manager of Bolckow Vaughan and one of the most progressive men
in the Cleveland district, had installed a Bessemer plant in the early
1870's and in 1874 had begun work on the large Eston plant. It was no
surprise, therefore, that he should have taken an interest in the basic
process and become "one of the earliest pioneers in Britain". (1(5) On
4 April 1879, he gave a public demonstration of the process at Bolckow
Vaughan. By November of that year, Richards was obtaining very satisfact-
ory results in the manufacture of steel from Cleveland pig iron. He later
told members of the Institute that his firm was putting in some big con-
verters at Eston especially erected for the Thomas-Gilchrist process
because "in using the old converters ••• the output of ingots was much
too small, and it was evident that a large rolling-mill plant suoh as
those at Eston, could not be kept at halt work". (106) Middlesbrough
was soon "besieged by an army of metallurgists from Germany, Belgium,
France and the United States", all of whom were anxious to have an
opportunity of seeing the process in operation. (107) '!'he firm of Hoerde,
Westphalia, took advantage of Richards' inVitation to attend the Bolckow
Vaughan demonstration and in return they made their experiments open
to representatives of English firms. Sheffield firms took advantage of
this offer. (1C>8) R. Pink, manager of the Hoerde Works, was able to
experiment for a time in a small plant of two }-ton converters because
the company was working at half pressure due to the depressed state of
the German industry throughout much of 1879. Pink made "a most reliable
and cheap steel" from the "worst olasses of pig iron". In September,
1879, he got the "first rail manufactured under the Thomas patent in
Germany" •
(105 ) J.I.S.I.,1880, i, p, 79-80.
(1()6) Ibid, p. 102.
(107) Turner, op cit, p. 49.
(108) J.I.S.I., 1880, i, p. 80.
te.
Undoubtedly, the basic process sharply altered the comparative advant-
ages against Britain as a manufacturer of steel, and not least because
it meant that Britain had lost her superior resource position.(109)
Followed so quickly afterwards by the discovery of the Mesabi ores, which
inevitably led to a decline in U.S. demand for British steel, the British
industry was now faced with an entirely changed situation. Just as the
huge ore supplies helped to encourage innovation in the United States
industry, so now the basic process on the Continent, based upon the
phosphorus-rich ore in Lorraine and Sweden, brought about what almost
amounted to a revolution in Europe's steel industry. lot least to change
Was the plant used in the production of steel. Whilst the British in-
dustry "tinkered and imprOVised", the Continental steelmakers, "stimulated
by necessity •••• worked at the basic process with a scientific will;
they achieved and maintained a proper mix and produced a metal of good,
uniform quality". (110) As in the United States, the major Continental
producers, and notably the Germans, sought after the large plant,
from the smelting stage to later stages of manufacture. German equipment,
which was formerly much smaller than that in the United Kingdom,
rapidly outpaced the latter in both size and output. Furthermore,
Annual Output of Steel Plant, Britain and Germany.
Blast Furnaces Bessemer Converters
1870
Britain 8,700
Germany 5,000
1910
30,000
49,000
1901
21,750
34,000
the Germans, as, indeed, the Americans as well, erected fully-integrated
works, i.e. the production unit consisted of blast furnaces, steel
plant and rolling mills. The very size of American and German plant
made imperative extensive mechanisation; the huge quantities of ore
and fuel for the blast furnace, the conveying of large amounts of hot
(109) In fact, inertia on the part of the personnel of the British industry,
leading to a failure fully to exploit the lorthants ore, only exacerbated
the situation.
(110) D.S. Landes, op cit, p. 263.
metal to the steel plant - both called for more than "the traditional
winch and counterweight systems or even human brawn and hand shovels".
Originally, the open-hearth process, acid or basic, had been attractive
wfor the small producer even without a blst furnace or two on site, and,
J.
in fact, this remained very much the case in the United Kingdom.(111)
The Americans, followed by the Germans, changed this with the introduction
of their giant, tiltable furnaces of 100 to '00 tons capacity; mechan-
ical means of charging such furnaces were a must and S.T. Wellman came
up with the electrically-driven charging machine. By the early 1900's,
when the open-hearth furnaces in the United states were still of the 40
to 50-ton variety, Enoch James remarked that that Americans were able
to get "14, 15 and 16 heats" from their furnaces "with less physical
exertion on the part of the workmen engaged than would be necessary
in England for half the number of casts".(112) Characteristically, the
British industry hesitated over the Wellman machine. It was generally
recognised that "human brawn" would have to be replaoed by ~ohinery,
but there was too much suspicion of electricity amongst British steel-
makers:
" ••• the one thing he should hesitate about was the application ot
electricity ••• he did not think that this country had yet got such
a strong confidence in the use ot electrical apparatus in steelworks
as that they might venture readily ••• to spend the large sums of
money necessary for the installation, not of one machine, but, in
large works, of two, three or four of those machines".(11')
(111) D. Burn, op cit, pp 2'8 - 40.
(112) BITe report, 1902, p. 528.
(11') J. Riley, J.I.S.I., 1897, p. 104.
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Over the next few years, a few steelworks in the United Kingdom overcame
both their conservatism and their site problems(114) and installed
charging machines. Bolckow Vaughan, Cargo Fleet, Palmer's and Sheepbridge
installed one or two charging machines each, whilst the Parkgate Works,
Yorkshire, actually installed a Wellman machine. The Cleveland firms
had generally opted for a Tomkins machine for the charging of their
furnaces.
Against the background of tremendous change and growth abroad, the
Black Countr,y established a steel industr,y on a firmer footing than
hi therto. Reference has already been made to the experiments in basic
steel production carried out by Alfred Hickman and his decision to go
into steel production with the setting up of the Staffordshire Steel
and Ingn:Ingot Company in 188'. Although small and fairly traditional
in conoept, the lay-out of Hickman's Bessemer plant was ver,y sound.
Three Bessemer oonverters of five tons capacity were arranged in a row
at 25 feet centres and 15 feet above ground level (the so-called "Amerioan"
or "Holley's" floor plan). Each converter vas fitted with an hydraulic
lift to enable the worn-out vessels to be replaced by relined ones;
besides, Hickman had provided sufficient blowing power to deal with
two casts at any one time - there were two pairs of blowing engines to
give an air blast of 15 lbs. per square inch. Cold or molten metal could
be used in the works, the former being melted in three large cupolas
from which it was tapped out into a travelling ladle which was raised
by a 20 ton hydraulio lift to the Bessemer platform. The blown metal
was cast into ingot moulds contained in a casting pit from which the
ingots were removed by five cranes. To overcome the variable silicon
content of the pig iron used at Spring Vale, Hickman introduced a two-
s~age process of working typical of duplexing processes used in later
(114) E.W. Richards aUitted in 1897, when talking of the Wellman charg-
ing machine, that he sometimes wished that he "could pull down the whole
&
works at BolCkow_s and start afresh"; he envied the spaoe which the
Americans had at their works(J.I.S.I., 1897, p. 106)
'IJ. .
years.(115) His work was, in fact, contemporary (but separate) with that
of Professor F. Kupelwieser at the HOllerich Works in Luxembourg.
In 1887, Hickman deCided to introduce the open-hearth steel process
to the Black Country for the making of basic steel. A little surprisingly,
he chose a Batho furnace, a modification of the Siemens furnace with
the regenerators for preheating the air and gas placed outside the
furnace and quite separate from it. By keeping the furnace and regener-
ators apart it was hoped that the furnace would cost less to erect since
little or no excavation was needed. Darby, at the Brymbo Works, had
taken a great interest in the Batho furnace, but, in fact, it was not
generally used by steelmakers and Hickman replaced his later in the
century. Hickman's decision to install open-hearth furnacell~was no doubt
taken because of the advantages which that process had over the Bessemer
converter, especially the cost-factor where comparatively small makes
were concerned. (116) Furthermore, the use of scrap in the charges meant
that both phosphorus and silicon could be diluted down as necessary,
the latter without the need for further desiliconising treatment.
D. Burn has suggested that the "bigger malleable ironmakers, where
thei~ puddling business was threatened, could with little expense turn
to the new business (open-hearth steel production), utilise their old
rolling plant, and market steel with :the goodwill established in the
iron business".(117) This, clearly, was what happened at the Barl of
Dudley's Round Oak Works in 1890; by the end of that year, one Siemens-
Martin furnace (capacity ',000 tons per year) was in operation. Three
years later there were three 17-ton open-hearth furnaces at Round 0ak.(118)
(115) lor a fuller technical account, see G.R. Morton and M. Le Guillou,
loc cit, pp. 14 - 16.
(116) D. Burn, op cit, p. 239. AlsO, Views of La Ieve POster, Proc. S.
Staffs., 1898-99, pp. '9-40 and 1901-2, p. 101.
(117) D. Burn, op cit, p. 239.
(118) Prac. s. Staffs.,189Q-91, pp. 22-26, paper read by R. Smith Casson.
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In Alexander Smith's valuation of the 'Round Oak Steel Works' in 1897
he listed the existence of five twenty-ton basio' open-hearth steel
furnaces. His descri ption of them was as follows:
"••• w. 1. Framing Cast Iron doors & Frames Vhi te Brickwork.
Regenerators underneath, mushroom reversing Valves and J'lues
W. I. Stack 100 ft x 5' 10" dia Cast Iron bottom and brick base"(119)
There was no mechanical charging of the open-hearth furnaces but a "Hand
Railway", supported on "Girders and Cast Iron Columns", ran to and from
a "Tapping Platform". 'Phe casting pit had "massive brickwork and Cast
Iron ~aps with Steel Rails". Casting ladles mounted on trolleys were
also in use, together with a "Loco Ingot Crane!.!.' of 12 tons capacity and
two more of five and three tons respectively.
The third of the larger steel works in South staffordshire, 'Patent
Shaft', was, through the acquisition of the Old Park Works, the oldest
steel producer (by either of the new methods ~f production) in the
district. However, the acid Bessemer plant had been allowed to fall
into disuse and, following some difficulties in the 1890's, a decision
had been taken to concentrate steel production at the Brunswick Works.
'!'wo comparatively large open-hearth furnaces (basic-lined Siemens variety)
were put down, one of 4~tons and the other ot ,~tons capacity. (120)
The steel department of the Black Countr,y iron and steel trade was,
indeed, an area of considerable growth in the years after 1900, and
this is reflected in the amount of improvements to steel plant which
were undertaken, especiall,. at Round Oak and Spring Vale. In 1904, the
steel plant at Round Oak vas "thoroughl,. modernised"(121), the Bertrand-
!hiel process vas installed, an American charging machine erected and a
(119) The entr,y is as it is written in the valuation.
(120) Documents in possession of the present company, 1969.
(121) Colliery Guardian, 2'/9/04.
metal mixer brought into use capable of containing 200 tons of molten
iron.(122) At Spring Vale, similar attention was being given towards
the reduction of production costs; experiments were continued for a
number of years - 1905 - 1909 - to bring the molten iron 'direct' from
the blast furnaces to both the basic Bessemer converters and the Siemens
furnaces. It would appear that Hickman could not improve upon the "hot
metal mixer" method:
"Practically all iron is taken molten from the Blast Furnaces to the
Mixers, one small 150 tons capacity and one of 500 tons. These are
both active, being fired with Producer Gas, and considerable work
is done in them". (123)
Whilst continuing with their three 12-ton converters, the Spring Vale
works, in 1911, began a new building programme of larger open-hearth
furnaces for the production of mild steel.(124) The first furnace to be
erected was one of 40-tons capacity, and this was joined a few years
later by one of 150-tons capacity. In 1911, Spring Vale was producing
3,500 tons of steel weekly, whilst Round Oak (8 furnacel!l~ and Patent
Shaft and bletree Company (10 furnaces) were producing 1,500 and 1,500
to 2,000 tons respectively.(125) As preViously mentioned, the Veldless
Steel Tube Company of Birmingham. also began open-hearth steel production
in 1911 - 12.(126)
(122) Bertrand and Thiel, at IUadno in Austria-Hungary, had used two
steel refining furnaces, the charge being partially refined in the first
and then tapped into the second for finishing. Only Round Oak and the
Brymbo works gave the process a real try-out in the United Kingdom,
al though it was a process sillilar to that earlier tried at Spring Tale.
(123) Report by C.G. Atha on Alfred Hickman Limited, 16/4/1 920.
(124) CollierY Guardian, 22/11/11.
(125) Ibid.
(126) Colliery Guardian, 3/11/11.
Rolling and Sheet Mill Equipment.
Developnents in mill practice after 1870 were very greatly influenced
by the change-over from iron to steel, with the earlier initiatives
being almost wholly associated with the rolling of steel rails. The
Black Country was not involved in these developments, although it is
clear that representatives of the local iron trade were aware, if not
completely in favour of, the changes being brought about. Two countries
stood out in being 'pioneers' in mill innovations - the United States
and Belgium. (127) Almost inevitably, the American industry had gone after
the 'large make' machinery and equipment. Whilst the United Kingdom
industry, especially Menelaus at Dowlais, had achieved much greater
production with the reversing mill, the Americans opted for the three-
high rolling mill.(128) This method speeded up production, and was
particularly sui ted for the American market conditions. ( 129) As Lowthian
(127) The United Kingdom's participation in this field must not be
underestimated. The three-high mill, the 'Universal' mill and the contin-
uous mill all had their supporters in this country, despite the~fact that
the structure of the industry and market conditions might not have been
as favourable as in the United States or on the Continent. See D. Burn,
op cit, pp. 58 - 61 and 192 - 198.
(128) The use of a third roller placed above the top roller of the first
pair was not a new indea; it was employed by John Wilkinson (Gale, op cit,
pp. 5' -4) and Thomas Butler, the noted Yorkshire ironmaster, had observed
in 1815 that the plates passed through "three grooved rollers fixed
upon each other" at the 'Bilston lew Kill' of the Gibbons' brothers.
However, John Fritz at Pittsburgh had introduced the three-high mill
principle in 1857 for a 'continuous' process of rolling. This was only
possible because of the efficiency of the steam engines then in use •
(129) D. Burn, op cit, p.58.
Bell saw on his visit to the United States in 1874, best mill practice
meant that ingots were "reduced to the size first for the finishing
mill, without a man ever touching them".(130) One man operating a "small
double cylinder engine" sets the rollers in motion; another, "by means
of hydraulic pressure", manipulates the "feeding tables" and traversing
frames along which the ingots can pass backwards and forwards.
The Belgians, in the 1870's, originally favoured the British-type
reversing mill, and before going over to the three-high mill they achieved
a break-through with the "rolling in one heat" process. (131) lfot sur-
prisingly, in view of the growing Belgian competition with the Black
Country industr,y, representatives of the latter gave a good deal of
attention to developments in Belgian mill practice. In 1870, for example,
a group from the local Institute of Mining Engineers had visited Belgium
and had been much impressed by the "bold engineering enterprises, yet
rigid economy" of the Belgian fims (notably Cockerill's of Seraing). (132)
The Be19ian industr,y' s adoption of the Universal mill - the s1multaneous
use of both vertical and horizontal rollers - vas admired by Valter·
Williams (133) and Lowthian Bell who, nevertheless, both took pains to
emphasise that it was a )Ir. Arrowsmith of Bilston who had invented that
type of mill. Generally, United Kingdom opinion was not favourably dis-
posed towards the Universal mill; it produced materials of poor quality,
an aspect ot the Belgian industr,y that Black Countr,y spokesmen seemed
at pains to empnasise.(1'4)
Throughout the 1880's and 90's, developments in best rolling mill
practice continued in the United states, on the Continent and in the
(1'0) J. 1.S. I ., 1875, p. 127.
(131) J.I.S.I., ii, 1877, p. 149.
(132) I.C.T.R., 6/7/70.
(1") H.H. Creed and W. Williams, Handicraftsmen and Capitalists, 1867,
(reprinted from The Times), p. 63.
(134) See views of W. Farnnorth, manager of E.P & WBaldwin J I S I
. , . . . .,
1875, pp. 247 - 51.
-United Kingdom. American practice was characterised, typically, by the
large scale of its operations. Economy of production was achieved through
the elimination of hand labour, although this entailed heavy capital
expenditure on complicated machinery. Commenting in 1890 on the large
makes of the "great mills of the country", Bell wrote:
"These results are largely contributed to by thecomplete and ingen-
ious appliances for handling the bar, by rolling off in one heat,
by rolling the bar in several instead of one pair of rolls in order
to have a number under treatment at the same time, by using multiple
saws for cutting up the bar, by the use of cambering machines to
facili tate straightening, and by speed of machinery". (135)
Bell was most impressed with American rolling mill practice, although
he was a little concerned over the amount of machinery in use in some
of the mills. Maintenance costs could be high and, indeed, there had
been a great need for engineering skills of the highest order to manu-
facture the machinery in the first place. Morgan's adaption of Bedson's
"continuous mill" (originally for wire-rod rolling) for the manufacture
of steel rods, bars, strip and billets is a good illustration of this
point. The Americans spared no expenee to ensure that their large mills
were constantly at work(136); any stoppage in that department would mean
that the Bessemer shop would also have to stop "for cold steel is not
acceptable, nor could it be dealt with under existing conditions without
dislocating all the subsequent stages of the manufacture".(137) The 1895
BlrA report on conditions in Germany and Belgium brought home to the
Black Country ironmasters many of the excellent rolling mill practices
in those two countries. Steel products, of the highest quality, were
(135) J.I.S.I., 1890, Special Volume, pp. 281 et seq.
(1'6) BITC Report, 1902, p. 548.
(1'7) Ibid, p. 551.
rolled in both countries. It would appear, however, that neither of
these two countries quite matched the progress being made in the United
states, progress, in fact, which continued right up to the First World
War. (138)
Rolling mills in the Black Country had, of course, produced a wide
variety of articles throughout the nineteenth century and, in their own
way, had proved to be highly efficient. However, in the period which
saw the decline of wrought iron and the growing supremacy of steel, the
rolling mill department of the Black Country tended to stagnate. Ex-
ceptions to this general trend once again were to be found amongst the
steelmakers and among one or two of the larger producers in the finishing
trades. The key-point with the steel works, and especially Alfred Hickman's
Spring Vale plant, was that they were experiencing a period of growth
which warranted the installation of new rolling mills. At the time when
Hickman first engaged in the production of steel he adapted his existing
mills to the new material and only a small amount of new equipment was
used. Even then it was efficiently and economically operated. Ingots were
removed from the casting pit by five cranes; they were then reduced to
blooms in a cogging mill and the billets were then re-rolled in a
finishing mill with two stands of rolls driven by a pair of horizontal
engines. At Round Oak, in the early 1890's a new rolling mill and an-
cillary equipment was installed to deal with the basic open-hearth steel.
It included a 3Q-inch cogging mill, with attendant live-roller gear,
vertical engines, inverted cylinder engines, together with a "massive
set" of hot shears, and a 28-inch bar mill with, in addition to IDa terial
similar to that above, a 25-ton overhead steam-travelling crane and an
hydraulic jib crane.(139)
(138) J.C. Carr and W. Taplin, op cit, pp. 222 - 227.
(139) Alexander Smith's Valuation of 1897.
Two developments outside of those taking place at the main steel works
occurred in the 1890's. The first concerned the ill-fated New British
Iron Company at Cradley Heath. In the year before it failed, the company
possessed at least eight different mills, including an 8-inch guide
mill, an 8-inch hoop mill, a 1Q-inch merchant bar mill, a 12-inch merchant
bar mill, a 20-inch sheet mill, a 16-inch bar mill and a 15-inch strip
and slitting mill. The New British Iron Company was, in fact, in the
process of changing completely over to steel and, as part of a programme
of plant installation, Jeremiah Head was commissioned to design a new
cogging and shearing plant capable of dealing with ingots weighing about
20 cwt. each and measuring not more than 15 inches square at the thick
end. It would be designed to roll these down to 6 x 2 inches.(140) Head's
cogging mill was in the course of installation when the company crashed
and it was eventually offered for sale in its unfinished condition. (141 )
The second development took place at the Osier Bed Works of John Lysaghts
in the period 1894 - 95. Like the New British Iron Company, Lysaghts
decided to install a new mill (sheet mill in this case) expressly for
the purpose of working steel. The Collie;r ~uardian described the mill
as one of "the finest steel rolling works known" and saw it "as an
important step in the displacement of iron for steel for galvanising
purposes".(142) Following the great amount of discussion whioh was held
over the BITA report on ~rmany and Belgium, and especially the suggestion
that the "English (were) being beaten by their Continental competitors"
because of better maohinery (amongst other things) Thomas Morris wrote
to the secretary of the South Staffordshire Institute to deny this:
"Is there a plant throU8llout the whole of the Continent that can
compare for efficiency with the new sheet-rolling mills at the Osier
(140) Colliery Guardian, 313/93.
(141) W.K.V. Gale, The Black Country Iron Indust~, p. 118.
(142) Colliery Guardian, 19/10/94.
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Bed Works, Wolverhampton? Are there any sheet-mills either in Germany,
or in Belgium, doing more work, per pair of hard rolls, than is being
done in some of the despised, tumble-down sheet mills in certain
parts of South Staffordshire?"(143)
Late in 1906, Sir Alfred Hickman Limited took a deoision to install
a large new merchant steel mill specially designed for the production
of half-product bars and billets.(144) Installation of the equipment
was carried out towards the end of the following year and beginning of
1908. Described as "one of the most important in England", Hickman's
was the first English-designed electric reversing (30-inch) cogging and
(24-inch) bar mill. The cost of the mill was put at £100,000 and would
have an estimated output of 1,500 to 1,600 tons per week. With nearly
all the Staffordshire ironmasters of "much importance" rolling down
half-product steel into sheets, hoops, strip, etc., Hickman's new mill
was assured of success. In fact, not long before his death in March 1910,
Sir Alfred Hickman had made known his intentions to lay down new machinery
for the rolling of plates and other descriptions of steel.(145) Almost
simultaneously, Round Oak was announcing plans to increase production
(143) Proc. S. Staffs, xi, 1895-6, p. 125.
(144) For a stage-by-stage account of the installation of this new mill,
together with its effects on the Black Country steel scene, see the
Colliery Guardian, 9/8/07, 8/11/07, 11/12/08, and 29/1/09.
(145) Ibid, 16/7/09. Atha's description of the rolling mill equipment at
Spring Vale in 1920 was not very favourable:
"(it) consists of three Cogging Mills, each about 35". I cannot quite
understand why they should have three as I should think one - a com-
paratively new Mill, electrically driven - could easily be made to do
the work of all three and effect a considerable saving".
levertheless, he thought that the site was ideal for the installation of
a continuous strip mill.
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by providing "up to-date rolling plant". (146) Furthermore, even amongst
firms engaged solely in re-rolling steel there was "a certain amount of
modernisation and here and there equipment of quite advanced design for
the period was introduced".(147) The Bromford Iron Company, of West
Bromwich, for example, introduced in 1909 the first continuous strip
mill in the Black Country - a straight-line 6-stand continuous mill
driven by a steam engine of 1,100 h.p•• (148)
(146) Colliery Guardian, 10/9/09.
(147) W.K.V. Gale, The Black Count~ Iron Indust~, p. 120. In any case,
it was found that rolling mill equipment originally designed for iron
resulted in a lower level of production when steel was used.
(148) The Engineer, 5/11/09.
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Chapter 3 • The Supply of Raw Materials.
"Nature", wrote Elihu Burritt in 1868, "did all she could for the
ironmasters of the Black Country; indeed, everything except literally
building the furnaces themselves". (1 ) It was, indeed, the case that
the district in the first 40 years of the nineteenth century possessed
abundant supplies of those raw materials necessary for the making of
iron. Coal and ironstone were available and the stratification was
such that very often both minerals could be obtained from the same
shaft. Fireclay v~s also available, together 1'dth limestone and re-
fractory sand. The very abundance of some of these materials, together
with their high quality and easy accessibility, proved, to some extent,
the undoing of the district. Within the Black Country, there grew up
an industry ~~ich adopted wasteful practices, which tended to seek
after perfection of the finished product, but which failed to develop
a resourcefulness and a willingness (or ability) to adapt to changing
circumstances.
Iron Ore Supplies.
On the occasion of the 1865 meeting of the British Association in
Birmingham, a number of local people contributed to an account of the
Birmingham and Midland Hardware District o Samuel Bailey wrote about
"The Economic Value of Various Measures of Coal and Ironstone in the
South Staffordshire Coalfield"(2), and his account of this subject
has formed the basis of all future contributions.(3) Bailey divided
(1) E. Burritt, Walks in the Black Count~ and its Green Borderland,
1868, p. 3. ,
t
(2) Ed. S. Timmins, Birmingham and the Midland Hardware District, 1866,
pp. 27 et seq.
(3) Bailey himself relied heaVily on the work of J.B. Jukes, The South
Staffordshire Coalfield, in Memoirs of the Geological Survey of Great
Britain, second edition, 1859.
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the Black Country into five districts, in four of which ironstone measures
- some of them extremely rich in ore - were worked. The southernmost
district, lying southward of a line drawn from West Bromwich on the
eastern side of the coalfield, through Tipton and Deepfields, to the
western fault near Sedg.ley, contained both Gubbin Ironstone (46.30%
iron content) and White Ironstone. Whilst the yield of ironstone was
not large, when compared with later finds elsewhere in Britain and the
world, it did average out at about 1,300 tons per acre per seam. It
was 'computed' (4) that the ironstone raised in Lord'Dudley's estate
alone "totalled 200,000 tons per year". The next district, lying to the
north of the first, extended by a line from West Bromwich Old Church
through Wednesbury, Darlaston to the north of Bilston as far as the
west fault, a little to the south of Wolverhampton. It contained
Gubbin, New Mine, Fire Clay Balls, Poor Robin(s) and White Ironstone,
Gubbin and Balls, and Blue Flats. The Gubbin and Balls (49.30% iron
content) was the most important in this district, and was found mainly
near Darlaston. The third distric~, lying immediately to the north of
the second, extended to a line drawn from Rushall through Bloxwich
into the western fault at Heath Town, and included Walsall, Bentley
and Willenhall. Here were to be found the following ironstones - Brown,
New Mine, Poor Robin(s), Gubbin, Blue Flats, Silver Threads and Diamonds.
The Blue Flats (42.34% iron content) was probably the most important.
The remaining district to possess ironstone, and the least worked in
1860, ran from a line extending from Goscote or Rushall, into the
western fault, near Cannock. Here were to be found Black Gubbin and
Brown ironstones.
In addition to the names of local ironstones already given - all of
which were argillaceous ores - there were Brooch Binds,~ or Penny-
earth and Pennystone. The measures of ironstone were very varied.
(4) CollierY Guardian, 27/1 0/99.
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Brooch Binds occurred immediately beneath the Brooch coal, but they
contained ironstone only to the south-west of Dudley. The~ and
Pennyearth ironstones underlay the Herring Coal, whilst the Gubbin
came in below that Thick or Ten-Yard Coal and was the most widely
diffused and richest ironstone beds of the district. The New Mine or
White ironstone was deposited under the Heathen Coal. It was a light-
coloured stone, and occurred in large modules in a bed of clay, or
clunch (soft white limestone), and also in continuous bands. ~­
stone was a partial band underlying the New Mine. Fire Clay Balls
occurred in large masses coated with argillaceous matter, whilst the
Poor Robin(s) stone was suitably named. Gubbin and Balls ironstone
was found under the Bottom Coal and the Blue Flats under the Singing Coal.
The Brown Stone, found chiefly in the Bloxwich area, was "condemned as
a poor worthless ore" for much of the first half of the century. (5 )
When Samuel Bailey wrote his account of the ironstones of the South
Staffordshire district, many of the listed varieties were already no
longer available to the ironmaster. Either the beds had been exhausted,
or they were simply too costly to extract (and in some cases too danger-
ous). Two points were ver,y clear in the early 1860's. Firstly, gone
were the days when the local Black Countr,y blast furnace proprietor
could afford to pay "20/- and 24/- per ton for ironstone" .(6) The
Scottish industr,y, based upon Neilson's hot blast, the blackband ironstone
and the Lanarkshire s plint coal (used raw in the blast furnace), had
appeared as a formidable rival to the Black Country. Once the main bed
of lias ironstone had been discovered at Eston, near Middlesbrough,
in 1850, there occurred the phenomenal growth of the Cleve-
(5) J.1.s.r., 1871, p. 20.
(6) S. Bailey, Steam Power •••• in the Coal and Ironstone Mines of South
Staffordshire, Paper read before the Birmingham Meeting, the North of
England Institute of Mining Engineers, x, 1862, p. 29.
land district. Secondly, the South Staffordshire iron industry was con-
suming over 1,SOO,000 tons of iron are each year, whereas, according
to the estimated totals of R. Hunt, the district was producing only
about 950,000 tons of ore.
The shortage of local ironstone first gave cause for concern in the
1S40's(7). The Quarterly Meetings of the iron trade in Birmingham pro-
vided the opportunities for the ironmasters to voice their misgivings.
It was clear that the shortage of ironstone had hit the south-western
side of the district first - the diViding line being the Rowley Regis -
Dudley Castle range of hills - and in the early 1S40's, the Gibbons'
were familiar with the problem of maintaining supplies of ore to their
blast furnaces at Corbyn's Hall and Shut End. Ore was being 'imported'
from the Wolverhampton and Tipton districts, and there is evidence to
suggest that they were seeking mineral rights to lands well to the north-
east of Wolverhampton in thevr search for local ironstone.(S). Gibbons'
neighbours, at the Ketley Furnaces, had gone much further afield and
were obtaining are from the Furness Peninsula (through Ellesmere Port),
from Froghall in North Staffordshire and from the "Bedworth Balls"
seam of Warwickshire. (9) As time went on, the situation pertaining
to local ore supplies steadily deteriorated. S.H. Blackwell, ironmaster
of Russell's Hall, Dudley, frequently spoke and wrote on this aspect
of the Black Country iron trade. "There are upwards of 20 mills or forges
now standing in South Staffordshire", he wrote in June 1861, "which in
all probability will never again go to work, and that the suspension
of these works has not arisen in any case from want of capital or
(7) H. Scrivenor, History of the Iron Trade, 1854, p. 299.
(S) Gibbons' Deeds Boxes, William Salt Library & C.J.O., Stafford.
(9) O.W.W.R. Committee Evidence, 1845, especially of Benjamin Best and
Richard Smith.
reckless trading, but from the utter inability of obtaining cheap supplies
of minerals ••• "(10) As Blackwell himself well knew, this was not strictly
true. Ore could be obtained cheaply by this date from Northamptonshire
but, as will be shown shortly, the scientific/technical knOWledge of the
average Black Country blast furnace proprietor was not sufficient for
him to use the are Trith any degree of confidence. Local ore, i.e. ore
mined within the confines of the Black Country itself, had become too
expensive and too costly to mine. Even where the ore was mined and con-
sumed in the blast furnaces owned by the same firm, there was evidence
to suggest that royal ties were too high or that" the dead charges (were)
too great per ton on the small quantity raised, and that nearly two tons
ought to be raised for the sum which one ton now costs". (11) By 1871,
whole areas of the Black Country were exhausted, including the once
important parts of Priestfields, Bilston, Willenhall, Darlaston and
Wednesbury.(12) Others, like Bloxwich, were "nearly exhausted". George
Addenbrooke and T. Parkin investigated the situation in that year and
reported their findings to the Iron and Steel Institute:
"The present producer of ironstones ••• cannot supply more than
half the demand required to keep the furnaces going in the said
district" .(13)
Even the poorest ores of the district, once ignored by the smelters,
were estimated to last for only another ten years. In fact, exactly
ten years later, Mr. Sparrow, owner of the Millfield Furnaces (and
(10) Midland Counties Herald, June 1861, quoted by S. Bailey, loc cit,
p. 27.
(11) S. Bailey, loc cit, p. 25.
(12) J.I.S.I., 1871, p. 20 et seq.
(13) Ibid, p. 22.
others), claimed that the mines of South Staffordshire were "not ex-
hausted and Harked out, but drowned out"o(14) The Earl of Dudley's
works were said, at this time, to be the only ones in the district still
making pig iron from native ores. Certainly by the last few years of
the century, the amount of ore produced locally had dried to a trickle:
Production of Ironstone in South Staffordshire.
Ore I895 1896
Produced under Coal Mines Tons
Act 31,205 30,096
Produced from quarries
under Quarries Act 2,290 2,086
Total 33,495 32,182
Price per ton in South Staffs. 10/- 9/6
Average U.K. price 3/7
In addition to the ores mined in South Staffordshire, John Gibbons
had shown in the 1830's that the "refuse of the puddling furnaces"
could be used to make a cheap pig iron.(15) However, not all the Black
Country blast furnace proprietors could match Gibbons' knowledge of
blast furnace practice and for a great number of years cinder pig was
regarded with some suspicion and then distrust. Consequently, the
tap cinder remained unwanted and therefore extremely oheap to purohase.
Alfred Hickman made full use of it in the 1870's, produoing a satis-
factory oommon pig iron, made from a mixture of "Pottery, Northampton
and taps". However, the whole situation ohanged quickly in the early
90's, when the basio steel producers realised the suitabilit,y of tap
(14) Select Committe on Railways, 1881, M.E. 14385. Alfred Hickman told
the Committee: " ••• the stone of the district has been worked out to a
very great extent; and, moreover, the operation of the Mines Regulation
Act, the limitations as regards young persons, and the hours of working,
has been to increase the cost of getting the ironstone of the district
(which is very thin) in which boys' labour could be used very advantag-
eously••• " M.E. 4567.
(15) W.A. Smith,"The Contribution of the Gibbons Family to Technical
Development ...", West Midland Studies, 4, 1970/1, p. 51.
cinder. From being 3d. per ton, or "the cost of carriage", tap cinder
rose to "2/6 and cost of carriage" in May 1893; a further rise to 4/-
a ton then occurred. The Birmingham correspondent of the Colliery
Guardian wrote:
"The new aspect of affarrs is very welcome to the trade, and no one
will grudge the ironmasters their good fortune in this matter, for
they have fallen upon evil times, and if the sale of tap cinder does
not augment their PFofits, it may, at any rate, diminish their
losses for the time-being". (16)
However, there were also disadvantages for the district in the rise in
the price of tap cinder. With cinder pig selling at only 37/6 to 38/-
per ton in the early months of 1894, blast furnace owners could not
afford to pay 4/- a ton for the tap cinder.(17) Nevertheless, tap cinder
did remain as a very important raw material for the local steelworks.
By the late 1850's, some 100,000 tons of high-grade ore were coming
to the Black Country ironmasters from the Furness area. Because of
high freight rates, the cost was high, and the ore was used only in
the making of better grades of pig iron. Upwards of half the Brown
Hematite (the so-called hydrate of iron) mined in the true coal-measures
in the neighbourhood of Cheadle, North Staffordshire, was sent into
the Black Country. (18) The North Staffordshire ore was "highly esteemed
in South Staffordshire for making special classes of pig iron". (19)
(16) COlliwry Guardian, 12/5/93.
(17) In fact, in the boom in pig iron prices of a few years later, the
price of cinder pig more than doubled, and the price of tap cinder
reached 10/- a ton for a short time.
(18) J. Jones, loc it,. p. 63.
(19) Ure's Dictionary of Arts, Manufactures and Mines, 1878, edited by
R. Hunt, vol 2, p. 923.
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Alfred Hickman, for example, made a very successful Hydrate Iron from
a mixture containing hydrate ore from the Churnett Valley. It has been
suggested that 213,500 tons of North Staffordshire ore came into the
Black Country in 1854 (20), but if this figure is correct, there was a
decline in the total tonnage after that date. According to Jones, 180,000
tons came in in 1865. By the early 1880's, when Hickman was obtaining
his ore from the Froghall and Chatterley districts he was haVing to pay
10/- and 6/6 respectively per ton at the mine.(21) With the cost of
carriage on top of this (3/6 to 5/- without wagons), he was hard pushed
to compete with the price of Chatterley pig iron at 42/6.
It was with regard to Northamptonshire ore that the real test for the
Black Country pig iron trade was to be presented. In 1843, S.H. Blackwell
first had his attention given to the existence of ore in Northampton-
shire, and he exhibited some of the ore with the rest of his collection
of British ironstones at the 1851 Great Exhibition. Then, in January
1852, representatives of the Black Country industry made the journey
to Northamptonshire to examine the ore in situ (22); the ore was hailed
by the Press as "the salvation of that area". In that year and the next,
large quantities of the ore were sent into South Staffordshire:
"But the Staffordshire people did not take kindly to the new ore.
Their conservatism, and their lack of scientific knowledge of ores
and of the processes of smelting anything but the local claybands,
(20) K. Warren, op cit, p. 18.
(21) Select Committee on Railways, 1881, M.E. 4695.
(22) Mining Journal, 17/1/52. Also S.H. Beaver, The Geography of the
Iron Industry of lorthants, Rutland and South Lincolnshire, 1931, un-
published thesis of the University of London, p. 58.
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conspired to make them belittle the Northants are, which they
slightingly referred to as "rhubarb" (oHing to its easy fusibili ty)
and as "monkey dirt"".(23)
Undoubtedly, the Northants are was difficult to use in the average
Black country blast f'urnace by ironmasters accustomed to working wi th
J..
the more homogenous clayband ores. The Northants are was porous and
t,
friable and a lower temperature and smaller blast were sufficient to
effect its reduction than were necessary in the case of the denser clay-
band are. For example, when a mixture of the oolitic and clayband ores
was used in the Black Country furnace, the former ore was melted by
the great heat "before the reduction by the rising gases had had time
to be properly completed"; as a result, "perhaps 10 or 20 per cent of the
iron was run off in the slag, whilst a part of the gangue remained
in the iron, rendering it weak and brittle". (24) In addition, the North-
ants are was subject to great variation, as regards the proportion
of iron, lime and ailica which it contained; there were two distinct
chemical types of are, carbonate (which really requires calcining be-
fore use) and hydrated peroxide. It has also been suggested that the
Black Country ironmaster would have been disconcerted by "the amount
of soil and rubbish with which the early surface-worked ore must have
been accompanied". (25)
Undoubtedly, the Black Country ironmaster was conservative and pre-
judiced; more important in the case of Northants are, however, was
his ignorance of science. John Gibbons had shown that detailed attention
given to a system of material and quality control would payoff in the
(23) S.H. Beaver, loc cit, p, 58.
(24) Mining Jowmal, 10/9/55 and 10/11/55.
(25) S.H. Beaver, loc cit, p. 60.
case of the use of tap cinder in the blast furnace burden, but few
local ironmasters had been prepared to learn from his example. No
'analytical chemistry' was practised by the Black Country ironmasters,
although it was llsed in the Cleveland district at this time. Without
wanting to be harsh on the S0uth Staffordshire iron industry, it cert-
ainly missed a good opportunity in the 1850'0 and 1860's by failing to
make full use of the close proximity of the Northamptonshire ore. Peter
Temin(26) rejects the idea that a more thorough exploitation of the
Lincolnshire and Northamptonshire ore fields in the 1890's and 1900's
would have helped the British i.ron and steel i.ndustry to liard off the
competi tion of the Continent, but the significance for the Black C")Wltry
iron trade would have been enormous if the ironmasters cou Id have
possessed those qualities necessary for the full exploitation of the ores
at this earlier date. In one sense, the iron industry of the United
Kingdom in the 1850's and 1860's was at the point of large-scale change
in location. The Cleveland district occupied a near perfect situation;
as well as its own local ore and coal supplies, it was admirably located
to receive are from overseas, especially from Spain. The Black Country
was in exactly the reverse situation; overseas supplies of are could
offer no hope for the future of the iron trade there. To remain in the
front line of iron producing areas, the Black Country industry had to
seize upon every opportunity which presented itself.
The poor state of the South Staffordshire iron trade in 1854 was
blamed for the most part on the low quality of the iron produced from
the Northants ore.(27) Although the ore could be bought cheaply enough
a number of ironmasters chose not to use it for fear of having their
customers go elsewhere - even a small proportion of Northants ore waS
(26) P. Temin, The Relative Decline of the British Steel Indust~,
1880-191"I9'~' pp. 152-3
(27) Mining Journal,25/8/55.
sufficient to "totally condemn the iron by the finished iron manufact-
urers" • (28) Again, Gibbons had found the same a tti tude on the part of the
puddlers towards his cinder pig; again, too, he had overcome any diffi-
culties when using cinder pig by giving his personal attention to the
weighing of the pigs in relation to the amount of fuel used in the
puddling furnace. Unfortunately, this degree of production management
generally was not found throu,dlout the ranks of Black Country ironmasters.
By the end of the 1850's, Northants ore was obviously being used by a
number of smelters in the South Staffordshire district as an admixture
with claybands. The prejudice and lack of scientific knowledge obviously
remained, and not all ironmasters were open about their use of the ore.
One writer informed the readers of the Mining Journal:
"I have seen contracts wher-e the ironmaster has been prohibited
using it in any shape".(29)
Ten years later, despite the fact that now thousands of tons of the
oolitic are were being consumed in the district this attitude remained:
" ••• the use of a small proportion of this ore with Staffordshire
claybands in smelting was, and in many cases is now, sufficient to
suspend orders". (30)
Despite the fact that there was a decided South Staffordshire prefer-
ence for Northants pig iron rather than the ore after the early 1860's,
it is clear that by 1880 the former district was relying heavily on
Northants ore to remain as a producer of pig iron. According to Alfred
Hickman, ten out of every eleven pounds of iron ore used in the district
were brought in from outside; (31 ) his railway opponents before the same
(28) Mining Journal, 12/6/69.
(29) Mining Journal, 23/7/59.
(30) Mining Journal, 12/6/69.
(31) Select Committee on Railways, 1881, M.E. 4567.
Select Cownittee were adamant in their belief t}~t the Black Country
pig iron department could not have existed without, Northants ore. In
fact, the South Staffordshire industry was reproached by a member 0f the
Select Committee for failing to see that the local ores would become
exhausted, and this view, although unfair - for which iron producing
area in the lTnited Kingdom was totally self-sufficient in ore by this time
- only underlined the point made previously.
Accepting the difference in size - and the fact that the Northants are
needed the addition of manganese to render it suitable for the production
of basic pig - the main difference between the development of the
Northants ore field and that of Lorraine rested in the ownership of the
ironstone quarries. Almost every mine and blast furnace was part of a
vertically integrated system, a fact which went a long way "towards
the reduction of transport and re-heating costs, and towards the attain-
ment of a high level of economic efficiency".(32) In Northants, on the
other hand, for more than the first twenty years in the life of the
iron district there, all those quarries which were not controlled by
the local blast furnace concerns, lvere in private hands, or administered
by small ironstone companies who sold wherever they could find a market.
The South Staffordshire ironmasters, large or small, made very little
effort to acquire quarries in Northants, the exception being Samuel
Lloyd, formerly an active partner in the family firm at Old Park,
Weonesbury. Lloyd first showed interest in Northants ironstone in 1880,
but by then he had very little direct interest in the Black Country
pig iron trade. Indeed, the first of the 'outside' works to enter
Northants was the Stanton Company, which began to quarry ore in 1871.(33)
(32) S.H. Beaver, loc cit, p. 162.
(33) F. Scopes, The Development of Corby Works, Stewarts & Lloyds Ltd.,
1968, p. 5. Lloyds Ironstone Company was, of course, acquired by Alfred
Hickman Ltd. in March 1919. See G. Morton & M. La Guillou, loc cit, p. 15.
By 1910, out of a total of about 27 workings (excluding those owned
by the local smelters), only ten belonged to 'foreign' ironworks, mainly
of the old established works of north-east Derbyshire (Staveley,
Sheepbridge, Clay Cross etc.).(34)
Because of South Staffordshire's failure to accept the potential of
the Northants ore, a large part of the output was 'diverted' to Derby-
shire, Nottinghamshire and South Wales.(35) Consequently, ore supplies
to the Black Country remained suspect, and a number of Lronmaaters
were always ready to investigate finds of ironstone in other midland
counties. In the 1850's, workings of ironstone took place at Fawler,
in the Banbury district of Oxfordshire. The land was conveniently ad-
jacent to the Oxford, Worcester and Wolverhampton Railway (the Wolvercot
Junction to Evesham section had been opened in 1853); intermittent
working of these pits occurred.(36) Like the Northants ore, the Oxford-
shire ore was found near the surface, or wi th only a thin over-burden
of earth to be removed; the cost of extraction, including the loading
of the ironstone either into trucks or on to boats on the Oxford Canal,
could be as low as 1/- per ton. When Samuel ~loyd heard that iron are
(34) S.H. Beaver, lac cit, p. 163.
(35) For example, the Blisworth Mines of G.E. Bevan and Company Limited,
opened in 1863, originally sent the are in almost equal amounts to
Staffordshire (by the Grand Union Canal), Derbyshire and to South Wales
(by rail). Two years later, almost all the ironstone was going to South
Wales. (Evidence of an 1865 delivery book, quoted by E.S. Tonks, The
Ironstone Railways and Tramways of the Midlands, 1959, p. 12.)
(36) E.S. Tonks, op cit, p. 238. See also Geological Survey of Great
Britain, vol. The Liassio Ironstones, 1952, PP. 140 - 198.
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from the Adderbury area "as being used at the Parkfield Iron 'Narks in
1Nolverhampton, he showed keen interest in this and acquired the mi.ning
rights:
" • •• the Oxford Canal passed through the property offering every
facility for the loading and despatch of the ironstone as soon as
raised, and, as the canal tolls to South Staffordshire were very moder-
ate and as all the South Staffordshire furnaces were on the cunal it
made a trade possible and profitable".(37)
The problem with Lloyd's acquisition, and others in the district, was
that it was soon worked out. Exploitation on a large scale was, there-
fore, not possible.
By far the most important South Staffordshire ironmaster to develop
ironstone quarries in Oxfordshire was Sir Alfred Hickman. He acquired the
Adderbury Pits of the Adderbury Ironstone Company in 1889; these pits
had been previously worked for a few years in the 1860's and then throuRh-
out the whole of the 1880's. They were worked regularly by Hickman for
seven years or so, but only intermittently after that date. The opening
of the King's Sutton to Kingham railway line in 1887 provided an incentive
for local Oxfordshire landowners to encourage ironmasters to come and
look for ironstone on their lands. In the mid-90's, Hickman decided
to begin working the are found on the estates of' Sir William Richard
Brown of Ostrop (Astrop) House. He spent between £9,000 and £10,000
on the works(38); between the pits and the Great Western Railway's
'Astrop Siding', Hickman laid a tramway of 2-feet gauge. Having decided
that it would reduce his transport costs to Wolverhampton by up to one-
third(39), Hickman also erected five 80-feet high Conyers kilns in which
(37) "Samuel Lloyd's Reminiscenses': quoted by F. Scopes, op cit, p, 43.
(38) Colliery Guardian, 18/2/98.
(39) Collie;y Guardian, 1/12/99.
to calcine the ore:
"(the) kilns were erected alongside the standard gauge siding; the
narrow gauge tramway was carried on R wooden viaduct to the top of
the kilns where a tipper was installed so that waggons could be
emptied directly into the kilns. A mixture of are and coal was intro-
duced thus and the calcined ore afterwards loaded into standard
gauge waggons via chutes at the feet of the kilns".(40)
The Astrop Mines came into operation in 1897. Meanwhile, Hickman was
prospecting in other parts of the neighbourhood. He was reported to have
sunk several trial holes at Aston-le-Wallws, about six miles from
Banbury, but it is doubtful if he ever mined there. (41 ) The most distant
pit from the railway line which he quarried was the one at Burton
Farm, situated a little over two miles from the Great Western line.
No narrow gauge track l~S laid in this case; instead, ore was carried
by a cable line. This was partly due to the fact that Hickman did not
feel that the reserves of ore justified the expenditure on a track.
The pits were always shallow and in general the working depth was less
than the 20 feet maximum permissible to obviate compliance vri th the
Quarries Acts.(42) Contemporary observers gave a somewhat idyllic
picture of the method of mining adopted in the Banbury area:
" ••• the method of mining is somewhat peculiar. All the are lies
within a few feet of the surface, and it has simply to be dug out
and loaded into trucks which stand on a temporary siding".(43)
Besides, the Oxfordshire countryside was not to be raped as had occurred
(40) E.S. Tonks, op cit, p. 241.
(41) Colliery Guardian, 1/12/99.
(42) E.S. Tonks, op cit, p. 241.
(43) Colliery Guardian, 1/12/99.
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in South Staffordshire. It was reported that "a condition of the mineral
leases is that, as the iron ore is removed, the surface soil shall be
at once replaced, so as not to interfere 1nth utilisation of the property
for agricultural purposes more than is absolutely necessary". Mechanical
shovels were not used in the excavation of the ore; as a result, the
work was hard and the pay small - 4d. per ton for wet ore, 3td. for
dry, 20 tons per day being the average output per man; 3d. per yard
for 'baring' (removing the overburden) and ~. each for tipping wagons.
The Sydenham Pits, a small, compact system lying to the west of Kings
Sutton, completed the Oxfordshire ironstone interests of Alfred Hickman,
Limited before the First World War. The quarries were not actually
opened until March 1914, but development after that date was rapid.
Unlike the Astrop Mines, steam locomotive power was used along a narrow
gauge railway. Mechanical excavation was also tried out, but was soon
abandoned because of the amount of "rubbish" which was taken up at the
same time as the ore. When the ore had been calcined locally, it was
run directly into railway wagons for conveyance to the Spring Vale
furnaces. (44)
Charles Cochrane, proprietor of the Woodside Ironworks, Dudley, also
bought ironstone leases in Oxfordshire. The West Adderbury Pits were
purchased in 1904 from the Hook Norton Ironstone Partnership. The
Round Oak Iron and Steel Works were reportedly interested in develop-
ing quarries in the BanbUry region in 1898 and 1899 (45); in fact,
they purchased the last quarry reached on the line from Kings Sutton
(44) During the war, the company rapidly used up their Oxfordshire
ore reserves, a fact which explains why, in Karch 1919, the whole of the
share capital of Lloyds Ironstone Company, Limited was acquired by
Alfred Hickman, Limited.
(45) Colliery Guardian, 1/12/99.
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to Chipping Norton. The ore outcropped on the valley side and, after
being calcined in a kiln at the foot of the valley, was conveyed via
a cable-worked incline up to the railway line - "a unique arrangement as
far as the Midlands ironstone industry was concerned". (46) The ore
was worked from about 1900 onwards, but not without considerable diffi-
culty and several particularly lengthy stoppages. Round Oak also re-
ceived Oxfordshire ironstone from the Hook Norton Quarries, owned by
H.W. Baker and Sons. These quarries were in operation from about 1895
to the end of the First World War; ore was sent in small quantities to
Lilleshall as well. The only quarries to the north of Banbury owned by
a Black Country firm were the Burton Dassett Quarries, which were taken
over by the Willings~Orth Iron Company in the early 1900's.
In their search for Oxfordshire ironstone, the Black Country iron-
masters faced competition from their counterparts in other iron-making
districts. In 1899, for example, the Brymbo Company had acquired a large
area of land in the Banbury district on which they were reported to have
spent £13,000 on plant:
"They propose to send the iron ore, after drying it, on to Wrexham,
so as to economise freight. Two drying kilns, each 70 feet high,
have been completed, and a third is in course of erection•••• A
steam lift of sufficient power to lift the loaded trucks to the top
of the kilns and pour in the contents is being provided and will
enormously reduce the cost of labour".(47)
Undoubtedly, those Black Country ironmasters who took the initiative
and aoquired mining leases in Oxfordshire were veIl rewarded. The Spring
Vale Works, a point repeatedly made in this thesis, vas perhaps the
leading producer of iron and steel in the district after 1890.
(46) E.S. Tonks, op cit, p. 257.
(47) CollierY Guardian, 1/12/99.
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There was very little reason why more South Staffordshire ironmasters
should not have followed Hickman's lead.
Raw Materials Consumed in South Staffordshire, 1896 & 1898.
Tons
Material
Pig Iron Made
Iron Ore
Coal
Fuel Supplies.
1896
326,702
659,096
597,330
1898
332,869
738,244
711,509
Any study of the coal resources of the Black Country in the period
under review can, as in the case of iron ore, begin with the papers
presented to the Birmingham Meeting of the British Association in
1865. In the first district referred to by Samuel Bailey of Walsall,
coal was found in four different seams - Brooch, the Thick or Ten Yard
-l
Coal, Heathen and New Mine. The Tick Coal, the most famous in the whole
district, was used raw for smelting in the blast furnaces, whilst the
Heathen Coal was used for coke-making. (48) The second district also
contained Thick and Heathen seams, as well as New Mine, Fire Clay and
Bottom Coal. The New Mine and Fire Clay Coal was used raw in the blast
furnaces. The third district did not contain the most valuable seam,
but it did have the Yard Coal (used raw), together with Heathen, Four-
Feet and ~ottom. The fourth area, also without the Thick Coal seam,
had four different seams, whilst the Cannock Chase area had Yard,
Shallow and Deep Coal seams. Something like 20,000 tons was the yield
at
per acre of Thick Coal, and Bailey suggested that the height of working
the district, the coal and ironstone obtained per acre was valued at
£20,000.
Having given the barest of outlines, as presented by Samuel Bailey,
it is necessary to look a little deeper into the situation. A few years
before the Birmingham Meeting of the British Association, Bailey had
(48) Ed. S. Timmins, op cit, p. 27.
read a paper to the North of England Institute of Mining Engineers in
which he had expressed some reservations about the coal-mining industry
in South Staffordshire. Whilst accepting that the district possessed
coal "in abundance, and of a quality suitable above all others for
making iron", he pointed out that the landlords were still thinking
in terms of the hey-day of the Black Country as an iron producing
centre when they made their royalty charges - they still wanted 2/6
per ton royalty on ironstone, for example, "which cost 8/- to 10/- to
raise". Bailey severely took the mine agents to task:
" ••• it is for them to bestir themselves, to lay aside the old
methods of their forefathers, to improve and re-arrange their pits,
workings, and machinery, and economise the labour of men and horses,
aboveground, and more especially underground". (49)
On this occasion, the central theme of Bailey's argument was that the
mining industry needed rejuvenating. He put forward the following ideas:
" ••• our 'ninding machinery to be improved, more extensive under-
ground workings to be opened, skips, wagons and tram-roads to be
better constructed, so that instead of raising seven or ten skips
an hour, thirty or fourty may be drawn, and instead of sixty tons
per day, 250 or 300 tons must be raised, for it is quantity also
that must answer the purpose intended of reducing the cost per
ton". (50)
Bailey also advocated the use of steam power in the pits. Unfortunately,
very few of the mine-owners in the Black Country were prepared to take
such advice. Mismanagement in the mines clearly hastened the process
which was leading to the exhaustion of the better coal seams.
(49) S. Bailey, loc cit, p. 29.
(50) Ibid, p. 29.
Although not as significant as the developing local ironstone short-
age, there \faS an indication of the impending shortage of coal in the
1840's. Only in certain districts of the Black Country vms this trend
pronounced, but by coincidence it was the reverse of the ironstone
sit~~tion in that the main shortages were to be found in the northern
part. Once started, the exhaustion of the better seams, and especially
of tho Thick Coal, gathered momentum; there were frequent references to
it in the 1850's and 1860's. The coal situation was, in fact, worse
for the blast furnace operator than for anybody else in the district;
he could only use the Thick Coal, Heathen Coal, New Mine and Fire Clay
Coal and the Yard Coal in the blast furnaces. In the 1860's and early
1870's, the national coal situation was giving cause for concern - these
were the years of the 'coal famine '(51 ) - and both a ~oyal Commission
(1869-71) and a Select Committee of the House of Commmns (1873) did
little more than elaborate on the difficulties; nowhere was the coal
shortage more desperate than in the Black Country pig iron industry.
In the space of twelve months in 1871-2, i.e. during the boom which
followed the Franco-Prussian War, coal prices rose by 80 per cent. In
wide areas of the district, no suitable local coal was available for
the bIast furnaces. The sorry misuse of the mines was now only too
apparent; mine flooding was a significant legacy of the wasteful and
indiscriminate mining methods of the previous fifty years or so. The
Old Hill Mines Drainage Company Limited, of 1870, was quite inadequate
to deal with the s1 tuation and in 1873 the South Staffordshire Mines
(51) J.1.S•I • , i , 1882 , p. 128
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Drainage Act was thought necessary. Henceforth, a Mines Drainage Comm-
ission had powers to act and bring in measures to be paid for by the
mining industry. Having elaborated upon the shortage (and dearness) of
coal for the pig iron department, it must be stressed that the other
branches of the iron industry were in a much better position; the abund-
ant supplies of slack available at nominal cost were used for firing
boilers and stoves.
A major short-coming of the leading South Staffordshire coals \~s
that they were not coking coals in the modern sense of the term. The
Thick Coal was of the "Clod"variety, Le. "vith a high durain content,
78 - 81 per cent carbon, very low in sulphur, and weakly-swelling", (52)
and only the lump coal was used in the coking process. The slack, on
its own , wou.ld not agglomerate or "cake". The wastage of ThicK Coal was,
therefore, enormous and the primitive mining methods used only made
matters worse. Some pits adopted the practice of not bringing the slack
to the surface; once worked out and left standing idle, the pit's slack
often caught fire and, in some cases, continued burning for years.
Even when the slack was thrown on surface pit-heaps, it would remain
unused and spontaneous combustion would reduce it to ash and clinker.
A number of methods were tried to make coke from the slack. Jones(53)
mentioned the "great value" if some economic process could be discovered
by which "thEJ material could be converted into coke". Hitherto, uneconomic
coke had been made with the slack either by mixing it with'Welsh coal
or by adding "a considerable proportion of coal-tar". J. Percy recorded
one such attempt at Dudley when 4t tons of slack were put in an oven \rith
(52) S.H. Beaver, Coke ManU$acture in Great ~ritain: A Study in Industrial
Geography, Transactions & Papers, 1951, Publication No. 17, p. 134.
(53) Ed. S. Timmins, op cit, p. 65.
one ton of coal-tar pitch. (54) C.~I. Siemens also tried his hand at
turning the slack into a saleable coke ,'ri th his regenerative "breeze-
oven"; in this case, the coke would have been for forge purposes only.(55)
In fact, little or no progress was made in this direction, and as late
as 1898 Le Neve Foster was suggesting that a fortune awaited the man who
could find a way of making cheap coke from the slack. "Broadly speaking,
the South Staffordshire iron industry "rent on using either hearth coke
or raw lump coal and the slack remained unused".(56)
The "hearth" process of making coke, the only method in general use in
South Staffordshire for much of the nineteenth century, was both slow
and wasteful. J. Percy has pointed out that in the Dudley ~rea in the
middle of the century it took ten days before the coke could be quenched
and dz-awn from the heaps. (57) Jones spoke of "antiquated arrangements"
~rith regard to the coke-making processes in the mid-sixties, and he
could see no immediate prospect for change.(58)
Inevitably, the Black Country ironmaster became more and more dependent
upon outside supplies of coke; the fact that this was SO was undoubtedly
one of the most serious shortcomings in the structure of the local in-
dustryo Besides, because of the lack of progress in coke manufacture in
Britain throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, the South
Staffordshire industry was faced in an exaggerated form with one more
factor making her less competitive in an international sense.(59)
(54) J. Percy, MetallurgY, i, Fuel, etc, 1875, p. 424. See Figure 10,
(55) Ibid, pp. 456 - 8.
(56) S.H. Beaver, loc cit, p. 135.
(57) J. Percy, op cit, p. 424.
(58) Edited S. Timmins, op cit, p. 65. Also S.H. Beaver. loc cit, p.
135 and W.K.V. Gale, !he Black Country Iron Indust;r, pp. 43 - 44.
(59) Because there was little coke-making in South Staffordshire, I
have not included a detailed account of that industry in the main body
of the thesis. However, because the coke situation was so crucial for
the industry an account is given in the form of an appendix.
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A number of Black Country ironmasters sought to acquire mining rights
outside their own district, although thi s trend vas by no means a
general one. Alfred Hickman, for example, purchased coal mines in the
Bedworth district of Warwickshire. He, like many of his fellow iron-
masters, was still faced with the task of obtaining coke supplies for
his works at Spring Vale. Hicl~n's blast furnaces were run on a mixture
of raw coal and imported coke; in the 1870's, for example, he bought
his coke from three areas - South Wales, South Yorkshire and North
Staffordshire. In the case of the coke from the first area, he :ms
paying 16/6 per ton in 1876, delivered at his works. Although Hickman
himself chose to play down the district's dependence on ou t.ride supplies
of fuel before the 1881 Select Committee on '1aihlays, George Findlay,
lIIanager of the l&NV/R, emphasised the fact that Hickman had "to go far
afield for coke to work his furnaces~
" ••• he gets a quantity from Staveley, upon the Midland Railway;
he gets some from Talk-o'-the-Hill, in North Staffordshire; he
gets some from Pemberton, in our Wigan district; he gets also
from Ruabon a quantity of coke •••"(60)
Five years later, this time before the Royal Commission on the Depression
of Trade, Hickman informed the Commission that he had bought 10,000 tons
of coke at a time from the Staveley Company. Apart from the freight-
cost issue, the organisation to maintain the smooth operation of supplying
the district's few remaining large iron and steel works was considerable.
Patent Shaft, for example, consumed a very heavy tonnage of coal in the
three-year period 1899 to 1901, much of it having to be imported into
the Black Country:
Year Coal Consumed Cost Av. price per ton
tons e
1899 168,032 50,804 6/1
1900 174,625 72,089 8/2
1901 160,211 83,994 10/6
(60) Seleot Committe on Railways, 1881, M.E. 14382.
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The tonnage figures for coal/coke which passed through Wolverhampton
were considerable; after 1885, the annual figure did not fall much
below 80,000 tons ~nd for three years it was well over 100,000 tons.
Mineral Traffic through Wolvcrhampton, 1885 - 1899.
Year Coal & Coke Other !Unerals (iron ore &
Tons limestone)
1885 82,571 75,132
1886 80,310 71,544
1887 77,640 84,718
1888 83,709 96,279
1889 86,112 112,690
1890 81,435 93,903
1891 91,630 111 ,436
1892 87,218 111,204
1893 78,703 134,850
1894 82,234 140,153
1895 115,556 139,436
1896 106,295 159,602
1897 111 ,710 184,124
1898 89,358 190,412
1899 95,623 194,735 (61 )
Another very serious aspect ,vi th regard to the supply of coke 'lias the
difficulty of maintaining supplies at a price which the ironmasters
could afford and still make a profit from the sales of their pig iron.
This was very marked in the comparatively prosperous years between
1896 and 1900. The price pf coke trebled in some cases, and in September
1899 the Black Country ironmasters were reported as being "bewildered
at the manner in whd.ch the prices of ironmaking cokes are rising". (62)
Things proved too much for at least one ironmaster; in September 1900,
Messrs. Round Brothers of the Tividale Ironworks "decided to blowout
their blast furnaces forthwith".(63) In August 1898, a "coke famine"
had occurred, in part due to the South Wales coal strike, and in the
July of the following year, it was again reported that "a serious
situation (had) arisen owing to the famine in iron-making cokes. Certain
leading pig iron firms (had) declared themselves unable to get sufficient
(61) Chamber of Commerce (Wolverhampton) Statistics, 20/5/98.
(62) Colliery Guardian, 4/9/99.
(63) Colliery Guardian, 28/9/1900.
coke to keep the furnaces going".(64)
The situation with regard to coke supplies remained virtually the
Coke Prices (January of each year unless otherwise stated)
11. J
Type of Coke 1896 1897 1899 1899(June) 1900 1901
Best blast furnace
Derb,y. furnace coke
Best" " "
South Wales furnace
II "foundry
Durham furnace
13/- -
16/-
17/- 21 - 22/- 30/-*
27/-
18 - 19/-
26 - 28/- 40/- 30/-
32 - 34/- 40/- 32/6
* price at ovens
same throughout the Edwardian years; prices tended to fluctuate a good
deal and there was little that the Black Country ironmaster could do.
In slack periods for the iron trade, coke could generally be obtained
cheaply; when the pig iron makers were able to obtain a better price
for their goods they were faced with a combination of coke scarcity
and high prices. Frequently, pressure was put upon the blast furnace
ovmers by the finishing department to lower the price of their pig
iron; on every occasion the former were unable to oblige because of the
high cost of their fuel.(65)
(64) COlliery Guardian, 14/7/99.
(65) Colliery Guardian, 31/1/08 and 12/6/08.
Chapter 4 Developments in Transport in the Black Count~.
Because of its midland location, the South Staffordshire district had
required a fairly sound transport system from the beginning of its in-
dustrialising process. Canals had provided just such a system; by the
late 1830's some "four million tons of coals, lime, ironstone and other
raw materials" were carried on the canals of the Black Country, together
with nearly 240,000 tons of iron and "large quantities of heavy hardwares,
tin plates, glass and other goods" annually for export from the district.( 1 )
London was the most important port for the Black Country, taking 42 per
cent of its exports, followed by Liverpool (37 per cent), Hull (13 per
cent) and Bristol (8 per cent). In 1836, a sample year taken before the
coming of the railways, the rates to London from Birmingham by canal
were as follows:
Articles
Undamaged iron
Damageable iron
Hardware
Nails
Rates by canal collected & delivered
Per ton
25/-
27/6
60/6
40/- (2)
From the Dudley area to Liverpool, by the Shropshire Union and the
Bridgewater Trustees, in the late 1830's, the rate for undBmaBeable iron
(pig ieon) per ton was as low as 6/2 to 7/6 "delivered alongside ship
by barge".(3) From Cookley (Kidderminster) to Liverpool by canal, a
distance of around 110 miles, the rate for boxes of tin-plate was 12/6.(4)
(1 ) Report of the Railway Department of the Board of Trade on the London,
Worcester and Wolverhampton, and on the Birmingham and Shrewsbury Dis-
tricts, 1845, p. 2. To support the Tame Valley Bill of 1840 it was pointed
out by the proposers that along the two miles of canal in the centre of
Birmingham, from Farmer's Bridge locks to Bordesley and Aston, there were
seventy steam engines and 124 wharves and works.
(2) Select Committee ~n Railways, 1881, ii, Appendix ~o. 59.
(3) Ibid, M.E. 5451 - 5470.
(4( tbid, M.E. 4610.
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Despite this undoubted early contribution of the canals to the growth
of the Black Country iron industry, it is true to say that by the late
1830's the canal system was beginning to display numerous inadequacies
in the face of a changing situation. The rise of the near-coastal locations
of South Wales and Scotland, with their "readier access to the sea" (5),
meant that South Staffordshire's two great rivals could convey their
products to export markets at far cheaper rates. Furthermore, the canal
journey for heavy goods was always slow; it would take up to two weeks
to cover the distance to Liverpool, for only in exceptional circumstances
and with small cargoes would the fast boats do the journey from Dudley
to the Mersey in three days. The Board of Trade's Departmental Committee
recognised in 1845 that the canals were "not only more tedious and ex-
pensive, but subject to serious interruptions, often for weeks together,
from frost in winter and drought in summer".(6) Equally significant
was the groWing strain being placed on the canal system within the district
itself by the exhaustion of either coal or iron ore in one or other
half of the district. Evidence before the Oxford, Worcester and Wolver-
hampton Railway Committee in 1845 suggested that 1,333 tons of raw material~
were being transported every hour of the day in the Black Country district,
and that the Dudley Tunnel had become very much of a bottle-neck. Boat-
loads ranged from fifteen to eighteen tons in this period, so it is not
difficult to imagine the build-up of craft at both ends of tunnels. Be-
sides, the important letherton Tunnel was not opened until 1858.
By the mid-1840's, the Black Country was in the position of being able
(5) '845 Report, p. 2.
(6) Ibid. The whole canal system in the area was affected by the South
Staffordshire plateau; in whichever direction the canals went they pursued
a downward course with inevitable loss of water. An indication of the
BC~'s water supplt difficulties is to be seen in that of 54 pumping
engines made at Soho between 1777 and 1828, nineteen were purchased by
that company.
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to judge the benefits which could come to the district with the railways.
In 1845, the London and Birmingham Railway opened a goods department in
Birmingham, and almost immediately a means of communication was opened
with the Birmingham Canal. (7) In the same year, the Railways Committee
of the Board of Trade was listening to the claims for rival schemes
proposed by the London and Birmingham Company and the Great Western
Company. The routes under discussion concerned London, Worcester and
Wolverhampton, and Birmingham and the Shrewsbllry district. A majority of
local businessmen - representing 46 ironworks, 57 furnaces and 98 coll-
ieries (8) - favoured the scheme pllt forward by the London and Birmingham
line, one important factor being that the Great Western Company's gauge
did not conform' with the more llsual narrow-gauge system. A break of gauge
at Birmingham wOllld seriously hinder the distriet's traffi. with all
ports " except Bristol. Bearing in mind the future diffic10tlties of the
district with regard to the mineral traffi., it is interesting to note
that one of the factors which influenced the Board of Trade team to re-
commend aceeptanee of the London and Birmingham's proposals were the
plans of that company "to lay down an additional double line of rails
throughout the mineral district, to be devoted entirely to the accommo-
dation of the mineral traffic". (9) It was felt that the cheap transit
of coals and minerals would obViously help the industry of the area,
but would also bring a "still more important benefit for the poorer and
industrious classes". The officials of the Board of Trade clearly foresaw
the situation wiich, indeed, arose in the 1870's and 1880's when they
wrote:
"It is only by obtaining ready access to the Railway by means of short
branches or tramroads from those mines and works, that the benefits
(7) Select Committee on Railways, 1881, Appendix No. 58.
(8) 1845 Report, p. 7.
(9) Ibid, p, q..
contemplated from the introduction of Railway communication can be
fully realised. But if this is to be the case, and if any considerable
portion of this immense local traffic is to pass by Railway, it is
manifest that the rails so used could not be rendered available witho~t
extreme danger and inconvenience for the general traffic. Even the
export trade alone in coals and iron eould not be conducted with con-
venience upon the same line of rails in order to allow the waggons
passing and repassing from the different works within the district to
reach without inter~ption some principal station at its extremity,
where trains of the proper si%e could be formed and despatched to
distant parts". (10)
In 1881, the General Manager of the Great Western Railway, J. Grierson,
admitted to the Select Committee that it would not be worthwhile for the
company to see more coal carried between Round Oak and Hickman's works
near Deepfields on the grounds that "it would have, and must have, the
effect of blocking our main line, for the traffic would have to pass upon
a very heavy incline, and the rate would be too low to block our main
line for it". (11) In other words, although the railway companies init-
ially made a case out that they would serve the area's needs with regard
to mineral traffic, decades later this no longer held true. The Board of
Trade officials were apparently also aware of the difficulties which would
arise as a result of the fact that the majority of the ironworks would
not lie alongside the railways. However, no serious thought was given to
(10) Ibid, p. 8.
(11) Select Committee on Railways, 1881, M.E. 12838. Generally, promoters
of railway lines were more interested in passengers than anything else:
"Coal! " a certain Mr. B. of the London & Birmingham is reported to have
exclaimed, when it was first suggested that his railway should carry SO
humble a commodity: "Why, they'll be asking us to carry dung next". W.M.
Aoworth, Railways of England, 1900, p. 153.
...
1'53.
planning a sensible railway system for the area and within a short time
a whole host of different companies had been brought into being. Even
after the main amalgamation period had taken place there were three
large companies serving the area. The Great Western, incorporated in 1836,
came to control the Birmingham and Oxford Junction Railway (1852), the
Shrewsbury and Birmingham Railway (1854) and the West Midland (1863),
which included the Oxford, Worcester and Wolverhampton Railway. The
LNWR came into being in 1846~ arising from an amalgamation of a number
of companies, one of which was the London and Birmingham; in the follOWing
year, the Shropshire Union and the Birmingham, Wolverhampton and Stour
Valley Railways were acquir~d, followed by the South Staffordshire (1867)
and various lines on and near Cannock Chase (1870). The Midland Railway
arose in 1846, resulting from an a~gamation of the North Midland, Midland
L.
Counties and the Birmingham and Derby Railways. In the following year,
the Birmingham and Gloucester Railway was acquired. It is worth bearing
in mind that all the railways mentioned had been brought into being by
separate Acts of parliament; signifioantly there was a number of variations
with regard to maximum rate clauses and terminal clauses. Before 1845,
parliament had not considered the latter, envisaging that the railways
would be like the canals and that carriers would pay tolls for the use
of the traok, ete •• Initially, too, little thought was given to the
possibility of the railway companies liaising with the canal companies,
and as a result for a short period of time not only was there severe
competition between the two modes of transport but the opportunity was
lost of bringing about an integrated system of transport. Rather than face
a continuous battle with the canals, the railway companies bought them
out. The process was started by the Great Western when it purchased the
Stratford-upon-Avon Canal in 1846, followed by the LNWR purchasing the
lease of the Shropshire Union Canals in 1846-47.
In 1845, the Board of Trade officials spoke of the railways carrying
coal to London from Staffordshire and Derbyshire for between 11/- and 12/-
1'5lf-.
a ton (best coal would be sold for 20/- compared with 30/- to 40/- in
London during a frosty winter). Indeed, freight rates generally went down
however, the rates which prevailed in the,' period of intense rivalry
between the railway and canal companies could not be expected to last
(although they were frequently quoted in the 1880's as the rates of "30
or 40 years ago"). By 1860, the railways were firmly in control, for they
were carrying a larger proportion of the goods traffio in and out of the
district than the canals. The railway route to London, by the shortest
line, entailed a journey of only about 100 miles, compared with 1631- miles
by canal; there were similar advantages to other major ports in the
country. Professor Allen bas argued that "bad it not been for the railways
••• South Staffordshire would have been rapidly sinking to a position of
obscurity as a seat of pig-iron production ••• and malleable-iron
production". (12) On some routes water transport was, nevertheless, pre-
ferred; one example was the passage of nearly 100,000 tons annually of
high-grade iron are from the Furness area which came into Shropshire and
Staffordshire "by ~oasting vessels, thro~gh the river Mersey, to Ellesmere
Port and Runcorn, and up the river Dee to Chester••• ". (13 )
The Blaok Country's'inoreasing dependenoe on outside supplies of are
in the 1850's - 213,000 tons of calcined North Staffordshire ore and 120,000
tons of Northants are annually - had brought to the forefront onoe again
the absolute necessity of good and cheap transport faoilities. Increasing
oompetition from the leading British areas, notably Cleveland, and from
"France and Belgium in the depressed years", made the South Staffordshire
district inoreasingly aware of the "long haW. to the sea". Looal manu-
(12) G.C. Allen, op cit, p. 100.
(13) Braithwaite Poole, The Commerce of Liverpool, 1854, po 54.
facturers were not slow to blame the railway companies and to levy the
criticism that the area as a centre of the iron trade was being strangled
by high freight charges. The companies, for their part, regarded such
views with disdain. What, then, was the situation with regard to South Staff
·ordshire and freight costs in the period up to 1872, the year in which
the Joint Select Committee on Railway Companies' Amalgamation met? Between
London and Birmingham, the rate for undamageable iron was 15/- per ton,
17/6 for damageable iron, 35/- for hardware and 32/6 for rails; all quoted
priees included collection and delivery. (14) Compared to the rates prev-
iously referred to for canal transport, these amounted to reductions
of 40 per oent, 36 per cent, 54 per cent and 47 per cent respectively.
Even oompared with the canal prices of the period of intense rivalry,
the railway rates in 1866 showed substantial reductions. From Wednesfield
Heath, near Wolverhampton, to Liverpool, the rate on undamageable iron ,
including 1/6 a ton from the railway station to the ship, was between
8/- and 9/-. (15) Ore from Northamptonshire was brought into the district
at the rate of 0.5d. per ton per mile, a rate which was low even when it
was realised that either the ironmaster or the qwarries supplied the
wagons in which to carry ore. Inside the distriet, Alfred Hiekman found
things satisfactory enough to set himself vp as an ironmaster. The Great
Western Railway Company, for example, oarried ooal for him from ROWld
Oak to his works at Sd, per ton. However, few local ironmasters were
prepared to offer praise to the railway oompanies. In the first place,
the three companies were known to have reached agreement, on 17 March
1863, "by which they are severally bound that neither of the companies
(14) Select Committee on Railways, 1881, Appendix No. 59.
(15) Ibid, p. 243.
,~
should reduce any existing rate or give a new low rate without the consent
of both the others ll.(16) In 1881, Hickman had no hesitation in agreeing
to a sUGgestion by a member of the Select Committee that this agreement
constituted -rhat in the United States was termed a I r i ng" . (17 ) Secondly,
the railway companies had gone a long way towards crippling cnnal trans-
port in the district. In general, once the rai1way companies acquired
a canal ~hen the through-rates on the canal were brought into line with
those charged by the railways. By 1872, all the canals leading northward
from the district were in the hands of the railway companies.(18) Even
the most avid supporter of canal transport had to admit in 1872 that the
railways ',ere vastly superior over long distances; however, the railway
companies clearly took action to ensure that the canals, both railway-
owned and independent, would have a very hard time trying to compete with
them. Unlike the railways(19) the canal companies had had to face com-
petition from independent carriers using their canals. Tenders were
(16) '~eport of the DepartJJlantal Committee on Railway Agreements and
Amalgamations, 1911, M.E. 3982.
(17) Select Committee on1a.ilways, 1881, M.E. 4445.
(18) Select Committee, 1872, pp. 480 - 81.
(19) Initially, and in order to overcome the difficulties of establishing
through-routes between rivalry-minded railway companies, the companies had
used private carriers on their lines - Pickfords for example - • However,
-,rith the adoption of the Clearing House practice, the system was dropped.
Braithwaite Poole, who became chairman of the Railway Clearing House,
argued that users thereby obtained lower charges. See P. Bagwell, The
1W.ilway Clearing House ... , 1968, pp. 64-70, and W. T. Jackman, The
Development of Transportation in Modern England, 1966, p. 624 et seq.
frequently made for large contracts and occasionally the carrier, providing
his own boats eta., would be able to outbid the ver,y company along whose
canal he paid a toll for the passage of his boats. Once a canal fell into
the hands of a railway company, this position was terminated; either
the private carrier was bought out or ruthlessly forced out of business.
E.J. Lloyd (20) was of the firm belief that the railway oompanies in the
Midlands area never intended to utilise the ~anals which they aoquired.
They were more interested in securing the traffic of the canals; he claimed
that the Great Western had invested £633,036 in the canals, the revenue from
which was £276. Taking the running costs into aocount, the canals ann-
ually made a loss of nearly £8,000. (21) As fUrther evidenoe that the rail-
way companies were intentionally running down their canals, Lloyd produced
traffic figures for the Stratford-upon-Avon Canal (GWR) and for two
independent canals - the Warwick and Birmingham and the Coventr,y Canal.
The Warwick and Birmingham in one year carried 300,000 tons of long-
distance traffic and a local traffi~ of another 200,000 tons. A mere
25,000 tons was carried on the St:rrztford-upon-Avon, which Lloyd suggested
was virtually shut down. (22) The Midland Railway had allowed the Ashby-
de-Ia-Zouch Canal to enter a similar state of "gradual deterioration". (23)
(20) Lloyd was 'engineer and general manager' of the Warwick and Birmingham
Canal Company, an independent eana.l , He gave eviden<Je before the 1872
and 1881 Seleot Committees and, with the possible exception of Alfred
Hiekman, knew more abouf transport problems in the area than any other
person.
(21) Select Committee on Rai~ways, 1881, p. 459.
(22) Select Committee, 1872, M.E. 5036.
(23) A nllDlber of practiee. was used by the railway aompanies in the Black
C01Ultry to plaoate the management and shareholl1ers of the canal eompani.ea,
i.eluding the guaranteeing of a fixed dividend and the appointment of former
eanal managers to the new boards of directors (withOllt the right to vote).
Not content with running down the traffic on their own canals, the railway
companies pursued a policy of non-cooperation with the independent canal
companies. On one occasion, the Great Western arranged for one of its
employees to purchase the upper Avon navigation for the purpose eventually
of abandoning it. By this means the company was able to close the river
Avon as a through route from Stratford to Tewkesbury, much to the annoyance
of the Worcester and Birmingham Canal company who had leased from a Mr.
Perrott the lower Avon navigation. They had agreed to pay the latter
"400 pounds a year in perpetuity", but without the upper Avon navigation
being open to them they had no means whatever of recovering even the £400,
let alone running the canal at a profit. (24) The LNWR had acquired
effective control over the very important Birmingham Canal, which, with
its branches, ~overed 158 miles in length, and eould be said literally
to intersect the factories of Birmingham, and the Gollieries, ironmills,
forges and foundries of the Black Country. The possession of this ~l
by a railway company seriously disrupted the flow of traffic on several
of the more important independent eanaLs who had made a number of "friendly
agreements" as to the portion of the through rate whiah each woald obtain.
On the canal jO¥rney from the Staffordshire area to London - a distance
of about 160 miles with a statutory total charge of 4/6 per ton of iron -
the Birmingham Canal, covering a distance of less than a dozen miles,
took 1/6, leaving 3/- for the independent canals(chiefly the Warwick and
Birmingham and the Grand Junction). (25) Even on local traffic, the Bir-
mingham Canal made full use of its central position by exercising a bar
toll of 3d. in one direction and 4d. in the other. Lloyd explained the
situation th\1.s:
"Suppose my boat passes from our oanal (Warwick and Birmingham) into
(24) Select Committee on Railways, 1881, M.E. 10,184.
(25) Seleet Committee, 1872, M.E. 5032.
Birmingham, or from the Birmingham Canal into ours; if it, passes
only the length of a boat, if it only just crosses the canal, they
charge the toll". (26)
For short distances the canal companies had been given the right to charge
for fractions of a mile (the minimum charge being for one-sixteenth of a
mile); in 1893, they sought permission from the Board of Trade to abandon
the fractional charge and to levy a rate for one whole mile even if it
meant that a boat had simply moved from one bank of the canal to the
other. (27) A further obstructionist tactio of the railway-owned canals
was for them to create long hold-ups for repairs to stretches of their
canals or, particularly, to tunnels. The Gosty Hill Tunnel was a favourite
(26) Select Committee on Railways, 1661, N.E. 10,141. Lloyd stated that
in only two cases in the area did railway-ol~ed canals show any increase
of traffic, i.e. the Birmingham Canal and the Trent and Mersey. He was
able to give examples of nine railway-owned canals obstructing through
traffic etc. from private canals. With regard to the Birmingham Canal's
importance, Lloyd told the Select Committee: "••• this was really becoming
what I may term an omnibussing canal for railway traffic. A very large
proportion of the traffic on the canal is now the collection of goods
from works, and carrying them to the railway sidings, and the canal busi-
ness in connexion with the railways", N.E. 13,569.
(27) Colliery Guardian, 27/1/93. At the same time, the canal companies
sought to abolish the system of contracts in the Black Country whereby
the freighters had provided their own basins and wharfage aCQommodation
in return for which they obtained freight reductions. The Board of Trade
refused to accept this request which meant, "in scores and hundreds of
cases, a saving in the cost of freightage of a suggested increase of 45
per cent". The Board of Trade also refused to accept the companies' request
to abolish fractions of a mile, although they did agree that the minimum
charge should be calculated at the rate of one-quarter of a mile.
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for this type of tactic, the result being that canal traffic had to make a
very long detour o By such devices as these, the railway companies made it
almost impossible for the companies that owned the remainder of the lines
of canal on a through route to maintain their traffic in competition
with the railway. (28)
Whether justified or not, a majority of Black Country ironmasters were
highly critical of the railway companies. At this point, as, indeed, three
or four years earlier, there was little attempt to compare Blaek Country
freight rates with those either elsewhere in the country or on the
Continent; it was pointed out, however, that local nail sheet was having
to face strong competition from Belgian sources on the London market.
Local spokesmen were content to oppose railway amalgamation in principle.
When the Wolverhampton Chamber of Commeroe answered the questionaire
circularised by the Association of Chambers of Commerce in Maroh 1872,
doubts were expressed as to whether or not "economical management" followed
amalgamations. Not surprisingly, the loeal chamber of commerce believed
that every effort should be made to guard against "a combined Monopoly"
arising in the case of canal companies being "bought, leased, or worked
under any agreement with a railway company". (29) On this point, it is
interesting to note that the 1872 Joint Select Committee recommended that
"no inland navigation now in the hands of a public trust should be trans-
ferred to, or placed under the control of, a railway li'lompany".
(28~ W.T. Jaokman, op cit, pp. 650-55. Most of JaCilkman's examples of
unfair praotices by the railway-owned canals were, in fact, taken from
the Black Country even though he is supposedly writing about Britain as
a whole.
(29) Minutes Books, Wolverhampton Chamber of Commerce, entry for r1arch 1872.
Throughjout the decade of the seventies, the many changes that had
earlier got underway affecting the fortunes of the Black Country iron in-
dustry became more pronounced. Of those relevant to the transport issue
the following can be mentioned:
i. the area's almost total dependence by 1880 on imported ores;
ii. the working out of that part of the thick coal basin upon which
the earlier blast furnaces had been sited;
iii. the dependenoe of the area upon outside supplies of pig iron;
iv. the continued expansion of the Cleveland district and the growth
of competition from other British coastal iron and steel producing
areas, together with Belgian competition. (30)
In his evidence to the I881 Select Committee on Railways, Alfred Hickman,
,
acting as spokesman for the district s ironmasters, considered the quan-
tity of ironstone brought into South Staffordshire to exceed "that produced
there by the proportion of ten to one". (3I) Thrl1e years later, no less
that 80 per cent of the pig iron produced locally (279,360) was made from
Northants are. This fact is of the utmost relevance to Hickman's whole
argument concerning the burden which high freight rates brought down
upon the shoulders of the local pig iron manufacturer. He argued before
the 1881 Committee that the local pig iron trade was "very rapidly becoming
(30) L{ailway rates were raised during the boom period of 1871-2, and
not lowered with the onset of 'depression'. In the seventies, too, it
became customary lor the railway companies to drop the long weight (2,400
lbs.) in favour of the ton of 2,240 Ibs. without any price reduction.
(31) Select Committee on Railways,1881, M.E. 4318. Hickman was suggesting
that, although at first sight the area was well located to receive both
Northants and North Staffordshire ores, high freight rates made a mockery
of this.
defunct" because of the "excessive railway rates on the material", Le.
the raw materials for the manufacture of pig iron. In working out the
extent to which the railways "overcharged" local ironmasters, Rieman
made too much out of the rates charged for North Staffordshire ironstone.
Re played down the fact, for example, that local pig iron was made from
"a mixture of North Staffordshire, South Staffordshire and Northamptonshire
ore"; the rates from Chatterley and Froghall were, indeed, high - 3/10
per ton without wagons (4/6 with) for a distance of 39 miles 53 chains
from Chatterley, and 5/- without (5/S with) wagons for the 47 miles from
Froghall to Deepfields - but it was misleading to give the impression
that 10 per cent of the selling price of pig iron was taken up by the
"overcharge". Hickman made very little pig at Bilston from North Stafford-
shire ore alone; it was mixed with Northants are which had been brought
to his works at 0.5d. per ton per mile. Rieman claimed that if the raibways
could carry Northants and Leicestershire ore for O.Sd. per ton per mile,
and presumably make a profit, why could they not do the same for the
North Staffordshire ore? For their part the spokesmen of the railway
companies denied that they were overcharging on the Chatterley and Froghall
areas and that, in any case, the importation of iron are into the district
"at very low rates" was "the only thing to a very large extent which
(kept) South Staffordshire going as it was". (32) The manager of the LNWR,
G. Findlay, was especially adamant on this point:
" ••• in South Staffordshire no blast furnaces could exist at all if
they had to depend upon native are ••• The only means by whieh the
trade carried on at all is because the London and North Western, the
Great Western and the Midland, earry Northamptonshire ore into the
district; the North Western Company also carry hematite ore from
Barrow ••• at -!-d. a ton a mile into South Staffordshire, and the
(32) Select Committee on Railways, 1881, M.E. 12,700 and 12,705.
North Staffordshire ore is brought in to a very considerable extent;
we are carrying a very large proportion of the North Staffordshire
ore at something like 1d••••"(33)
Under cross-examination, Hickman had to admit that unless the lower quality
ore had been brought cheaply from Northants few South Staffordshire iron-
masters would have used it; the railway spokesmen chose to put it another
way when they described the Northants rate as one "charged under except-
ional circumstances", i.e. "to preserve the trade of South Staffordshire".
A further factor to be borne in mind was that, except in the case of
Northants, very few local ironmasters were prepared to take a full train-
load of iron ore.
With regard to the assemby of coal/coke at the blast furnaces, Hickman
and his fellow ironmasters were, perhaps, more justified in their oriticism
of the railway companies. Much of the coal trade was on a very local
basis, and as such was extremely difficult to organise by the railway
companies if they were to prevent their main lines from being cluttered
up with coal wagons (the very point foreseen by the 1845 Committee).
Consequently, the railway companies were not over-anxious to listen to
the complaints of the ironmasters or colliery owners, or to make con-
oessions. Indeed, it would appear that many of the local ironmasters
were having to pay extraordinarily high freight rates on their supplies
of local coal. Hickman, in his own eVidence, said that it "took about 2t
tons of coal and slaok together to make a ton of iron" and, as a result
of the alleged "overcharging" by the railway companies he had to pay an
additional 10 per cent on the price of a ton of iron. He obtained some
of his coal requirements from Round Oak; the distanoe from Round Oak to
his works was 6 miles 51 chains, and the combined rate (both the GWR and
LNWR lines had to be used) was 1/10 a ton wi thout wagons. At the time
(33) Select Committee on Railways, 1881, M.E. 14,380.
of the 1881 enquiry he had tried and failed to obtain a reduction from
the companies:
"On applying to the railway companies who were interested, I was told
that there was a private arrangement between the London and North
Western and the Great Western, whereby the discharging company should
take 1/- a ton, whatever distance the company might carry the material,
that is to say, that the discharging company, if it only carried the
material 100 yards, would take 1/- a ton for it; and that being so, we
could not get the rate reduced because the discharging company, taking
1/-, the Great Western Company were not willing to take less than 10d•• "
Perhaps in part to illustrate the confusion which sometimes surrounded
the local railway system, Hickman proceeded to tell the Seleot Committee
that he did not, in fact, pay the 1/10:
"I found that the London and North Western Railway have a local rate
of 9d. from Dudley, which is the point of junction, and so by oarrying
the coal to Dudley, and re-consigning it from Dudley to Deepfields, we
got the Great Western Company's rate of 9d. making 1/7 instead of 1/10".
(35 )
He alleged that in the days before tha Stour Valley Railway had been taken
over by the LNWR the maximum rate permitted by parliament had been 1d. a
ton a mile (for truck loads) and that on the West Midland Railway the
journey had been done for 1/-, "being 6d. for carriage and 6d. for wagons".
Grierson, for the railway interests, explained away Hickman's allegations
of "overcharging" in a statement which goes some way towards illustrating
the sharp differences of approach taken by the two sides in the legality
of rates charged:
(34) Select Committee on Railways, 1881, M.E. 4339.
(35) Ibid, M.E. 4340 0
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"Deal ine ~,~th the rate for coal from :i.ound Oak to Deepfields, it has
a l ready been e::plained that the rate from "tound Oak to Dudley is 9d.,
.md not 1Od , , pel' ton, and that this is for a minimum distance of six
miJes, in lieu nf the actual distance of two miles and 49 chains. The
London and No r th Western part of the charge, 9d., is presumably vii thin
their pn·'!ers. This makes the rate thoughout 1/6, and not 1/7, in
owner's wagons, as stated by Mr. Hickman. In estimating the total
maximum leg2l charge he appeared to have ignored the minimum mileage
charge applicable to each company, and, therefore, the excess of
charge ,..hich he puts at 1/5~. falls to the ground'", (36)
'\'Thenever the issue came under discussion, the railway companies could argue
the case of "minimum mileage charges"; even over such a short distance as
the journey in question two companies were involved and each could make
the charge. Terminal charges, handling charges, toll charges - the company
could select the material to justify the rates from any number of such
points. Hickman knew, for example, that at the Bloomfield Basin of the
LNWR (37), the cost of dispatching and discharging goods by the company
was 2d. per ton - this amounted to marshalling the wagons at one end and
shunting them at the other. The railway company charged customers like
himself between 10d. and 1/- per ton. Hickman was further exasperated
over the fact that the railway companies refused to give a reduction to
th0se ironmasters or colliers who had built their own sidings:
(36) Select Committee on ~ilways, 1881, M.E. 12,705.
(37) See Appendix 1 for a full list of the railway-canal basins in and
around the Black Country. The railway companies were also in the habit
of charging for terminals on canal traffic whereas, in fact, they did
not exist.( Ibid, M.E. 12,539).
"I have in vain argued that a man who has gone to the outlay of making
a siding, which saves expense to the railway company, and who has
gone to the expense of locomotive power to shunt and marshall the
trains, should be benefited by the outlay, which the railway company
saves. Of course, it is obvious that when a train goes into a large
station and has to be led out to discharge the waggons into boats,
if the waggons are not in place when the boat is, the waggons must be
moved, and if the boat is not there they must keep moving the waggons
about in all sorts of ways until the boat arrives ••• ". (38)
Railway companies, in fact, did not have sidings; they simply put in a
pair of points and the blast furnaces connected with them. One ironmaster
from the Dudley area had spent £5,000 on railway sidings only to be told
by the railway company that they would have to charge him "Zd, more per
ton for running the ore into the sidings" than if they had taken the ore
to the nearest station. He argued that "but for the sidings belonging to
the various companies in the district the railway companies would not have
been able to accommodate half the traffic". (39) The railways pointed out
that the Dudley ironmaster would have spent more on boating the ore from
the station to his works.
Another area from whieh ironmasters in the Bilston-Wolverhampton district
obtained coal supplies was Cannock. On the evidenoe of the manager of
the Cannock Chase Company, J.N. Brown, the railways "overcharged" by 33
per cent to Wolverhampton and 60 per cent to Bilston.
(38) Select Committee on Railways, 1881, M.E. 4429. It is interesting to
note that on 4 December 1884, Hickman made an agreement with the GWR
whereby, in return for his permission for the railway company to build
two. bridges over part of his land, the company lent him second-hand sleepers
and rails with which to build a siding. (Deeds in possession of BSC).
(39) Select Committee on Railways, 1"1:381, N.E. 5547.
With regard to the local mineral traffic, be it the carriage of iron
ore, coal or limestone, what was really at issue was whether or not the
railways wanted the traffic in the first place. It was, indeed, a far
cry from 1845 and the promises of the railway company that they would
build lines exclusively for this traffic. Hickman was obviously quite
mistaken in thinking that his custom could be of value to the Great
Western; he argued that if the rate from Round Oak to Deepfields had
been 0.5d. per ton per mile he himself would have increased the traffic
from "240 tons once in a month or six weeks" to "two train loads a day",
and that this would have given the railway company ~42 a week instead of
£19 a month. Grierson, with unusual frankness, commented that "the traffic
would not be worth carrying; it would have, and must have, the effect
of blocking our main line, for the traffic would have to pass upon a
very heavy incline (the Dudley Bank), and the rate would be too low to
block our main line for it". (40) Grierson concluded: " ••• there are cases
in which we can make low rates to encourage traffic, but this is not one
of them". (41)
Hickman, it must be admitted, was especially concerned over the alleged
high freight charges on the mineral traffic because his works at Spring
Vale were integrated, that is, he possessed blast furnaces, puddling
furnaces (after 1884 these were replaced with steel-making plant) and
rolling mills. He was less concerned over the freight charges on pig iron:
"Some of the railway rates on pig iron are excessive, but they are of
(40) Select Committee on Railways, 1881, M.E. 12,838.
(41) Despite Grierson's views, Hickman was, in fact, able to get a re-
duction on the rate from 1/6 to 1/- from both Cradley and Round Oak to
Deepfields on the promise that he would receive full train loads of 150
tons a day.
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of small importance compared with the excess on the raw materials". (42)
By this time, South Staffordshire had ceased to be a noted exporter of
pig iron, although it received pig iron from all the major producing
districts in the country. It was Hickman's contention that given what he
called a fair railway rate (0.5d. per ton per mile) the local district
could produce pig iron as cheaply as anywhere else, including the Cleve-
land area. Staffordshire cinder pig was sold locally for 35/-, whilst
common foundry pig cost between 37/6 and 40/- a ton to produce. Similar
pig iron from ~liddlesbrough cost approximately 38/-, plus carriage of 12/-
per ton. In such circumstances, it was not surprising that Hickman told
the Select Committee that Middlesbrough pig imports had "declined as of
late". To illustrate what he chose to call "the apparent perversity of
railway companies", Hickman informed the Select Committee of the LNlffi's
pattern of charges for the carriage of pig iron to various centres tathin
the Black Country. Pig iron coming from Dowlais reached Wolverhampton
first and the charge was 9/2 per ton; the next station, which was Bloom-
field, the charge was 8/4:
"When they get to Bloomfield their line stops; they do not go any
further than Bloomfield but they deliver at Stourbridge, to get to
which place they tranship the iron and boat it, and they charge to
(42) Select Committee on Railways, 1881, M.E. 4312. Hickman claimed that
the railway companies were overcharging for pig iron on the jounney from
Deepfields to Monument Lane Station (Birmingham), a distance of 9 miles and
2 chains (2/6 instead of 1/3id.), and to Brettell Lane (West Midland) a
distance of 7 miles and 72 chains (2/11 instead of 1/2). Once again, two
railway companies were involved, each claiming its minimum mileage charge
and terminal charges.
Stourbridge 7/6". (43)
In fact, Hickman was well aware of the reason for this strange state of
affairs - competition arising from the fact that the two companies concerned
- LNWR and GWR - brought the Dowlais iron into the district by two en-
tirely different routes. The former company took a longer route, leaving
South Wales by Abergavenny Junction, then northward to Shrewsbury, via
Leominster, Craven Arms and Churoh Stretton, before turning south-east
to Stafford and then on to Wolverhampton. The Great Western left Dowlais
by the Tafbargoed Valley line to Pontypool Road, and then through Hereford,
Worcester, Kidderminster and on to Stourbridge.
Perhaps inevitably, by 1881 many local ironmasters in the Black Country
were keen to show that their district was labouring under unfair freight
rates in comparison with the other iron producing districts of the country.
For the first time, too, although Hickman admitted that he then knew little
about them, a fair amount of interest was shown in both American and
Continental rates. In looking at the situation with regard to the other
British areas, a number of general principles can be noted. Firstly,
where an area, like the Black Country, was served by more than one railway
company, it was extremely difficult for the manufacturers to ootain re-
ductions. Indeed, it was preferable for an area to be served by only one
railway. Mention has already been made of the fact that the three companies
serving the Black Country did not permit competition to take place which
could lead to lower freight charges. Hickman stressed this fact: "The com-
petition is set aside by combination; they are all agreed to be bound by
certain fixed regulations which they all carry out, and never depart
from". (44) On another occasion, he quoted what Mr. Moon, chairman of the
LNWR, had told a South Staffordshire deputation follOWing complaints
(43) Select Committee on Railways, 1881, M.E. 4456.
(44) Ibid, M.E. 4528.
about the rate to Liverpool from Staffordshire. Moon said: "It is your
own fault: you, the leaders of South Staffordshire have yourselves to
blame. When we alone served South Staffordshire we were the only company
carrying to Liverpool, our rates were 25 per cent less than they are
now". (45) Again, too, there were occasions when local manufacturers had
approached one or other of the railway companies to see if they could
get some temporary concessions to try and develop (even open up) a part-
icular market. Always the answer was no, because although one railway
company would have benefited from the new traffic, one or both of the
others would not give their consent because either they would "not have
shared in the traffic thus assisted", or "it might have competed disad-
vantageously with other traffic in which they were interested". (46) Not
surprisingly, Hickman went so far as to say to the Select Committee: "I
think if all the railways were in the hands of one management; if for
instance they were in the hands of the Government, we should be far better
off". (47) This was not the first time in the area that hints at national-
isation of the railways had been made. By contrast, in the case of the
Cleveland area, Sir Lowthian Bell had found that the North Eastern Railway
Company served the local ironmasters to their general satisfaction. (4~)
(45) Hr. Moon was almost certainly referring to the fact that his company
,
lost control of the Shrewsbury and Birminham Railway in 1851, when the
...
directors of that company decided to throw in their hand with the GWR.
The Shrewsbury and Chester Railway did the same, and in 1854 a through
route was completed when an extension was made to Birkenhead Docks. At
the time, it would seem to be in the interests of the local ironmasters
to have two routes to Liverpool at their disposal.
(46) Report on Railways, 1909, M.E. 3984. The three companies which served
the Black Country area between them owned 3,965 miles of track in 1872
and 6,345 miles in 1911. They had to be careful to view their operations
over the whole country and weigh up the effects on other producing areas
if they gave freight advantages to a particular region, (Report on Rail-
153.
An arranGement had been worked out whereby freight charges were lowered
on iron ore and other raw materials when trade was bad, and to raise them
during boom periods. Furthermore, to try and encourage the industry to
pick up again in 1884, a reduction of 1/3 per ton was made on pig iron
carried into the South Staffordshire district. It was hoped in Middles-
brough "that the alterations may lead to a larger demand from that part
of the country". (49)
The second point to make is that where the railway companies had to face
competition from coastal shipping their rates were decidedly lower.
Both South Staffordshire and the South Yorkshire area were 'victims' of
this state of affairs. For example, bar iron from Dudley to London, a
distance of 126 miles, was carried at 15/- per ton, or 1.43d. per ton per
mile, whereas the same product went from Cardiff to London, a distance
of 170 miles, for 12/6, or .88d. per ton per mile. Hingley was sure that
this was because the railways faced competition from the sea in the case
of Cardiff. (50) Local manufacturers were equally sure that such var-
iations in freight charges had been sufficient to cause the area to lose
out in galvanizing and sheet-iron and for a former Dudley manufacturer
of cast-iron water pipes to open a foundry and blast furnaces in the
Middlesbrough area. The slower rate of growth of the Black Country tin-
plate industry, compared ,nth South Wales, was also in part attributed
ways, 1911, pp. 840 et seq.) In a sense, this fact made the 18~3 railway
agreement doubly significant (and harsh) for the local area.
(47) Select Committee on Railways, 1881, M.E. 4531.
(48) This was not always to be the case. In 1897, Cleveland ironmasters
complained of unfair railway rates to ports on the West coast of England,
and in 1909, Burton, the managing director of the Tees Iron Company,
complained of high rates due to the fact that the North-Eastern had "got
it all its own way". Report on Railways, 1909, M.E. 4072-74.
(49) 1.!:Q.!!, 29/8/84.
(SO) Select Committee on Railways, 1881, MoE o 5503-5506.
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Freight Rates on Bar Iron and Tin Plate
Journ~y Distance Rate :per ton Rate per ton
(miles ) per mile
Bar Iron
Cardiff to London 170 12/6 .88d.
Dudley to London 126 15/- 1.43d.
Middles. to Hull 85 5/6 .70d.
Dudley to Hull 140 15/- 1.30d.
Middles. to Liverpool 155 8/9 .68d.
W/ton. to Liverpool 97t 10/6 1.23d.
Tin Plate
Llanelly to London 226 18/4
Swansea to London 216 17/6
Cookley (Kidd.) to Lon. 148 17/6
Llanelly to Liverpool 187 12/6
Swansea to Liverpool 192 12/6
Cookley to Liverpool 108 12/6
Llanelly to S/ton. 232 16/8
Cookley to S/ton. 158 21/8 (51 )
to the favourable railway rates to Liverpool and London given to the
South Wales district.(52) The Midland Railway carried iron from Staveley
to London (149 miles) cheaper than it was carried from Birmingham, on the
grounds that Staveley largely produced iron pipes and was thus greatly
in competition with Middlesbrough whose sea freight to London was only
6/6 per ton (53).
The third point to bear in mind was that the larger companies in any
district were more likely to obtain concessions from the railway companies
than the smaller producers. It has already been pointed out that Hiclonan
obtained reductions in his coal shiJlllents; it was generally thought that "big
firms like lettlefolds and Sir Alfred Hickman (could) take care of them-
selves, but the small man cannot". (54) William Menelaus, of Dowlais, had
no need to turn to the Railway Commissioners for help - "We are strong enough
Select Committee on Railways, 1881, material taken from pp. 273 - 274.
Ibid, M.E. 5807 - 9.
Royal Commission on Depression ... , 1886, 3rd. Report, M.E. 12,540.
(54) Report of Departmental Commission on Railway Agreements and
Amalgamations, 1911, M.E. 5806.
to fight the i'Cl::lway companies ourselves" was his coment to the Select
Comm! ttee. (55) A much different fate, howeve r , befell the Chatterley
Lr-on COIDjp,ny ';hen it took the North StaffJrdshire rlaihlay Company before
the'li::J,'ay C()L1S~.ssi.oners and obtained a favourable decision. The ra i Iway
company s i mp.l y refused to carry for them at all, and when they were placed
under a »ena J ty of £50 per day by the Comnri as i oriez-s whiLs t they maintained
that a t ti t'de, the ra i Lvay company retaliated by sending trains at in-
convenient times or permi tted a build-up of the .i r-onuorks ' wagons. The
Chatterley :'on Company ~rere finally brought to heel when the raiLway
C"LJ.pD.ny told them to pul I down a bridge which passed over, before connecting
Ii th, Jj-;e 82.::n rn i Iway line. It ~:as generally agreed, too, that it was
far too costly for the smaller companies to bring an action before the
::lailuay Com issioners.
The iron trade, in 1881, was fortunate in having J.S. Jeans to give
evidence before the Select Committee. Not only did he have a thorough
knowledge of the British industry as a whole, but he was also one of the
first members of that industry to ..leigh up deveLopraerrts on an :11 ternational
scale. He showed to the Select Committee just how important the carriage
of the raw materials for the iron industry was as a source of revenue
for the railway companies. In 1880, for example, the railway companies
together had been paid a sum of £4,406,051 for moving fuel, ore and
flux to the blast furnaces for the manufacture of pig iron, at an average
rate per ton of pig iron of 5/-, 4/11~ and 11/4 respectively.(56) On a
rough calctUation, this had amounted to between sixteen and nineteen
pe r cent of the realised value of the pig iron made in 1880. What was
interesting, in view of Sir Lowthian Bell's evidence a few years later
(55) Select COIDffiittee on Railways, 1881, M.E. 1304-7, et seq.
(56) Ibid, M.E. 8831.
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to the Royal Commission, was Jeans' further evidence in 1881 that the
Average Rates per UK USA Germany
ton per mile
Fuel 0.55d. 0.96d.
Ore 1.19d. 0.51 d. 0.51d.
Pig Iron 1.2Od. 0.70d. 0.66d.
Finished Iron 1.63d. 0.70d. 0.72d.
United KingJom rates were higher than the rates of the chief iron-producing
countries after Britain by "116% for iron are, 60% for pig iron, 109%
for other iron, and 98% for steel rails, the average of the whole being
about 94%". (57) According to Jeans, the average cost per ton of pig iron
for the conveyance of raw materials in the United Kingdom was 10/10.9d.;
if the average Continental rate had applied it would have amounted to
5/2. (58) Like so many other commentators on the railway scene, Jeans,
when he wanted to illustrate the absence of any "guiding principle in
determining rates", found it easy to select examples from the Black Countryo
From Round Oak to London, the carriage on pig iron was 10/10 a ton; to
Liverpool the carriage was 10/-. The carriage on finished iron to London
was 15/-, whilst to Liverpool it was 11/-. Finally, Jeans was one of the
first spokesmen to mention the fact that whereas in the United States,
for example, freight reductions of over 50 per cent in the last ten years
had been realised, in Britain there had been no reductions whatsoever,
and, in some cases, increases had occurred. (59)
Although Hickman had admitted in 1881 that he knew little of Continental
freight rates, other representatives of the iron trade of the Black Country
were more forthcoming on this subject. As was to be increasingly the case,
(57) Select Committee on Railways, 1881, M.E. 8869.
(58) Bell's figures for 1886 differ greatly from this estimate. He gave
the following to the 1886 Royal Commission: Cleveland (7/- to 8/-); South
Wales (3/3 to 4/-); Scotland (412 to 5/-); Cumberland and Lancashire (10/-);
Lincolnshire (7/6); South Staffordshire (7/- to 12/6).
(59) Select Committee on Railways, 1881, M.E. 8935.
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:i t Has in those areas of trade \V'here foreign competition was beginning
to hurt that the loudest voices were raised about high freight rates.
~epresenting the galvanized iron trade of Birmingham and SO'J.th Stafford-
shire, ".• Heathfield gave evidence before the 1881 Committee and stated
tha t local manufacturers we re having to fight competition from both Belgium
and Germany in markets as far away as Australia.(60) Their export per-
formance was undoubtedly being held back because of the high railway
charges to London and Liverpool. D.J. Kempson, a partner in the Birmingham
firm of Thomas and Leonard Jenkins, iron and steel-wire manufacturers,
complained bitterly of "100's and 100's of tons" of wi re coming from
Belgium on to the Birmingham market and selling at 8/6 per cwt. delivered,
at a time vhan the list price for the local product was 10/-.(61) To
Kempson the reason for this was simple; bright iron vrire was carried to
London for 28/4 per ton, whereas Belgian wire came all the way to Birming-
ham from Antwerp/Rotterdam, via London, for 16/8. Under cross-examination,
it was expJained to Kempson that perhaps the real cause of his troubles
was the fact that the Belgian manufacturers could produce the "rire more
cheaply. Kempson was told by a member of the Select Commi, ttee:
" ••• you do not pay any charge upon your Birmingham wi re in Birmingham;
the Belgian wire is no doubt charged with a railway rate, but the
Birmingham wire has not seen a railway yet; do I tmderstand you to say
that the Belgian wire, with the addition of the freight to London,
and the railwaY rate from London to Birmingham, is cheaper in Birmingham
than Birmingham wire? Yes - it is cheaper". (62)
Kempson's agreement must have appeared tame to the Select Committee,
whereas, in one sense, he was right. Earlier in his evidence, Kempson
had come closer to the fact that the Belgians' pr0duction cnsts were
(60) Select Committee on lailways, 1881, M.E. 10,763.
(61) Ibid, 1ft.E. 11,5470
(62) Ibid, M.E. 11,566.
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lower because of the longer runs in production they were able to obtain
through meeting very largely the needs of the London market. Exactly why
were the Belgians able to obtain a rate of 16/8 for a distance of 313 miles,
when the Birmingham manufacturer had to pay a much higher figure for 113
miles? This aspect of the railway rates issue was to trouble Black Country
and Sheffield spokesmen on every occasion when evidence was called for by
parliamentary bodies. (63) The practice arose, in fact, of charging low
sea freight from the main Continental ports, notably Antwerp and Rotterdam,
because otherwise the ships would have come back in ballast. (64) In the
case of the actual journey on the railways, it was becoming customary by
1861 (and firm practice by 1900) for the railways to grant lower rates
th~n the ordinary local rates for the carriage of goods for export, "but
in order to comply with the law as to undue preference, the same rate
must also be charged on goods imported into the United Kingdom". (65)
This was cold comfort to the Black Country manufacturer, although one
member of the 1861 Select Committee did point out that Birmingham nail
manufacturers were able to benefit from the fact that low rates were being
quoted from Antwerp to Birmingham "for the iron rods whence the wire is
(63) See the 1911 Report, M.E. 5911 and 8135 - 41; also Appendix xix of
the same report, p. 849.
(64)In 1911, it is worth noting that the sea freight for the same journey
on goods going from Britain was appreciably higher than that on goods
coming into the country. In the case of iron and steel class C goods (in-
cluding Bessemer steel), it was 7/6 per ton outwards and 4/6 inwards; in the
ease of hardware the charges were 15/- and 13/- respectively.
(65) " ••• goods, such as hardware, imported, say, in London, are carried
to inland towns at lower rates per ton mile than such goods would be
charged, say, from Birmingham to the same town••• " 1911 Report, M.E. 5911 0
drawn" • (66)
The Black Country obtained nothing from the workings of the 1881 Select
Committee, and Alfred Hickman determined on other courses of action. By
now he had become the leading spokesman in the district on the question of
freight rates. As Chairman of the Wolverhampton Chamber of Commerce, he
endeavoured, in 1883 and 1884, to get the railway companies to reduce their
rates on traffic affecting the Midlands. A Standing Joint Committee on
Railway Matters, comprising representatives from the major iron centres
in the district, was set up and in early 1884 the trade press spoke hope-
fully of the chances of a newly-created South Staffordshire Railway and
Canal Freighters' Association with its headquarters in Wolverhampton. (67)
Virtually no progress had been made when, in 1885-6, the Royal Commission
took a hard look at the effects of railway charges on the economy as a
whole. In answer to question 10 of a circular sent out to Chambers of
Commerce by the Royal Commission (68), the Wolverhampton Chamber of Commerce
unhesitatingly replied: "The most important circumstance affecting the trade
of this district is the unfair, unequal, and excessive railway rates
which are charged upon all its productions". In February 1886, Hickman
(66) Select Committee on Railwas, 1eS1, M.E. 15,461-3-6.
(67) Iron, 22/2/84.
(68) Q.10. "Are there any special circumstances affecting your area to
which the existing condition of trade and industry there can be attributed?"
A. "The most important circumstance affecting the trade of this district is
the unfair, unequal, and excessive railway rates which are charged upon
all its productions. Being an inland district all its manufactures have
to go away by railway or canal, and obtaining its supplies of raw material
to a large extent from a distance, it is entirely dependent upon its means
of communication. The rates charged are excessive, as compared with either
those obtaining in any other district in the United Kingdom, or in Europe
or in America ••• " (Material in the possession of the local Chamber of
Commerce, Wolverhampton).
was a prominent speaker at a Special General Meeting held by the Wolver-
hampton Chamber of Commerce on the subject of foreign competition. He
was convinced that at the root of most of the district~ ills were the
heavy freight charges. Since his appearance before the 1681 Committee,
when he had, indeed, to admit his ignorance of foreign rates, Hickman had
made a thorough investigation of Continental canal and railway rates.
Speaking of the local canal rates in comparison with those then prevailing
on any of the French and German canals, he said:
"The rates now charged on the French canals for haulage, toll and all
expenses averaged about -.}d. per ton per mile, and on the German canals
the rate was less than id. as compared to this district, where the raw
material was charged for tollage alone 1id. per mile •• " (69)
Hickman further pointed out that in England they had to pay twelve times
as much for toll on certain material on the Birmingham Canal as the Germans
had to pay for carriage including toll.
Alfred Hickman was the obvious choice to present evidence on behalf of
the Black Country iron and steel indastry to the Royal Commission. (70)
Between 1881 and 1886, Hickman held that railway rates had become even
"more oppressive", in as much "as the price of iron and materials have
been lowered". (71) In 1873, the cost of freight from the Birmingham
district to London had amounted to one-sixteenth of the price of the goods,
whereas in 1886 it amounted to between one-sixth and one-eigth. He severely
(69) Minutes Book, entry for 5 February 1886.
(70) He appeared before the COmmission as a member of the Council of the
Mining Association of Great Britain, of the Associated Chambers of Commerce,
of the South Staffordshire Ironmasters' Association, of the Wolverhampton
Chamber of Commerce and as Chairman of the South Staffordshire and East
Worcestershire Freighters' Association.
(71) Report of the Royal Commission, 1886, N.E. 12,505.
h"
cri tic i sed the ra i Iway companies for a lLegedLy making up their losses
uh i ch t':1C)y'nc1;r1'ed ,n the passenger t raf'f'Lc by raising the charges on
gnods cal'r; age. (72) 'I'he railivay companies engaged in teo much competi bon
'-~, th TE;5ll'd tJ attracting passenger traffic; he gave an example of the
numbs'" of t-:'ains running between Birmingh<"Ull and London - "no Jess than
56 trains r-un every day, 28 trains each vraytl. On another occas i on ,
Hickman had stated that the number of trains running each day between
\'[olverhampton and London - "48 trains, besides 28 others on the Midland
and \'1est r·"idland tl - amounted to "gr-oas mi.smanagemerrt"; He gave as a further
example the number of trains which ran each day between London and Glasgow -
"15 each ''lay each costing the rail way company about £60tl • (73) The failure
of the last few years to get the railway companies to reduce their rates
was to be seen in Hickman's wish to the Royal Commission that the Railway
and Canal Commission would become a more active partner in the struggle
for cheaper rates. Again, he wanted to see the Commission take more
direct interest in the running of the canals, especially 1JTi th respect to
such things as through-rates between places having an unbroken line of
communication over different canals. Hickman also made the point that whilst
the South Staffordshire district had to pay at least 1td. per ton per
mile on the canals, their French and Belgian competitors had an average
canal rate of from id. to -ide per ton per mile, a figure which included
conveyance, tland prOVision of boats and every expensetl•
If.hen Sir Lowthian Bell, by far the most prominent witness on behalf of
the iron and steel industry to appear before the Royal Commission, gave his
evidence, he took a different view with regard to railway rates and their
(72) Report of the 10yal Commission, 1886, M.E. 12,513.
(73) Minutes Book, entry for 13 November 1895. On that particular occasion,
another Special Meeting of the Wolverhampton Chamber of Commerce, W.W.
Walker went so far as to express the view that they "would be really better
off if the rat Lways were under State control". A Foreign Competition
Committee was set up by the Chamber of Commerce.
influence on the industry. A little unfairly, he included Sir Bernhard
Samuelson in his view that there was little to ch~se in the rates charged
.in the United Kingdom and on the Continent. His figures to the Royal
Commission bore no relation to those given by Jeans in 1881; Bell tried
to show what a particular journey in Britain would have cost in both
Gc~any and Belgium. Even if we take his figures to be accurate, but they
are, indeed, in sharp contrast -.,ri th other 'independent' sets of figures,
those relating to the iron trade of South Staffordshire show that in every
case except Northamptonshire are the South Staffordshire rate was apprec-
iably higher than what a similar journey would have cost on the Continent.
Br-i tish Journey Cost German Equivalent Belgian Eguiv.
Northants ore to
Great Bridge (74) 3/2 3/3 3/8
Coke - S. Wales to
Darlaston 7/3 6/10 4/7
Cleveland pig iron
11/3to Birmingham 7/10 6/2
Barrow pig iron
10/9 6/1 4/7to Birmingham
Kettering pig iron
5/10to Wolverhampton 3/11 3/6
Wellingboro' pig iron
5/10 3/11 3/9to Wolverhampton
Whitehaven pig iron to
Tipton 11/8 7/11 5/3
Barrow pig iron
to Tipton 10/6 6/7 4/9 (75 )
From the findings of the Royal Commission it is clear that Bell's views
on freight charges were accepted in preference to those pertaining to
Hickman and others from inland centres of the iron trade. (76) Almost
without exception, writers have since tended to dismiss the views of
(74) In this case, Bell was probably thinking of the ore located on the
south-west extremity of the field. It would be transported from Blis-
worth by the LNWR.
(75) Material selected from Bell's eVidence, Appendix, part i, pp 345 et seq.
(76) The Final Report of the Royal Commission, pp. viii - ix, included a
section on the iron and steel industry in which was lfritten: " ... Much
stress was also laid on the cost of railway carriage as affecting the
coal and iron trades".
Hickman and others, st8.ting that they both exaggerated the levels of
frc:ip;ht ch;orge3 o.nd that it was impossible to make a fair comparison be-
tvleen 5r ti sh and Continental charges because of the vastly differing
s i h~Bti"ns »hich ex i s tcd .in the various countr-i ea, Nevertheless, it is
.mrth1'lhile to look a t the transport issue from a number of po.irrts , even
if some old goro'll1d is re-covered, and the f'oLl.owi.ng aspects have been
selected for examination:
i. developnents both in the United states and on the Continent
b~tween 1875 and 1913;
ii. the various policies purs1Jed by the transport lobby in the
Black coun t ry after 1886.
The United States.
Before an attentive audience in 1902, J.S. Jeans told members of the
South Staffordshire Iron and Steel Institute that "the history of the
American iron trade in the last thirty years is in no small part a history
of transportation".(77) Andrew Carnegie would have agreed wi th him for
in the next yenr, he told members of the British Iron and Steel Institute
exactly what it meant in transportation terms for the American industry
to sell "wi, thout loss hundreds of thousands of tons of 4-inch steel
billets at 3 pounds for one penn~ (62/3 per ton):
"To make that 3 pOlll1ds of steel, at least 10 pOlll1ds of material were
required - 3 polll1ds of coke, mined and transported 60 miles to the
works; 1+ pounds of lime, mined and transported 150 miles and 4+ pOlll1ds
of ironstone, mined at Lake Superior and transported 900 miles to
Pittsburgh, being transferred tWice, once from cars into the ship,
and again from the ship into the railway cara", (78)
In fact, the great distance through which raw materials had to be carried
was the distinctive "feature of the American iron industry" in the last
quarter of the nineteenth century.(79) From the early and middle 1860's,
(77) Proc. S. Staffs., 1902-3, p. 43.
(78) J.1.S.1., ii, 1903, p. 9.
(79) H.H. Campbell, op cit, p. 441.
"ch e ra i !"\v,::y oon.oarri e s had played an increasingly significant role in the
deve Lopraen.t .-f ":he Ameri-can Lndus t ry ; in some cases the ra i l',Jay companies
could be said to have adopted a "forstering caret! towards the industry,
pr-ovr d i ng the credit etc. to site furnaces along a particular line. (SO)
By the early 1870's, when the then Mr. Lowthian Bell accepted an invitation
to vi s i t the ironrorks of the United States, there were a' ready 70,651
mi les of rniLroad laid down there, compared ',Ii th 16,OS2 miles in the
United Kingdom. (81 ) A very important difference between the two countr.ies
concerned the cnst of railway construction, £36,582 for the United Kingdom
compared ·,·ii th £11,500 in the United States. However, as yet, railway rates
were high in the United states - Bell put them at 1fd. per ton per mile
f()r distances under 40 miles - and in the case of the leading ironworks
in Pennsylvania the cost of bringing the are, flux and fuel together
was about twice the f'igure given for the Cleveland district. (S2) Because
of these high freight costs, and the variations in the quality and type of
are, un t i l the late 1870's it was as cheap to take Spanish ores or Bri tish
West Coast hematite to Pennsylvania. The State of Pennsylvania was itself,
until 1880, t!the heaviest producer of iron are in the Union", although
the quantLty mined was insufficient to supply its blast furnaces.
:With the discovery of vast supplies of ore in the Lake Superior area,
it became of the greatest importance for the American iron and steel in-
dustry to meet the challenge of having to transport the ore over very long
(80) J.T.S.T., ii, 1872, pp. 108 - 9, article by T.G. Smith of Phila-
delphia: "Weftern Development of Iron Manufacture in the United Sta t e s'",
Smi th ~'Jrote: "Following the example of Reading Railroad, one of our "restern
lines i offering to give in fee not only the land upon TroThieh to build a
furnace, or a rolling mill, or a Bessemer steehrorks, but a l so 100 aeres
of coal land upon whi ch collieries can be cheaply and easily opened".
(81) Poor's Nanual of American Railways, quoted by Bell, J.1.S.1., .i ,
1875, p. 83.
-(82) J.l.S.I., i, 1875, p , 114.
0/"(1
I
DISTRICTS.
WEST V,
NORTHERN IRON
I
INDIANA:
I
I
I
I
I .
-~
I
I
I
I
I
I
c
,
\
J..
1 L L. I N 0 I s
WISCONSIN
~AST[RN 5Tol'TE.S.
\f"'t'-
IRON OIU " ••N
.. PUt '''ON
IN THL
P"ODUCTION
r-;»: -,
i \
i \
I \
I \
I .
i
r-
-i--
I
\
\
\
rL-.---'-
I
EJ
•
'-.,
'.
.s ..--...'
- _.- -·-'IS
I
i
"
\
\
I
\
I
I
I
I
I
: • L A e A"'" ...
-,
-,
-,
,
I
I
I
-.--1
f-
\
I
I
I
i
I
I
\
\
\
I
\
I
\
\
I1'- --
_.- -.~ .....
':
"I N· ... IIOT.
r---- -
)
-._-- ........... ..;
,
"'.... -".-\..."".,...' .... I
"---
I
r---
,,, .
and often difficult distances. The Marquette Range (Michigan), opened in
1845 but not extensively mined until a decade or so later, produced
155,722,000 tons of ore in the period 1854-1926. (83) In 1877, the
Menominee Range (Michigan) was opened and the first shipments from Escanaba
on Lake Michigan took place in 1880. By the following year, the output
of iron ore of Michigan was the highest in the Union. In 1884, ore from
the Gogebic Range, also in the north-west of Michigan, was sent east to
Permsylvania, Illinois and Ohio, and in the same year production started
from the Vermilion Range in Minnesota. The great bulk of the Lake Superior
Iron Outputs of the Lake Superior Ranges.
Marquette
Menominee
Vermilion
Gogebio
Mesabi
(1854-1926 )
(1877-1926 )
(1884-1926 )
(1884-1926 )
(1892-1926 )
155,722,000
152,544,000
51,533,000
160,547,000
747,932,000
ore (see Maps 11 and 12), mined comparatively cheaply, was transported by
rail to the ports and then by ship to ports on Lake Erie, notably Cleveland,
the largest distributing centre on the Lake. The Lake journey varied from
750 to 900 miles, and in 1881 the contract rate on ore from Escanaba was
10/H·d. (12.45c.) per ton. In 1897 and 1898, the same journey could be
made for 1/1otd. (45c.), although the average price quoted in the two years
1898 and 1899 on the Lakes was 2/6 (60c.) per ton. (84) Freight rates on
the Lakes were, in fact, subject to eratic fluctuations; nevertheless, they
provided the iron and steel manufacturers of the Eastern States with the
cheapest means of transporting iron ore in the world. From Cleveland, the
ore was carried by rail to Pittsburgh and the Mahoning and Shenango
Valleys. To save the cost of railway transport on the ore from Cleve-
land, the Illinois Steel Company built a large steelworks at Chicago,
whilst the Johnson Steel Company chose Lorain on Lake Erie, just
24 miles to the west of Cleveland, as the most suitable site in the
(83) ICTR. Jubilee Issue, 1927, p. 205.
(84) BITC Report, 1902, American Industrial Conditions and Competition, p. 105.
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United states for pig iron production, that is, as near as possible to
the Connellsville area for coke whilst maintaining the direct water link
with the Lake Superior ores o It follows that both the Mahoning and Shenango
Valleys, situated some 65 miles from Cleveland and 135 miles from the
coke area, were not so well located as Lorain - if the assembly of the raw
materials is taken as the chief locating factor. Ptttsburgh, involving
a journey of 150 miles for the are and a 50 mile haul for the coke, was
even less well situated; yet, Pittsburgh vms the home of the Carnegie Steel
Company, the leading iron and steel producer in the world. Apart from the
organising genius of Carnegie himself, two factors made possible the con-
tinued hegemony of Pittsburgh. In 1892, the giant Mesabi Range (Minnesota)
of iron are was discovered; this was but two years after the visit to the
United States of the British Iron and Steel Institute when Sir Lowthian
Bell had gone on record as saying that Birmingham, Alabama, would dictate
the price at which pig iron would be sold. Carnegie, on hearing of the ore
discovery, was reported to have said that the ore would "have to be as
cheap as dirt". By use of steam shovels - which made it commercially
feasible to remove two tons of overburden to get one ton of are - etc.,
IU
the are was,-cheap as Carnegie wi shed for. In 1895, for example, "Mesabi
are ••• sold ••• f.o.b. Lake Erie docks, at 82.50 per ton for Bessemer and
81.75 for non-Bessemer, and for 1897 and 1898 ••• at 82.10 to 82.15 for
Bessemer and 81.70 to 81.80 for non-Bessemer••• "(85) Carnegie already
owned some of the largest and most modern ships on the Lakes; he now set
about reducing the cost of the haul from the shore to Pittsburgh to the
barest minimum by constructing what was probably the most effective, single
purpose railroad system in the world, the Pittsburgh, Bessemer and Lake
Erie Railroad. The railway connected Bessemer with the port of Conneaut,
156 miles away on Lake Erie; it was especially constructed for mineral
(85) I.C.T.R., Jubilee Issue, 1927, p. 205.
traffic, "the working expenses being reduced to a minimum by having long
and heavy trains of large cars drawn by powerful locomotives, all passenger
traffic with its attendant complications and expenses being excluded".(86)
The cost per ton per mile was little more than id., in other words, only
about one-eigth of the cheapest average ton-mile rate charged on the
North-Eastern Railway, thought by Bell to be the most efficient railway
serving a major iron and steel producing area in the United Kingdom.
Even charging such low rates as those quoted to Jeans in 1901, the
Operational Facts of the Bessemer Railroad in 1900
Total Freight Traffic
Gross Freight Receipts
Average Receipts per ton mile
" Length of Haul
" Live Load per Train
" Tonnage Carried per
Loaded Wagon
4,180,391 tons (60% iron ore)
"2,112,860
0.20d.
121.78 miles
868 tons
37 tons
Bessemer Railroad was able to make a "handsome profit" (87), a fact which
prompted Jeans to comment:
"When one thinks of the rates charged on British railways, as typified
by the normal charge of 10/- to 12/- for the transport of pig or other
metal from South Staffordshire to London, a distance of 120 mi~es,
and by a charge of 7/6 for carrying a ton of coke from the South
Durham coalfields to West Cumberland, an average distance of less than
100 miles, this American ore carrying line surely suggests great
possibilities in the way of cheapening British mineral transportation
in the future". (88)
Jeans and Bell were poles apart in their interpretation of the signif-
icance of American freight rates. Bell tended to pour scorn on the
fonner's views, especially Jeans' belief that "American railways had
(86) Proe. S. Staffs., 1987-8, p. 28.
(87) BIT,C 1902 Report, p. 95.
(88) Ibid, PP. 95 - 6.
a ttained a dee-ree of economy to T'rhi_ch our ra i Iways are strangers" (89);
nevert~AJe8s, even Bell in 1890 had to admit that reductions of between
)7 and 52 per cent had been made in the cost of the assemblage of
raw' m2.te~ials ove r the fifteen years' inte:r'val behreen his visits to the
United St0tes.(90) He vro to in 1890 that information whf.ch he had re-
ceivad proved that f're i.ght rates on iron ore from the Lake ports to the
pig .i r-on pr-oduc i ng districts of Ohio and Pennsylvania had been reduced
from O.791d. per ton per mile to 0.396d., and from 0.740d. to 0.360d..
respectively in the decade from 1880 to 1889.(91) Rates for carrying coke
had dropped to 0.650d. (60 mile journey) and .287d. (528 miles). The
charge per mile for conveying steel rails over a distance of 479 miles
per ton (2240 lbs.) had also gone down from 0.365d. in 1880 to 0.235d.
in 1890. By 1900, similar reductions had again taken place; for example,
coal was often carried for as littlwas 0.16d. per ton per mile on jour-
neys of between 450 and 500 miles. The whole assemblage charge on a ton
of pig iron made in Pittsburgh in 1901 was 8/4.
In looking for an answer (or answers) to explain just how freight rates
in the United States were reduced so dramatically, Bell and Jeans, be-
tween them, give a full if often conflicting account. Bell accepted the
(89) Bell'S views can be found in the 1890 Special Volume on America
published by the Iron and Steel Institute; those of Jeans in the BIW
Report of 1902. Bell was correct in denying Jeans' view that the cheaper
freight rates largely accounted > for the growth of the American iron
and steel industry. In every other point, however, Jeans was much nearer
the truth, and he took delight in prOVing incorrect so many of Bell's
prophecies. See 1902 Report, pp. 116 - 118.
(90) J.r.S.I., Special Volume, 1890, p. 48.
(91) Ibid, p. 49.
view of "an old friend of great experience in railway matters":
"First, The increase of capital, whereby competing lines have been
established, which struggle for supremacy in tonnage, and cause great
reductions in rates.
Second, The use of steel rails has enabled the companies to use much
heavier locomotives, and thereby the cost of carriage has been greatly
reduced.
Third, The improvements which have been made in the construction of steam-
vessels upon the lakes of our northern border have greatly reduced the
cost of transportation by water, which changes have compelled railroad
companies to reduce rates to a corresponding extent". (92)
Jeans gave the following as the most important causes of the "Lower Range
of American Rates and Charges":
"first, the cheaper cost of construction; second, the greater competition,
owing to there being practically free trade in transportation; third,
the less amount of handling done by the railway oompanies in relation
to the length of haul; fourth, the stimulus to secure and develop traffic;
and fifth, the economies in the conditions and cost of transport intro-
duced within recent years. These are not submitted as the whole of the
oauses, but they are the most important". (83)
According to Jeans' figures the cost of construction in the United States
was a bout oneQquarter the English cost. Little or no "free trade in trans-
portation" existed in Britain, with the result that there was but scant
competition between the various railway companies. Rather than see any
railway company go under in Britain, the amalgamation movement had of
necessity entailed the absorption of unprofitable lines by the major
companies. This was not the case in the United States where, partly as
a result of "unrestricted competition" in the period 1876 to 1900, some
(92) J.l.S.l., Special Volume, 1890, p. 50.
(93) BI~ Report, 1902, p. 92.
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634 companies, and representing "113,275 miles of line, and a total capital
in bonds and stocks of 86,388+ million, went into the hands of receivers".
(94) A member of the 1881 Select Committee on Railways had the American
situation very much in mind when he accused Hickman of wanting to destroy
the railways:
"Do you not think that it may be just possible that in endeavouring
to force upon the railway companies a rate which you chose to term
fair, the ironmasters may also now not be looking far enough ahead,
but may be ruining and crushing railway enterprise?" (95)
However, it did not follow automatically that low freight rates had
caused the downfall of so many lines in the United States. Jeans commented:
"The railroads of the United States are ••• builtin advance of both
population and traffic, and it depends largely on their staying powers
whether they can be kept alive until they become self-supporting. The
Pennsylvania Railroad, which quotes among the lowest rates known, even
in the United States, has long been a prosperous exercise, and has
demonstrated the possible co-existence of low rates and good divi-
dends". (96)
Undoubtedly, the amount of handling in relation to the length of haul
greatly favoured the Americans; with one or two. exceptions, the length of
haul in the United Kingdom did not exceed 35 miles, whereas in the United
states it was approximately 112 miles. If a direct comparison is drawn
between the Pennsylvania Railroad and the North-Eastern, then the former
carried its traffic an average distance of 109 miles whilst the latter's
average "was probably no more than 22 miles, or say about one-fifth of
its great American oompeti tor". (97) It is with regard to Jeans' fifth
(94) BIT~ Report, 1902, p. 105.
(95) Select Committee on Railways, 1881, M.E. 4544.
(96) BIT:C Report, 1902, p, 105.
(97) Ibid, pp. 89 - 90.
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point that the record of the British railways of the last twenty-five
years of the nineteenth century compared most unfavourably with the main
ones in the United States. In 1888, Jeans had argued, and had been severely
taken to task by Bell, no doubt in his capacity as a director of the
North-Eastern, that British railway managers would have been well-advised
to visit the United States and see the improvements being made there.
One of the most significant was the growth in size of railway wagons, a
factor stressed by E.P. Martin in his Presidential Address to the Iron and
Steel Institute in 1897. (98) With their larger wagons the American com-
panies had greatly reduced their tare; Martin gave an example of the
Taff Vale Railway Company increasing the si%e of its trucks to ten tons
and then asked: "Why not 25 or 40 tons?" The 5-ton car (wagon) was used
for mineral traffic in the United States in the 1860's but from that time
onwards there was a steady increase in size, together with a decline in
the deadweight. The 2o-ton truck was introduced in 1876; the 25-ton in
1883; the 3D-ton in 1885; the 40-ton in 1895 and the 50-ton by 1900. In
terms of the enlargement of train-loads, on the New York Central the
figure rose from 258 English tons in 1896-7 to 365 tons in 1900-01; on
the Iake Shore Railway it advanced from 119 tons in 1872 to 224 in 1880,
238 in 1890, and 404 in 1900. On the Pennsylvania Line in 1900 the ton-
load was 431; compared with these, the figure for the LNWR had been 59.4
tons in 1872, 65.6 in 1880 and 68.6 in 1900, but it was felt by many ob-
servers that the conservative approach of the Railway Clearing House had
practically confined them to the use of 10-ton trucks. To pull the heavier
loads in the United states, improved locomotives had been necessary, and
this demand had been met by the Baldwin Locomotive Works which, by 1900,
were prodUCing freight locomotives of 100 tons (the standard Americah
freight locomotives in 1870 had been 40 tons), Obviously, the longer
(98) J.I.S.I., 1897, p. 37.
hauls characteristic of the American system would have necessitated more
powerf'ul engines, but another factor ,'Thich ,'TaS of considerable influence
"ms the increased traffic on the railways. Greater intensity of traffic
in the Uni ted Kingdom had resul ted very largely in the rail vTay companies
Hanting to cut back on their supposedly less profitable traffic (the
point of I saue be twe en Hickman and the raihray management); certainly,
greater density of traffic did not lead to a lowering of freight rates
as a resll.lt of improvements influencing running costs. The absence of
la~ger trucks did lead, if only occasionally, to running difficulties in
the Black Country. In December 1893, for example, a great demand for
coal arose in the area; the LNWR. was scarcely able to meet the heavy
demand for wagons , The railway companywaa running 120 trains a day
a.t the height of the coal shortage, each of them made up of between 20
and 40 trucks. (99) Be-tween 1880 and 1900, the ton-mileage figures on
the U~W?c rose by nearly 30 per cent, yet the train-load increased by only
4.6 per cent.(100) Samuel Fry, ma.nager of the Great Central Rai11'lay in
1900, was prepared to concede superiority to the Americans:
"Where the Americans'lre far superior to us is in the economical man-
agement of the freight traffic. This is the reason why they can show
greater net earnings while charging lower freight rates and paying
higher wages than our roads. One of the first things the English roads
will have to do "lnll be to get heavier and more powerful engines for
freight traffic". (101 )
At the end of 1901, the Pennsylvania Railroad and the North-Eastern
company had the following rolling stock:
(99) Colliery Guradian, 8/12/93.
(100) 1,194,078,000 tons in 1888 and 1,549,556,000 tons in 1900.
(101) Collie~ Guardian, 23/11/01.
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Pennsylvania Railroad North-Eastern '1ailway
Lacomo tives 1,889 2,121
Passenger cars 1,779 2,884
Goods and
mineral cars 52,784 98,248 (102 )
In each case, the English company possessed more eq1upment than its Amer-
icc.n counterpart, and yet the latter carried twice as much freight over
a much greater area. It followed that the American equipment had to perform
!"
to higher standards than in Britain, but it also meant that each American
locomotive handled "from six to ten times the quantity of paying traffic"
of its British opposite. Initial capital outlay, maintenance, and labour
costs all favoured the American company. Obviously, these major American
developments could not have been introduced on all British routes; the
fact is that before the First World War virtually nothing was achieved
in this direction. As late as 1929, there were only 26,000 wagons of 20-
ton capacity in use on British railvmys, a figure representing but three
per cent of the total number of mineral wagons. A prominent economist
wrote in the early 1900's:
"In England again the general introduction of the larger truck and
longer train would prove very costly, since turn-tables, weigh-bridges,
goods-yards with their sharp turnings and sidings - the number of which
is legion on the British system, which reaches with its ramifications
to the very doors of innumerable factories and warehouses - are
accom,:oda ted to the small truck and short train". ( 103 )
No matter how true this was it was the refusal of both industry and the
railway companies as a whole in Britain to face such difficulties that
was leading to the country becoming less and less competitive in inter-
national markets in the period prior to the First World War. Charles
Schwab, then President of the United States Steel Corporation, told Jeans
that "one of the chief causes of our not maintaining our place in the
(102) BIT~ Report, 1902, p. 90.
(103) S. Chapman, Work and Wages and Foreign Competition, 1904, p. 281.
rrs.
world's commerce was the defective character of our railway organisation,
and the consequently high railway rates generally oharged". (104) Carnegie's
advice to the British railway companies had long been the same - "make
a bonfire of their rolling stock generally".
The Continent.
Iron production in Germany was originally tied to the ore deposits,
with the result that the industry was to be found chiefly among the hills
and valleys on the Upper Rhine, in UpperSilesia and in the Harz Mountains o
With the growing use of coke in the blast furnaoes the industry tended to
migrate towards the coalfields, especially towards the Ruhr district.
This move presented the German industry with enormous transportation
problems; in the first place the chief ore and coal deposits were now
at considerable distances apart and, secondly, the native German ores
were of low quality resulting in the need to transport even larger quan-
tities of fuel for their reduction. Before the discovery of the basic
process, too, Germany was compelled to import large quantities of hematite
ore from Spain (as was Britain). As Bell pointed out to the Royal Commission
it cost roughly the same amount of money to transport Spanish ore to
either South Wales, the Middlesbrough district or Rotterdam; the Germans
then had to pay a further 4/- per ton to carry the ore to their blast
furnaces, with the result that "this item alone will make a ton of Bess-
emer pig iron cost 8/- above what the same iron, in some cases, can be
produced at furnaoes on the Tyne or at Middlesbrough". (105) Even with the
basic process making available the huge ore resouroes of German Lorraine
and Luxembourg (the ore was very cheap and self-fluxing) there still re-
mained some 250 miles between the ore and the Westphalian coke. Because
it was more expensive to transport the ore to the coalfields, there was
a tendency for the German industry to migrate a second time, and many
(104) BIT.C Report, 1902, p. 87.
(105) Royal Commission on Depression of Trade, 1886, AppendiX Bell's
Evidence, p. 347.
of the leading works in Rhenish-Westphalia erected new blast furnaces
and steelworks in Lorraine. A locational break-down of the industry in
the years 1908-12 was as follows:
Rhineland-westphalia••••••••••••• 43%
German-Lorraine/Luxembourg••••••• 31%
Saar, Siegerland & Lahn
districts and Hesse-Nassau••••••• 13%
Silesia•••••••••••••••.•••••••••• 0.6%
In the same period, 66 per oent of the Lorraine-Luxembourg ore was con-
sumed locally, whilst 13 per cent was sent to Westphalia and 11 per cent
to the Saar. (106)
Even this brief account of the shifts in the location of the German
industry will make it abundantly clear just how important it was for
the industry to be served by good transport faoilities. Fortunately, the
Germans were able to take full advantage of excellent natural facilities
for assembling the raw materials and distributing the finished product.
The coalfields of Westphalia were intersected by the Rhine, into which
flowed the Moselle from Lorraine. Furthermore, the Rhine was navigable
by sea-going vessels (carrying 5,000 tons), and barges (carrying 2,000
tons) could go up to Mannheim. With the opening of the Ems-Dortmund Canal
in 1899, cargoes of 900 tons could piss directly from the Rhine to the
sea. Generally, the average barges on the German river and canal systems
carried 600 tons, against the 300 on French canals and canalized rivera,
and 30 tons on the English canals. (107) Indeed, the main difference
between vater transport faoili ties in Germany and those in England was
the latter's absence of navigable rivers ("to which canals are merely
adjuncts"). Of the total length of naVigable waterways in Great Britain,
less than 27 per cent consisted of rivers, as against 92 per cent in
(106) Parliamentary Pape~ 1913, No. 285, Iron and Steel, 1912, p.27.
(107) Harbord and Hall, op cit, pp. 519 - 20.
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Germany. (108) A further important difference concerned the average rise
per mile on the waterways, important because of the great differenoe in
1'17.
the cost of locks per mile of waterway. On the English canals, the average
rise per mile was 10.8 feet, compared with 1.5 feet on the continent, or
just over seven times as much. (109) Apart from a brief spell after 1840,
when railroad construction tended to divert oapital and attention from
the waterways, continued efforts were made to improve water transport
facilities. Hard upon unification in 1871 came a policy of creating a
coordinated transport system out of the railroads, rivers and canals; as
a result of a large expenditure of capital, by 1903 Germany had almost
9,000 miles of navigable waterway. Much of the shallow "cuts" of earlier
decades had been turned into wider and deeper canals. Not surprising,
therefore, that water freight rates were lower in Germany than in England,
but Hickman was fully justified in complaining of the fact that the Black
Country ironmasters had to pay eight times the rates charged on raw
materials in Germany.
Important though the waterways were to the German economy, the develop-
ment of an excellent railway system was even more significant:
"Hindered hitherto by a short coast line, by the northern flow of her
rivers and by the freezing of her canals in Winter, she gained new
outlets East, West and South at all times of the year. She became a
Mediterranean power by the oompletion of the railway over the St.
Gotthard in 1882. She obtained great economio influenoe in North Italy
and Genoa became an important German outlet. In the same way the railway
(108) 62% of the waterways in Franoe were navigable rivers.
(109) Two extreme oases - from Birmingham to the Bristol Channel, a dist-
ance of 72 miles, there were no fewer than 62 locks, 5 tunnels and 115
bridges; from Berlin to Hamburg, a distance of 230 miles, there were only
3 lOCks.
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to Constantinople made her a power in the Balkans with commercial
interests in the Levant. She was connected by railway with France
on the West and Russia on the East and became the centre of the con-
tinental system of distribution, thereby affecting the hitherto
unrivalled sea distributing posi tion of England". (110)
Before 1871, some 12,000 miles of track had been put down by some 70 state
governments or private companies in the area of the neW German Empire.
Generally, the builders of the German railroads had tended to follow the
American, rather than the British, pattern of cheapness in construction
and operation, a result of which was that the cost per mile of railroad
was only £20,275. Although Bismarck failed to create an Imperial Railway
system, public owne r-sha.p of the greater part of the railways enabled
Germany to fit them more neatly into an overall economic policy. In a
sense, the iron and steel interests benefited from the fact that the
states, not the Empire, owned the railways because individual state Min-
isters were willing to promote exports through offering preferential rates;
in 1893 and 1897 special reductions were made on the carriage of iron and
steel goods which amounted to export bounties. Officially, preferential
rates were described as "applicable to agricultural and industrial pro-
ducts, and intended to assist and facilitate import and export, and in-
crease the traffic of the country"; in the case of iron and steel goods
for export preferential rates were the rule rather than the exception. It
would be quite incorrect, however, to give the impression, as some English
observers did at the time, that the German railways were a further form of
state subsidy to either the iron and steel industry or to German industry
as a whole; running losses were incurred, but, in 1911 for example, after
all working and capital costs had been met, the railways showed a total
(110) L.C.A. KnOWles, The Industrial and Commercial Revolutions in
Great Britain during the Nineteenth Century, 1930, p. 187.
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surplus of 190,000,000.
It was clear from the evidence presented to the 1881 Select Committee
that Germany's cheaper freight rates were causing concern amongst English
industrialists. Bell might choose to deny the fact, both in 1881 and in
1886 at the time of the Royal Commission when he estimated that Rhenish
and Westphalian works were 15/- a ton of pig iron "worse situated than the
English and Welsh works for carrying on a foreign trade" (111), but the
cheaper freight rates available to the Germans enables firms in Oberhausen,
Dortmund and Ruhrort - more than 120 miles from the nearest tide-water -
to compete with British works situated upon or within a few miles of the
sea. In 1880-81, for example, it cost Sheffield hardware producers 22/6
per ton to convey their goods to either Hull, West Hartlepool or New-
castle (Tyne Dock) for export. This amounted to a rate per ton per mile
of between 2.061d. (Newcastle) to 4.655d. (Hull). On various steel goods,
the rate per ton per mile to all three ports was 1.374d. to 3.103d.,
the through rate per ton averaging out at 15/-. From Essen, to either
Amsterdam or Rotterdam, the rate per ton for hardware was 8/4.800d., or
from 0.76Od. to 0.822d. per ton per mile. Equally much lower rates were
charged on a whole range of iron and steel goods. (112) A further sign
that German iron and steel goods were threatening former British markets
can be seen in the growing number of consular reports which contained
reference to German competi tion. Many of the European-based consuls linked
this faot to the exoellent transport facilities available to German ex-
porters - the fact that Germany could get her goods into European markets
"at the cost of one handling and one train journey at very cheap rates".
The BITA Report of 1896 on the German and Belgian industries stressed
the value of the cheap transport rates; from figures quoted in the report
(111) Royal Commission on Depression of Trade, 1886, Appendix Bell's
evidenoe, p. 348.
(112) Sel~eot Committee on Railways, 1881, pp. 175 and 179.
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- "German firms, 150 miles from a shipping port, could reach Antwerp by
railway for 3+ marks, or 3/6 per ton of finished iron or steel" - it
was clear that substantial reductions had been made on the already low
freight rates of the 1880's. Indeed, if the outstanding advantage of
excellent railway facilities for the American iron and steel industry
had been extremely cheap assemblage of raw materials, for Germany it
seemed to British observers to be an excellent base from which to
launch an assault on British export markets.
Belgium was the first country in the world to plan a coordinated national
railway system; the base of the plan, conceived in 1834, was the con-
struction of two trunk lines, one from Ostend eastward towards Germany,
the other at right angles to it from Antwerp to the French border. Built
for the state on borrowed capital, the Belgian railways followed the
English pattern; if anything, even more attention was paid to the study
of engineering, fuel and cost accountancy problems. Freight rates were
low - too low at the commencement in that the railways incurred losses -
and, as a result, as well as stimulating the growth of Antwerp, the iron
industry received a great boost. Belgium's iron industry was based on
its coal resources, notably in the Liege district, and most of the iron
ore consumed was imported. Geographically, the Belgian works were more
favourably located than their Rhenish-Westphalian competitors for sea-
borne ore, especially the superior Spanish ores. According to Bell, in
1885 the carriage on imported ore per ton from Antwerp to the blast
furnaces was 2/4+ by boat or 3/6-t by rail, which made the "Belgian
smelters a little unfavourably situated than the works in South Wales, as
the sea freight to Cardiff is less than to Antwerp and the carriage to the
Welsh works from the port is also a Iittle lower". In the same period, ores
from Luxembourg to Liege or Ch.arleroi cost 6/- to 7/- per ton for carriage.
~en years later, transport costs had been reduced by from 35 per cent
to 45 per cent; the ton-mile rate was between O.35d. and O.45d •• Iron
and steel goods for export through Antwerp, for example, cost an average
u;
0.51d. per ton per mile.
Black Country Policy.
The meetings of the South Staffordshire Iron and Steel Institute in the
1880's and 1890's sometimes witnessed the occasional sign of animosity
between the ironmasters of the districy and the managerial ranks. Accus-
ations were, in fact, levelled at the ironmasters that they had failed
entirely to do anything concrete about the question of high freight
rates. To be fair to the ironmasters it was not for want of trying; un-
fortunately, the question of railway rates, at least in the minds of many
involved with the industry, had become acute. It was well known, for
example, that Nettlefolds had moved their steelmaking division from
Wellington, Salop, to South Wales because of differences of opinion with
the wailway companies; several other firms in one or other of the staple
trades had already moved, or were actively considering a move, to a
coastal site. Small concessions were, indeed, won from the railway com-
panies; reference has already been made to Hiokman's suocess and in 1885
the Freighters' Association had won a slight reduction on the freight
rates on galvanized sheet to London and Bristol. When, however, the
Standing Joint Committee on Railway Matters of the Blaok Country Chambers
of Commerce, together with a number of local mayors, petitioned the railway
oompanies for a general lowering of export rates, they met with failure.
The BITA Report on conditions in the German and Belgian industries was
published in the year when the now Sir Alfred Hiokman was the Association's
President; also, on the delegation to visit the Continent was J.S. Jeans.
Both men were, of oourse, prominent oritics of the English railway com-
panies and it should have oome as no surprise that the report should
oontain some unfavourable reflections on the home railways in comparison
with those of Germany and Belgium. Extremely low rates were quoted for the
main routes in Germany and Belgium and the rates for two districts of
similar location - Couillet in Belgium and South Staffordshire - were
contrasted:
Distance
Hiles
4-10 tons Rate per
ton mile
10 tons
upwards
Rate per
ton mile
Couillet-
Antwerp 70
s. Staffs.-
London 113
S. Staffs.-
Liverpool 97+
15/-
10/-
1.502d.
1.230d.
3/-
12/6
10/-
0.51d.
1.327d.
1. 230do
In the discussion on the report held by members of the Institute it was,
however, noticeable that voices were raised against making a straight-
forward comparison between English and Continental rates. Jno. W. Hall,
noted for a certain degree of obstinacy in the face of popular argument,
gave a fair summary of the differences:
"We have also to remember that in Belgium, at any rate, railways can
be made very much more cheaply than in our country; because that country
is almost dead flat, whereas this country has to be tunnelled and em-
banked. Land there is obtained at less cost than here, and in several
ways there are greater facilities for construction. They are also able
to buy cheaper material, they have cheaper labour, they have a better-
thought-out system of railways than we have, and, consequently, they have
long straight runs, whereas our railways were originally made from Little
Peddlington to Little Puddlington, stopping at both ends".(113)
Meanwhile, local ironmasters were seeking alternative means of cheap
transport; indeed, it was the view of many in the district "that things
would never improve whilst the district had no real alternative to the
railways for transport of goods. As things were, the canals were not a
tviable alternative'~ (114) E. Parkes had frequently argued for a greater
use of improved canals, whilst F. Scarf, of the Bromford Iron Company,
thought that "a canal capable of carrying barges of 150 tons capacity
need not be expensive (to construot), and it would effect an enormous
reduction in present rates". (115) There was considerable disagreement,
(113) Pree. S. Staffs., xi, 1895-6, P.1~1.
(114) CollierY Guardian, 3/2/93.
(115) Prec. S. Staffs., xi, 1895-6, p. 91.
amongst Black Country ironmasters, as to Which waterway should be improved -
to London, Liverpool or Bristol. In fact, each route had its supporters.
A most ambitious scheme, but one which reoeived the least support, entailed
the construction of a Birmingham-Liverpool Ship Canal; a survey was
carried out by a number of people, inoluding Sir James Brunless and Edwin
Clark, and agreement was reaohed in principle for a canal, 72 feet in
width, to run from Birmingham, through the Black Country, to Wolverhampton,
"thenoe, in a line aihmost due north, to Stoke-on-Trent, through the heart
of the Potteries, and then, in a north-westerly direction, to Kidsgrove,
Wheelock and Winsfmrd, where the canal would meet the Weaver at a plaoe
oalled the Top Flashes". The canal, a total of 61 miles and costing an
estimated £2t to £3 million, would have been large enough to accommodate
sea-going vessels of 300 tons burden, or barges of 400 tons. Nothing
came of these plans.. The second scheme was a proposal to improve the
existing canal navigation between the Black Country and Bristol. E.D.
Marten, engineer to the Sevem Commissioners, was engaged by the Bristol
Chamber of Commerce, following olose disoussions held with loeal bodies
in Wolverhampton under the chairmanship of Sir Alfred Hiokman, to draw
up plans. Marten oame up with a sGbeae to oost an estimated £360,000, and
whioh would have ended the different g&ugeson the existing eanals. Full
use would have been made of the tiyer Severn; some diaappointment was
,
o••asioned by MarteD s b~ief that it wollld haye beeD far too 008tly
to have altered the canal system froll WolverhamptoD to J.ldersley Junotion.
(116) Annual running oostswere estimated at £14,000, bllt if 01'111' one
q_rter of the eXistillg traffio Gould have been diverted from London then,
at a toll of 2/9 per ton, Z'eveD1l8 would haTe amounted to £68,000 per
year. bongst the reasons tor the failure of this seh... to oOlle to
frotien was the realisation that Bristol ¥ndled aUGh a aall percentage
of Black Country trade, Go.pared with both London and Liverpool.
(116) 12111' 1jI i!aldiaa.F-I2!9'.
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The third proposal was Hickman's contribution. Having outlined various
ideas in a pamphlet entitled "Improved Means of Water Communication
between the Midlands and the Ports of London, Liverpool and Gloucester",
Hickman decided on a "proposed canal between Birmingham and London to carry
steamers of 120 tons burden". Steam tugs could be used, each capable of'
drawing three barges, and Hickman also suggested the abolition of locks
as far as was possible.(117) A Committee of the Wolverhampton Town Council
was set up, under Hickman's chairmanship, to consider the proposal:
"The Committee estimated that the traffic between Wolverhampton and
London was three times as great as between Wolverhampton and Liverpool,
and seven times as great as between Wolverhampton and Bristol.
They concluded, therefore, that it was most important first to enlarge
the waterway to London". (118)
Another factor which helped to convince Hickman and his committee that the
route to London should be tried first was that the waterway to London
from the Black Country was in the hands of independently-owned canal
companies. The most important of these, the Grand Junction, was marginally
paying its way, but only because it charged a high rate; this was mainly
due to the fact that the smallness of the canal made imperative the USe
of small boats. Following the engagement of an engineer to draw up plans,
the cost of the project was estimated at £1.25 million, whilst "the
benefi t to be derived therefrom was a reduction in carriage charges on
iron from 12/6 per ton to 6/-; and on coal from 6/9 to 4/-". Much to
Hickman's disappointment, when the scheme was put before the Councils of
Birmingham and Volverhampton - "in the hope that, conjointly, they would
be willing to guarantee a low rate of interest on the capital required
taking into account the enormous advantage the undertaking would be to
the whole community" - there was no positive response. Some people felt
(117) CollierY Guardian editorial agreed With Hickman's proposals.
(118) lleDloranQumpresented by Sir Alfred Hickman to Volverhampton Town
Council, quoted in Proc. S. Staffs., xi, 1895-6, p. 116.
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that with the Manchester Ship Canal nearing completion at that time, it
would be better to wait and see how suoh schemes turned out. Hiokman was
himself convinced that the two schemes were totally different:
"Of course the Wolverhampton and London projeot is oonoeived on very
different lines to the Manohester Ship Canal, and, personally, I have
no doubt whatever that it could be a commercial success and at the
same time confer enormous benefits upon South Staffordshire". (119)
Thwarted in such efforts to create what Parkes called "a cheap inlet
and outlet for our goods" - there were plans to bu~ld a road from Coventry,
via Birmingham and Wolverhampton, to Manchester and Liverpool under private
enterprise but these, too, came to nought - the iron and steel industry
continued to plug away at the railway companies in the hope of gaining
reductions. Voices were occasionally raised in favour of the public owner-
ship of the railways, but the idea did not gain widespread support. On
one occasion it was pointed out that "any wholesale interference" with the
railways in Britain "would cause a serious disturbance of the general
interests of the community". Considerable praise had been given on that
oocasion to the German state-owned system, but ,a pro- British railways
speaker warned: "The one system you see is carried on by a military high-
handedness, the other is the free-handed dealing of Gammeroe". (120)
Instead of seeki~ outright state control, responsible bodies in the
Blaok Country began to demand more aotive partioipation in the running
of the railways either by the Railway and Ce.nal Transport OODllllis&ion or
by the Board of Trade. In 1893, a oommittee under the chairmanship ot
Shaw Lefevre, of which Sir Alfred Hio~" J[J•• was a member" had oonsid-
ered the possibility of a system whereby the Board of Trade would decide
between traders and the railft7 companies in matters at dispate, but had
(119) tetter from Hiokman to H.K. Punnett, quoted in Proo. S. Staffs.,
ii, 1895-6, p, 116.
(120) Ibid, p. 106.
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then rejected the idea. H.W. Edmunds, Chairman of the Railway Rates
Committee of the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce in 1911, raised the idea
again when he advocated a "general extension of the powers of revision
and direction and control by the Board of Trade" in the administration
of the railways before the Departmental Committee on Railway Agreements
and Amalgamations. (121) Edmunds argued that it was far too expensive
(he quoted figures of £2000 - £3000) for any but the largest firms to
take the railway companies before the Oommissioners; the latter were,
in fact, far too inaccessible. Edmunds went on to stress three complaints
felt by the Black Country industrialists and traders to be fully justified:
first, whilst the travelling public had received "enormous advantages
in the way of cheap excursions", the trading community was "in no better
posi tion than it was 20 years ago"; secondly, there had been an increase
, if an 'indirect one', in the rates on coal and ooke; thirdly, there had
been no inclination by the railway companies "to remove rate preferenoes
given to foreign merchandise". (122) An interesting omission from Edmunds'
list of complaints was his failure to mention railway monopoly. For years,
the Blaok Country spokesmen had argued the evils ot monopoly (W.A. Walber,
representing the BITA. before the 1911 Committee did, however, raise the
matter of the "agreements" between the three oompanies serving the distriot)
(123), but in 1909, Sir George Bingley, from Netherton, near Dudley,
clearly voiced a ohange of emphasis:
"I am not at all sure that trading interests are injuriously affeoted
by working agreements or amalgams.tiona, and with proper safeguards,
consider they are not Bluoh to be teared. The tact is that competitioD:.
(121) Report ot the :Departmental OoJl1li ttee on Railway Agreements and
Amalgamations, 1911, R.I. 5755.
(122) Ibid, M.I. 5819.
(123) Ibid, M.B. ~2.
has done practically all that can be expected from it, and if anything
is to be obtained, the companies must be allowed to effect economies.
There is no doubt, I think, that at present there is much duplicate
service which might be avoided - and consequent waste•••". (124)
Referenoe has already been made to Edmunds' third point; it was a serious
issue which affected other inland manufaoturing areas besides the Black
Country. Perhaps the fullest case against this practice of the railway
companies was given in 1911 by J.W. Sissons, representing the Sheffield
Chamber of Commerce. Sissons was especially angry over the fact that the
railway companies serving his ,area also had large interests in - if not
outright ownership of - the steamships which sailed from the ports to
which the railways carried the goods for export. Pressure was put on
traders and manufacturers to use those ships 'suggested I by the railway
companies, and through rates, i.e. Sheffield to Hamburg, were quoted to
the manufaoturers. Further information given by Sissons goes some way
I tt .
List of Docks Harbours Piers Wharves and
Worked or Controlled by the Great Western.
Docks. etc.
Briton Ferry
Brentford
Burnham(Somerset)
Chelsea Basin
Fishguard
Fowey
Garston Docks
Heysham
Holyhead
Llane1ly
Plymouth
Porthoawl
Saltney (Chester)
Railway Company
Great· Western
" "
" "London & North Western
and Great Western
Gras t Western
" "
London &North Western
Kidlaud
London &NorthWestern
Great Western
" "
" "
n "
towards explaining why Black COlUlt17 spokesmen did not make too mu.eh ot
this faot in 1911 • Itwuld appea.r that they had WOn sOlle concessions
from the railway companies. 5is80ns stated that Birmingham traders were
(124' Report onRailftt8.1909.:H~B'~4043~
(125) f&terialerirUted frO. 1~n1leport.
Itt.
given preferenoes over traders from Sheffield on a number of items with
regard to sea freight; sea freight on iron and steel (railway classification
C) was 7/6 ex-Sheffield, and 4/- ex-Birmingham, whilst on hardware it
was 15/- and 10/- respectively:
"The through rate (to a European port ) inclusive of the rail when ex-
Sheffield is 49/1 and when ex-Birmingham, W'olverhampton and Stourbridge
is 35/- •••• I might say that there is a most deadly competition between
such places as Sheffield, Birmingham, Wolverhampton in this trade. It
is a hand to hand fight and this 5/- per ton is a very important item."
(126 )
By the Edwardian years, it is clear that the Black Country ironmasters
were no longer so concerned over the high freight rates. This was, no
doubt, in part due to a general reoovery in prices (except at times of
severe economic dumping by either the Americans or Gennans); also, of
course, the finishing trades tended to benefit from the praotice of the
railway companies in allowing imported iron and steel goods into the
country at what amounted to cheaper freight rates (inward sea freights
were often 40 per oent lower than outward freights). Equally important,
however, was the belief that So~th Staffordshire would stand to benefit:
trom its olose proximity to B"ast ~dlands ores; instead of the former
aV~rs1Qn to Northamptonshire ore, ,there was now a proud boast by William
Poster, President of the South Staffordshire Institute for t~ 1900-9
i:i'ssion, that SOllth Staffor<ishire, NortbaJlptonshire and other Midland
'; ,; : ' " ,,' -- ;>~ , , <', '. "
.ttn~ret9 lre re "stillproducillJ the cahtt~~lJt piC in the world".(127) 'rhere
~s ,a certain astoni~hme!1t!\,.if'~9trell~op.a,inthe knOWledge that lorthants
QJ:'8 vas being carrie<i up to Middlesbrouch, - "!hat showed the fortunate
, " ' '." " r.;, .--:.. ' -. ': : -. ~ ',' .--, ' " , .
I'
$. ,
. r
~~?c~ >.}~po~ of1;e Dep'-f~4ffl~li'~~,tee " •• , 1~11 J ~... 8135-8141 •
A.•eordiDB to SiSS0D8, too! Oazmook had to pa7 a .. freight of 15/., thus
j&kiJig i t5/- W03:oa."o'tt p6f.i;toliYof UpOrtsthan t1ie neighbouring t01rD8
of Bi1'll1ng!Jam,Volftfteap1:on· ··&tldS-'rbridge.
r' 'J~::",<'.:}(;'~, '_:'~ ,,:=._-:~J_~"J,; ~ .,)t'.L"r ~ _ ,~)
~1~1} fi!.; 'Pt s#ti•. t D1T~ 1908-9~ p'. 10.
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position which the Midlands occupied with regard to ore supply, when even
Middlesbrough was coming to this district f'or a portion of' its ore re-
quirements". (128) Finally, local ironmasters had at last realised the
excellent position which the Black Country held to reoeive "an ever-
increasing quantity of iron and steel scrap of' considerable variety".
Foster commented in his Presidential Address: "'rhis material deserves
our best attention, owing to its capabilities in promoting to a great
extent the future prosperity of' the iron and steel and allied industries
in the Midlands". (129)
High freight rates, in the period of increasing domestic and foreign
oompetition, clearly played a significant role in the changed circumstanoes
of the Black Country 0 Whilst it would be almost impossible to estimate the
aetual extent of damage caused either to the area as a whole or to individ-
ual firms by the inadequate transport service provided by the railways
"
it was , nevertheless, of oonsiderable importanoe. A conservative esti-
mate put the railway charge in the early 1890's as equal to 10 per cent
on the average selling prioe. Most signifioant, the haulage issue helped
to create an air of despondency and dissatisfaotion which cannot be
measured in statistical terms. The 'scientifio' approaoh of the economet-
rician would simply miss out on this point, just as it was no comfort
for the local ironmaster to be informed that he had to pay higher rates
than his Continental or American oompeti tors "'beoause land, Parliamentary
expenses, rates and taxes, and other outsoings (took) a higher range in
i'~
this OOltDtry than abroad, however mUGh these facts (oontrolled) the
situation". (130) For the aTerage Blaok C01U1t17 ironmaster, who kept no
\!I('l Y' - . - .,_ '
proper acoounts, it was more signitieant that he pe1'8onally was oonvi~d
~~ L
of' the high freight rates to aDd f'rom hie 4istnot. As 811.0, f'reilht rates
.ere one IlOre link in the eoneat.nation ot oiro....te.nee. bringing about
_~:~:'i »> :J
the de.line of' the Blaek COlUt.try aa a leading iron and ateel producer.
"$9~C, ',' .
~_••tSaji""'.'f""'t·;·1~tp. 10.
(129) Ibid, p.~lP!l"." "_<H""
(.")4..~;tll"'~,'.~',,1...
'i ~::\~) .:<"........" ,,_.,"".,'.•,
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Chapter5 " Masters and Men:
Following the great deal of interest shown in the Belgian iron and steel
industry in 1894 - the meeting of the Iron and Steel Institute had been
held in Brussels - W. Jacks, M.P., and S. Jeans drew up a report on the
q'llestion ot Belgian and German competition which they then presented to
the board of management of the BIT.!. One of their main th_es in the re-
port was that lower wages in both Germany and Belgium was the chiet cause
ot their euccese in markets tormerly the exclusive preserye ot the United
Kingdom industry. In the supply ot raw materials, Jacks and Jeans sliggested
that United Kingdom wages were 65 per cent higher than in Belgium or
Qerma.ny; less wages were paid by the Continental industries than in the
UJ1i. ted ICingdODl at the blast turDace stage, althoup this vas in part due
to the fact that both the ayerage Olltput ot German blast h.rnaces had
tncreased great11 (100 per cent inorease in the period 1881 to 1893)
and the average output of pig iron per worker had jumped tro. 1~ tons
ann_111 in 1881 to 206 tons in 1893. (1) With the publioation ot this
report by the BITA ia .1' 1895 there_s a stroDg reaction by the .en's
leaders in the Ifid1ands; a deoision wa. _de tor them to "risi t the Continent
aDd find out tor theuelYes the tNe state ot attairs. Bearing of this
deoision, the employers deoided to sen& their own de1elate. and, a little
rirpr:i.sincl l , a joint delegation ot employers and UD'. representatiY.s
~ agreed lipon. The aim ot the DeleptioD (orp.n1secl now lIDder the
allSp10es ot the Brn) 1IU to 10e.t1,,"8 "the _p., paid, hours ot wort,
,-""\>j.
oODditiona ot WOraeD, eto.·, ud to oond_t 'eDq1l1ri.. at PartiCular
l"';
_!'b. Represenf:inc the "lt1al_4.1f8N"~orAaesPatoht't."~a1_
director,ot the Shrops1l1re !ron Co.,..,. ot Vell1ncton, V.B.D. Glad.tone,
t ·,1 ": . ' , , " :,:'T~L, :~" ,;;".. '-', .f'.';:', >:" t'.>
o't ....ra. JOhn L7aa&bt of Vo1••rhaaptoa, Bl'1sto1ud IoDloa, V• .luoott,
:;.rati.... Moreta17 ot ,,~ i1~ V.... Board aaClPre.1deat ot the
'rt·"'t .'. . ",.. :.' .;. :," :." ~'~:' ~i'~:
.l-.ooiated lroa &IId8te.l VorbN ot G~t lri.a, and S. Bam., noe-
i -iou• '~~~';"':''''' '> . .--k:~r.: ~.'•.~", .' >~.:'-.: j . . "
.ir-a ot._ '.4laia4 .... Bo&r4.(2)
Briefly, the Delegation found that as far as fuel was concerned, "it
appears that Belgium stands at a disadvantage as compared with this
country". The average price of a ton of coal at the mine was put at
7/5-to.. (it could be as high as 8/8), compared with between 6/1 and 6/6
in the United Kingdom. For Germany, the cost of coal "at the mine's
mouth" was about the same as in the United Kingdom. Where both Conti-
nental countries scored over the United Kingdom was "with the system
generally adopted in both countries for the recovery of the by-products
of the coal in the process of manufacturing coke". With regard to iron
ore supplies, both Ge~ and Belgium imported ore, but Germany less
so than Belgium. In the case ot Bessemer ores, imported from the north
and sou.th of Spain, "the German works can haTe no advantage over our
own". What impressed the Delegation most with regard to the workmen
employed at the various works visited "was the splendid discipline main-
tained"(,), and their "splendid physique"(4). Relations between management
.J..I-.t.
and workers WM also excellent. The linng condi tiona of German and
Belgian workers were further admired, especially the proTision of loans
to the workers to blq their own houses, arrancements which tended "to
bind the wotkmen more closely to the locality and hence to giTe more
(,) "Each man worked as if he were a piece ot maohiner;r ti tted into its
proper place, which did exaotly the right thing at the right moment,
because it could not do otherwise. The operations,_ as a rule, were
oarried on with. the regularity ot clockwork". (BrrA Report, Iron and
St,el Ind_trie. ot Bel&iUII &ad Qerpp;r, published in ProOf St Statt.,
~':,,' '-·-,t,·,. " ,,",' ',",: , .. ', }, 'c';., '~""',::#/,~:.•: ':~<~'} .,r, r. "~_:C
1S95-6, p.S,.)
',i'
(4) "The Deleeation>_.0. ~t;7 ,tnok ~.,~ the splendid ~sique ot the
',. .. '.....:... ',-,-;\i>_' ..: ;__'" ".. :-..
I!I,~ 8IlP1018d ,in the worts that }"~re Tiaited in Ge:raJQ', ancl Dot lese so
:;':" { ~:i' .. • .,' .-
with th~r sobriev, the1:r steatine••,and their readine•• to aot on
}::;'>'-:,' ':.' " -, < - - ;'-.'.'
t~~~:I;"UOtiOS18·. ~ oontra'~i~ it _s .aid ot nineteenth centlll7 1118ton
~t,~t va. the ,lLO- ot ~,~ •pub.' thaa ~re else in Britain.
steady service".(5) On the matter of vages, the Delegation was hesitant -
one South Staffordshire ironmaster accused them of beine "extremely
indefini ten - but in their conolusions the following points were made:
"Speaking generally of wages as a whole, they are wndoubtedly lower
in Belgium than either in England or Gel'lB&nY; but (as shown for the
blast furnace department) there is a larger n\lDlber ot men employed
there than here, and considerations such as those reported in the
printed report ot Works 'B' haTe also an important bearing on the
question. (6) So far as Germ&!l7 is concerned, the greatest ditterence
n til our countI"1 appears in the &IlO\ll:lts receiTed b7 -11T ot the head
"mill contraotors", or rollers, whose counterparts praotically do
not exist in GerJDan7, the encineer there taking tul control, OTer-
silbt, and responsibility of his department. Apart trom these men,
there is not the differenoe in the wac•• paid aa betwe.n Q.ermaD7 and
this count17 that is generall,. supposed to eXiat, takinc into oonaide~
ation the whole at the UJ'lutaoturing det»-rtJIent. in iron and steel
worts. In other words, the general diatribution of waces ia aore
litTenll balanced, and we did not tind the extreaea that obtain &aODpt
When the Report •• presented. to the South Stattorc1ahire ID.ti tllte, it
oc;oall1one4 • gre.t deal ot discusioll aDd, in taot, proTid.ed • good
(5) 1fh1lst an X.P., HiU-», who sip.d the Report a. Preaideat at the
lriUsb Iron frad• .la.ociatio., ~t17,i~~!:reate4 hi.elf in • soh.e
trbiM, it,itlaad,be.. ·.pp~e4 ....,,11..,_ vo1l14 ka.,. _bl.d. illd.ut-
:ri~ workers to' .oqtd.r8~.ir ow6iO....~ J'6l"Jliokaan'. OD wosen, ••
elsewhere in th.'Blaokteat 17, there Mftaa.Mr ot tied ootta,.a.
<'
~ (; .<,
Vi til rqaril to the ."aiDC' good beanov ot tla. CJe~ worker thia
, .
contrastM '.~~ with treq'l8.t attacb ...cie on the YOrke" ot South
:'-;.>.",:,:;;-;
stattor4tiad",~,'I.e rti. ot lien lib Jao. W. Ball, hoot It Staft•• 1895-6.
(.t1>24;'''' U4 t .....if,... '..plO1M per U1ft at ta. two· '\I%'D&c.. ot
Ip,ttoiti. '.":r..tftId.6.t1tfO'&h 'llIJlda7, Vi th the iron coinc 1n1:0 'thee~" lao...••
opportunity for members of the looal industry to look at their own per-
formanoes. In turn, r haye used the discussions on the Report to look
at some ot the factors relating to the personnel of the industr;r and
to tr,r to assess the general situation in the local iron and steel
indust1"1 with regard to problems ot management.
One of the major contrOYersial aspects of the Report ooncerned the
matter of the workers, both trom the Continental industries and the
looal industl"1. Belgian workers came in for a certain amount ot or!tioism,
but not so "the brain power and discipline eyer,rwhere Yisible in Germany".
'lbe absence of strikes there gaTe the (Jerman produoer a tremendous ad-
Tantage oyer those in South Stattordshire and elsewhere in the united
nnsdom. If wages were apparently a little lower in Germal11' there was
the "paternal system" to be taken into consideration whioh gaYe the
workers certain "compensat0l'1 adYantages", as well as plaoing a heaT1
burden on the German producer. A brief inTestigation ot the V&7 the
"state accident, sick and pension tunds" worked showed that the three
establishments loaked at contributed £50,000, £40,000 and £'5,000 per
year respeotiTely; in fact, the indi'ridual pa11llents amo\IDted "to nearly
tiTe per cent ot the total capital ot the concerns". '!he benetits aaouted
to about an extra 25 per oent on the ..... ot the workers, "so it w.
tate these thiDga into aocount we ••• that wages, althoUCh apparentl 7
lower, are really yerT .UGh on a par vi th Oll!' own". (7) A naber ot worb
(7) Against this, it .\lSt be pointed 0.' that other endence, not included
ia the Report, augpste4 that the area neit.d bJ the Del.cation was
"the hOM of the ariatocl'&07 ot labour in Gel'llaDJ'''. lfaps, in tact, Taried
a great deal throughout the Geraan iron aDd steel areae: £. s d
maeni. Veetphaliatorp cI: rolliDC aill. •••••• 50 2 0 (per
If-V Iron a: Steel Industrie. •••• 44 14 0 year)
._1" " • 44 4 0
S-V " tf " 42 , 0
Southern " • 41 17 0
SUoJQ', Thuringia " 41 8 0
$i1••1.. n " '0 6 0
(ae,POt-* .Qt the, C..1A 1"-..1, Sir Charles Oppenhei..r, 189', "I.bour
tiae. and liabour "'8 in Gel'llaDT').
managers and masters attending the meeting of the South Staffordshire
Institute found this very difficult to acoept and one Yent so tar as to
aoouse the Delegation of having given Yay to the workers' delegates
on the question of labour and wageS' - "the most important business of the
menI s Delegates would be to prevent anything appearing in this Report
which youd tend to bring down the wages of their oonstituents" •
In discussions over labour and wages amongst the 'management' of the
South Staffordshire distriot three themes ocourred time and again, first
with the Belgians and Germans in Jlind and then, later, very much with
the Amerioans in mind. Hoy ready were the men to aooept new equipnent?
Was the best use being made of the available labour? What type ot person
was being reoruited into the industry at the operative level? The puddler
of the Blaok Country, indeed, occupied aver" distinotive position.
Briet referenoe has already been lIl8.de to the faot that great physical
strength was required in the stirring of the molten pig with the 'rabble'
and 'puddle', but also oonsiderable skill. Furthermore, it has been
remarked upon that the puddler had earned a reputation for oonsen-ati_
and opposition to nell' ideas. Speat1ug ot the puddler in general, and
not neoessarily from South Staffordshire, Sir Lovthian Bell remarked
that he was hidebound b.J traditional praotices. He was oapable, tor
exaaple, ot doing more work It tban he usually turD.8 out, but practioe
bas established siz h_ts or charges as the proper quanti't7, and as
soon &s he tinish•• this he goes home, leanne his ~ce tor aD hour
or acre doing IlOthiDg, while the toreip furDaoe is kept at work alaost
un1Zlterruptedl1" •(8) hrtherao1'8, it was well reoognised! by Black Count17
managers that the puddler's opposition to progress had done auch to
bring about the tailve ot Dub' rota17 puddlillC t'urDace.(g) In 1874,
tor eUJIple, & bitter d18p1lte had tatea plaoe at the RoUDd Gak Worb,
(8) Sir Lowthiaa Bell, !heZro. 'bade ot the United nygoa, 1886, p.88.
(9) Proe. St s_tt..... 1895-6. ,. 96.
OTer the installation of a mechanical puddling furnaoe, and the men bad
only returned to work on the adTice of their union leaders. Jeremiah
Head,(10) in fact, belieTed that the puddler would oppose a~ nell' equip-
ment for the puddling furnace - "the puddler was a contractor and would
8&' "I viII work at the district rate per ton of iron produced, proTided
you giTe me an applianoe I am accustomed to work with, i.e. the ordin&I",J'
p¥ddling furnace".(11)
Head also had some discouraging things to 8&' about the furnaoe b\1ilder.
'!'he latter would be giTen a "certain price per ton for maintaining the
ordinary puddling furnace" and "it they had ~thing added for the purpose
of economising fuel, the, vould be sure to find slloh additional apparatus
If&S neglected and grad1l8.1ly fallout of use". (12) Head vas sure that
(10) In the 1870's, Head was himself a aill-owner, but later on he estab-
Iished himself as a consulting engineer. BllrIl remarks, a little pointedl"
that Head showed much aore elLthusiasa for lLelI' maohine17 atter he bec"e
a consultant. (D. Bllrn, op cit, p. '00.)
(11) The same sitlation was to be toed in the South Wale. tinplate vorks.
J.R. Jones stated that "until qllite reoentl, in this count1'1 the ettioienoy
01' labour in lIoSt ot the departaents TariM Iittle betveen ditterent
plaoes, for the output 01' each aill _s liaitedto ~ boze. per Nitt
01' eight hours" (The Tinplate Iad~trY' 1914, p. 1'2). R.A••ott (op cit,
p. 100) reoords euotly the .... situation in the coke industr,r; tor
ezaaple, cokiDg time 01' the first batte1'1 at bJ'-produot OYens at Crook
•• 72 hours, a8 in beehi'9'e praotioe.
(12) The difference. betlI'eell Aa.r1oan and SOllth Statfordalaire practice
with reprd to payiq aainteD&JlOe operati'Y.S are interestirac. In South
Staftord.hire thq vere paid for the &01:\1&1 wort carried out on the
fumaoe (with the reaut that 10ZIC periOds vere spent on furnaoe repair),
whereas the tendeno1 in the 11mted States .s to reward. the person for the
lea8t aaount 01' vort don. ill the 1fIL7 01' rep.irs. The logio behind this was
sUple. It was the tur.aace whioh produced the iron and kept the majorit1
of workers busy - both were idle when the fUl"Daoe vas under:8>inc repairs.
"unless an altogether disproportionate amount of attention was paid by
the principals or their managers, any novel arrangements ~ell into dis-
use". Several years later, he raised the same mis-g!vings with regard
to the introduction o~ the Wellman Charging Machine into Britain (then
widely used in the United States) - "they had another factor which •••
would probably intet'fere with the adoption of this maohine in number
to their furnaces, and this was the consent of th~en. They had not in
the past got the returns from the men they should have for the capital
laid down for labour-sannc". (1') Head's comments are obviously hostile
to labour, as well as illustrating the very limited approach to the wages
and productivity issue that existed generally throughout the British
industry at that time. I~ new equipment was installed to inorease pro-
duotion then the worker was surely entitled to think that a new wages
agreement was necessary. Despite the many adverse comments whioh were
expressed about the American industry in this period, this is in faot
the line taken by the majority of United States manufacturers. H. Pilking-
ton, speaking on one occasion to the South Stattordshire Institute, was
perfectly justified in wondering whether or not British employers had
played fair with their men, as Amerioan management had dealt "fairly and
squarely by their men".(14) In England, the employer very often wanted
to take all the advantages which could arise from the introduction of a
Dew piece of machinel"1 and leave his workers worse oft than betore:
" ••• in Amerioa ••• when a pieoework prioe is ti%ed ••• and the II&ll
increases the production and lI&kes hi. earnings tor himself, the
Amerioan employer gives it him without grabling, wher.s in this
-". > ,
countr,y the _ployer would probably d.ook the rate. In America, so
lol'lC as that partioular jobot pieoework is in force the rate 'holds
good. When any un introduces &n1 idea, also, by which he makes a
bigger 8JIlount Ollt a piece"ork job tor himselt, then he gets the tull
r,',) £,'x\!,.t."h,;" i ,P.1 b9,
(14) Proo. S. Statts., 1901/2, p. 103.
iY1.
benefit of that kink or new idea which he introduces. The employer
does not, as he does in this country, penalise the resul ts of the
ingenuity of the workman".
The same unawareness of the worker's point of Tiew, as witnessed by
Head's comments, perhaps even an insensitivity, can be seen in a comment
ma.de by Ebenezer Parkes. He recounted the story of an Englishman visi ting
an American works and being much impressed with a labour-saVing machine;
the process in England took twenty-four men to per.....form, whereas in
America it was taking only two. Parkes continued:
"The Englishman called hiS men together and asked them how many men
they could dispense with if they had the American ma.ohine. They
consulted together and came and told him that they thought they
might manage with two less. So you see that meant twenty-two men in
England against two in America for the same work". (15 )
Here is an example of the worst type of labour relations - Parkes was
ei ther naturallY' unaware, or chose to be so, of the reluctanoe of the
working man to aocept possible redundanoy in fac. of increased automation.
It was almost inevitable that the more advanced trade union d....elopment
in Britain should receive its share of the blame iD reduoing the worker's
willingness to accept chance and new machinery. Commenting on the BITA
report, H.X. Pum1ett, of Plumett, Thompllon, and Company, Sheet Iron
Manufaoturers of Birmingham, stated:
"The great lesson whioh Labour and Capital has to learn from the
Report is that the Continental races by industry, regularity, disoip-
line and thrift, are doiDg as goad work &8 we, at our beat, with
greater happiness and at less oost".
He found Jluch eri.4enoe to support his rin that the CJermaa worker weloomed
ne. _ohiDe17 "and the introduction ot Dew ideu". Plmnett had mllCh to
8&7 in fayour- ot 1DIl18h a.bov, but h. found the "deadening influence"
(15) hoot St SWf•• , 1901-2, ,. 90.
of oertain trades unionists to be harmful: (16)
"Even here, we are in great danger of suffering from the deadening
influenoe of that form of trades unionism whioh maintains that a
rule once made cannot be altered, whether it applies to the heats
of a puddler at work, whatever his furnace may be capable of, or to
the sohedule of the sheet mill wages, whioh is spoken of as almost
inspired, although those who framed it know only too well that it
was simply a compromise between the highest and lowest wages paid in
the different works at the time it vas drawn uP".
Ebenezer Parkes, in his oustomar,y one-sided, and often exaggerated,
manner, frequently complained of what he called "the restrictive practioes
of trade unions". He had eoae away from his ns1t to America (BIT-b Dele-
gation to the United States in 1901) totally oonvinced of the super-
iority of United States techniques; equally, he had no doubt as to which
group was to blame for much of this state of affairs:
"The American workman knows little or nothing of them (restrictive
praotices). Each man is enoouraged to do as much as he can, and he
is paid by results•••• I ....s told by hericans that the great cause
why they vere so much ahead of us was tbat the un controlled the
situat10n 1n England, whereas 1n America there was nothing of the
kind, and both workers and men 8trove together to see how muoh they
could prodYOe for a day's wage".(17)
(16) Froc. S. statts•• 1895-6, p. 115.
(17) Recent researob in .laerica on the labour question tend. to 00nf1rm
the Tiew that Inclish T1.s1tors like Parke. had acoepted a ve17 narrow..
view of the trans-Atlantio situation. AlIl08t oertainly, Parke. would
aot have spoken With the leaders ot .laerioaa labour and 80 obtained
the other 81ele of the 81;0 17. The American worker was oaught up in what
I. Yellonts (&JIlO~t others) bas termed the "suooess ethic" (The P081tion
ot tae,Vork.r ill .l.aerioan Society. 1865 - 9§. 1969). He "was exposed to a
SU008S. -Jio which tried to Win his allegiance for the cap!talist
Undoubtedly, increasing competition from the Continental industries
had compelled the looal South Staffordshire industry to look critically
at itself. If the South Staffordshire 'management', as was the case
elsewhere in the country, was only too ready to blame labour for many
of the ills which had to be contended with, there was an inevitable
reluctance to admit that Black Country managers might be falling behind
their Continental and, a little later, American opposites. Sir Lowthian
Bell summed up one aspect of what was really a widely held view on the
issue of the uses made of labour:
"The power of producing cheaply depends on the cost and efficiency
of human labour ••• with the exception of the royalties and profit
on railway carriage, the expense of manufacture consists almost en-
tirely in wages paid to workmen". ( 18)
Because American labour was so dear it would follow, if Bell's inter-
system by promising him a share of its fruits" (p. 1). It "encouraged
innovation and progress, and it 1I&S the best method at distributing
wealth"(p. 22). CollectiTe action within labour organisations, rather
than "isolated efforts of individua.ls", was anathema to the "success
ethic", and American employers did their utmost to ensure that the former
did not cOile about. Iellowitz writes: "JIost first generation immigrants
continued to work at unskilled or semi-skilled work, and they felt the
impact at the newcomer 1Il0st strongly. This led steel companies, for ex-
aaple, to eaploy a aulti-linsual work force composed primarily of new-
oOJUra and first generation immigrants. It _a hoped that the tensions
aaoDgSt the workers would block the gro.th of un1oni81ll and keep labour
costa at a minimum" (P. 11). Jerelliah Bead adaired the .y AJlerioan JII8.I1agers
(his son was a director of the Otis Steel Comp&.Il7) mixed the difterent
raoe., therebJ haaperin, "coheaion and \1Di. ted action" and making "the
methoda at the '.e. 'ODiord.. ' diffioult to enf'oroe" ( 'roo. S. Statt,.,
1891-8.p. 120).
(18) Sir Lowth1&D Bell, op 01t, P. 81.
pretation had been correct, that American production costs would be Tery
high. Bell, in fact, frequently stated that this was so, tailing to
realise, unlike Thomas Ashton ot South Staffordshire, for example, who
stated that "more labour was exacted in a giTen time from the American
than an English workman" because of the "more improTements in machinery
now so general in America" • (19) Indeed, some English man11facturers came
to believe that men 'Working in America produced 50 per cent more work
than the,. did in England - with the same tools. Parkes found it worth
mentioning that "eTe1'1 man there seems to haTe an ambition to get on
and to succeed in life and build himself a house, and haTe that house
as comfortable as he possibly can". La WeTe Poster, too, came to realise
that there was nothing to be gained, either tor the employer or the
workman, froll cheap labour:
" ••• as our workmen get better educated, We shall find they will not
be content to do the work: that oan be done better and more efficiently
by machinery; that it is to their ultill&te adTantage to employ labour-
eaTiq appliances, and that the appliances instead of decreasing the
Talue of labour really increases it, as they not only obtain higher
wages but are able to bUJ' cheaper, and 80 obtain a greater Talue
for those -les". (20 )
ParDs apin and again repeated bef'ore the South Staf'f'ordshire Inatitute
that the 014 arpmeat no longer held 100d re«&rdiJ1« Britain '. lower
-..s ukiq it 1UU1eceS8&1'7 to find and use labour-saTing applianoes.
!he 100a1 industr,r had muoh to l_rn trom American practioe with regard
to bl••t f\11"D&oes and II1lle; Dot onl;r did American _thode oreate liON
eUicient aeau ot pr04uotioD but thq also resulted. in. better working
ooaditiona:
• ••• 1. "8J!1 aJ:lop, area" or saIl, where weighty goods ban to be
.eyed, there &1"8 ill .....r1ca oyer-h_d electrio trayelliDC orane.. In
(19) hoc. S. statts., 1897-8, P. 125.
(20) Ibid, p. n. See a1.0 1I.!. C"-pibell, it 4'1t1\
..... op c , p. "v.
one shop alone I saw seven 75-ton electrio traTellers. Large pieces
of machinery, railway cars, locomotiTes, and immense castings of all
kinds, are mJed about as though they were toys".
J..
In the Institute's discussions on the BITA report, Punnett raised
another aspect of the same problem. He observed that fewer men were used
in sheet mills in Belgium than in this country and, because of the intre-
duction of a "rack arrangement" (21 ) the work was less arduous than in
most South Staffordshire mills. German sheet mill practice had struok
a number of local managers as being too dangerous (the high speed "at
which the rolls were running, say upwards of 120 reTolutions per minute,
or three times as fast as is usual in this district") but, again, Punnett
could see no reason why the foreign practice could not be followed in
South Staffordshire. It was more a question of the use made of labour
in running "machine1"1 of a high order for rolling either iron or steel
plates". There vas Tery little danger - "the screws are not touched bY'
the roller or his breaker down, but are regulated by a boy oontrolliDg
a central wheel, moTing both screws at the same time" - and greater out-
put at less cost. Punnett did not think that it was too late for South
Statfordshire to alter the conditioD8 ot labour "to a great extemt",
and the "first thing to cODsider with regard to 8.I1J such change is whether
we can adopt the Ge1"lllB.1l method ot more ••n, more equitable distribution
ot wages, and, it possible, get acre contentment and steadiness ot work
a8 the ou1;oo••·.(22)
J .J~ Chaaban, ba't'i~ tirst read the report, co_ented on the 801'17
stat. ot the Jl&D&pr's control OTer the puddler "in his neighbourhood":
(21) !his was a Prl.oti~. ~i1al in the 111118 in Gema!l7, a8 ••11 as in
:; r,·o
Belli., wh.reb7 ihe'last8'nd of the Jack as it left the rolls was lifted
b1 a laTer under the COl1t~l of a Catcher or a be7.
22) Proo. S. St&m~ ,~18951, p. 94.
, ; , 1"
"Whether the works is going to payor not depends a great deal upon
the working men. For instance, in a great many cases, puddlers leave
three-quarters of their work to the underhand while they go drinking,
and it is the same at the mill furnaces. Directly they have charged
their heat away they go, and the assistant has to see to the firing
- one of the most important things - himself. Consequently, a mill
can soon be kept standing a quarter of an hour or twenty minutes
because the firing has not been attended to properly, whereas, I
suppose we may take it for granted - although the Report does not
actually say so - that the Germans do not leave the works from the
time they come in, until they leave for the day".(2,)
Chambers had put his finger on a ve~ important factor. Because of the
widespread system of contract labour which still operated in the iron
trade of the district, the management of a particular firm had no direct
control over large parts of the labour force. In other words, although
some iron and steel establishments in the area were large employers of
men, the management ei ther lacked the skill or were prevented, through
local practices, from apply1ng the principles of labour-management.
Compared with the situation developing in the United States and Germany,
the difficulties facing the South Staffordshire ma.na.ger in obtaining the
willing cooperation of labour with regard to such issues as the install-
ation of new maohine17 were enormous. A feature of most of the local
works (as was the case with JIlaD.y other BriUsh industries), indeed, was
the list of rules "for the guidance of the SeTeral PersoDS emplo7ed".
In the absenoe of labour-mana,gement techniques, this was an attempt to
1II&intain labour discipline throup fines and Tarious other punishments.
The puddler, agaiD, was sincled out for a great deal of attention; in the
oaee of "The. Right Honourable Willi.. Baron Ward'8 Round o..k Works", he
bad received fourleenseparate paragraphs trom Richard Sa! th, the 'Principal
J.,e 3 .
Agent for the Proprietor". Failure to comply with the rules had meant
instant dismissal or fines ranging from one to ten shillings for each
offence. Engineers had been fined as much as one pound for such offences
as neglecting the machinery under their control. Fines of one pound had
also been imposed am people leaving the works without the manager's
consent.
J.S. Jeans, in his capacity as secretary of the BI~, levelled oriticism
at certain South Staffordshire practices. He found it difficult to
understand why the head rollers in some mills were so highly paid. When
he had asked employers why this was so he had always been told "that the
rollers were a special body of men, strongly orpnised, and tbat if
they were to go on strike, it would probably be dif'ficult to replace
them - the more so that the7 take creat care to limit their possible
numbers".(24) Jeans argued that this could DOt haTe been the case in
the United States, otherwise the mass deTelopnent in the sheet, wire
and other branches of the industr,r there oould not haTe taken place.
The President of the American Steel Trust had, in f'aot, informed hill
that "he could take a fairlY' intelligent agricultural labourer, fresh
from the plough, and ake a roller of' him in a few months". Jeane
ooncluded:
"If' this can be done there, it can surely be done here a8 well, and
if' it can be done here , the extraordina17 high ..... paid to these
men surely calls tor further explaDation".
!he BIT.l report 000&8ioll.e4 further disoussion on the question ot
ac1eDtitio and teohn1oal eduoatiOD. For the iron aJJd steel indust l'7
this was in DO -7 a newtopio, altbo•.now it vaa Been TeZ7 m\lOb in
the light of' grolfiDB Continental and United States oompetition. Tho••
repre.entatiTel of the looal indust17 who bad g1:t"8Il endenoe to the
S1867-8 electQolll:Utt.eon Sc1entit1~ lnatruo,t19n had. not be. impress1Te.
" < p
Having sifted through the evidence, D. Burn suggests that the "indus-
trialists of the Midlands" did not appreciate many of the issues to do
with education on the grounds that "generally (they) had no technical
training themselTes tl • (25) He further suggests that they saw no reason
e1ther to giTe their own sons "a long or a scientifio educationtl , or
that a workman with a basic education would be better able to hold down
a foreman's post. There were, of course, exoeptions to this eTen in the
1860's; Charles Cochrane(26) showed that he understood something of
the difficulties inTolTed when he told the Select Committee that 'good
foremen' could be capable of the grossest mistakes in their work because
of their total laok of "primary education".(27) It is difficult to see
,
where the Black Country ironmasters of the 1850 8 and 1860's could haTe
obtained their scientific education;~ of them had sel"Yed an "apprentice-
ship" with the leading ironmasters of John Wilkinson's day. A most un-
important ironmaster and colliery owner, G.R. Hickman, also found it
worthwhile to send his son Alfred, born in 18:30, to Xine Edward's Grammar
School, Birmingham. What he was taught there, and what basic essentials
of business he was able to acquire from his father, eDabled him at 17
to set up as an iron merchaBt.(28) Beside8~ before the 1870 Iducation
.lot, and before~ of the iroDll&stera disappeared in the harsher
econoaio oli_te, a nllllber of schools in the Black Country beloDBed to
ironworks. CJD!oally, it could be ar«U8d that this type of factor" schOOl
had been used by the iroDJl&ster8 to ensure a steady supply ot cheap
(25) D. Burn, op oit, p. 12.
(26) :Burn reluctal'lt17 adll1ts (in baokets) that Coohrau, whilst beine a
"progre8siTe I1ddlesbrousb ironmaster", "also owned a works in Stafford-
shire". Cochrane liked to describe himself as an "ironmaster of DudleT';
see "Blast Furnaoe Praotice at Oraesb7 Iron Yorks ••", 1860-8', p. 16'.
(27) S.C. OD Scientifio InstructioD, 1867-8, M.I. 7210 _ 22.
(28) G.R••orton & X. La Guillou, loc cit, p.1.
ohild labour, but at least the Old Park Sohool at Wednesbury whioh be-
longed to Lloyds, Foster and Com~ proTided some education for the
working olass. In 1865, for example, a 'new teaoher' was paid the
prinoely sum of ".£60 per year and half the goTernment grant of about
£50" .(29) Despite a "Look-out and Colliers Strike", disoipline was des-
cribed as "very good" and "InttUtion Satisfaotory".
Throughout the 1870's and 1880's, the debate on the provision ot
soientifio and teohnical eduoation oontinued at national leyel. Increas-
ingly, Germany, BelgiUl and the tJni ted States came in for praise, if a
little grudgingly at times. Bell, in his Presidential Address to the
Iron and Steel Institute in 1873, found that the Belgians had a ye17
good system of teohnical education as far as iron and steel was oonoerned,
and that they had giyen much more attention to the subjeot than had
been the case in this countr;r. In the taoe ot cri tioiSJI, no matter how
mild, a number at influential people in the industr;y insisted that the
Bri tish workman was the best in the world and that the British metallurg-
ists were the equals of their foreign riTals. Dr. Percy, indeed one of
Britain's few outstanding metallurgists of the period, took this as one
of his chief themes in his Presidential Address to the Iron and Steel
Insti tute in 1885. Speaking of the Bri tish worker, he said:
"These men are technically eduoated, haying acqUired that eduoation
in the only school where it can be acquired, i.e. where metallurgioal
processes, on the large soale, are conducted. Where else ••• can
the eye and the hand .be educated? and Wi.thout such eduoation ot what
use ••• would be a brain crammed with theoreti08.l principles?" ('0)
In a~ O8.S8, argued Perc:r, better educated art1sana would sillpl:r demand
more IlOne:r. (31 )
(10) .inute Books ot Llo:rds, PO.ter and Coap&Jl7, ent17 for 1865.
('0) J.I.S,I., 1685.
('1) • Terr coed acc01lJlt o'E technical education at the national leTel is
to be touadin P.W. KUsgr&Te, !ec::hnical QbapBe - the 14bour Pone and
Iducatiop •• ..1967.
Although the whole subject of technical education became a muoh dis-
cussed topic in South Staffordshire, it was not surprising that the
district •s spokesmen should be chiefly interested in the proTision of
metallurgical instruction. First among them vas 'rhoMs Turner, vho was
Director of Technioal Instruotion to the County of staffordshire before
becoming a professor at the new uniTerai ty college in Bil"lll1nghaa.
Using the pIatfom of the South Staffordshire 1nstitute of Iron and
Steel Works' Managers, Turner greatly influenced the proTisian ot tech-
nical education in the Black COlm'tr,y. Speaking in 1895, he made a detailed
attack on the failure at national leTel to proTide for metallurgical
instruction. (32) .18 late as 1895, none of the ~Terai't7 colleges in the
count1"7 had a Iletallurgilaal departae.t; in tact, no Sllah college could
boast of "eTen a \horoushly-equipped aetallurgical laboratory", let alone
eta properly endowed metallurCical clla1r". '1'lI1'DeZ" stn...d the point:
"It aetalluC1' && a whole is _us ne.180t", iron and st••l un\lf'acture,
or other branches ot the nbjeot, a:r:e urally iB eTen a wors. cond-
i tion, and in the U'ni. ted n!1B401l_ ha BO iron aetallvgist& to
correspond wi t11 the TeteftJl TOIl 'llmJ1er, ot I..eoben, or Led.bur, .t
haibur." •
.1 auabar of the ut.t1ncUDiT.rei't7 ooll......d etTen .oae at_ation
to the teaohillc of ..tallurl7, but oal7 ae aVT.ry a1nor bl'8BQ ot che..
ist17. !he DU'haa aoll.,. ot Sci.noe, for UUlple, .laad aPlWinte4 Ita
JUIl10r deaonstratol' ot oh.1I18t17" to tea. the ,,-'llVC1eal stu4 _.
!he peNon appoiat.dha4 reoe1yecl - ·.. ·.pe01.1 _tallll1W1oal t_1., ,
but tia. sllbJ.ot bad tlolll"1ahed 8uttioient17 to warrant the appointMILt
ot a full l.cture&- in ...:l11llWf. IIl_th.r 0011.... .' ....oall... .
ti.plo. in aetallvcr ael/;.e•.·f01lD4 to,1nol•• -1'8 tilantllre. t1ata:.
•• ..., 1.C'ture8 ..in'.hnllU.ltOr,raaiJ1a7al0papIQ- •• in ...llurl7.
the'prao.ioe .'1 wlUah ... to tom the lit. "*,ot ille. etu.d_t'.
'lUaer .....f. tbec,,,••;,,that ·1IIltil;..tall~G' 'eaU1q .(••) plaol"
J.,e7
on the basis as, say, that of chemistry or physics, with an independent
professor, having a seat upon the Board of Studies, with properly--
equipped laboratories, and with efficient apparatus, comparatiTely
little progress can be anticipated in the uniTersity colleges".(33)
Turner's views were echoed by another member of the local. iron trade,
H. SilTester. In his Presidential Address to the South Staffordshire
Institute in 1899, Silvester said that "whilst agriculture vas dignified
with a Chair at Tarious colleges, metallurgy generally remained a mere
adjunct to chemistry, and too often from lack of funds, lack of interest,
or a combination of both causes, maintained onlY' a sickly, maimed exist-
ence".Quite correctly, Silvester singled out the Royal School of Mines
.(34), King's College(35) and the Sheffield Technical School(36 ) as the
(,,) Proc. S. Staffs., 1895-6, pp, 26-27. Turner "further stated: "From
a metallurgical standpoint ••• the uniyerai tY' oolleges of the Un!ted
Kingdom during the last fifteen years, haYe been weighed in the balance
and found wanting. '!he nuaber of pupils attendinc the classes have been
in many cases miserably small, while a considerable number hay. obtained
on the continent the education whiCh theY' were denied in their 10ca11t1.
The amount of reseal'Ch conducted in _tallurS7, too, has be.n conspicuous
bJ' its absence. After all, the tne cntenon of the success of the
teacher and of the utility ot the SUbject, is the amount' ot usetul
research which is beine'done, and b1 this 8tandard perbapa alaost I\Ore
thail a1l1 other, the Illetallurgioal traiDin« ot this COU1'1t l'7 has been
&1together 1mBatililtaoto!1"'.
(34) Pouncled in 1851 'aj th.~Qoir.rDa.Dt'School ot 'JI:1nea &114 at Soience
"~lied to the Arts, Lonct6A. the SChOOl ot Iine8 .....t up in answer
togrowiaC dWandftor .oi.iitrio i~truotion, ••peoiall1in the miDinc
district. ot 111.t.iJ'{~ ot whiCh, lndeed, .411" oent3."M ot lron aa:nu-
taotuie a••jll.Gia6:raii" 'the aUilbare ot atuaelllj wih'...u and not
until thi '1fn6~~ ch4~'tora.r student••Cilti........MU.tatus.
sir ~&ii'"..n'~di<l~troncboth b. ot no one in the north o~
,tet.
three most important centres of full time metallurgical teaching. Turner
was himself highly cri tical of the fact that two of the three leading
centres of instruction at a higher level were situated in London, which
England employed in the iron industry who had attended the School of
Mines. A number of former students did gain important teaching posts,
however, including Turner at Birmingham and A.H. Sexton at the Glasgow
and West of Scotland Technical College. Dr. Percy and Professor Roberts-
Alusten were two of the more important teachers at the School of Mines.
Turner, despite his obvious sense of loyalty as "an old School of Mines
man", criticised it for out-of-date laboratories and equipnent and for
failing to give enough attention to the needs of the iron and steel
industry. J .0. Arnold, of the Sheffield Technical School, in turn strongly
criticised the School of Kines on the grounds that it taUBht "the met-
allurgy of the cram books and not of the steelworks".
(35) King's College, London. The second of the two leading metallurgical
schools in London. Indeed, it was the only uniTersity college With any_
thing approaching a Chair of XetallurQ. Sir William Siemens was chiefly
responsible for the success of King's College in this field; he left
the institution large suss of money, as well as providing apparatus
and an annual gold medal and priae in metallurgy.
(36) Shetfield Technical School, regarded bY' JD8.JJ1' contemporaries &s the
leading centre tor the study' ot metallurgy. According to J .11. Dixon,
President ot the Shetfield Chamber ot Couerce, the original idea tor
a technical school came about because of the German lead in technical
education. I t was started and aintained b7 a nuaber ot leading men in
the district and, .atter tiTe Tears, was handed over to the town. ,To-
gether wi th the School ot X.deci:ne and Firth College (founded .07 Mark
Firth with a donation ot £20,000), the Technical School cue to t011l
the uniTera:1,ty collegeot Shetfield. luoh of the School'~ SUCcess va.
4ue to .r.O~.AZ'QO~4. ~ put his faith in the teachinc of applied science,
. "scorDing the pure acientist who held the Tiew that knowledge applied tor
the benetit ot hUJlal1i.ty becomes knowledge degraded".
was "far removed from the chief centre of the metallurgical industry".
He believed that looal industrialists in the Black Country should be
prepared to contribute towards a centre of metallurgical instruction
similar to that in Sheffield. Indeed, largely due to Turner's persever4
ing enthusiasm a metallurgy department was set up in the Mason College,
Birmingham's university college. As a professor of that college, he
continued to campaign for oloser links between educational establishments
and local industry, and it 1s no surprise to find that it was at Bir-
mingham that the Faculty of Commerce made the first systematic attempt
in Britain to prepare men for the higher positions of commerce as a
university study. The Faculty was helped in their deliberations by an
advisory board made up of businessmen.(37)
A number of people in the Blaok Country, greatly influenced by IJ.'u.rner,
MoWilliam (a lecturer in metallurgy to the Staffordshire County Counoi1)
and XcX111an (another lecturer), were beCOming aware of the deeper compli-
oations in the provision of technioal education for the iron and steel
industry. To some extent, they were the local counterparts of leading
national figures like Sir Bernhard Samuelson, Chairman of the 1884
Royal Commission on Technioa1 Iduoation, Sir Henry Roscoe and Sir
Philip Jlagnus. One problem was the suitability of instruction for, on
the one hand, the nuaerous different industries, and, on the other, for
the different 18'Ye1s of worker and manager. Turner vas dubious as to
the validiV of the 1J&y1Z1g "Educate your masters and enct obedience
fro. your un". It "Si a vi." held by '!)'rer, President of the Society
(,,) :P. X1IBgra••, op'olti p.. 78'. It woUld appeato that furner fared
bH'Wr w1th,the 'JlaoJr.!'JCchm'17 1...trlaliftIP........xton' did in GlaBlOw.
Speu:lag to the ...tett Saotian4 It'Ollan4 Steel lnatttute in 1896 on
the subject ot his,!ecbJU.caJ. Collep hft said: "lfhen I look back on the
rH~r4...t:jJa1.1~tu:t.qf'ioan oJL1.,.'lIonder at the extreme apath7 of the
.iJh.tactvlH'~o"'fVthe:liltrict;8IJpecially the iroDDlasters, with reterence
u·"t"""",,'w' f ,,_,.,. <,,,::.t.
of Chemical Industry in 1895, and, whilst conceding that it may have
been "the main reason of German success in chemioal manufactures",
Turner correctly observed that the iron and steel industry was in a
different category: "It can scarcely be classed as a purely chemical in-
dustry, nor, on the other hand, is it merely a mechanical trade in which
manual dexterity alone is required".(38)
Obviously, Turner was well aware of the need to distinguish between
the types of educational requirements, Le. between the needs at operative
level and "for the masters and others who have to lead". Twenty or so
years after the coming into being of the 1870 Education Act, the train-
ing of operatives in the United Kingdom could now be based upon a system
of state-provided elementary education. Prior to the mid-1870's, it had
been almost impossible to give operatives systematic training which in-
volved or required an ability to read and write. P.W. J(usgrave, for
example, correctly contends that the German worker, like his English
counterpart, was trained in the job; "but the essenti""l difference was
that the training could be based on the compulsory education of the
Tolkesschule".(39) Even an ambitious worker, because his basic education
had been too weak, vas Virtually unable to take adTantage of aD1' later
technical education which might be made available in the United Kingdom.
ObYiously~ too, things had impraYed and it 1s ver,r interesting to hear
Tumer adTocating the extension of the school leanne age to fourteen
so that "the men" could receiTe a "sui table education":
" ••• it the parents can spare the boy for another year, so much the
better, thoup it is Dot adTisible that a boy who is atterwards to
beoome a workan should reMin too long at achool". (40 )
Regarding the subjects to be taU8'ht, he stressed the Deed for the three
~ 0,
'R. 's'; in the laat two years at school more techDical subjeots would
(~) Proc. S. statts., 1895-6, p. 21.
('9) "it'ci,"'~T•. op oit, p. 42.
(40) hoo. Sf S9Ua" 1895-6, p. 22.
Jlf
be useful - "elementary chemistry and physics, machine drawing and con-
struction, and instruction in the use of tools". Whilst the teaching of
woodwork was thought important, "an early acquaintance with metals and
familiari ty with metal-making is more sui table to the needs of the youth
in many of our industrial centres".
Turner raised several aspects of the provision of education suitable
at a higher level. Over the course of a decade or so, his enthusiasm
for part-time stu~ at evening classes tended to wane; it was terminated
following a Visit to the United States. For the higher levels of technical
education, he found that the Americans had no interest in evening tuition.
They had a system of full-time education lasting three or four years,
which was accepted "by manufacturers as the best training for the direction
of the most important industrial undertakings". This was a point ot view
strongly shared by Protessor Sexton in a letter addressed to the South
Statfordshire Institute. Sexton believed that the industry's first need
was tor well-equipped central colleges~ which would proVide the type
ot education suitable for the future masters and managers. In taot,
Sexton believed that it was in this sphere that the British indus t17
fell farthest behind both the Americans and Germans. Another factor
which greatly concerned 'fUrner and others _s the attit~ ot indust17
to college training, both as regards the amount ot financial support it
was prepared to make and to the provision ot employment for suitabl.
"graduates" of the uni'V'ersity colleges. It was common moYIedBe in the
1890's that there Yere no United Kingdom equivalents ot Andrew Carnegie
or Rockteller (£1 million to the UIl1'V'ersi1:7 of Chicago), but what ~er
was real17 interested in _s .the recocni tion by indust1'7 of the need
to contribute towards the pronsion of technical education at university
college level. Be vas aware that the average iromaaster was still in-
different to the type 01' place where his son should recei...e a satisfacto1'1
educat~oDJ the ave~ge educationist, on the other hand, "would prefer
J./,J. ,
that the systematic course of instruction, commencing not earlier than
in the student's sixteenth year, extending over three years, and re-
quiring the whole of the student's time during that period, should as
far as possible, be conducted in connection with a university college,
and should be certified to with the stamp of a university degree".
UniTersi ty college fees were high, £'0 as compared with 30/- per annum
in Germany, and, whilst inoreased State aid to colleges was necessary,
Turner was of the opinion that industry should make its contribution.
If the provision of higher technical education was to be complete in
Bri tain, then industry W'ould have to folloW' the American pe,ttern and find
sui table jobs for the products of the university colleges. When on a
fact-finding tour of universitites and technical colleges in both the
United States and Oanada, Turner and Professor Redllayne had found re-
markable the number of managers of W'orks who had been to oollege or
un!versity. The same si tuation was found in Germal17, whereas "in our
district the managers who occuPY' important positions are almost to be
counted on two hands who are able to 8ay' theY' haye gone throU6h a tho..
ougbly good high-class institution, and haye spent there three or four
years". 'l'\1rner spoke kindly of "the good old praotical Ilen" of South
Staffordshire who had "risen froll the ranks", but who lacked "the adwant-
aces of scientific training". (41 )
<"1) Turner'.s oo-.ents are })articularll interestinc in light of Charlotte
lrickson's l'esearohesQn the '••n' of the ,teel-maki1lC era. She looked
at 80M 60 men in all (!ho_s Walker ot Patent Shatt being the one she
:~h&d ••J.eQted fro. SO*tIl :J~toJ'4Ui~). 0nl7 six men had academio technical
~ni.n&, altbouch a~/Duaber under various gui.e8 bad risi ted the
aODt1~taJMJ/or~~,",State8 (C. lrickson, Britillh Industrialists,
Si:eel.and. BO~!~,,<'~"1950", 1959, p. 165 et aeq). James Ri.ley, who at
*- .'ofj' .....~·s••ger althe -wl7 o~ae48teel COIlp&D1'
OtSo6tlah4'''...zo~~ionei.f in beiDg the oDlfuual worker to gain Ii
, "
posi tiOD. of leadership in the steel induatrT'.
Locally, the South Staffordshire district made some headway towards
the provision of technical education and not least in the important
industrial town of WolTerhampton. Following hard on the meeting of the
Council of the WolTerhampton Chamber of Commerce which drew up the reply
to the questions asked by the Royal Commission on the Depression of
frade, came a Special Meeting of the Chamber and "district manufacturers"
to discuss the matter of foreign industrial progress. (42) J .C. Tildesley,
who chaired this meeting, listed technical education amongst a number
of reasons for Germany's rapid pro&ress in recent years in the iron and
steel industries. He was supported in his view by the majority of speakers,
including Mander, who expressed his anxiety to see "the town's School of
Art get going". Mander, as well as wishing to see a school set up, wanted
to see the creation of a museum "where samples of foreign manufacture
might be eXhibited~ At a later meeting of the CounCil(4'), a resolution
was taken to support "Ilr. Mander's suggestion to help the School of Art,
Art Gallery and Free Library ••• in Tiew of the great compeUtion from
abroad in superiori t.Y of form and ornamentation as well as price in
articles of eTer,y-day use largely manufactured in this district". Oyer
the next few years, the question of technical education repeatedly
occupied the Counoil's attention. Approval was given "to Kr. Howard
Vincent's idea of Imperial Schools of Commerce(<<), and a resolution
supporting the goyernaent's bill regarding technical education (the
Technical IJistruction .let of 1889) was accompanied Wi th the Tiew that
the ·otficial cooperation of the Chambers ot C'olllllerce was needed in the
direction and -.n&gellent of the schools proposed 'b1 the Bill". (45)
(42) Intry in Kinutes Boob for 5 February 1886.
(4') Bnt17 fo '0 July 1886.
(44) Entry tor 18 "rob 1887.
(45) .lt the -- ..etine a resolution was passed in tavour ot "the Oxtord
and habrid&'8 Sohool lEaa1Dat1ons Board' s" proposed exaaination tor a
certificate of prof1oieno7 preparatol'J' to a cOllDlercial career. '1'he Chamber
failed, hOlfeYer, to interest the local gr&IImar school in the idea.'
The Council also received the offer of financial help from the town's
Liberal member of parliament, Sir William Plowden, who promised a sum of
£100 towards "any fund aimed at providing technical education" .(46)
The Council considered Plowden's offer and thought that it would best
sene in going towards "the establishment of a chemical and metallurgical
laboratory in connection with the Free Library Classes". The cost of
such a laboratory was estimated at £500, £250 of which would come from
the Science and Art Department at South Kensington. In actual fact, in
189' Sir Alfred Hickman, recently victorious for the Tories in a general
election, donated a further £500 towards the same laboratory.
In 1889, the Technical Instruction Aot was, indeed, passed giving local
authorities (municipalities) the power to levy a rate for that purpose;
the next year the Local Taxation Aot helped the movement towards the
proTision of technical education by prOviding County Councils with con-
siderable funds to deYote to this purpose. The local area took adYantace
of the neW legislation. Wolverhaapton, Va l ea11 and West Bromwich all
established centres where praotical metallurgy could be taught; ~tatford­
shire County Oounci1 set up a turther 8eYen oentres in the southern
half of the county where lecture. were given b;y tu.l1-time staff. .A.
n\Dlber of scholarships, valued from £2 to ~ were also offered by the
County "in order to defray the traYelliDg and other expenses ot proJlising
students". IT the Jlid-189Q's,too, a laboratory tor practical work had
S
been establi8hed at WeclDe,4burr. '!he -e.. Technical School, Bria1ngh••,
pro't'ided the b••t tuition in the area. In Tie.. ot so.. of Turner's
co__ts preTie.l,. mentioned, possib1,. the area as a whole could be
onticisecl for .preadiDC it. a11"8&41' slender resource. OYer too wide a
field. '!'Mre .. no.herta,e of place. ot ill8truotion at the JIaIlual
worker lenl; indeed, !UrJ:utr wa. ot the opinioa that "in re8pect to
(46) matt? tor 21 Ootober:. t8fJ7•
classes for manual instruction in all probability Staffordshire stands
well to the front, both in the number of teachers and the number of
students". It was argued by some informed men that authorities like
Staffordshire County Council had provided too JDaJly classes and that
they had neglected both staffing and equipment:
"The small schools are necessarily poorly equipped, the teaching
staff must be small, the work cannot be divided out, the teachers
must be ill-paid, and the schools must necessarily be inefficient".
(47)
There is clearly some truth in Turner's view that the County would have
been better advised to haye set up a central college, or to haTe paid
the fares of more students wishing to attend the universi't7 college in
Birmingham.
Indeed, a powerful body in fayour of technical education in South
Staffordshire was the local Institute of Iron and Steel Vorks I Managers.
First and foremost, the Institute provided a platform for members of
the local iron and steel trade to discuss the problem. Professor Sexton,
for one, was lavish in his praise of the Institute's wOrk in this field,
especially the rapidiV with *hich the7 dealt with the problem in the
lieht ot the findines at the BIB Report on the German and Belgian in-
dustries .. lfuael'OUS meJIbers of th8 InIItitute nnt on record with their
encouragement to yo~ members in their works to attend eYeDing 01as88s.
18 JeYe Poster, for example, urpd "forellen, managers and others connected
with workers to do this", whilst V. SOMrs, the !nstitute •8 President
in 1901-2, commented:
"The great nlue at this instruotion is its importanoe eD&blinc the
oount17 to hold its own in its race of oompetition wi th other ooun-
tries •••• !hi, teohD1oal education CQe DOne too soon; and it is
for our Institution, composed of men who came in daily contact with
so many of our artisans, to instil in their minds and make them
realise the great advantage and value of technical education" .(48)
Inevitably, there were members of the Institute who advised caution;
Jno. W. Hall who, adm:f. ttedly, was becoming a little testy in JIl&ll7 of
his views, warned the audience which had listened to Turner on the
subject of technical education that "technical education was "not a
patent pill which is warranted to cure all the diseases of the iron
trade" • (49 )
In their criticisms of the type of recruit at the operatiTe level,
especially with regard to the question of technical education, South
Staffordshire spokesmen became increasingly aware of the shortcomings of
the personnel of the local'iron and steel industry at maJlAgerial
levels. (50) !he lU!"J. report clearly recognised the importance of an
"abiUty to direct and control". In Gel'lll&n7, men who rose fro. the ranks
of industry "had the addi tional adYantage of a special scientifio and
technical education", a point which marked.ly Jl&d.e fo~ a "more efficient
and economic management - an iaportant faotor 1n Continental production".
Contemporaries such as'!'tl1"lJ8r anch;1 more recentlY', writers like Charlotte
lricbon, haYe &11 testified to the absenoe in the South Staffordshire
area of men with &117 tosl high-l.,.,el teohnioal education. Indeed, a
critici. which oould. be lmedat the local 1I1cluat17_. that too _~
80ns followed their fatheri 1n the ...e positions. C. nrOhhotf, the
cont_porar, &aericall oo.entator on the iron and steel industries
located both aide8 of the Atlantic, 'belieTed that this tendenC7 had
brought about -the aoetstr1k1hg te&t111"e ot the' attitwleof the Inglish
(.e( Proo. S'.Stltt...i1901-2, p.4.
(49}:hoo. I~ statra~,-ta~, P.4'.
(50)"t.r8ie~foll'th1s(ill'bOthP.V. -U8CraYe alld C. Briotaon with reprd
to ~oiaf:8Wfi~,:reaW'" 8o&ro••
iron industry today( 1900) ••• its pessimism and its lack of courage"; (S1 )
Another American wnter obviously shared this view when he wrote:
"In England there is a tendenoy for the ma.n.a.gement of an enterprise
to descend from father to son, and an opposi tion to change, a magni-
fying of every tradition into a law of nature, and a disinclination
to be different from others".(S2)
There were still a number of what W. G. JlIcllillan described as tlmasters of
the old classtl in existence in South Staffordshire in the 1890's; such
a person had what he "considered an especial seoret in his particular
trade which gave him the advantage over his competi to.17,s; and, to put
the whole thing into a nut-shell, he seemed to consider that the success
of his secret was the secret of his success. It is scarcely an exagger-
ation to say that in some cases they were not aware (just because they
isolated themselves), that nearly all their riYals had the same secret,
and that it was to be found in the text booke".(S') Obviously, keeping
top management positions in the hands of the immediate family did not
always result in weak leadership. :Both A.V. Hickman (the "Young GoTemor")
and his brother, Edward Hickman, ably serYed their father's business
both during his lifetime and afterwards.
Charlotte Erickson, speaking of the industry at national leTel,
stresses the considerable interchange ot knOWledge within Britain itself
at "the top management leTel, for experience in more than one firm was
custOJll8.l'7 among the Ilen associated wi th the introduotion of nev pr0.-
cesses". (S4) UDf'ortunately, this was generally not the case tor the
Black Count17. Because the area's tame was associated With wrought iron,
and not steel to azJ1' great extent, Tel'7 tev "new" men came into the area.
(51) C. Kirchhoff, lotes on Some EuroPean Iron Ilakiy Districts: J.
Colleotion ot Letters to the "Iron .lp", 1900.
(S2) H.B. Caapbell, op cit, p. 421.
(5') ProO, s, statts" 1895-&, Pp. '8-9.
(54) C. IrickBon, op Cit, p. 170.
An exception was Enoch James, formerly of Dowlais, who left the South
Wales firm to become general manager of Patent Shaft and Axletree Company,
Limited (one of the few major steel firms in the area in any case). It
was James, for example, who was entrusted by the BITe to prepare the
section on "The Steel Works Plant and EquiIJllent of the United States"
in the 1902 report on "American Industrial t:ondi tions and CompaUtion" •
If the South Staffordshire area was not attracting new men to its man-
agerial ranks, it was also losing them. One typical member of this nine-
teenth century version of the 'brain-drain' was Henry Grey. Born in
Dudley, Grey went to the United States and became manager of one of
Carnegie's ....orks. In the early 1900'a, Grey was actively engaged on the
European Continent • .At Diffel'dange, in Luxembourg, he built a mill
"capable of turning out 50 tons of 14-inoh girders per hour". Another,
more exalted, person to leave the Blaok Country and not return was
•Benjamin Talbot (1864-1947). Talbot s father, a native of Brierley Bill,
had moved to the Castle Ironworks, Wellington, Shropshire, and it was
from there that Benjamin vent to the United States in 1890. He worked
in steelworks in Tennessee and Pen.ns11vania, before returning to the
Uni ted lCingdoll in 1901. Whilst in America, Talbot perfected the tilting
furnace which, apart froll its rapid production features, was partioularly
suited for vorking low grade pig irons. Talbot beoame managing director
ot the Cargo Fleet Iron COIIlpe.D7 in Eddle.brough, and it was there that
his prooess was first developed in Britain. Thi8 loss in personnel to
the South Staffordshire district was., indeed, llade vorse by the de-
parture ot BOII8 of the larpr finas to coastal sites. L,saghts, for
example, al thoqh they initially ued locally-trained lien in the UJ:lsge-
ant of their Volverhaapton works, had, by the closing years ot the
centurJ, brought in _bers of the Bristol croup. The departure of the
ti~ C)briowsly, included the 10s8 to the area of lien like 'Ii.R. ~8asht.
It we accept the arcuaent of Profes80r Habakkuk regarding the posi tion
ot mana.....nt in the "IrM.'t Depression" then we can lI.y that the 81tuation
in South Staffordshire of oTerall decline in the iron and steel industries
was a cause of the shortage of first-class industrial leadership rather
than a result of it. Taking this line of argument a atage further it can
also be said that local leaders of the industry like Sir Alfred Hickman
vere prevented by the location of their works in a depressed area from
displaying their talents to the full. In other words, if Hickman had
occupied a position similar to that which he held in the South Stafford-
shire area in Middlesbrough, then he would haTe dominated an industry
undergoing expansion perhaps even more successfully than ironmaaters
of the calibre of Sir Lowthian Bell.
Reference haa been made to Professor Turner's requests for the local
induatry to giTe encouragement to the provision of higher education
and then to find employment at managerial leTels for the products of the
uniTersity colleges. Ebenezer Parkes, on a number of separate occasions,
developed this theme to the South Staffordshire Institute in the further
light of his experienoes in the United States. As a member of the BIT.t 'a
team to visit the United States and inTestigate its iron and steel in-
dustries, Parkes had been greatly illpressed by "the class of managers
theT haTe in the works •••" (55) Generally, thq were lien with a college
or uniTersity background who had then "come into a works at, 8&Y twenty
or twenty-one, (and) had aeTeral years practical experienoe as assistant
to a manager, and finally they bad deYeloped into managers and supenJ:l-
tendents at a Ye17 early age". Parkes vas aurpr1S'~ at the degree of'
responsibilit7 giTen to the young anapr. Be coaented:
"Ve haTe not a raOe of managers like that; but, with, the spread ot
education, technical institutes, &Dd, aboYe all, a de.ire for self-
iaproTement, there is DO reason wh7 in the near tuture ve should
DOt haYe a stldlar class".
(55) hoc. S. Statts., 1901-2, p. 93.
He also suggested that Britain had to get away from thinking that "age
and long experience" were" the only qualifications for successful manage-
ment". In fact, there is no evidence to suggest that this deTelopment
did take place in the Black Country before 1914.
Chapter 6 Specialist Aspects of Industrial Aanasement.
Although information is scarce on the subject, it is fairly safe to
say that not a great deal of progress was made in the South Staffordshire
district with regard to specialist aspects of industrial management.
PreTious reference has been made to the realisation by some local works'
managers of the need to establish more direct control CYf'er labour. In
the three larger steel plants, the installation of fairly expensiTe
equipment for the production of steel necessitated continuous attendance
and nen round-the-clock working. Sub-contracting or team-worting was
not really suited for the new steel processes. Verr gradually, centralised
lII&D&g&ment came in, although the slowness in the growth of aD7 real
supe1"'f'is017 class was a serious hindrance. EYen in Te17 recent years,
two of the three steelworks still displayed eTidence of the retention
of sub-oontracting. (1) Without the employment of centralised management
techniques, it was impossible, for example, to deTelop departmental
aocounting. Parkes had tound this to be one of the key-points of the
suocessful production methods ot the larger American works:
"!he perfect orier and syst_ obaert'ed in AJler:l.oan vorb is another
notable teature. The sfSte. of returns, an4 results ot work, in
difterent departments, efther iD. mills or in eDglneerinc shope, is
carried out with a coapleteness and a oorrectness which leaTes nothing
to be desired. The department ot statistios and oosts is worked. up
(1) on a perso_l Tis:l.t to one altha YOm a oompaniOD. and myselt were
arne4b7 an ezeeutfft ot.oae'.taaclinc to be ..err oareful in how we
dealt Witll the' elcl.r17p.~JlfD char.. ot the patternahop. Be _s only
the fourth pe:NOaWMAP7-1iU.$ pHiti08:1.n the ..Ie lit.ti.e of the
lfOl"ta'&Ht 4"_";'.'n"\erOf~. in ownership and the growth ot
......8tit, the 1l...40fthe':pattem ahop reaained a closed appointment
and tuDotionecl .eparately tro. the rest at the worts.
.).H- .
to a high degree of efficiency, and in a well managed works it is
marvellous to see the celerity with which they can put their finger
upon each different department and know all about it •••"(2)
It is very doubtful, indeed, if anything other than very rudimentary
accountancy methods were adopted in the South Staffordshire area before
1900, especiallY' amongst the smaller firms. A number of firms that failed
in the period under review displaY'ed staggering weaknesses in this field.
Dr. Warren quotes the example of a plate worker and galvaniser who "had
nei ther purchase ledger nor cash book" (,), whilst the Gospel Oak Company
of Tipton kept no profit and loss account. Often, so-called 'Account
Books' were simply records of whate'Yer nature the secretal'J of the
company thought IIlight be worthwhile putting down. Suoh a book belonging
to Lloyds t Foster and Company contained frequent references to firms
which had gone under owing money to that co.~. Bow Black Country
firms arrived at their quotations (tenders) for specific jobs would make
interesting reading. Benjamin Gibbons, for example, a man whose life-
span in Black Country indllstrr oovered nearly fifty years, se_ed to
keep his 'facts and figures' on &DJ sorap ot paper that ....s available.
, Another aspect of' manageaent which tailed to develop alone lines
sufficiently flexible to deal with a chancing scene conoerned marketing
and sales techniques. The advent of severe foreign coapeti tioD, both at
boae and abroad, made the situation desperat.. J'urthe1'llore, market
conditiona continued to change, not least beoaWle of' ~e speedin, up
of the a..ns of' transport and ooaUllication8. lefore the advent of' the
tele~, for exuple, the tranatlantic, cO,lonial and eYen the nearer
hropean markets uaual17 pert01'lled to a .et pattern. Orders followed a
(2) hoc. S. Statts., 1901-2, p. 95.
(,) IC. Warren, op cit, p~ 38..
seasonable pattern; the travellers returned With them and orders were
placed With the manufacturers who ei ther met the orders from stocks or
from sustained bursts of production. In the 1850's, 60's and even 70's,
delivery of the greater part of bulky and heavy goods 1I8.S made by sailing
ship, because of the lower freight as compared With the high rates charged
by the steamships. It was estimated by Messrs. Bolling and Lowe(4), in
fact, that ten per cent of Britain's total exports of iron and steel
at any one time was aboard ship. Uncertainty of arrival was a further
factor which caused foreign buyers to keep heavy stocks of goods:
" ••• but every year, and even in every month, changed the position,
and now we calculate the quanti ties on the seas do not amount to
five per cent of the total export".(5)
Large stocks of iron and steel goods, with the possible exception of
pig iron, were no longer held. Orders could be placed by telegram if
necessary, and the fast and frequent mails made it unnecessary to order
in bulk. Hanufacturers had to be ready, therefore, for the moderately-
sized order and to deal vith it promptly. In such circumstances, it
was becoming of increasing importance to haTe experienced selling agents
on hand in the main overseas markets if sufficient orders were to be
obtained to keep the manufacturing plant at economically sound production
levels. As early as 1881, a British consul 1nM-tin Amerioa had praised
German merchant houses in Mexico, and had aqgested that British goods
sent to Mexico trom le.nchester, BtrmiDBbaa or Sheffield were ordered
chiefly by German and other merchants. ObTioualy, when German fil'lll8
were able to produce the goods required by .exican custours the orders
would not go to British fil'll8.
In the finishing trades of the Black Count1'7 the factor or merchant
(4) lPo1'llerl7 William Bird and COJIIBDY, London Kerchants, founded in 1827.
(5) Annual Report on the state of the iron and steel trades, published
in Iron, 22/1/84.
had acquired considerable influence over the manufacturer; in fact, the
latter was very often totally dependent on the merchant. In a great
number of cases, it was the merchant who employed the travellers; only
when the travellers had returned from their journeys would the merchants
place their orders with the manufacturers. This almost complete depend-
ence on the merchant by the producers can be seen in the following
comment made upon the state of the trade in the local area in July 1884:
"The return home of the tavellers to South Staffordshire results
in a diminution of the orders arriving at the hard-ware manufacturers.
The merChants have not yet either begun to operate treely since the
warehouses were closed for stocktaking".(6)
Pointing in the same direotion, if slightly different in cause, was a
oomment made by a member of the Council of the Wolverhampton Chamber of
Commerce in 1894 on the state of the district's staple trade - the
iron trade:
"Prioes were never lower•••• The tin and japan trades bad been exper-
ienoing a hand-to-mouth eXistenoe, and goods had been ordered one at
a time, and to a large extent by parcels post" .(7)
As vas the case with the other important centrea ot iron and steel
produotion, South Sta:ttorclah1re cue to re17 a great d_l on London
merchant houses. )lessrs. Bolling aDd Love vaa, in fact, an example ot
the more imaginatiTe merchant house, although it must be stressed that
such firms did not represent any partic\llar manufacturer or area. They
treqantl7 tenderecl for oontraots in oompeti t;l.on with the large internat-
ional f1ms (JOD Cockerill, Fred.. trupp, Viokers, Ibbv Vale), and, it
auoeesaful, the,. either ..t the orden out of atook or plaoed them though-
..
01lt the Yari01lS iron and ate.1 producing dietrict•• ru.rthermore, be-
cause aerchants aad -roh&nt hOURa acted increasingl,. on an international
(6) 1ro., 4/7/84.
(7).JUnut•• :eo.b, -tq tor 9 liar 1894.
scale, it was not unknown for those houses with considerable interests in
the Black Country to go outside the district and place their orders for
overseas shipment. In shipping iron and steel goods to India or the Far
East, Continental fi~s were frequently able to offer lower prices f.o.b.
a major English port than Black Country producers. As well as providing
a very detailed catalogue of iron and steel goods for sale, Bolling and
Lowe provided the industry with an abstract of details of tests for
steel plates, angles, tees, etc., as well as conversion tables for prices
and measurements. Of great value, too, was the series of "Reports on the
Prospects of the Iron Trade", some of which were published by the trade
journals such as 1!:2!!.. The calibre of these reports was extremely high. (a)
Gradually, the larger fims in the various branches of the South
Staffordshire industry began to set up their own selling agencies.
Lysaghts and Stewarts and Lloyds (an amalgamation in 1900 of the Glasaow
firm of A.J. Stewart and Menzies Ltd. and Lloyd and Lloyd Ltd. of
Birmingham and Halesowen) were just two of these firms to establish agencies
throughout the main markets of the world, and notably in Australasia,
South Africa and Canada. Some sll8.l1 firms, John Knowles for example,
were well rewarded for paying similar attention to marketing factors •
• evertheless, despite individual successes Parkes was fully justified
in 1901 in complaining that British goods suffered from lack of advert-
(a) In their 1884 report, Bolling and Lowe had seen the danpr of keeping
large stocks of pig iron in Connal' s stores in Glasgow and Middle.brough.
They put the stocks at one million tons. They Were "never encroached
upon to any great extent. Taking the value of this at only 40/- a ton,
we have a figure of t2 million, on which the dead charge of interest alone
, ,
at 4" per annum, gives £80,000 exclusive ot all other expenses". The
Black Count17 also knew only too well that a slump in Scotch and north
ot England warrants could ha,:"e a disastrous effeot on pig iron prices
on the BirminghslI kchanp. Bell told the WolTerbampton Chamber ot
Commerce as much in 1889. (Entr,y in tinutes for Januar;y 1889).
ising and the absence of "suitable agents to dispose of them". One
member of the South Staffordshire Institute, H. Parry, went so far as
to criticise "the capitalists" of the district for their failure to
appoint commercial representatives on a scale similar to that of the
Germans. In a~ case, the German firms were soon to establish central
selling/marketing agencies in Britain which were to be exceptionally
active in the Black Country. One of the reasons for the success of the
Uni ted States steel firms in the years after 1898 was the use of aggress-
ive selling methods in the main British and overseas markets. !he Black
Country, indeed, contributed to the appearanoe of "commercial backwardness"
in the closing years of the nineteenth century.
The question of official goyernment support and information about
foreign markets for local manufacturers had frequently been raised in
the Council of the lfolYerhampton Chamber of Commerce. As early as Bovember
1881, the town's member of parliament, "illiers, vas instructed by the
Council to raise with the the British Government the question of diplo-
matic representation in Kexico. Their reason for doing this was the
help which the German and Prench iron and steel industries had supposedly
received there from their diplomatic representatives. \'0 some extent
the looal Chamber of Commerce was following a course of action stimulated
by the amount of attention given to the subject by '!'he 'r'iIles; that news-
paper had intomed its readers, in tones of righteous indignation, that
foreign govel'DDlents (notablT the <Jerman) were usiDg their diplomatio
senice to e%ert pressure to secure special trade favours for their
nationals. A few Tears later, the Council requested the 1'oreign Office
to ask the Yarioue consular officials "to embodT in their reports &D7
intormation on the subject of foreip'trade whioh may be likely to serve
the interests of Brit18h manutaoturerstt (9). In tact, the Poreilll Offioe
(9) tinutes Boob, entr,y for 12 Dec_ber 1884.
U1.
took up the sugges.tion, and the Council was pleased to report on another
oooasion tba t oonsuls in China were to send details "of the exact re-
quirements of Chinese consumers". In 1886, the Blaok Oountry lobby
decided to bring the whole question before parliament and Molaren,
member of parliament for Stafford, moved for the Government to consider
the advisability of appointing special diplomatic agents in all foreign
oapi tals "for the express purpose of promoting the extension of British
commerce" • (10) The Under-Secretary, Bryce, s tated that" i t was now
acknowledged within the Foreign Office that one of its olearest duties
was to promote the interests of British commerce to the best of its
power by all legitimate Ileans". However, ten lears later when G.X.
Curzon, then Under-Secratry of state at the Foreign Office, addressed
the WolYerhampton Chamber of Commerce it would appear from his remarks
that not a lot had been done in the intel'Tening period. Ourson attempted
to reassure the local industrialists that the Foreign Office could play
a great part in helpinc them, especially it they were to be able to
compete wi th "the foreip Governaent backed trade". (11 )
If' the 100&1 industrr had failed to uk. muoh head1f&7 with marketine
and sales teobniques, at 1ea8t it had spent a great deal ot energ in
tryiDg to influence ..rkats and prioe. tbroUib trades assooiationa.
As was the case wi th the other ...in iron producing areas in the United
liDgdoa, the South Staffordshire pig iron producers had had a lone histo17
ot ....surea dea1ine witil the atate of the 100&1 lndlUltZ"7. The South
Stattordahire an4 lut Voro••terah1re lroaaster.· AHoeiation had 'bult
up .&J1 etteotl.,.e ergaaiation tor im.ti.tiDe the n.el'OUS stati.tloal
battle. which it carried .ut wi til the rai1W&7 co.paDi•• uul 100&1 ratiDC
bHie., ani tor d_1iDe With the 1nore&aiq &IIOlIIlt ot par1ia.enta17
lel1.1ati_.1'he .laooiatin al.o tried to u.1nta1. Prioe., e.peoia117
(.) lIansarel, ,rd. Serie., v. ~, pp. 609-1,.
(11) Xiautes Boob, ent1"1 tor 15 January 1896.
).)..(.
wi th regard to unmarked bar iron. ( 12) However, by the early 1890' B the
situation was fairly desperate and in an attempt to aToid complete
disorganisation the South Staffordshire and East Worcestershire makers
joined with their counterparts from Shropshire, Derbyshire, Nottingham-
shire, South Yorkshire and Lancashire to form the Midland Unmarked Bar
Association.(1,) Quarterly meetings of the Association were held and in
Birmingham minimum (basis) prices for the home market were agreed upon.
Goods for export were not controlled as far as price was concerned -"All
iron which is sold, and delivered f.o.b. in English, Scotch and Irish
ports shall not be in any way affected by the terms of this deed" - a
point which Macrosty interpreted to mean "economic dumping". In other
words, the Association "permitted exportation at reduced prices, the
policy which in more recent years has aroused so much resentment when
practised by American and German Kartells". (14) The history of the
Association was extremely ohequered. The first agreed minimum price was
£5/5 per ton, which ws then quickly raised to £6/10. This latter price,
hoveTer, was too high in the early months of 1898 and it was lowered to
£6; eyen this was too high and a number at fi rms found it difficult to
uphold against the cheaper bars ot South Staffordshire, Shropshire and
Welsh firms outside of the Association selling at £5/12 per ton. The
(12) As their number declined, the 'Marked Bart houses tended to aot to-
gether; in eftect there _s a 'Jlarked Bar Bouse Association' but, al is
related elsewhere in the text, it tended to tollow, rather thaD influenoe,
_rket condi tiona. At tiIH8 ot hip d~, tor exaaple, the speciality
iron ot tims like Jno. Bapall and Son8 and Brow:a. and heer, II&de biuer
adyanoes than was general thl'OUatulJut the 1ndu8t17.
(1') In 1898, the le.acaehire aakera set up their OVll orpniaation.
(14) W. lfacros'ty, The'.trus1: IIoY.en1: in British Induata, 1907, p. 62.
South wales coal strike came to the rescue of the Association and by
October 1898, agreed minimum prices had been advanced to £6/10 per ton
delivered in the district.(15) Pollowing the market change, but to some
extent acting as a further factor encouraging price increases, the
Association fixed the price at £7/10 in J.ly 1899. In fact, ver" little
iron was sold for less that £8 and this was soon made the basis price
for iron delivered in the district. It was observed in November 1899
that the Association was "holding together much better than was formerly
the case, the circumstances whioh favour greater cohesion being inoreased
local consumption with deoreased competition from North Staffordshire
and Wales".(16) At its meeting in April 1900, the Association fixed the
price at £10/15, which was the highest price for a very long time. ( 17)
This, in fact, proved to be the peak; soon afterwards, Scotch, north ot
England and Lancashire firms began to sell heavily in the Black Country
and by' September of the same year, when the Asscciation _s still ad-
hering to the basis of £10/15, individual member firma were known to be
selling at £9. At its October aeetine in the Great Western Hotel, Bil"llling-
h&ll, the Association reluctantly lowered the basis price for ordinary
sizes and qualities by' £1 to £9/15. Six months later, the basis price
was down to £7 delivered and, with firms accepting £,6/10 to 1:6/"'/6,
the Association was in ruins.
List prices remained in abeyance for the next few 78ars, with manu-
facturers acceptinc the best teras which they could get.(1S) Slightly
i.proved condi ticms, early in 1904, saw the " resusci tation" ot the
UDDI&rked Bar -.ars' Assooiation, and a minimum prioe 1I&s tixed at 1:6
per ton at the works. Bo.ever, trade conditiona took a tum tor the
(15) Oolliery Guardian. 14/10/98.
(16) Collieq Guardian. 10/11/99.
(17) In 1889 - 90, for exaap1., unaarked bars had sold tor lJ3/10, but
thereatter a deoline bad .et in.
(18) Colliery Guardian, .,0;'0/0'.
worse and no summer quarterly meeting was held by the Association. There
was little cohesion amongst member firms but in defence of them was the
fact that that there were few branches of the South Staffordshire iron
trade "more exposed to competi tion both home and foreign", and under
those circumstances it was "extremely difficult for the lesser firms
to maintain Association prices".(19) When the Association did reappear
again, early in 1906, it proceted cautiously with regard to a price-
fixing policy; no attempt was made to raise the list price until prices
had actually advanced in the market. Furthermore, the Association recog-
nised the fact that if it raised prices too high foreign competitors
would be encouraged to enter the Black Country market as, indeed, had
happened in the past. A.fter a few months, foreign competitors did enter
the market; there were insufficient orders to go round and, onoe again,
the fourty or fifty makers in South Stattordshire sOllght their own
solutions. When, in 1910, the A.ssooiation made a tinal attempt to in-
n uence the market, it failed hopelessly because its efforts ooinoided
wi th an outburst of Belgian dumping of common bar in the district.
Perhaps in part because of the district's maD1 difficulties, South
Staffordshire firms in 80st branches of the semi- and finished steel
industry were always to the fore in attempts to control the home market.
All three of the major steel producers readily joined in 1910 with
Soottish and north-east coast makers of plates and sections to respect
each other's 'home' and 'special' territories. The following year, in
the face of mounting competition from South "ales and abroad, the scheme
wa8 extended in soope; a rebate system amountin« to 5/- per ton _s
introduced. Apart froll oreating a furore in the trade press, the rebate
80helle vas not sucoesstul. (20) It •• now that firms lite Hiolrman' s and
Round Oak aut haye telt their TarT limited posi tiOD. They Were like
(19) Colliert Guardian, 22/7/01,..
(20) IO'l'R. 22/9/11.
pawns in the real battle between G.K.I. on the one hand and the larger
Scottish firms on the other for the domination of the West Coast and
Belfast markets. (21 )
The galTanized sheet trade in the Black Country had for some time
shown interest in a combined effort to control prices and production.
Two agreements, the one ot 188' and the other a dozen years later, both
failed. Welsh competition and the defection of the leading manufacturers,
notably ~saghts and John Summers, indeed, proved too much for the
second Galvanized Iron Trade .l.ssociation and it collapsed in 1900.
FiTe years later, a national body was set up - the lational GalTanized
Sheet .lssociation; again, the Black Country firms showed an unhealthy
oTer-eagerness to join the pool. The output of each fim was restricted
and the market diTided up; penalties were exaoted on those who exceeded
their production quotas. The formation of the Association coincided
with an upswing in the trade cycle, with the result that it is difticult
to assess the .lssociation's real contribution to the iapl'OTement in
sheet prices. Between 1905 and 19f11, the price per ton for sheet of a
ciTen gauge rose fro. £10 to nearl,. £14. When deJDaDd began to vaTer,
the pool was forced to reduoe its list prices and then to abandon prioe
control altogether. At one tillie, in July and August 1909, prioes vere
back to £10, before settling don at £11/10. The oauses of failure vere
only too obYious. In the tirst place, not all the sheet manufaoturers
had joined the pool; the remainiq fima were joined by others (including
toreign produoers) t.apted into the _rket b7 the pool'ship prio.
l .....ls. The nuael'OUS mall and ineffioient Black COlmt17 tims had been
largely respnai.ble for the hip leTel of agreed prioes; all that the
Assooiation did for a while was to feather-b.d firma who otherwise would
haTe been forced out of business. Its policies were too rig.l.d and the
(21) D. Burn, op cit, pp. 342-', aDd J.O. Carr and W. Tapl1n, op 01t,
pp. 256 .t seq.
small firms persuaded themselves that capital investment in new plant
was not necessary.
Similar developnents took place in the tube trade, which was in fact
another branch of the industry in which South Staffordshire could boast
a large number of sma.ll uni ts. (22) The same situation was to be found in
Scotland which, together with the Midlands, was the chief' centre of the
tube-making industry. Competition between the two areas was fierce, and
even within each other relations amongst the manufacturers were often
bitter. John Knowles, for example, had built up an extensive export
trade, with important customers in Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne (Bosch and
Haag for example) and even Johannesburg, but his trading accounts for
the period show the topsy-tuny nature of the tube business. Attempts
were made amongst the larger tube manufacturers - put at between fifty
and sixty in 1m with a host of:lesser f'irms as well - to fom a trade
association, but those of 1898 and 1902 both failed. With the exception
of' one Glasgow boiler tube manufaoturer, all the United Kingdom tube
firms joined together in a British Tube Jlanutaoturers' Association at
--
the end of 1905. This association lasted until the .econd half of 1908;
for nearly three years there was severe competi tion amongst the reJD4ining
(22) An interesting account of one lI\1ch firm, John KnOWles ot Vedneebury,
is given b;y the grandson of the founder of the firm, K.W. K!:iowles, in
the JOUrD&l ot West Midland Regioll&l Studt.a,vol. 2, 1968, pp. 77-99.
John KnOWles at one time worked for the moet important wrought iron tUbe
makers in the count1"1', Jues Ruasell of the Crown l'ube Works at the BiBb
Bullen, Wednesbury. He eet up on his own in 1850 and in 1867 purchased
Pl'Opert1 in Valsall Street, Vednesbury, for £1,740 fro. the unfortunate
Llol'ds, Poster and CompaD.J". Two ;years later, the approxiaate value of
the firm was put at £4.,827. let protite tor 1870-71, a boom year, were
put as hip &8 £1,'91/17/2. John bo"le. bad then decided to ooncentrate
on tube fittings, and the tirm. reuined in that line ot busine8s until
it va8 8cld in 1946. 10 further expansion took place atter 1907.
thirty-six or so important British manufacturers. In 1911, another more
successful attempt was made at association. Home prices rose by some
five per cent and in 1913 a rebate scheme was introduced. Of great re-
levance to this was the changed nature of the structure of the industry.
In Scotland, eight small firms had amalgamated into the Scottish Tube
Company, whilst the merger movement which had brought Stewarts and Lloyds
into being in 1900 meant that the whole British trade could be greatly
influenced by one firm. By 1910, for example, Stewarts and Lloyds' pro-
duction was about 140,000 tons annually. As well as building up a large
export trade, through a system of strong selling agencies especially in
Australia and Iew Zealand, Stewarts and Lloyds benefited as far as market
conditions were concerned from the geographical location of its two main
plants. The Scottish plant in Glasgow was able to place its products f.o.b.
at about a cost of 2/- per ton, whilst the plant at Halesowen in South
Staffordshire was centred next door to the largest home market for the
Bri tish tube trade - Birmingham. The German industry, "whose works were
on the whole larger and better equipped and more modern than ours", bad
naturally cornered the larger share of the Continental inter-state trade,
but they could not compete consistently with Stewarts and Lloyds in the
main British markets.{23)
When Ebenezer Parkes raised the question of American trusts before
the South Staffordshire Institute in 1901 (24), he attempted to show
why, in his opinion, South Staffordshire firms could never actively
plrticiplte in any major trust movement in the United Kingdom. Uppermost
in his mind was his conviction that there were no men of "commanding
genius and personality"owmng a sufficiently large firm in the area
(23) H. Jeans, "The World's Export Trade in Iron and Steel and its
Regulation", Proc. S. Statts., 1900-9, p, 95.
(24) Proc. S. Staffs., 1901-2, p. 95.
from which base they might haTe been able to initiate some such mOTement.
Charles Schwab had told Parkes that the American trust was not like
the old-type association which had been established "for the purpose of
the restriction of output and the fixing of prices". Indeed, it was
"an association with one capital, one management, one polioy, one oontrol,
coordinating all the different classes and stages of production into one
uni. ted whole, and embracing in its operation transit by land and sea,
the possession of steamers, of railWay plant and railway lines, and the
whole system ot prodllction from start to finish". Parkes shrewdly ob-
sel"'f'ed that there were very great organisational problems inherent in
this new type industrial/commercial structure - OTer capitalisation for
one - but aboTe all was the question of leadership:
"They are pushed along and controlled by the oommanding genius and
personality of one man, and if a succession of such men cannot be
found it is like to go hard wi th the trust".
Recent wri ters(25) on bencan management trends in the iron and steel
industr,r of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries haTe
suggested that ironmasters can be diTided into three oategories:
a. pre-classical,
b. classical,
c. the Carnecie generation.
In the first, the ironmasters displayed outstanding technioal, rather
than organisational, ability, with the result that their units ot pro-
duction were 811&11. South Stattordshire ironmastere ot the calibre ot
the Gibbons' brothers, Joseph Ball, .lddenbrook, to name just a tev,
clea,rly fit into this oatego17. The second stage in this deYelopllent
(25) .l Redliob's .lmerioan Bu1nee8 Leaders and P. Tem1n' s seTeral works
on both the .imerioan and Brit1eh industries are ot especial interest.
saw the rise of the capitalist entrepreneur, the ironmaster himself
combining technical insight (rather than personal inventiveness), an
organising ability and, above all, business understanding. Fewer Black
CO'UJltl"1 ironDl8sters fit into this catego1'1' than the first and it is
easier to think at examples of men who possessed one or two of these
characteristics but lacked the third. Sir Alfred Hickman, however,-
clearl,. possessed all three. In his own lifetime, he built up his various
interests into a moderatel,. large enterprise; he contributed little
that was original in the _y of technical adTance but at each stage in
his company's develolllent Hiokman displayed a full knowledge of the
technical issues involved. Equall,., he ..8 able to 11813818 his works,
which, in fact, consisted of a vertically integrated concern. Some ot the
larger wrought-iron fi1"ll8 could be Aid to haTe briefly entered this
classical stage. It is doubtful it the Blaok Coun1:l'7 threw up aQ repre-
sentatiTe of the 'Carnegie generation', i.e. "captains ot busines. instead
of oaptains of industl'7". Who in the area can be said to haTe inher1ted
lar....soal. plant and .quiJaent and then ••t ov.t to create "bie business"
wi th oomplicat.d tiDaDoial ad oorporate structure? The Camegt••,
'ricks, Schwabs aDd QareTs ot tlae .taerioan indut17 GOneemed th....lves
With industrial rationaliation aDd the d.....lopaent ot trauportation
s1.t.., "leaviDe tec!mical 30b.to hired teclmioal expert.".
It i. olear11 ot eo•• aipiticanoe 1:1I&t the two 1-.4111« .t••l produo.ra
18 the Blaok C01lll1:17- ·b1U1Cl Qat. aad Spriq Yele - eMll1. not ha.e taken
part in &D7 larD ...lputioD 1IO'Y..~1: in the period under reTi...
!kef reaine4loca1 ..t.rpri... la".17 ..n.e of th••Nalth••, in-
Ri_attl1,._ bad_-'1O/0081.. 1:M<ti.tnot tor taelr .upplle. of
.v}_terial.. In te97. Slr Altre4 1I1obell brouaht together hi. two
o1t1efiat..na .. thec'lpri.q'ale Steel1r02b aad. the Bil.ton Blaat,
JlVDaoe•• "Vad.rtlae' ••l.ot,....rs. Altred 110ban LiJlite4, the OOIlJll.DJ
oolltritlle4i;.'_hr of ....itiazor enterpri.e., notably 1.1. Wright
1d.aited (35,COO out ot 50.000 £1 ahaft8), a ne1lhbour1D1 iron aDd at.el
plant erector at Bilston, and the Oxfordshire Ironstone Company Limited.
The Ironworks included part of the former Cappon Field Furnaces and
Colliery which Hickman had in fact purchased in 1881 from Richard Bagnall.
From 1905 onwards, too, Sir Alfred was chairman of 'Tarmac Limited'(26).
He had also possessed a sizable personal holding in the Chillington
Iron Company, once a Tery important ironworks, but by the twentieth
century concerned mainly wi th the manufacture of edge tools. 'l'he third
steelworks in the district, the Patent Shaft and Axletree Company, did
lose i ts separate identi ty in 1902 when it was incorporated wi th the
Ketropoli tan Amalgamated Railway Carriage and Wagbn Company Limited
(Xetropoli tan C:arriage, Wagon and Finance Company Li.mited in 1912).
The growth of amalgamations in other branches of the iron and steel
industry in which South Staffordshire firms played a plrt haTe been
recorded elsewhere in detail and here need only be mentioned briefI7.(27)
In the tube industry, where home and foreign competi tion was, indeed,
sft'ere, the Scottish firm of Stewarts and Xenzies joined forces with
Lloyds of staffordshire, thus mald.ng a firm with an issued capital ot
£1,750,000. H.V. JlaOl'Osty described the formation of Stewarts and Lloyds
a. an attempt to ach1eTe "the extinction of competition" - "One might
8&7 that there was the embryo of an '.fficienc7' trust which oont_plated
the extirpation of its riTals" .(28) '!'he largest SCreW manufacturer in
the I1dlands, Xessra•••ttlefolds ot Saethwiok, featured in one of the
most iaportant 811&lgaations of the ear17 1900's. Althoup a nlUlbar of
(26) Por further details .OD how Sir Alfred BiclaDan aoquill84 "The far
llaoadam (Purnell 1001e7'. Patent) Spdioate Ltd" see G.R. Korton and M.
I.e Gla1llou, 100 oit, pp. 17 and 19.
(27) Dr. Warren for details ot the sheet aanutaoturers and C. lriokson
for a n_ber ot exaaples ot .ergers.
(28) I.V. korosV, op cit, p. 46.
leading South Staffordshire figures had tended to view with alarm the
decision of Nettlefolds to move their iron and steel-making interests
to a ooastal site (through aoquisitions in South Wales)(29), the creation
of Guest, Keen and lfettlefold in 1902, with an issued capital ot £4,500,000,
had important results for the Black Country. Before the outbreak of war
in 1914, various other Midland fims bad joined the group, which then
controlled mines, blast furnaces, steelworks, rolling mills and engin-
eering plant.
When the management problems of the Black Count%'1 iron trade were
discussed by members of the local industr,r, as sometimes occurred at
meetings of the South Staffordshire Institute, a number of managers
were not fully prepared to accept criticisms implied of them, unless
they were put in their proper perspectiTe. H. Pilkington, for example,
stated on one occasion that managers and men "were what' they are" because
they Yere so made "by' the capitalists or by the boards of directors,
or the owners who employ them". (30) Pilkington went on:
"'!'he day has arriTed when we should haTe to consider what the re-
quirements of the times are SJIODg owners of works, among boards of
directors, among the financial men who haTe the supreme control OYer
our works. The time for ornamental directors have gone. The time for
guinea pigs has gone also. 'rhe tille has arrived when those who are
in supreme control over our great iron and steel worb ahall be men
who haTe some real conne:don with what they are suppo.ed to do. They
ought to be men of real financial and encineerilJC or commeroial abil-
ities, capable of underatandiDg their people's experiences in the
(29) Professor TurnerbelieT.d that httle1'old' s lIOVe threat8lled the
area with extinction, ProOf S. Statfs., 1901-2, p. 158.
('0) Ibid, p. 9'.
works and in their difficulties".
Another contributor to the same discussion was firmly of the belief
that the area did not suffer from either inferior workmen or managers,
but from owners who were unprepared to risk their capital on neY
machinery:
"Our great misfortune is that we are working wi.th old tools and the
old machines. If our capitalists would layout works upon modern
lines and put Englishmen to work them, I think we could get as good
resul ts out of them as anyone. However well you may instruct the
youth of this country, if you turn them into badly laid out and
poorly equipped works, you can never expect to get £Ood results".
It was clear from what many' of the managers had to say that they were
not in authority in the works which employed them. The direct management
of a typical South Staffordshire works dift.lred from its .blerican oounter-
part in that the latter really controlled matters. American directors
regarded improvements as inerttable:
"As for the stockholders, they are not supposed to inquire into de-
tails. In England they rise at the annual meeting and ask questions
as to the money spent on ne" work and the returns derived therefrom,
and if J.merican managers were subjeot to this inqU1.si tion they might
live a less forceful life. In BDgland, iapro"'_ent. are not aade
from profits, bu.t new capttal is authol'1sed when d••e4 neces8&17". ('1 )
J.t the .e.tiD« at the South Staffordshire Instl tute vb10h had di.cussed
the !ITA's repori on Gel"'lll&n1 aDd Jelglua, •••• II1llard ud .xpressed
dismay thatwbilst tbe.tnstitute had done "its best to point out improYe-
.ent.,an4 ha.e'Oalle" .'tent1•• to werything that scientists ha...e
.\lgIeste4, yet 11' 'ill now the ·1t4le4 ltoaastera ha•• not tabn up
the various p:topolalswb1oh the JIaIIageft. ha...s put to the.". Killard
gave an example of the way the ironmasters backpeddaled on the matter
of capital expenditure:
"A master admitted to me some years a.go that certain machine17 was
getting antiquated, and on my pointing out to him that a saving could
be made if he went to the expense of putting down new plant, he said,
"Yes, itts all very well, Killard, but it Will sel"'f"e my time"".
Jno. W. Hall went some way towards explaining the position of the iron-
master on the question of capital expenditure. He painted the classic
picture of the ironmaster in the period of the 'Great Depression',
putting down new machinery to get better results only to see the price
of the product in question go on falling. Hall quoted the ocO&sion "when
a certain steelworks vas inaugurated, and I had a little to do with i til:
"At that time steel rails were quoted at £22 per ton• .A little later
on I saw soae rails rolled off at £19/10. The last rails were rolled
off at «/10. The works were stopped and it is said that the prop;.
rietors lost half a million of aoney •• "
If new equipnent was to be installed was SOllth Staffordshire the best
location? Hall raised this very importaDt faotor when h. recounted the
view of a "very enterpria!nl" looal ironmaater:
"Supposing ~f .ere to effeot tha, I haTe no certainty that I shall be
&DJ better off in the ••d, and it the•• alteration. haTe to clone
at all bact I not better a. "0...... to tJae .ea .-out?" ('2)
It i8 dltticJl1,t to reach a '.lai_ ontha issue between aaDacer.
and ...ters (oapitali.t.). ("),:Qa the one band, SOllth Staffordshire
('2 ) Proo.. S. Statt,., 1895-6,. p. 120.
(")'.l'. BurDhaa aDd I.loakine. Il'9'y4 1".1 lllrtjt1h 1@7o-",0,
194', p. 271. The authors ot this book state oateCOncall,. that the
lJn1W 11qUa·.1~~ ."eel od..1:17 wolllt Dot haft cIeo11... 10
f.st ~...tor the shoriool\1nca ot "tho.e at the top".
management could be described as ordinary and unenterprising but, non-
theless, efficient. By British standards the local managers were average;
by American standards they were over-cautious, too content simply to
remain as good as the next in the district. They certainly would not
have satisfied the prominent American ironmaster quoted by Axel Sahlin
in the 1902 Report on American Industrial Condi tions:
"We want a manager who not only keeps our works going, looks after
men and plant, and repeats to-morrow what he did to-day, and next year
what he did during the last; we demand of our manager that he looks
ahead, watches and keeps us informed of the trend of the times, and
the progress daily making in our industry; that he deTises means and
methods to meet altered conditions, and to keep our business in the
front rank. It 1s not enough that he works up to the level of others.
He must constantly endeavour to do a little better, acoomplish a
little more, save a trifle here, improve a detail there. As for the
blast furnace manager who has not learnt more during the time his
furnace has been working than to put it into blast again, after re-
pairing 1t on the 88Jle lines as laat time, without seeing his way to
improve, to strengthen, and to make aore effective his tumace; we
have no use for that class ot men".('4)
Equally so With the masters. To listen to their representatives dis-
cussing, together with the m&Dagers, the main issues atfecting the state
ot the iron and steel industry of the cla7 one could be excused tor
thinking tha-t they _1'81'8&11)' enthusiastic tor nn 1d.. and avare ot
the need to keep abreast of ohaDce••0 JIU., throuch word ot mouth,
promled to do more tor the 10eal:1ndustr,. than Ibeneser Parkes, and
yet, al Duncan Burn pointl out,· haTing om.ticised Bntiah indutry tor
('4) .....r1~n IndYtri.i CORditioy and ComPltition,
;·-,~'\f'
t902, p.'oO.
Report. ot BIfe,
not having "sufficient pluck ••• in scrapping old and effete plant",
he had himself "just started a new works whose power unit was an old
beam engine reassembled on a new site".(35) Similarly with Sir Alfred
Hickman, much of the machinery installed in his own works was either
second-hand or obsolete. His saving characteristic was his almost German
ruthlessness in the way he sought after economies in production through
the utilisation of by-products. (36) In sharp contrast, too, with American
ironmasters, was the tendency for the more important local industrial
figures to seek careers in politics. Both Parkes and Hickman became
members of parliament and were prominent figures in local politics as
well. In the absence of outstanding management at the lower levels,
their lengthy periods away from their works must have had a poor .ffect.
It was not without significance that J .8. Jeans, in the com~ of
Parkes, should have found it worthwhile to remark upon the lateness of
the hour worked by "the responsible superintendants or managers of works -
as, for example, the Duquesne Works of the Carnegie Steel Company".(37)
It is doubtful, too, if the local South Staffordshire iroDJll8.sters would
have agreed with Schwab's comment to Sahlin:
"We pay high salaries bec&ue it is economy to do so. .l good income
a ttracts first-class men, and such & man Will earn his 8&1&17 over
and over again". (38)
'.rechnical or scientifio management vas especiall,. poorl,. rewarded in
the United Kingdom. indust17; head chemists, for ezample, would not re-
(35) D. Burn, op cit, p. 296.
(~) "His ironworks are .odels, for he ellulate. the Qe1"ll&Ds in the appli-
cation of science to induat17, and in the utilisation ot the valuable
residuals of iron lIaIlutacture", !he Yolyerhaapton Journal, Karch 1905.
(,.,) 1902 Report, ~~ 75.
(38) Ibid, p. 500. '~~:},'
~" .,
ceive more than £100 per year. (39)
Weaknesses were to be found in the composition of local Boards of
Directors. As was common with much of British industry, the local iron
and steel industry had its quota of examples of nepotism, of the appoint-
ment of men who knew little or nothing of the industry, of the continued
presence of men long past their prime. Little of that "industrial potent-
iality" found in America by the British Iron Trade Commission was to be
seen in the South Staffordshire area at the Board of Director level.
The fortunes of the Earl of Dudley's Round Oak works in the early 1~90's
illustrate the lack of confidence on the part of the investing public
in Black Country management. When the Earl sold the works to the
lancashire 'rrust and Mortgage Insurance Company, there were few men on
the Board wi.th any experience in iron and steel making; by July 1894
the affairs of the compaD.1 were desperate. In an attempt to staTe off
disaster, a nUlllber of leading local managers and masters were brought
in, including Francis Grazebrook and James Roberts. In Tain, the company
went into liquidation in !foTember 1894.(40) George Ratton surviTed from
the comPanY's crash to become lanaging Director of a new Round Oak
company which was formed in July 1897. This time there vas no attempt
to seek oapital from the general publio; a few members of the Earl's
business friends subsoribed, inoluding the Birmingham engineer, Alexander
Smi the Ezcluding the Barl's agent, G.R. Claughton. there vere two solioitors
on the Board, J. 'hTson and C.R. Saltwell. In faot, members of the legal
profession were generallY' important inTestors in the local induatr,r,
wi thOllt, of course, knoWing much about the Dature of iron and steel
production• .1 solicitor frca Oldb\117, by the name ot Shakespeare, owned
(:59) J,l.S.I., 1896, p. 119.
(40) Co111e (nos, Steel a1; Brierlel Rill. 1857-1921. 1957, 1tP.71~"
especially the seotion "People and Dates",
extensive ironworks at Frodingba.m in Lincolnshire; perhaps no Black Countr,y
ironmaster was interested in acquiring add! tional plant because it was
reported in the trade press in 19(17 that the works had been sold to
the Sheffield firm of John Brown and Company for £100,000.(41)
(41) Colliery Guardian, 5/7/rn.
Chapter 7 South Staffordshire and the Growth of Foreigg Competition,
1850-1914.
The poor showing of the United Kingdom iron and steel industry at the
Paris Exhibition of 1867 deservedly resulted in The Times taking the
English producers to task.(1) Almost for the first time, the general
public became aware of the fact that there were foreign competitiors in
the iron trade. Two public enquiries - one into the state of scientific
instruction and the other into the Trades Unions - were also started in
1867 and they provided the opportunity for a great deal of eVidence to
be collected on the state of the iron industry at this particular junct-
ure. Besides, the public was looking for a scapegoat as a result of the
collapse of speculative industrial developments of the previous year.
Although of very small proportions, Belgian iron imports had appeared
in the United Kingdom markets in the promising year of 1866 and, perhaps
even more significant, they grew slightly in. the next three, rather poor,
years. It was remembered, too, that dUring the panic of 1857, Belgian
iron manufactures had entered the foreign field in competition with
British ironmasters. In 1859 and 1860, British makers had lost contracts
to a Belgian syndicate for the supply of iron rails to Spain, Switzerland
and Holland, not to mention the supply of Belgian locomotives to Russia
in the 1860's. Considerable attention was paid by the two public bodies
1866
1867
1868
1869
Im rts of Bel an
Iron into Britain
10',000
135,000
146,000
124,000
Total Imports ot
Iron &: Steel t£.)
1,498,000
1,331,000
1,335,000
to the question of labour costs in industry; inevitably, it was suggested
by witnesses that labo~;costswerehigh in Britain because Of the actions
~f trades unionists and that the, price of Inglish iron had risen to the
point when foreign i;-<>n could be imported into the oountry and sold iJlt
(H) The 'Pimes, 29/5/67.
competi tion with the home product. Having seoured a foot-hold in the
English market, Belgian iron "could not be beaten back again". (2) What
particularly caught the public's attention was the quantity of iron
girders which came from Belgium, especially when they were used in the
building of both st. Thomas' Hosp!tal and the South Kensington Museum.
Buildings in Sheffield, Middlesbrough and Glasgow also had Belgian girders
in their structures. It was suggested in the later sixties, and again to
Lowthian Bell by the Royal Commission in 1886, that the reason why this
had taken place was because the Belgians' "scienCle and practice ••• was
infinitely superior to what they were in owr own industry" .(3) What seemed
to be worse in the eyes of the cri.tics was that the Belgians were reported
to be using pig iron imported from Middlesbrough. Bell, in fact, was able
to put the record straight in this instance: "no iron is ever sent from
this country for conversion into girders" - but the presence of Belgian
girder iron remained in English markets. (4) Benjamin Ringley, for one,
(2) S.C. on Soientific Instruction, 1867-8, M.E. 10,939.
(3) Royal Commission on Depression of Trade, 1885-6, M.E. 2151.
(4) Bell was no doubt correct in saying that Belgian producers of girders
had been able to gain a good home market - as well as one in Ge~ _
because continental architects and engineers had for some time advocated
their use for the struotures of buildings: "The demand for this form. of
iron became so large that it taid the masters to keep.a large stoClle,
out of which orders could be supplied without delay". W.A. Donaldson, an
ironmerchant of Glasgow and Middlesbrough, thought that British ironmasters
had simply preferred to make angles or ship plates, for which there was a
readier market: "now ••• they have turned their attention to girders, and
I believe that they are suocessfully oompeting with BelgiUJI. in girders" •
.
Ibid, X.E. 2578. In faot, this Tiew was far too optimisti•• When English
producers did; in faot;turntheir attention to' Sirders, beams and pillars',
tlleyfound 1t ve1'1', diff'icnlJ.t to win orders from customers who had found
~1~AA ,irpA ..~tn!7.ti.sfaoto1"7.
• ;>,,', ;",,: - ....~.,-.- .,.,.,:",..,..,'
admitted in 1881 that the South Staffordshire ironmasters had tried to
compete with Belgian girder iron but had failed.
All thoughts of foreign competition subsided in the boom of 1871-73,
although it was again noted that the high prices which then prevailed
were sufficient to bring Belgian iron on to the Birmingham market in
competi tion with the local product. Once the boom bad ended, muoh more
attention was given to the continued presenoe of Belgian iron in the
British markets, even if was thought by some that it did not mean that
the Belgians were selling much above cost. (5) South Staffordshire iron-
Total Belgian Exports to Britain, 1872-75
Year Tons
1872 27,316
1873 13,293
1874 34,713
1875 33,662
masters were not muoh concerned over Belgian exports of rail iron (they
had long ago gi'Yen up this branoh of the iron trade) but they vere alarmed
at the extent ot Belgian oompetition in plates and sheets, anchors and
chains, nails and various other articles of wrought iron. For eDJllple,
Belgium exported about 70,000 tons of 'plates' in the period 1873-75,
and over 33,600 tons of nails, two items for which the Blaek Country had
an established reputation. In 1875, W. J'arnworth, llanager of the iron
and tinplate worb otE.P. and W. BaldWin, nsited i1"'()llWOrks in Bel g1\Dl
to see for himselt why the lJlaek Country was having to faoe noh eo.pet-
ition. (6) He was impressed with the high q'U8.lit,. of Belgie steel and the
"great economT'whioh resulted from running the ••tal "froa the blast
furnafts direot into the ~.OJmtrftrs·. HoveTe1", h. vas also of the opinion
that ifth.·_D8~s ofSo1rth 'Statfordl!lhire vere"to .e 1Ultl$ggingly all
their skill, ta.t' and energy to produce good iron at the cheapest possible
rate" they would han 'l'1ttle to tear. Th.,. could o:peot fieroe oOllpet1t1on
(5) S4tl!!!.;;;~~B~, "on ,Bail.7s, 1881, p. 250 and Royal C0JlUD1ss1on on
Depression of Trade, 1885-6, M.E. 2485.
(6) J.r.S,I •• 1875, i, p. 247.
•from Belgium in the markets for common qualities of iron, but little in
the market for superior quality iron. Whilst he had found that Belgian
girders were "particularly good", Farnworth had much to criticise with
regard to rails and sheets. Spokesmen for the Belgian industry took issue
with him on this, and the editor of the Moniteur des Tnterets Materials
pointed out that Belgian rails and sheets were both used in a number of
markets in preference to those made in England - the London market had
even been supplied "with several hundred tons of fancy sections of bar
iron, at prices below those of Staffordshire, and the quality of which
has never called forth the slightest complaint on the part of the buyers".
Farnworth, who had already addressed the South Staffordshire Mill and
Forge Managers Association on the subject, spoke to them a second time
on Belgian competition, and this time he was strongly supported by a
'Mr. Adams' of the Mars Iron Works, Priestfields, who said that "he had
seen, in London, some Belgian sheets for galvanizing purposes, which were
so inferior in quality that he pricked several holes in them with a pen-
knife". Farnworth conceded, however, that the Belgians had certain ad-
vantages over the Black Country; these included cheaper labour and easier
aocess to raw iron from Mtddlesbrough and superior ores from Spain.
Despite the rather superior tones adopted by South Staffordshire iron-
masters to Belgian iron, an increasing amolmt was sold to customers both
in the United IJ.ngdoa and in neutral markets. A. Britie1l Consv.l in :norenee
eOlllJll8nted in 1E177: "Ii; .7 be that the q-li't7 ot toreilll ate.l i. in-
t.rior ••• iDaDl'oase the arttele .... to eatisty the puoha••r" .(7)
Ta. Consul was .r,femM speoitioal17·to n.11way_t.rial in the Italiaa
market, but 1ti.s ,-iew. v8reeq\l8.117 applioabl•.ript across the board. A.
vnter in .'P!:.£iI.••.8poke lilt 1;8e "a~'1l$1Qna 9ttoreigA ooapetition"
hautina ~e intleh lI&J1l1f'aoturer; this was oertainly true ot South
Skttordsb.irei~JIaa.t.,.~,,;*~.. ,i. 18T1. ta. "'l"1 o14tira ot I.B. norney-
•
croft (8) closed its doors and amongst the reasons given publicly by
Thorneycroft was foreign competition. By 1881, "hundreds and hundreds of
tons" of Belgian wire were selling on the Birmingham market, together
with Belgian nails, at prices substantially lower than those quoted by
the local producers.(9) The same was true on the London market, even
though it was generally accepted that production costs in Birmingham and
Belgium were the same. The sheet industry was even feeling the effects
of Belgian competition in Australia where, in 1881, the latter country
had gained a prize medal for galvanized sheet.
Belgian competition continued to disturb the Black Country industry in
the early and mid-eighties. It was described as "severe" in November
1881, especially in "light wares" which could be transported in_to the
Midland markets.(10) What was especially significant about the extent
of Belgian competition with the Black Country in the early part of the
decade was the fact that in general the period was one of satisfactory
progress for the Bti. tish industry. The railway boom, which began in the
United States towards the middle of 1879, soon became world-wide in
soope and no threat was seen in the increasing continental iron exports
when British plant were refusing orders. (11 ) As suddenly as the general
situation had improved, however, it disappeared in 1883 with the almost
(a) The closure of this firm was especially significant in that the
~orneycrofts had taken over premises formerly owned by John Wilkinson.
One of the brothers had worked with Addenbrook at the latter's JIoorcroft
Works - the Thomeycrofts firmly linked their generation of ironmasters
wi th those of the first industrial revolution era.
(9) Select Committee on Railways, 1881, M.E. 11,547 and 10,943.
(10) Iron. 2/11/83.
(11) In periods of high demand, British producers often failed to meet
the requirements of the hOlle market; promised delivery dates were not
.J. _,
kept to or, simply, foreign suppliers could promise immediate delivery of
goods required. This failing or the home industry obviously enoouraged
intish users ot iron and steel to look to oontinental suppliers.
complete falling off of the American market. Despite a continued drop in
prices, Belgian iron remained in the world markets, sometimes even im-
proving its position. A number of British consuls remarked upon a "pre-
ponderance of Belgium in iron exports". Now it was possible to observe
some indirect effects on the Black Country of Belgian competition. Faced
with increasing difficulties in overseas markets, better located producing
areas in the United Kingdom, notably South Wales and the north-east,
found it convenient to increase their sales to the Black Country or to
markets hitherto left largely to Black Country ironmasterso By the winter
of 1884, Middlesbrough steel producers were offering to execute orders
for South Staffordshire 'middlemen' at "£6/15 delivered in the Thames,
as against £7/10 to £7/15 required by Staffordshire makers". (12) The
situation simply worsened in the following year when some 225,000 tons
of bar and section iron were exported by the Belgians, 55,000 tons
coming direct to England. Even Sir Lowthian Bell had to admit that,
considering the extent of its trade, Belgium "is the largest exporter -
not excepting Great Britain - among iron-making nations". Bell further
emphasised that "it is worthy of note that the products sent abroad are
disposed of in the very markets to which Great Britain has even a readier
access than the Belgian makers possess".(13) When the Royal Commission
sent a circular containing a number of questions about the supposed de-
pression of trade and industry to the Wolverhampton Chamber of Commerce
it was not surprising that Belgian producers should be mentioned as
posing a serious threat to South Staffordshire ironmasters in continental
and other markets. Al though it was not thought that there was much of a
lasting danger in their own local market, foreign competition had greatly
affected markets in which "English productions had formerly an almost
(12) ~, 14/11/84.
(13) Royal Commission on Depression of Trade ••• , 1885-6, p, 349.
J-fjo.
exelusive monopoly" • ( 14 )
In the early 1890's, when Belgian exports fell by only 20 per cent
compared with ¥. 40 per cent in British exports, .tlelgium not only found
an annual market in Britain for approximately 100,000 tons of iron and
steel goods but she also made further inroads in markets where previously
,
South Staffordshire ironmasters had been successful. Early in 1893, the
Belgians had seriously disrupted the market for bridge and girder iron
and had virtually driven out South Staffordshire producers.(15) This
development was especially unfortunate for South Staffordshire in that
she had only just recovered from severe north of England competi tion.
Imports from Belgium of "girders, beams and pillars"
1890 - 93
~
1890
1891
1892893
'rons
56,604-
55,433
49,695
44,233
£.:.
404,649
387~923
337,697
283,296
Total Belgian exports to Britain in 1893 =82,000 tons.
By September 1893, export orders for Blaek Country sheets, both plain and
galvanized, had almost stopped because of competition from Belgian and
German companies. Two months later, the same oompetitors were said to
have seriously disrupted the Midland soene again, this time by quoting
lower prices (for future orders) for some ot the neutral markets: "South
Staffordshire merchants had hesitated to place their orders, with the
result that Midland iron Was almost certainly to be displaced".(16)
In the next ;rear, considerable attention was given to the :Belgian in-
dustry because of the BruSsel~ meeting ot the British Iron and Steel
!nstitute. One neYS18P8roorrespondent wrote:
"It is not alone the intention ot the '!homas-CilObrist steel pr1neiple
whiohhas made :seigiU what she is to-date Inglish iroJ1ilasters re-
(14) lIimttee BOeb.1t'01verbaa.pton Chamber ot CODlDleroe.
(15) Collier: Guardian, 2/6/93. The same sourete also mentioned the fact
that Belgian sheeta".ere Ooa1ng into the B1aok Country at "20/- _ '30/-
below South Statts. prices". (16) Colliery Guar4,;i.Nb 26/9/94.
turned from Brussels more than ever convinced that the long hours and
low wages and strict discipline of Belgian works has more to do with
Belgian success than any other element in the surrounding conditions".(17)
One of the points suggested by the oorrespondent as a possible solution
for the British industry overcoming Belgian competition, namely "reduced
freight rates", was recognised as not being applicable to the Black
Country. When, in September 1894, complaints were made about the railway
companies having granted "preferential through rates to foreigners", it
-l-
was noted that "the combination of traders" in the Black Country sellDled
"to be powerless against the overwhelming monopoly of the ~ilway compan-
ies" • (18) The behaviour of the railway companies had particularly infur-
iated members of the Black Country iron trade because it was generally
felt that the Belgians were already selling common iron and girders at
below cost. Throughout 1895, the Black Country had to faoe oontinued
Belgian competition in a variety ot produots, the two exoeptions being
steel and special quality iron. In March, Belgian bars were being offered
on the London market "at less money than they can be delivered trom
Staffordshire", whilst in May the unremunerative state ot contracts was
blamed on "very severe" continental competition. (19) By this date, how-
ever, the threat of German competition was beginning to push that ot
Belgium into the baokground.
Al though German iron exports bad appeared briefly in competition with
those from the United Kingdom in 1857t there was to be little"further
German competition for the next twenty years or so. J'reaM -and Belgium,
rather than Germany, featured in the 1867 'scare' and even the taot that
in 1878 Germany surpassed.'~1gi_·•.quantity of exports vent almost un-
noti_. b1 both thellritish public and the indwat17. '!'be attention gi'9'en
(17).Oo111eqGuarj1aat· 119/ 94.
(18) Ibid.
(19) Ibid, 8/3/95 and 1715/95.
by informed British circles to the German industry in the 1870's was
focussed more on the industry's troubles than on future possible compet-
ition. Nevertheless, there were the occasional references to Germany as
a possible competitor; in 1876, The Times spoke of "Apprehensions of
foreign competition ••• haunting us", whilst in the December of that
year, the Board of Management of Bolckow, Vaughan and Company sent a letter
to the BITA expressing concern about the successes of German ironmasters
in securing large orders against Eritish competition in both Italy and
Portugal. British consuls, too, in several European countries found it
necessary to raise the question of German competition in the iron trade.
Immediately the new decade started, a much keener interest was taken in
the German industry. Those who had sided with the view expressed in the
Statist. about foreign competition having "sharpened the struggle •••
(but not) gained largely upon us" were no longer so sure. (20) A letter to
The Times in November 1880 mentioned German rail competition in Italy -
the German firm of Bochum had won an order for 30,000 tons of steel rails'
for the Alta Italia Railway - and then went on to draw the public's
attention to "the strange and unfair German policy of selling cheaper
abroad than at home".(21) In the following year, whilst the British Consul
at Helsingfors lamented the fact that it was Krupp, who was supplying the
Finnish Stat.e Railway with rails and rolling stock, and a British repre-
sentative in Mexico sang the praises of German merchants in South and
Latin America(22), R. Heathfield, representing the galVanized iron trade
(20) S. Chapmen, op cit, p. 64.
(21) Letter from 'Steel', The T1mes, 23/11/80.
(22) Accounts &Pa~rs, 1881, 33, pp. 397-8, quoted and commented upon by
R.J .S. Hoffman, Great Bntain and the German 'l'rade Rivalry 1875-1914,
1964 (First Edition 1933), pp. 16 - 17.
of Birmingham and South Staffordshire, was giving evidence before the
Select Committee on Railways. He, too, spoke of German oompetition, this
time in Australia; Heathfield was oonvinced that in the near future even
greater German competition could be expected. (23) As the decade wore on,
so the references to German competition in the iron trade grew; in Novem-
ber 1884 the matter was diSCUSsed in the House of Lords and the words of
Sir John Brown quoted: "now former customers have become our oompetitors,
and not only sell against us, but un4ersell us, not merely in neutral
markets, but under our very noses at home". Referenoe was also made to
imported iron being used "for an enormous railway station in the Midlands"
and for the construotion of bridges. An element of bi ttemess was be-
ginning to creep into the dialogue, especially from Sheffield traders
who spoke scathingly of the fraudulent German use of English trade marks.
German ironmasters, too, showed irritation; in June 1883 - a most unsatis-
factory year for the international trade in iron - Herr Jacobi, of Sterk-
rade, apeaking to the S~ciety of German Iron Manufaoturers, lamented the
fact that Germa.n makers found it so diffioult to compete with England in
contracts for German shipyards. He estimated, in fact, that about nine-
tenths of the material used in private yards was of English origin. (24)
A. key-point to remember about the 1880's was that, in general, the British
(23) Select Committee on Railways, 1881, M.E. 10,763 and 10,936.
(24) Hitherto, relationa between the British and German industries had
tended to be ex.ellent. Both sides kept each other informed over early
progress in the basi.iJ,ld\1St17,~ndeven in lateJ:' years leading personnel
from both sides kept .~ t~eir .on~ots. Bevertheless, a oertain bitter-
!less QS oreepingin, .:;8san aooo\Ult of British observations on the
\
German industry will make olear.
industry was still far superior to that in Germany. In the three major
producing countries - Britain, Germany and the United States - there had
been wfuat was described as "feverish excitement" (1879 and 1880) followed
by "extraordinary expansion". l25) Whilst accepting that the German industry
was showing an encouraging sign of reoovery from the doldrums of the
1870's, together with the fact that the new tariff afforded her industry
a high degree of protection, it is, nontheless, true to say that the over-
Progress in the Iron and Steel Industry
Country I866 187' 1877 1882
Un!ted King.
U.S.A.
Germany
Total
4,970,206 6,566,451
1,603,000 2,868,278
1,053,260 2,174,7'7
7,626,466 11,609,466
* Increase 52~ *
6,608,664 8,49',287
2,314,585 5,178,121
1,421,667 3,170,957
10,344,916 16,842;667
* In.rease 58% *
production which occurred in Britain in 1883 had serious effects on the
Germans. Economic dumping might not have been pursued by the Brt tish in-
dustry, but Brt tish iron and steel goods were all but thrown on to oonti-
nental markets, thus forcing Germany for one to pass on the pressure. "It
is ourious to observe", wrote a leader writer in~, "hoY any movement,
up or down, in the English iron trade is first reflected in BelgiWIl and
West Germany, from where the wave extends gradually to the Silesian and
from there to the Austrian market". Forced, once again, to look for export
IIIB.rkets, the Gel'lllUi foreign trade in iron and steel aotually rose in 188'
(whilst Britain's deolined); f:erman goods vere now finding markets in
SOllth Amerioa, the Orient and even in the Colonies, at a time when Britain
was hoping to make good her losses to the Ibrth Ameriean market by in.reased
sales in these same market•• Between 1880 and ~885, Gel'Bl8DYts sales to
Australia rose troa 600 to_ to 28,000 tons, whilst to SO\lth herioa
there was a rise t1'01l6,600 to 40,000 tons. (26 )
(25) Iron, 19/10/a,.
(26) "D. Burn, op cit, p. 79. Burn gives a detailed a.count of British and
German. e:JCportlit to what he terms the I privileged I and I unprivileged I
,.mu.
The stage was thus set for Ge~ competition to feature, perhaps a
little alarmingly at times, in the hearings of the Royal Commission of
1885 - 6. Evidenoe from a number of British consulates situated in the world's
chief iron markets all told the same story - British retreat in the face
of German advance. (27) The British Consul at Hamburg stressed that Scotch
brands were losing out to Rhenish producers using Splnish ores, that
BriUsh gas and boiler tubes had almost totally disappeared from German
markets, although tin-plate was still largely imported from B~tain.
J(u1vanny, H.M. Consul at Dusseldorf, feared that British producers had
"been resting on their we11-earned laurels, and, (had) relied on this
prestige"; they had failed to keep themselves informed "as to the progress
being made by' their neighbours, who are now able to produce better warestt •
Putting aside the evidence of Sir Lowthian Bell for the moment, some of
the best material came from two men - T.I. Smith, direotor and general
manager of the Barrow Hematite Steel Company, and W.A. Donaldson, who
represented Hessrs. Watson & Complny, ironmercbants of Glasgow and
IIiddlesbrough, with branches in Swansea and Liverpool. Unlike Bell, both
men stressed the great importanoe of the basio process in the future
threat of Gel"lJlall competition. Smith was oonoemed at the effects which
this oould have on the West Coast's position in the ateel rail trade _
hs lamented the fact that the agreementa reaohed in 188' bet.en Britain,
Belgium andGe1"Jll8.BY oyer the trade in rail. had resulted in the GermDS
beiD« '!iven' orders totalling 246,000 tou - whilst DonaldSOD stressed
that even with Spanish ores the Qe1W.n industry had been able to _nu-
taeture i"&1ls for whioh theY' fO\ID.d _rlcet. in Canada, India and AiJatralia.
Baaio steel rail_ hadalao appeared in th.s. arlit...., aa well aa in the
ColOBie•• (28) Smith o'bae1"9'ecl that in future it wa_ probably true to 8q
(27) Appendix hrt 11 ot Ront t:OllllDis8ion on Depression of Trade, 1BSS-6,
pp. 111 et8eci~
(28) Ibid, p. 5?'-an4X.I.2618 - 262'.
that Germany would supply its own market's requirements and much of those
of its neighbours, especially along the Rhine. Whilst expecting that there
would be increased German competition in other continental markets, he did
not think that Germany would be able to get England out from all of them.
To the straight question "have you any fear of foreign oompeti tion in
your trade?", 8mith replied:
"We are able to hold our own against foreign competition, and we think
that we never could be in a worse position than we have been in during
the last twelve months". (29)
Bell's evidence to the Royal Commission vas clearly the most detailed
and obviously the most Widely acoepted. Whilst admitting that insufficient
attention in Britain had been given to the progress made by foreign
producers, Bell was not prepared to accept that GeI"Jll8.l13J' posed aD3' real
threat to Britain's position in the world's Jl&rkets.(30) Even the fact
that it might be cheaper to send goods to some parts of Great Britaia
from the continent than "from an itD«lish ironworks to the same plaoe",
did not seem to Bell to mean aDJ' alteration to the fact that Britain
held in the Mlltral _rata of the world "the most favourable plaos of
aD7 nation".(31)
~8 BOllth Stattoriahire distri.ot. 1n the early and Ilid-eighti8s, still
tended to vi." co_peti t10D from Belc;i.an works Vith acre alam than that
trom (Je:rmaDT.Howenr, 8.1'111&127 _.Bationed .peoifioally in the reply
a8at by the Vol.,.erhaaptoD. OhaaMr otCo_n. to the qU4t.t10D&ire of the
Royal ColIDdsa101l, and vIw1 H.L.ftller eel V.V. Lord appeared. betore tao
latt81' '-047, as Z08p:NNn'tiDC'tbeB1rainp•• maaalMr of Co_ree, tltey
atated tba1;. GerMa natla aadw1re, we" 8014 on the Jil'llinp'JI urket • t
prio. below th0ll_~L~ked .b1 1 0eal p;"04\1oe1"8. Whilst it i. true to say
JJ(29) B.o~, ~?~,8P~()" OD",~~88ion of Trade, 1885-6, X.E. 2369.
" ..t~.;.: ..~;v:.;.~ ......~;",,,·,,~;;...:,~~~~~-;-;.;.7- _,' '>
(30) Ibid, A:ppendiz, p. 343.
(,1 ) F1JUU Report of Royal Ooais81on, pp. T1U - iz.
that over the next five years or so the British iron and steel industry
experienced a certain amount of prosperity - felt less in South citafford-
shire than elsewhere - developments were taking place which would result
in almost a head-on collision between British and German ironmasters for
'G 'mastery of the world's markets. By the early 1890 a , ermany s exports
had entered another phase of rapid expansion; European markets were
dominated by her exports, whilst those from Britain were almost totally
excluded. Germany's iron and steel exports to Britain rose from 49,000
in 1889 to 121,000 tons in 1894, the latter total valued at £567,142.
In that year, The Times spoke of the "Decay of the Iron Trade" (32), and
remarked that few people probably knew that "more German iron (was)
imported into Great Britain than into any other country except Switzer-
land, and in the latter case the iron was probably largely in transit
for Italy and other countries, while in our own country it had come to
stay". The Black Country felt this competition especially in the hardware
trades, iron tubes and in galvanized wire, whilst sheet manufacturers
complained for the first time in September 1893 of being undersQld by
the Germans. Some seotions of the industry felt hWlli.liated over the
passing of British pre-eminenoe, althoup there Was Blore than a little
satisfaction expressed in the distriot when it was realised that the
tariff war between Germany and Rusia was resulting in Encliah firms
(including some from South Staffordshire) reoeiving Russian oontracts.(33)
When the SOlith Staffordshire Institute discussed the 1896 BITJ. Report
there was also a fair amount of frustrated anger at the German industry.
B.H., Thwaite, a notable oontrib\ltor to discussions at th.e Institute, had
expressed the views of many when he wrote an article in '&e lfineteenth.
C,2) 18/9/94.
t~J) Collie£( QuarclilQ, rJ1/94.
Century entitled "The Commercial War Between Germany and England". (34)
He concluded the article:
"Englishmen can have no objection to German success, if honestly won,
by quality or cheapness of product, itself the result of fairly paid
labour. They cannot understand why the German manufacturer, trained
in his student days to respect the principles of honour, if need be
up to the rapier point, should descend to commercial manouvres that
are dishonourable in the extreme".
At the height of Germany's exporting phase in 1893, it was remarked that
she had exported 36 per cent of her aggregate make of finished iron and
steel; this was substantially in excess of Britain's 32 per cent (40
per cent if tin-plates il included). However, for the next five years
the boom in her home market largely took German pressure off the export
markets and greatly reduced the degree of competition to British goods.
Between 1896 and 1900, the Black Country industry only felt the effects
In 1869, the President of the Iron and Steel Institute told an attent-
"4) Ta,lliuetemth O'ntw, 1896,p. 930. In faot. in 1896 the ou1Jl1n-
••tion ot Britishre,.tion to G~l"IIancollpetitiOll vas the P\1blioation ot
1.1. ,Williams' "de in Qel'!8!lY. Hotf1lan gives a ve17 good analysis ot
'1'1tish vi~ at tlp.'T~t op.it, pp. 242-57.
(3f;) 00111e"1 GerilM. to/"/97 and 1'/1/99.
,,' .. •..•_ ....,,;;>.•. -i<. '.,_ ,',' '. .. •. :.-·c
tive audience that "the manufacture of iron will be carried on across
the Atlantic to an extent never yet witnessed" at some future date; in
the meantime, however, the price of labour ensured that there would be
"no immediate prospect" of the United States competing "With the iron
producing countries of Europe in the open markets of the world". (36)
Even in the early 1870' s , when the advantages were all on the side of
the British, members of the American industry spoke longingly of the day
when they would be able to dominate world markets. In 1872, for example,
there was speculation in the New York Bulletin that Britain would soon
have to get both its coal and iron needs from the United States: "it
is in our power to control the iron trade of the world as absolutely
- during the next half century at least - as Great Britain has controlled
it during the past quarter century". (37) Reports in newspapers of American
iron being sold to Britain were alwaY'S proTed. to be lUltrue in this period;
in faet, total Ameriean iron exports in the period 1871 - 74 were ex-
eeedingly small when put alongside total imports. Lowthian Bell visited
Year Imports Exports
(tons)
1871 1,185,54' 5,251
1872 1,22'3,7'37 5,898
1813 608,661 14,428
1874 248,502 27,360
the country in 1875 and pronounced that "even With labour on anything
like equal terms, it is a physical impossibi1i t;y that iron can be made
more cheaply in the United states than it can in England".(38) Even Bell
(36) J. I .S.I., 1869, p. 23. Mr. Ford, Seoretary ot the Bri tish Legs.tion
at Washington, put U.S. wages 57~ higher than those in Britain for foundries
and machine shops, ~ tor rolling mills and 4~ for shipbuilding yards
(iron).
(~7) J.I,S.I" iii, 1872, p, 273.
(38) J.l,S.I" i, 1875, p. 141.
had to admit, though, that production of iron in the United States had
"advanced at a rate unknown in their previous history", and in such items
as rail iron it was becoming difficult for the British product ~o find a
market behind the high level of protection operating in Amerioa. Over
the next fifteen years, before Bell again visited the United States, even
greater strides were taken by the Amerioan industry. Unlike the British
industry, which had the whole world open to it and which pursued "a
dozrrm ••• channels through which to dispose of its production", the
Americans "had virtually only their own market to sustain demand". (39)
In 1890, the year when the Iron and Steel Institute held its meeting
in the United States and When United States production of pig iron sur-
passed that of Great Britain for the first time, the Institute's President
seemed to take oomfort from the faot that "while the United States (still)
continues to find its markets in ever-growing demands from a '"oivilised
and prosperous people at home, we in England shall have in more distant
fields, easily aocessib1e to us from our insular position, a great market
for our produoe". (40) As almost an afterthought, Sir James Kitson conoluded:
"Ve can look forward, each in our own sphere, to a groWing commeroe,
to cope with whioh our un1ted skill, aided by invention shared and
knowledge freely g1ven, shall confer lasting benefitit. on the world".
It fell to Sir Lowthian Bell to draw up a very lengthy report on the
American industry, which appeared as a Sp!cia1 "olume of the Iron and
Steel Institute in 1890. Charaoteristica1ly, the Report oontained a great
deal of statistical information; Bell showed, for example,. percentage
figures of total make .. (in terms of pig iron) for both imports and exports'
.>~~ . ~
of ~heUnited ~t,tes and Britain in the period 1874 - 90. Britain's per-
oentage of eXIX?rts on JD&b varied from 41.2 per oent (lowest) in 1876
"i
(,~) l.£Sa~, '/8/8'~n
',:'\,( J _.~{,< ~., .'c~~~_t,'~~:. ", ; '.~'. 4~ '1'
(40) J,l,S,I,. 1890, p. 11.
to 73.4 per cent (highest) in 1890. America's, by comparison, was extremely
low, 7.7 per cent in 1874 and 3.3 per cent in 1890. An interesting point,
,
upon whioh Bell did not comment, was that Britain s percentage of imports
on make had nearly trebled between 1874 and 1890, the respective figures
being 2.5 per cent and 6.7 per cent - the chief charact~ristic concerning
the import figures for America was their wild fluctuation:
Year Percentage
1874 14.9
1878 6.9
1879 34.5
1880 61.1
1883 19.9
1889 12.6
1890 9.8
.u
espite the rapid advance made in the American iron and steel inaustry
and the very high level of protection, in heotic boom periods the United
States had imported large quantities of iron and steel. Until now, in
moments of dullness in their home market, the American produoers had not
sought to sustain growth in production by seeking further export orders.
For e:mmple, in 1891 the make of pig iron in the United states was 923,000
tons less than in the previous year and yet Sir towth:i,an Bell could write:
"1 8JIl not aware that any atteapt vas made, or Qonteaplated, to
oontinue the make of 1891 on the footing reaehed in the previous year
by an extension of their foreign trade".(41)
If they had done. th:i.s, argued Bell., the;, would have made a mockery. of
their detemined .fforts to gaiD .....n greater hoa. protection. In &117.
case, Bell did not think that the Americans were in B.Jl7 position to in-
ll1'8as8. their exports on 11 l2-d.,f~t:
"With rep.rd. to &Il:export; t .... in iron from the Un!ted States, I
think it ....r.r i.probable tlIat•. beI1B:OiIlC nth pie1ro. at 53/6 per
,J..4v.
ton at Pittsburg, and adding 8/4 for carriage to a seaport, the older
seats of the American iron trade can compete with Great Britain, ex-
cept to countries close at hand, such as Canada and the northern portions
of South Amerioa. If we are to meet American iron in Europe, Asia or
Australia it will be that produced in the Southern States of the Union".
Over the next five or six years further rapid changes took place in the
United sta~es, one result of which was that the American industry made
a complete fallacy out of Bell's observations of 1890. Huge production
totals were achieved in the first half of the 1890's - home competition
was severe and led to extreme cost-conscious production methods - and
when the home market proved inadequate the American industry turned to
overseas markets.
From 1896 onwards, to a far greater extent than hitherto, the British
iron and steel industry had to take the possibility and actuality of
foreign competition firmly into reckoning. It was Widely accepted, too,
that the Black CoUntry suffered "perhaps more than any other part of the
kingdom" from what were described as "the operations of tariff-protected
Continental (and American) iron and steel manufacturers, who from time
to time seem to regard the Midlands as a leg!timate dumping ground for
their surplus products". (43) By traeing the fortunes of the Black Country
iron trade in this period it is possible to show the extent to which
foreign oompetition affected the industry.(44) Furthermore, the nature
(42) J.I.S.I., 1890, Special Tolume, p. 204.
(43) Co11ier;y Guardian, 18/9/1903.
(<<) By no means is it claimed that foreign competition was the sole
factor influencing the state of the iron trade in the district. Other
aspects of the industry - locational problems, communications, raw mater-
ials, plant and personnel - had their part to play; what is interesting is
tbat the JllaDy shortcoJli.ngs of the distriot made the Black Country industry
less able to faoe foreign competition and survive.
(45) Colliery Guardian, 7/8/96.
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As early as March 1896, South Staffordshire smelters were said to be
threatened "with serious competition on the part of American producers".
(46) The latter were said to be offering "pig iron in this country at
lower prices than iron smelted by English firms". In fact, such reports
were premature although pig iron from the Southern State of Alabama
was beginning to come to Europe. Almos t certainly, it was Axel Sahlin
who first suggested tbat the large stocks of pig iron which had aecuau-
.
lated in the South should be marketed in Europe. American railroad com-
panies carried the Birmingham, Alabama, pig iron to the coast at very
low rates and it then orossed the AtlantiQ during the cotton season as
ballast to ships bulging with light weight cotton; indeed, the great
bulk of Southern pig (non~s shipped from the North) was initially moved
only in this limited period. Tonnage figures rose considerably in 1897 on
Imports of U.S t Pig Iron into the United ICinw!om, 1897-1900
lear
1897
1898
1899
1900*
Tons
91,196
76,356
80,988
51,370
&.
209,275
180,614
219,715
201,429
* first ten months only
the previous year's total; by the eDd of July, 12,747 tons of pig iron
bad been sold to A:ustria, and by Oeto'ber 14,118 tons had gone to Belgian
oonsumers (compared with a mere 569 tons in the same period of 1896).
5,000 tons of Alabama pig iron were also ahipped to ,the Japanese ports
qf'J~oW aDdt~o. Vie.ed from the .AmeriCIan side, the8l1.ippiugof' pig iron
to Iurope ,was. very:rislq business, justified only ,bJ 1ib.e'f~t .iAat it
wouldbave ::,".JII,,~necl;l.n .took, it l-ninth. Un!ted States.BriUsb ..rohant
hq'!8es whiubaJ¥ilfdthe pic i~ ,4id 80 QD ve7:1 unf'ayourabl.,te~, to
the Americans - a taot which led to the produoers seeking new selling
~.~~1b..'-traCe8S established ona fifter tooting. '!here .... '
also the possibility that the conservative-minded British consumers would
not accept the pig iron at any price.(47) Sahlin's statement made later
to an English audience that the pig iron would have been sold at any
price (similar statements were, indeed,. made by Schwab in 1900) could
lead one immediately to think of economic dumping with very adverse re-
sults for the Black: Country industry. However, when we look closely at
the situation a different picture emerges. Throughout 1897, despite the
presence of Alabama pig iron on the market, prices of most classes of
pig were rising; at the end of 1896, it was thought "remarkable" by the
trade press that only 23 of the 69 furnaces were actually in blast,
whilst in February 1897 the pig iron sector of the iron trade was said
to be "in a better position than it has occupied for a long time". The
fact that Southern pig found a responsive ibarket in the Black Country
was largely because of this developing shortage of supplies for local
consumers, together with the fact that it was of BOod quality. Some con-
sumers were prepared to go so far as to say that the "Southern coke iron
was ••• the equal of the best brands of Sootch $Ild English iron, and
superior to aakes of part-mine aDd cinder pigs". The U.S. Consul in
Birmingham, commenti.Dg on the "healthy sales of American iron in English
markets", in January 1899, also made the point that the Blaok Comtry
consUiled I'large lots of American iron, chiefly forge grades", because
its principal indust17w.& ..the aanuf'acture of merchant bars and sheets".
(48) 'Phe COJ1$Uput the quantity ot Southern pig colling into the district
at "roughly 2,000 tons. mqDth", althoU8h on ODe oo0&8ion a weekly sale
of 6,000 tons had been recoried. This 'ftS at • time when the total weekly
make of pig iron in the distriet vas put at a little' over 7,000 tons.
(47) Southernp1c,"~,-1Q..tA.a.,,40at1J.e·1"Mept:Loa ..iJ1 the,·,C1evel~ distriot
when it ,-.de i~ ~~.~~",~»peuana•• sev'ral hundred. tons weN imported by
a H+~~e&Jb~,m~~l1t,inJe?5, but they were still in his bands in,
',.' 1- - " '.;)-'.t;,: ':,,"'j \«'>, ..\0-"":> _ :",";'. ".' --'" ':.. -•.c'
May'1896': ~2i:l1.tr~iiii.~ 8/5/96.
(48) ~oli/;'~~v, 'i11/99.
It would be quite wrong in this period to say that American pig iron was
"dumped" on the Black Country because at no time in 1897 or 1898 did it
sell much below similar local brands. Jeremiah Head was speaking no more
than the truth - no ma.:jter how much he frightened the district's
smelters - when he told a South Staffordshire audience that pig iron
could be sold in Birmingham, Alabama, for "24/- per ton on trucks". (49)
Allowing for the very low freight rates across the Atlantic, and even
including the "obstacles of high inland freight" once the iron left a
British port for the Midlands, Southern pig iron was not sold at a lost
when it slightly undercut quotations for the local makes.
By April 1898, the nuilber of furnaces in blast in South Staffordshire
had risen to 25, but their combined output was totally inadequate to
meet the needs of local consumers. In the following month, the wharves
of furnace proprietors were said to be completely bare of stock, whilst
finished iron manufacturers were reported to be working from hand to
mouth "even in cases where they have thousands of tons on order". (50 )
Prices ot pig iron, described on the Wolverhampton market in August
as "phenomenally high", oontinued to rise, in some cases by as much as
7/6 per ton in a sU1g1e month. By Novem.ber 1898, prices were said to
be the highest tor some years past, "both as reeards forge and foundry
sorts" :
statts. cinder (t~rge) ••••• 50/- per ton
part....m.iae•• • ••• • 50/6 to55/~ per ton
all-mine hot air ••••••••••• 72/6 per ton
" "(ordinar,r) •••••••••• 56/- to 57/6 per ton
" "(best) •••••••••••••• 66/6 to 69/6" "
S1;att8.0in.d~(to~) ••• 45/- to 46/6 " "
,"We:re it n'!t..fqr, ~b,.".."••petition of Amencan pic", re_rc.d an 0 beerver
iJ10.~ober~.":,piliron. ue~ tilbt,name their own price." .(51) Indeed,
(49) Proc. St Statt•• , 1897 - 98, p. 121 •
.. "'" ,·····c-··.· "'~"'J> •. ,' "';_", ...... :""",......,;,... _>",.~;",
(50)~eg a-. 26/$/98.'-~'.-'-. ·h,<.... ··_.· ....· _ -.h..",_~. .-...... ".,,~ ..""'zr:::e::s .. -. ,.
(51) Colliea G!ariJ.an, 14/10/98.
without Southern pig iron ooming into the distriot the finished iron trade
of the Blaok Country would have broken down in the winter of 1898-99.
Early in liJ.ay 1899, supplies of Southern pig to the Blaok Country did dry
up; it was reported on the Birmingham Exchange that Amerioan producers
had notified their United Kingdom agents that they would be unable to
complete contracts for pig iron. As a result consumers who had been wait-
ing for the pig iron had to swell the ranks of those already seeking after
looal supplies. The total weekly make of just over 7,000 tons of pig iron
was supplemented by a further 7,000 tons from other Midland areas but,
without American pig iron on the market, prices of all classes continued
to rise. The lowest priced pig iron made in South Staffordshire - cinder
pig for forge purposes - was selling at 50/- to t2/6 per ton, compared
with 36/- to 37/- in January 1'895. Rumours were current in the distriot
that some local pig was aotually being purohased by American agents for
shipment to the United states, whilst sales of oold blast pig iron at
92/- to 95/- per ton were definitely being made to Belgian and German
oonsumers. Prices reaohed their peak in June 1900:
staffs. cinder forge ••••• 70/- per ton
part-mine 0••• ,•••••••••••• e 75/- It "
all-mi
o
ne (ordinary) eo ••• e. 77/6 " "
" " (best.) ,•••••••••• 90/-" "
cold blast •••••••••••••••120/-" "
For about twelve months,
0
the only Amerioan iron to be offered by agents
in the Blaok Country was at prias1lh1oh did not attraot~ local
buyers. In August 1899, the price vas 75/- per ton, whilst in IIay 1900
it was being offered "for delivery in the aut\1lm when the cotton shipping
season arrives"~t 85/- per ton delivered Bimingbam.(52) It""s relognised
locally that the abno·~ll:y hiSh Prices ot local brands of pig iron va.
:' ....,:\l Lf<'~ :'~ 't' < ,;" _ _ ",-;,,:: _ .,
likely to attraot AMrioan pic; nth Amerioan "produotion then runmngat
the rate of 15 Il1lfi~t~ 'annually, it was "'qUite e:l:lMtotedthat a good
deal of surplus production would be offered in the Midland iron markets
during the present summer". Indeed, the summer of 1900 was a very con-
fusing one for the Black Country industry; prices fell sharply in the
United States (a further encouragement for U.S. producers to turn to
:I.. t ) and a sharp drop in both Cleveland and Scotch warrantsEuropean mar~e s
caused something of a slump on the Birmingham Exchange. American com-
petition was blamed for this sudden reversal but comparatively very little
foreign iron was actually sold in the distriot. The quality of the iron
offered for sale was very low and there were frequent delays in delivery;
besides, the price was "not materially" in favour of the American iron.
In September, the amount of American pig iron for sale was even lower;
there was considerable uncertainty as to freight charges "in consequence
of the cotton situation, and by the inoreasing disinclination of Shipowners
to allow pig iron to be carried free as ballast" .(53) Whether the prospects
of American competi tion had been the real cause or not, the artificially
high price levels had come to an end; there were no sudden falls - the
trade spoke of' '*aba tements" - but stocks of pig iron began to grow as
sales became less frequent. "The present depressiOn" vas a phrase used to
desoribethe situatiOn in the :irOn trade and instead of there being talk
of blowing in mo:re :fu.rn&ces five out of the mid-summer total of 23 had
been blown out" by December, including the Villenhalf furnaces of the
Patent Shaft and.b3'et1-ee Company.
The seccmcl pro<!ttot in the Blaok Countr;y to tace American competi tion was
". .. .J: ". . '.' .'... .' J' ." '. .
steel; in this case the com~t1t1on came trom Borthern steelworks situated
in Pennsylvania. ' Oaee apiD,"'IlO1Jeftr. it WOUld be 'qUite 9 wrong to imagine
the lme1'ioa..··Ji~:iJ~el.'in)~the :lidland markets With disastrous re-
. '. .' •....••...•..... T':" -J-
su1ts fo!'thi.loeal'·~i1c·e~.:tn1896, the fell' major steelworks in the
110
Black Countr,y had full order books and there was a mounting shortage of
billets and blooms and tin-plate bars. Bessemer steel blooms and billets'
were selling at 85/- to 87/6 per ton, with slightly more fo~ Siemens
billets. Local re-rollers of imported steel, i.e. from the north of
England and South Wales, were thinking of overcoming the shortage of
supplies by establishing a new steelworks in the district for the product-
ion of steel blooms and billets of Bessemer and Siemens qualities.(54)
Early in January 1897, some considerable excitement was caused on the
Birmingham Exchange with the announcement that there was a shipment of
steel billets on its way from PhiladelPhia to Britain at "the extremely
low price of 85/- a ton delivered in the Midlands". Later in the same
month, a cabled news item from the "Harrow" was reoeived in the district
announcing the ship's departure from Philadelphia; on board were 2,000
tons of steel billets (72/11 f.o .b. ), 1500 tons of which was for the
Birmingham. market. Local agents then announced that the selling price in
BirmiJ18ham would be 85/- per ton, or fully 10/- \mder the then English
minimum. In faot, the steel vas largelll uri for the rolling of galvanized
sheets. A leader writer on the Collle17 Guardian caused further disquiet
in the distriot with the statement that negotiations were in progress
in Philadelphia for tn. sale of 20,000 tons of billets to European buyers
"on the basis of 75/- per ton delivered in this country" .(55) l"Ien at this
price the Americans were said to have a fair margin of profit"after
cost of handling and transport, and middlemen's charges are deducted". (56 )
Inevitably, exaggerated stories of large sales at very low prices were
(54) ColUer;r Guardian, 30/10/96.
(55) Oollier:y Guarcl!an, 29/1/97.
(56) Additional evidenee that the Amerioans were not "dum.ping" their
matera.l~s,U1p~;o7, the faot that the same steelworks was selling steel
in the ~nited States at less than £3 per ton.
recorded in the Black Country; very little American steel was sold in
the district for as little as 80/- per ton and the one works alone reported
to have purchased 9,000 tons was not identified.(57). Gradually, the
excessive claims made about Americ~an steel competition died down and the
saner minds in the district recognised that it would not last any longer
than did the two factors which accounted for it - namely, "almost un-
precedently bad trade in the States, and high prices here". Indirectly,
the presence of American steel in the Black Country also brought about
renewed competition from Scottish and north of England producers who
were thought to have found it advisable to meet the needs of the Midland
district "rather than give the desired opportunity to the American manu-
facturers of obtaining a foothold in the English market". (58) What is
certain is that, in 1897, Amerioan steel in the Blaok Country helped to
overcome a shortage in supplies to the finishing trades; because this was
the case the fOnDer product did not greatly affeot the price levels pre-
vailing in the distriot. At most, steel producers deoided to drop the
price of billets about 2/6 per ton "in order to keep the American product
out" • (59) '!he district's large steel producers, and especially the Spring
Vale and Round Oak works, verEt"aaid in Karch 1896 to be "as busy as their
owners can wish them to be".
Slightly more unvrought steel was imported into the United Kingdom from
Imports ot·U.S t lfnvrousht Steel into the Un!ted JC1D«d0ll,
. ',', · 18"..1902 "
Year
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1Sga
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19oott'
(58)Qol'llm·;q.rtiM~"9i2/Yl. ,'~.
(59l,CoU.ier'dh'..... ·:,7I5Jrni '\'J
(S1)f.,Qrlll'!=t ,.,'~13 J!'
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the United States in 1898 than in the previous year, and a great deal
more in 1899, yet throughout the period prices continued to rise.(60)
Hickman's quotations rose repeatedly in these months, sometimes by as
mueh as 5/- a ton a week or so after the last Quarter Day lists. In
October 1898, his list prices showed increases of 5/- to 15/- per ton on
plates, 12/6 to 17/6 on angles and 10/- to 15/- on tees and bars over those
of October 1897. The Black Country stee1makers in 1899 were obviously in
an "enviable situation":
"The dearth of steel is becoming as conspicuous in this district as
the marked scareity of pig iron. The shipbuilding yards in the northern
steelmaking centres are consuming all the local output and this activity
reacts favourably on Staffordshire, causing orders which used to go
north to be placed with makers in this distriot". (61 )
In January 1900, Bessemer blooms and billets were selling at 145/- to
155/-, whilst best Siemens fetched an additional 2/6 per ton; these
prices showed increases of over 60/- per ton since the same month in 1896.
Sales of Ameriean steel to the United Kingdom in the first four months
of 1900 had declined to insignificant totals; by June, however, following
(60) Although the Amerioan home market was satisfactory in 1898-99, it
would be wrong to give the impression that American producers were not
competing With British and luropean makers. In April 1898, the Government
of Victoria accepted the tender of the PennsylVania and Maryland Steel
Company to supply 14,000 tons of steel rails and fish-plates for £75,471.
:&: .... ...
wo other tenders, both Inglish and 'both rejected, were for £79,244 and
£81,256. At the sametim.e, it was I5tated that the authorities of the E.
China and Siberian Aa:1l 1ray ot st'. Pete~bUrg had plaaed a contract with
ant!. American fim tor',2,OOO ttine ot steelraile and 4,000 tons ot access-
ori&lstobe aeli.e:recl: ..t tiadifdlitolc. (Ool1.!e" Gua~l&l1. 22/4/98)
(61) Co11181'1 G_i:dian, ,t"Yfi9.
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closely on the collapse of the American home market in April, exports
had jumped:
Imports of U.S. Unwrought Steel into the United Kingdom,
January - October 1900.
Xonths.
Januar,y
February
March
April
May
J\me
.Tuly
August
September
October
~.
409
369
585
2,632
2,190
14,988
10,200
11,883
21,538
31,217
~
3,988
5,190
4,991
18,955
17,684
109,034
67,100
84,663
142,796
181,591
A month later, the high prices for both semi- and finished-steel products
in the Black Country began to ease; gas strip fell to £9 - 10s. per ton
in that month (5/- less was being aooepted for orders of 100 tons and over)
because of oompetition from American firms. In September, wi th American
steel billets reported on sale at £1 per ton below English quotations,
consumers were able to persuade local producers to reduce prices. The
Carnegie Steel Compmy had chartered the British steamship "Sir Richard
~nville", of Plymouth, to sail regularly from Philadelphia to Manchester
and Iewport(South Wales) with cargoes of steel billets from their mills
at Pittsburgh. It was reported in the trade press that the steel was for
making tin-plates and structural steel and beams:
"Upon deliver,y of her cargo English -.nu:tacturers will for the first
time use American steel 1n mald.ng tin-plates at Swansea and elself'here".(62)
(62) One result of imported American and German steel was to giTe ooastal
s1 tes a further advantage oyer the inland areas, Frequent references were
made in the trade press to the increasingly severe competition which in-
land galvanized sheet _kers could expect from their riTals in South Wales.
(e.g. Col11e17 Guardian, 14/9/1 go(», K, Warren, op oit, pp. 92 - 95,
writes: "the arrival of toreign s8lli-finiBhed steel was yet another factor
pulling Jridland' (lheet)til'llS 008.stwards or tor those UDahle to move
rendering the. less oompet1 t1Te" •
The end of 1900, in one sense, brought to a conclusion the first phase
of intense foreign competition in both pig iron and steel. It had lasted
for about three years ~ if intermittently - , had been greeted with ex-
aggerated fears and had been largely American in origin. In this period,
the United Kingdom became an importer of pig iron on a fairly large scale
for the first time, together with semi-finished products like steel
billets for re-roll1ng into sheets and bars. As far as the Black Country
itself was ooncerned - when all things American became of great interest
and to imitate them was the panacea for all the district's ills - imports
of Amerioan pig iron and steel was, on balance, beneficial to the area.
Neither smelters nor steelmakers suffered from the competition to any
appreciable extent, and what prosperity many of the South Staffordshire
ironmasters achieved in theee years 1188 Ialogely due to the fact that they
were able to roll down imported ste~l billets into bars and sheets.
North of Englan~ and Welsh districts were too busy for much of the time
wi th the steel rail trade to be able to supply the Midlands with" semis" ;
the continued prosperity of the wheel and axle manufaoturers and those
engaged in the subsidiary bmnohes ot the comparatively new oyOle trade
was in no small way due to imported Amerioan steel •.
The se.ondphase in foreign oOllpetitie began Wi ththe reappearanoe of
Belgian and German iron and steel in the 'llidland marketll. Al though' ber-
iean COJllpeti tion remai:i1.a."':tie:i*oe iIl'bOth. foreign and' colonial _rbt.,
notably in tht.. 1fboferan"{'of"fiJrl.abic1 iron and steel products, 'it w&s
the s'e-rere cOIlpetition"'tro."the 'eont1.iitmt ":Ut"th 'bar iron t:rade whicah
gioeatly disrobed'~th·Staft'iHihfN'~.r..'lloe~ brand.' of pig iroll
tell steadily, not '" 'b.OWd.;·otth.·..~1tan.. of' _ ''to'1'eigrl :Pig iron,
but beoao. of illfjOrte«1B61tf.iifaii4Oerian _1' :trOll. By<'ebraary 1901,
.01I1IlOribari·ba4}tiili.tif,'tit;.iei:l"n'·~·Pe:ttOJf tm'1tlJae1:r~ peak' of the
previou su.r;-·~·..tlarla1:er-.~·lomidabl.Bell1aneoapetition - "at
pii.~e."e.'il1~lfI~itJ""·~/Jig.l:tahpreduoera" - in both bar iron and
iron and steel wire brought about further reductions. Belgian No. 2 bars
Pig Iron Prices(Jan. , Feb., &: .A.ug. 1901)
cinder forge 57/6-60/-
part-mine 60/- 65/-
all-mine (best) 90/- 95/-
" " (ord.) 72/6 75/-
Brand January February
47/- - 49/-
48/- - 50/6
80/- - 85/-
52/6 - 60/-
August
46/- - 47/-
49/- - 52/6
75/- - 80/6
52/6 - 60/-
were quoted f.o.b. Antwerp amd Rotterdam ~t 102/6 a ton, and ex-steamer
in the Thames at 106/- as compared with 145/- for Staffordshire bars and
135/- to 140/- for Lancashire bars at ports.(63) Even the list houses,
whose brands were generally indented by foreign customers to merchants,
were only working about one-third time, despite great reductions in their
quoted prices:
Prices of Marked Barse1900 8: 1901)
1900 1 .Tanuary
1 February
1 November
1901 1 January-
1 May
£11 .P8r ton
£11/.10 per ton
£10/10" "
£9/10 per ton
£8/10" ..
Once they had worked through their orders arranged bef'ore the January
Quarterly Meeting, South Staff'ordshire smelters were faced with the choiae
of' either building up their stocb of' pig iron or blowing out one of' their
furnaces • Few smelters welcomed any reduction in make because it could
easily mean the addition of' 1/6 to 2/- per ton to the cost of the re-
maining production; howe",e:t, witb prices having tallen so loy eaoh ton
ot pig il'Otw. made could mean a 10S8 or 2/6 to .,/-. B,. J'une 1901, 01'11,.
16 furnaoes we:"" ··ih blast. !he bar Iron de»artment showed no sips of'
iltproving thl"OUghout the .Ulliaer ad aut1aim, whilst in loftllber Staftordsb.1re
chain makers were being otterecfgooc1 q1Ja11t,. Belgian bar iron tor on11
122/6 a ton deliv'ered at l1d1anCf 'itationa. ROhTer, aaents t1"Oll the
Belgian f1ru we.. :t"~.1·a4Yi.e4.·_1..·pri...~. tact vbiGh
(63) Collie" GJarcl1y. 12/4/1901 •
irritated Midland consumers, who then tended to give their custom once
more to local suppliers. In fact, some observers of the Black Country
iron trade felt that in general it was not in too bad a state; only in
this one sector was there severe competition. Against this view, though,
is the fact that accountants for the Midland Wages BOard shovred that
over the nrevious twelve months the average selling price in the Stafford-
.,
shire iron trade had dropped by as much as 61/8 per ton.
In the first half of 1901, a certain amount of American raw and finished
steel was coming into the Midlands, but this dried up temporarily as a
result of serious labour troubles in the American iron and steel industry.
By the time the dispute was settled, heavy home demand for steel rails
and constructional steel was absorbing all the American production. In
fact, for some time to come, the South Staffordshire industry was to feel
the effects of American competition only in the finished steel markets of
both colonial and neutral countries. Fortunately for the finishing trades
in South Staffordshire, a great deal of German steel was coming into the
district in the closing months of 1901; with very few steel blooms and
billets coming into the district from South Wales (Welsh steelmakers were
busy with tin-plate orders and were not interested in supplying Midland
consumers), local sheet makers and producers of hoops and strips would
have found the going very tough. Indeed, it was observed in November
that several local works would have had to close "but for foreign import-
ation".(64) In addition to overcoming a shortage of semi-finished steel
in South Staffordshire, German steel imports also had the effect of
preventing any advance in price for Welsh and Scottish billets and tin-
plate bars; the latter steel was infrequently offered in the district at
1C1?/- per ton, whilst German steel was quoted at 95/-. Local opinion
(64) CollierY Guardian, 22/11/1901.
1.17·
felt that the Germans must be losing money at this price, and in fact
only a small amount of German steel actually materialised in the Black
Country at anything like 7/6 to 10/- below home prices.
The beginning of 1902 brought very little change to the scene. Virtually
no American iron and steel was coming into the United Kingdom and it
was a rumour that American agents were actually buying in British markets
that caused prices to rise slightly. It was felt, however, that Stafford-
shire firms were "too far from the coast to benefit much by the Trans-
atlantic requirements". The winter Quarterly Meeting of the Black Country
iron trade, held in Birmingham in .January 1902, was largely taken up
with the unsuccessful attempt of the Unmarked Bar Makers' Association
to withstand Belgian competition in bar iron. The basis price of £6/15
was fixed by the Association, but members were prepared to sell good
merchant bars at £6/10 to £6/12/6 "delivered by boat at works in the
district". Belgian bar iron was in evidence at £5/17/6 delivered. German
steel was quoted by agents at prices a little higher than those quoted
late in 1901; namely, steel-plating bars at 97/6 to 100/- and billets
at 87/6 to 92/6. February saw a further rise of 8/- per ton in quoted
German prices, which brought them very "much level with home prices.
German gas strip and steel tube strip disappeared completely. So desperate
were Black Country consumers to obtain Ge~n blooms and billets in March
that they were paying above the contract price to obtain delivery; there
was little or no Welsh or north of' England steel on the market. Birming-
ham merchants, with orders to f'u!ffT' from India and the ltast Indies, were
ordering steel sheets at Ul5 per ton f.o.b. Hamburg and A.ntwerp; even
if Black Country producers had been able to supply the local merchant•.
their prices would 'ha:ve been r:r/fSf.o.b.the '!hames or Kersey. By the
time the summer QuarterlT'.ettDgftS held, the price of home-produced
steel blooms and billets had risen to between £5 and £5/2 per ton for
Bessemer quality and a further 5/- per ton for Siemens quality; both the
1.
Germans and Begians were selling in the market but not without a certain
....
amount of difficulty. There were frequent complaints made by the con-
sumers of Black Country sheets that the product made from imported metal
did not match the quality of sheets made from Welsh steel. Furthermore,
the Belgians were not particularly anxious to meet any special require-
ments of the Black Country producers, or to guarantee delivery dates.
The most that could be said for both Belgian and German imports was that
they kept the market disturbed and, marginally, kept home prices a little
lower than they might otherwise have been. In the closing months of 1902,
a number of large contracts were placed by Black Country producers for
German billets and tin-plate bars, especially when one German house came
on the scene offering 20,000 tons of steel billets "of reliable quality",
together with guaranteed prompt delivery. However, it was again felt by
local ironmasters that the Germans were selling at a 10ss(65) but that
if they did not take advantage of the foreign steel many of their number
would be compelled to close their works or to put them on short time.
Furthermore, only by using cheap Continental semi-finished steel were
South Staffordshire makers able to withstand the growing Belgian and
German competition in the Mad!terranean markets and the Far East; as it
was there appeared to be "a continual shrinkage" in South Staffordshire
exports of black and galvanised sheets, tin-plates and fencing wire.(66)
For the first three months of 190', a great deal of foreign steel came
into the Midlands; just as harmful to the Black Countr,y trade (and else-
where) was a growth in the amount of German iron and steel coming into
....
London and I$Ull for r,shipment to Australia, South Afrioa and Par Bastern
",.
markets by English merchants. A temporary respite oocurred in April.
(65) Briefiy, aerman·c£illet~ and steel ingots vere offered at 86/- a ton
delivered; prioes then went up again to between 90/- and 92/6 per ton.
(66) Collie17 Quardiap..· 28/11/1902.
German firms, hoping to gain higher prices in their home market and in
Russia, sought to close the unprofitable contracts entered into with
Black Country consumers. Several large firms in the district were actually
offered 7/6 a ton by the Germans to cancell their orders. Within six
weeks, however, both the German and Belgian agents were back in Birmingham
and Wolverhampton seeking orders. Makers of Staffordshire common bar were
forced into greater prioe concessions because of severe Belgian compet-
i tion, whilst German wire and wire rods came into the district at 10/- to
15/- a ton below local quotations.(67) Perhaps a little late in the day,
was the full realisation by the Black Country iron trade that the Conti-
nentals "had come to stay". There was no doubt, too, in the minds of the
South Staffordshire ironmasters that, whether they were selling at below
cost or not, the Belgians and Germans could "at least compete with South
Wales and the north of England firms in respect of deliveries to the
Midlands". Belgian basic steel bars were quoted £5 a ton f .0.b. Antwerp,
and another 15/- a ton saw them delivered to Midland stations as compared
wi th £6 to £6/10 for looal makes; German' steel bars were quoted 90/- to
92/6 and billets 87/6 to 88/6 delivered.(6S)
This second phase in foreign competi tion, which had commenced with the
departure of Amerioan iron and steel froll Jlidland markets, really CUle
to an end in September 1903. If the first phase had been pr1mar1.ly American
in origin, the second had been almbst exclua:f""e17 Continental. 10 pig
iron Was incl\ided in the, list ot imports, bttBlaok COU1'lt1"1 aelters
suffered, n8ftrthelesll~ troll the severe Belgian (and to a lesser extent
hl'man) competition in the OMon bar department. The ~iaok C:O\UltiT' iron
trade Was "stationa1'1" for much Of 1'902 &1141903, nth Onl1;s~01ality
(tiT) Collie" h&r41'*!* 1l}/'1';~~l"
(68) COlliettGUtd1p:: "J/l/'t~;,;
iron and high-class brands giving producers any profit at all. Facing
"disproportionately high" production costs with regard to raw materials,
fuel and labour, South Staffordshire mills and forges frequently stood
idle whilst agents from Belgian and German houses left the district
"with their order books well filled". However, it must be stressed that
with regard to the imports of steel blooms and billets the Black Country
consumers were never more happy than when they were coming thick and fast;
the British producers who lost out were the makers of semi-finished steel
in South Wales and the north of England. This explains why the three
large producers of steel in the district - Round Oak, Spring Vale and
Patent Shaft - did not face any real difficulty in this period. ThesEil
plants did not produce steel for the local finishing trades; Hickman's
steelworks was fully employed on heavy sections, whilst Patent Shaft
had concentrated on bridgeworks and locomotive requirements.
The third phase in foreign competition began in the late autumn of
1903, with the reappearance of American steel blooms and billets in com-
petition with Oontinental imports. As late as the end of September, it was
openly expressed in the Midlands that the Amerioan Steel Trust would not
be able to undersell English firms there without incurring considerable
losses; in any case it was also reported that the Steel Trust was selling
at home practially all the steel that it could produce at between £5/4
and £5/9 a ton, i.e. between 11/6 and 16/6 per ton more than they could
". ,
hope to obtaitj in England. In tact, such Black Country opinion 'WaS not
based on fact; ateel could be produced in the United States tor 48/- a
• -." ',"i ,.
ton and even if 16/- were added to this tigure for transit costa any steel
801d over 64/- in England WOuld show a profit. At th~' end ot October,
1,!; : ..r \i~~' . t ';".:: ~t *;} c.:;;. t-"
contracts for something like 100,000 tons ot steel billets"~ tin-plate
bars had been signed by berica:n-apnta in'South Wales ODbeha1t of the
' ~ '! ,~
_.,.... .
American Steel 'fruste 'lin-plate bars were ottered at 80/- a ton delivered
at Newport, and about f!7/6 delivered in the llidlands. '!erms were strictly
:)..( (.
"net cash on delivery", but they compared favourably with the 90/- asked
for German steel and 92/6 for English or Welsh bars. United Kingdom mar-
kets, and especially South Wales and the Black Country, were now being
fought over by the American Steel Trust on the one hand and the German steel
syndicates on the other. Something like 18,000 tons of German billets and
tin-plate bars were coming into the country via the Bristol Channel ports
per month, and "probably double the quantity" through eastern ports.(69)
The American Steel Trust took the unprecedented step of inviting offers
from customers, rather than send quotations through American agents, and
it was alleged on the Birmingham Exchange that "AmericanHbars intended
for the Midlands (had) been ••• offered, c.i.f., at lewport at £3/17/6".
In face of such fieree competition in the South Wales market, the Germans
and Belgians decided to concentrate their efforts on the Xidland markets.
German sheet bars, which were quoted in Germany at £6 per ton, were on
sale in South Staffordshire, delivered to stations nearest to consumers'
works, at 85/-; German steel rods were also on sale in South Staffordshire
at between 2/6 and 5/& below the price of Inglish rods. The Americans still
undersold at even these prices, and in steel strip their quotations
were at fully 20/- below thoae of Welah and Staffordshire producers. At
the height of the competition, the Carnegie Steel Company secured a 20
per cent conceasion fro. the railway companie. carrying their steel to
the coast for tranaatlantie ahipaent. In addition to this "stern" 00.-
petition in their own local Mrket, South Stafford.hire produoers found
themselvea ouSted by foreip ooapet1tors in London an4 other port••
What were the effect. of thia "war of the cLant." on the Black Count17
iron trade? In the ti1"Bt Place, .anutaoture!'B ot finiahed st..l in Bir-
minghaa and SouthStaf'fordl!Jhire, 'took 'ad'f'antage otthe chea, supplies
to increase the quantity of bars, sheets, plates and strip being rolled
in their works (indeed, the cheap steel was essential if Black Country
firms were to sell abroad). However, because they were re-rolling steel,
such firms were no longer in the market for bar iron, with the result
that whilst each week there was an increased quantity of steel being re-
rolled there was a corresponding displacement of finished iron. Local
demand for pig iron was not sustained and smelters found their rates to
be the lowest for something like four or five years; indeed, prices were
to go even lower before anything like a revival was to be felt.(70) With
the number of list houses down in January 1904 to about half of what
they were ten years previously, there was little demand for Staffordshire
hot air and cold blast pig irons. Most of the South Staffordshire firms
tended to confine their attention to producing specialities and sectional
iron for engineering and naval purposes. Perhaps because of the ha1'll
being done to this very important section of the local iron trade, a cer-
tain amount of attention and publicity was given to the possible reper-
cussions of allowing so much imported steel to come into the district.
An example was taken with regard to steel rods imported from Germany:
"if 1,000 tons of steel rods are produced in Germany and sold
in this district, it will mean a loss of PrOduction here not only
of the rods themselves but also a loss of the labour which would be
required to produce the raw material needed for the manufacture of
the rods. It requires. about 3,000 tons of ore and about 1500 tons
of coal (in the form cf coke) to convert the ore into pig iron and
about 450 tons of coal to turn the pig iron into billets, besides
about 550 tons of coal to transform the billets into rods, so that
(70) From ,the list .of pii'.1ron .'P~ce8, it is possible to see that pig
iron reached 1ts trough in the late winter of 1905.
1,000 tons of rods obtained from abroad instead of from the Midlands
means a loss of labour in producing 5,500 tons of raw material, to
say nothing oir the labour needed in producing the rods themselves". (71 )
Of some considerable interest, too, was the fact that at the height of
foreign competition, renewed interest was shown in the plans to build
a new large steelworks in the district to supply the re-rollers with
blooms and billets. On this occasion, the lead was taken by the Wolver-
hampton Corrugated Iron Company - a large consumer of German steel -
with a public promise that its oustom would go to any juch firm. In fact,
in January 1904, it was reported in the district that "a well-known
Midland firm has decided to make its own billets instead of purchasing
them from the Amerioans and Germans and for this purpose have reconstructed
their furnaces and laid-down a modern steel-making plant. last year
the firm used 50,000 tons of German billets".(72)
For a few months in 1904, supplies of foreign steel drastically fell
.,...
off; there was nothing for local oonsumers from eithetAmerioa or the
Continent and when supplies were renewed in April quoted prices had risen
bY,5/- per ton. This additional 5/-. making imported steel 90/- a ton,
made English supplies at between 85/- and frT/6 for Bessemer quality much
more attractive. In lI&y, when again both German and .1meriean steel was
virtually wi.thdrawn from the market, home-produced supplies not only rose
in price but were also inadequate to meet the requirements of B1aek Country
eonsumers. For this sectio~ of the trade, it was fortunate that towards
'.:'"
the middle of J1IJle the Geru.n Steel SJUdioate reappeared with quotations
, :
reduoed by as muoh a8 5/- per ton. The SJUdioate was reported to be uxious
to find an outlet for "a Te'1!7 large surplus prod_tioD"; aecordinclJ.
(,,)~ 91tO/1905.
t7~)' 00111817 GJAdfM; 22/'71904". i
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steel billets were offered at 87/6 a ton delivered Midland stations. At
the summer Quarterly Meeting of the iron trade held in Birmingham in
August there were plentiful supplies of blooms and billets. Bessemer
billets were quoted at 85/- to 90/- a ton, or about 2/6 less than three
months ago and 5/- below the price of twelve months ago. Comment made
by representatives of the iron trade covering the whole country showed
clearly that the Black Country was not the only district experiencing
a renewed burst of foreign competition: the "depression" was "severe",
wi th strong competition both in home markets and abroad. Pessimists on
the Birmingham Exchange suggested that the closing of the greater part
of the Midland iron and steel sheet mills was "inerttable". The American
Steel Trust was also in the market, "underselling Welsh, German and
Staffordshire makers alike"(73); billets and sheet bars could be delivered
to Birmingham for 84/- a ton in quantities as small as 500 tons at a
time with a guaranteed delivel"1 within a month. This price eompared fav-
ourably With United Kingdom .teel quoted 87/- to 90/- for Bessemer qualit,y,
and 2/6 extra for Siemens, lese ~ diseount for prompt payment. With the
exception of the four looal steel.orka, foreign competition was hitting
the distriot hard; even with steel "seats" at stoh low prices, the looal
mills could fi.J!ld no profit becaue of the _11 8IlO\Ult of ..rk whivh they
aoquired. Many mills and fO%"88s were Oil short tiae, perhaps working tor
onl7 three daY'S ot the week; a good prctpOrt1on ot their .zpene88 and dead
charges re-.ined tlle .... &. it they haiNl orier baeb. Qe1'lllUl billets
went as low as '17/- .. ton nan attapt to tinc1.b\Q'8rB, b..t the trouble
was that the :B1aek Ooll1ltZ'J' pro4uoersooulclut .ell the t1n18hecl article
at a protit. (74) 't~ .d.GOuld be obta1aecl at '"1710. priMa troll the
(73) Colliery Guardian, 15/7/1904. (74) South Wales galvanised
sheet JDakers,tOl" ua.pie;'~;"e1of·a.ble to obtain 'la1'ge(tot1e1sruaente ot
Amerioan steel "at exceptioll&lly low prices". The Bil'llinpU\ correspondent
of the Collie17 Guardian oo_ented:"the competit1on of the galft%lised
sheet makers s1 tuat.d on the coast With the inland tirJll8 is evidently
destined to become inereas1ngly severe", 5/8/1904.
Continent, whilst Belgian rolled steel girders could be obtained for 95/-
a ton, compared with over 117/- for the home product. Some success was
achieved by the Midland axle trade in face of strong American competition,
largely through the introduction of improvements in axle construction.
The very important tube trade also came under severe German and American
attack, and several descriptions of tubes were sold at well below local
prices.
As to which side came out on top in the struggle for supremacy of the
Black Country market - the Americans or the Continental producers - is
a matter for conjecture. For sheer bulk in contracts, the Americans
probably had the edge, but their slightly lower quotations hid the faot
Produot (5/8/1994) !!&~ Continent Welsh
billets (offered 81/9+ 82/6+ as/-
Birmingham del.)
84/-+ f!;/- rrt/6 - 90/-steel bars
that these were normally only for large contracts at prompt cash settle-
mente As a result, the Belgian agents more often than not obtained renewal
of contraots with Black Country consumers, whereas the Americans failed
to do so. The a'Verage Blaok Country consumer was smail; he did not want
to make large purchases and in difficult times he had little available
cash for prompt settlement. It is qui te possihle that if the South Wales
district had been regularly able to meet the full requirements of Blaok
Country consumers, at competitive priCles, foreign produCers would have
found things very tough indeed. 'fo· imprOve their marketing of steel in
the main Englieh,arke'ts, the ·0e1'll&&8_el Trust, 1n October 1904, decided
to create a single selling agenGy - the German Steel Union Agency Ltd•• A
number of London English houses !8rtic1p$ted in the scheme, but those who
1'·.-; , .
did not quickly unloacled tAeiratoob ot Gel'tllP at.el OIL tl\e II&rket.
Indeed, in that month Ge1'man steelJlllters we're reported to ha'Ve .obtained
virtual supremacy in the Midland markets for crude steel and their fin-
ished steel goods, such as plates, bars and engineering sections".(75)
Together with a few Belgian houses, the Germans were quoting billets at
72/6 to 75/- at English ports and sheet bars at 75/- to 76/-.
Even in 1904, it would be wrong to suggest that the Welsh and English
manufacturers were not making strenuous efforts to retain their home trade 0
Two of the largest consumers in the combined South Wales/South Stafford-
ire market, Guest, Keen and Company and Lysaght, had become two of the
largest makers of the raw materials; as a result the market for foreign
"semis" was considerably contraoted. A. large programme of plant improve-
ment was undertaken by English and Welsh steelmakers - details of the
Black Countr,y itself are given in a different section - and new processes
introduced in an effort to cheapen production costs and so make them more
able to resist foreign producers. It was generally recognised by now that
the Germans could not produoe steel much below works in either South Wales
or the Black Country, but they were able to sell cheaply abroad beoause
of their government's rebate sohemes, coupled with the faot that they
obtained profitable prices at home. English producers were, on the whole,
prepared to acoept that they could 13 do little about this (76 ), but they
were angry at the way British railway companies and shipowners favoured
Gel1DB.n and Belgian firms by offering concessions on the delivery of" goods
to the Midlands. Some Amerioan firms a.ctually found it worth their while
to send their steel to Inglish ports and to the Xidl8.n4S Via Antwerp.
(75) Colliery Guardian, 14!10!1904.
(76) One or two ofthelargu Brlgliahti....·11:14 tl7to;..".taefilbtto
tlle,German home market.~uest" ~~ and RC)JIpe.ny. foreJ:-.ple, matoheclthe
dumping policy of Ge:rma.n screw-malr::inc firms (at one tiae the Germans were
selling sorews in the lltdianuat'~off tke list priees) by offering
1ihi1r .... ,i.nthe~..BII·Ia:.. liarket at SOJ' ott list. This preTed a
suffioient indueellent for the Gemau greatly to reduce their discounts.
This third phase of intensive foreign competition began to draw to a
close in the last few months of the year. Even before the Westphalian
Coal Strike early in 1905, German agents had advanced the prioe of billets
and bars by 2/6 per ton in the Birmingham market and they were not disposed
to accept orders of less than 500 to 1,000 tons. The German industry,
in fact, was-finding more lucrative markets' in Russia and, although
agents reappeared early in May 1905, a further 7/6 per ton was being asked.
Coupled with the fact that American competition bad also "been got out
of the way", English billets were commanding much higher prices - 90/-
for Bessemer quaIity and 92/6 to 95/- for Siemens. By the middle of
June, imported steel was actually dearer than the home product, and there
was something of a shortage in supplies for the Black Country. A struct-
ural weakness in the local industry vas only too ObviOllS when the re-
rolling sections could not obtain their raw JllS.terials; the small sheet
mill could not hope to compete with the Belgian producers, "who not only
produce their own raw material, and wom it up into the finished article,
but have the advantage of lower Bllipping and railway rates as compared
wi th the Midlands". (77) It _8 at such times that disoussions took plaoe
as to the possibility of the various Midland fi1"llS combining to set up
a new semi-finishedst.elworb; howenr, &s in the past, in 1905-6it
vas s till regarded as too rislq 8 "fentUJ!'e, especially as -a 'Very large
outlay wOuld be required to do~hi_Olia Hale sUfficient to cope
eft.cti....11 with enstiDC Ve16 -Ud future ·Continetal OOIIpetitioli.
Much, indeed,woulddepeDd>on3Ut hovlmagsteelprlcn oontinued to rise.
From 1906 until the outb1"tl8kfifwar 'Ul1 914, -tie ·::B1aok 00_1:1"1 OODtiDUed
'to experience burst1J of iDtenae fo:reillf eOrIpttif:lODf -unlibtbe earlier
phases they VeNAe) lODger W38Xpeot_. eapeo1al17 when _rket conditions
contracted in either the United States or Germany. Interspersed with
these periods of low prices were short-lived boom spells which arose
largely out of expansion in the German and United States markets. It
was, indeed, the case that the British home market was no longer capable
of instigating boom conditions beyond very localised cases. A revival
in the fortunes of the Black Country iron trade took place towards the end
of 1906 and lasted for about eighteen months, reaching a peak in 19CJ7.
It was generally recognised even at the time that this revival was due
to increased demand for iron and steel in both Germany and the United
States; foreign steel did not entirely disappear but it wa~ never avail-
able for immediate delivery in the Black Country and appeared chiefly
to test the strength of the market. Consumers of steel billets had to
wait up to three months for delivery and pay between £6 and £6/2/6 per
ton. The pig iron department matched the prosperity of the other sections
of the iron trade in 1907. despite the occasional;: spell of uncertainty
created by weaknesses in the Scotch warrant market. Almost no foreign
pig iron had appeared in South Staffordshire since the Alabama pig scare
but what was interesting about the 1907 boom was the scarcity 01' Northants
pig iron in the district due to the exPort of the latter product in large
quantities to German and Belgian consumers. Contracts tor 6,000 and
:
10,000 orders were signed by Northampton smelters' in 1907 and again in
1909 - they could get better prices b7 shiPPing their pig iron through
King's~ to Ge:nDa~ than they COuldob1:ain in South'S:b.ttordshire.(78)
When 1908 opened trade was ai~aq again deolining and it r-atned in
a state of depression for nearly two years. For muCh 01' this period, it
- . /".......-" '~. __>~,_._ __''''::'~'''' -~ 'i "';::.,'. '-~_:f'''
was the Belgian :i.ndustl'~rlmiohpve the~BlackOoUnt17 the most bOther,
{'Tal There was, in' f;~t, a shorG;~;iitivai-'diB~Dc~:lb8tieen the furnaoes
and Xing's Iqm1 ·COltl*1'ifdlJrtli''t!fiecU.tafiO.tbS6uth 'Staffordshire and the
e:.- '-; _;" .,,'" :,"'; .' "'.', '.:: '... .: .. ':':" ,"'_':~~" . -,.~:r:-
kioe :Pira~:DY'ih.'t:i:iwaD8f.O.b~'nDC·8 Iqnn was higher than the priee to
~;·ob;e~ilf.a.rnrtti~ft~.~':;~~ti.i~i.!he Qerau iJl4uatr;r liked the the
Borthants iron 'be."" ot ita lhoBPlorie nature and suitability for their
~"io Bess..rsteelworks.
,~.
although both German and Frehch steel (as well as American) added to
i ts difficulties. In October 1907, steelworks in the Charleroi district
had sent circulars directly to Black Country consumers offering finished
steel at what were undoubtedly "dumping prices":
Product
steel merchant bars
tees and nail rods
joists
channels
hoops
Price per ton
125/-
1301-
133/6
137/6
160/-
These prices were between 15/- and £1 per ton below South Staffordshire
quotations and in the case of nail rods a full £2. Foreign strip was also
coming into the district, and Belgian common bars could be obtained for
15/- per ton below South Staffordshire prices. However, this latter
material had less of an impact than it might have caused because delivery
could not be made in under two months. Steel prices collapsed in the
Black Country with the appearance in force of the Stahlwrks-Verband at
the end of November; English prices had been £6/7/6 but the Germans
offered billets at 95/- a ton and the English quotations slumped to 105/-.
By the end of January 1908, all the fight seemed to have gone out of
English steelworks and "supplies could be had almost for the asking". (so)
The situation was the same in South Wales, With combined American-German
imports of steel "semis" coming in at 6 - 7,000 tons a week. Special
port facilities had been provided at Newport for the importation of steel
bars and in the first four months of 1908 56,214 tOns of steel bars came
in (compared with 39,425 tons in the same four months ot 1907). The
Germans seemed to have taken oYer froll the Belgians as the main souroe
of danger to the Black Country iron trade by the JDiddle of 1900. The wire
trade was brought almost to a standstill in June, whilst in the folloWing
(79) Co11i817 Guardian, ·25/10/1907.
,
(80)crolli8i7 aUtiodi!i, 36/1/1908.
month German billets for delivery in the Midlands were quoted at 84/-
to 85/-. A small amount of Belgian steel was offered for as little as
80/- to 81/-, whilst German strip was also available at £6 per ton del-
ivered as compared with the £6/10 quoted by local producers. In fact,
Stewarts and Lloyct bought 16,000 tons of foreign steel strip at one go
in June 1909 in an attempt to force down the price being charged by the
Gas Tube Strip Iron Association; the move was successful in that the
Association lowered its price level, but it was resented by large sections
of the trade. For some time, home producers in various branches of the
industry were reported to have been sacrificing some of the profits made
during the boom period of 1906 and 1907 in order to hold their own against
foreign competitors:
"Cetrainly the day bas gone by when English makers were content to
allow Continental makers to undersell them by 10/-, or sometimes' even
by £1, with hardly a murmur. Every inch of the competitive ground
appears nowadays to be hotly disputed".(81)
Another sign of resistance by the local Black Country trade was the deo-
ision of Sir Alfred Hickman, Ltd. to take on the foreign producers in
their hitherto most successtul department - half product bars and billets.
The Bilston firm undertook a programme of expansion reportedly costing
£100,000; the main developaent was the construction of an electrically-
driven merchant mill for the production of small sizes of steel bars.
Sir Alfred Hiokman was thus individually creatin8 a local supply of semi-
steel for the sheet....making :i.ndustrt;-'sOlDetD.fiig that the sheet-makers
theuelves had spoken about for years Without having sufficient confidence
to put their plans into effect. The weeklY' make for the neW mill was
between 1,500 and 1,~600tons, which vouldlO some vaJ' towards meeting the
, - ;/>- ;-<,;:-~" s;
demands of the larger South Staffordshire ironmasters who were nov rolling
down half-product steel into sheets, hoops, strips and to some extent
bars as well. To win these consumers over, Hickman knew that his new
mill would have to produce the steel to sell at below Welsh and Conti-
nenta1 prices; in fact, his production costs were said to total about
80/- per ton, which compared very favourably with the 85/- production
costs of the Welsh steelmakers who had to pay a further 7/- to 8/9 a ton
in railway costs. However, Hickman's main opponents were the foreign
producers who, en hearing of this new source of supply for the Black
Country finishing trades immediately dropped their prices by 2/6 per
ton. Sheet-makers were now offered Ger.man steel billets and bars at 90/-
but delivery dates could not ma.toh those promised by Sir Alfred Hickman,
Ltd•• For the first time, agents of both Belgian and German houses left
the district wi.th empty order books. (82 )
Competition was most severe throughout 1910 in the oommon bar trade,
especially :from Belgium. Belgian rolled iron was stronger than the German,
with the result that it gained preference With oonsumers for use in the
nut and bolt trades. Belgian Wo'. 2 iron hit the Darlaston district very
hard, selling at £5/11 orlesa per ton in 1910. The local trade vas so
disorganised thattew bar pfroduoera Y6ft willing to risk quoting' a price:
"Everything has beOome smatter of negotiation between bU19r 'and.
seller. Black Country makers flay they cannot produoe at less than
£r;/15 to £6 delivered,'Whel"eaethe BelglaDS are prepared to do busi-
ness at £5/10." (~)
(82) one resUltot Bl'(J_ari '., id'tliaft.__a; tcJbe' ••er:('b_ CltaDp,o£
'~l1at 'on tbe:'pa:nof 'tihe 1Ieu1lk;,1falAJIJ:.t..a.-.",.. 'instead .otrelJ'ing on
.:i:taolt Cde t l'1 uker il iOt' ,gal......· IJ1Id;b~a1t ;Sheet. to;1:ake,tbe:l.r halt
:produC't Beesfiler :b.l1d S.w.. ":" "Lt.'tiq ba4:lrleci48cl, tb'go iB_ 1lle., fin-
llShed sheet;bUaine"',:fih~..:, 'JJlttt-..., described &s "a great compliment
to "'the Sll~SS 'tlf>tb8~I't1.steel ,ia~uoti.oa, ':b\t'tt·,it ·j"a' not
anf~"dpi':c1o..·;ee :.fW1,_.,ItGaD..tpl'9'&1d.8"'!'~ taut.. Gwtl't'M. ie,j4/og.
(83) Co11ie12 Guariiap.,24!6/10.
Naturally, the "dumping" policy of the Belgians pleased South Staffordshire
consumers, no matter how hard it hit the ironmasters themselves. Many
of the smaller firms in the district engaged in the nut and bolt trade
were kept going by the cheap foreign material because they were able
tp produce the finished article at prices which the larger works, with
their heavier dead charges and their greater obligation to use British
materials, could not touch. The higher-class material of the larger
firms had to come down in price in order to find buyers, with the re-
suIt that very little profit was made.
Whereas in the past there had been short bursts of Belgian competi tion,
in 1910 it was prolonged. Even the steelmakers were affected (Belgian
steel bars were offered 80/- per ton f .0.b. Antwerp or 93/6 delivered.
Midland stations compared with local quotations of 100/- to 102/6), but
the Spring Vale. Works were reported. to be full of work in August 1910.
They had decided to withdraw all their pig iron from the open market
and themselves convert the entire product of their five blast furnaces
( a sixth furnace was blown in in September) into steel. Even then their
weekly make of 3,000 tons of pig iron was inadequate and buying of pig
iron from outside sources was found to be necessary. Local oonsumers
of semi-finished steel were only too anxious to order from the Continetal
makers, partioularly when Welsh su.pplies dried up in' Ootober. In December,
too, one ot the largest' sheet manufacturers in the distriot placed an order
for 10,000 tons ot steel bars with an Amerioan steelworks - at 91/'
a ton delive~ed oompared. with 94/- (Belgium) ~ 97/6 (United Iingdom).
~~ large oi-der going to 'the .bJ.~r1oal.Jis seemed greatly to upset the
Continen~lmanufaoturers, with the NSult tha.{iihey immediately adYised
,
pondent of the Colliery Guardi.M Y1"Ote:
"No sooner are ~erio~ ,~~nts to this countl'1 advised than down
.' ~-:~\=,.-:;,. __ -._~~-._ ",~:I~-~~:;t~:~':~;-~~~J{_jt~-;; --~},f' -.~> --' ) ~,
come Continental prioes. Wi.th the Tie.. t 1t 1. supposed, of keeping
the English markets to themselves. If American price-cutting should
drive prices further down Belgian billets might possibly fall to
80/- a ton". (84)
After several false starts in the summer of 1911, trade began to revive
once more in the Black Country. Belgian steel virtually disappeared from
the market and even though considerable quantities of bar iron were still
coming into the Darlaston district for the nut and bolt trade towards the
end of the year prices for the local bars of similar quality continued
to rise; by November local common bars could not be obtained for under
£7/15 to £8 per ton. Even the manufacture of steel girders, for so long
the preserve of Continental makers, was becoming a lucrative industry
for two of the Black Country steelworks, Spring Vale and Round Oak.
The moment seemed right for twenty of the country's leading steelworks
to aim another blow at the foreign oompeti tion, and it vas interesting
to note that seven Midland finns were signatories to the steel rebate
scheme: Round Oak, Alfred Hiokman, Ltd. (seotions only), Patent Shaft
and Axletree aompany, Stewarts and Lloytis, Ltd., LilleshallCompany"
Shelton Iron and Steel Compmy and the Jtrodingham Iron and Steel Company.
! rebate of 5/- per ton wasottered on a list of produots to those con-
sumers who confined their purchases to the twenty firms. No attempt was
made to curb the imports of selrl.:"firitsh:ed steel - -raluedeJmually at
£3.5 millions - because'horia demahd in periods otexPansion was largely
in exoess of supply anci1t 'was iJittiis'brELnCh ot the 'ste.l trade that
'the Continental' and:Amerl~'''~dtioers~~uedtheir "a.umpinB- policy
'lrith the greatestvigollr. Th.t1fen:ty:"st~hg''1Cb.btDation' conoentrated
'on curbing the imPO~8 of iioobizia .'tci~~ht.iJ', sli~etW~ ar{gt.s and shapes
, 1;,", - " ,'."'" ::,':': (:: .. , ,,<"_:--' ~-~", :" '<-,'!",,-": ", .-',:: ::,,'.~i'_~
valued at £1.5 million per 'year. !he" 00111e" hat"dia! correspondent
ihommente4~\ '4~ i f
"The combination is using the same weapons as the Germans, for the
rebate scheme has been in operation in Germany to encourage their
export trade for several years past, and it is that which has so much
increased the German steel exports to the British markets, including
Staffordshire". (85)
Recovery in the Black CO\l1ltry was not without its setbacks in 1912; a
serious strike in the 100a1 coa1JBining industry occurred in February and
March and a number of the district's largest produoers, including Alfred
Hickman, Ltd., were forced to shut down completely for a time. Supply
difficulties arose again with regard to semi-finished steel and what
small quanti ties of foreign material came into the distriot were quickly
snapped up. There we1"9 further serious 1aboU1" difficultiew in June 1913,
and by this time severe BEt1giai'l aJlCI. Geman cOMpetit10n had returned.
Steel prices dropped dmstioa,lly in October 1913 when Continental blooms
and billets could be obtained in foh. dia'tl"i.t for 95/-to 96/-; the
finished steel trade also had .;,face nl"Y keen Belgian competition and
in Seotland the reba," aob.e:Ile ..lla~s.d. Blaok C01mt'ry .01IIJ'n0D, bllI:r pro-
ducers, who in 1911 coUldaot; ~'t1_ 'the' _terial luuier£6j10to-£6/12/6
a ton, found that' Belg:l.ima. '~iron'waa G01I1tag iato <the Darlastft aDd
Wec:lnesbUl7 di.tricta-f'or utittde'alll £i/1~6 to £511; per ton. German
gas.stri.p was imporie'd.,.,:1nJ'ilmary 1011\£5/10 a tOll••o~ With the
ClaB, Strip A.esoc1ation...., pr:L.. ·otta!l"to, Elf.; !'heft,: ...,_ in :tact, Db
let-lip in the, COIIlpet.i,tion -.til('i!le<:oul-...aJ&: ~f;""ia'Aupet :t914; ·'thell,
of C01Ilr88, " th.' .udilehnri*-.....u ~J'Cont1_tal:,l8r.a .... bUJ.tts running
at a: weekly total< ot',,'....ld:;, 45.,0IGi ................ :tlu'''P01lt 1;iaa.......1.
'COuntry. A11owimg. for:: t~'.a.lJt \tb.'t:.-*~.proti~_:...,~'alqht11
in evidenoe".~t..:i.,s_J.~~,P9B8A~l~ ..~t.M.•.4!!8 _~,,,.~~1~~9. of foreign
_peti,.~l~;~!->~,h~<>pi".J~looJd.DCat the market at the end of the
" :'?,-'."},
...
second week in August 1914:
"In the abnormal circumstances it is impossible to state firm prices.
In pig iron, for instance, the increase asked for varies from 5/- to
10/-. To meet the fresh advance in pigs makers of finished iron have
been com.pelled to advance values. Makers of gas strip put on £1 a ton
earlier in the week ••• Relieved of the pressure of foreign competition,
producers of small rounds, squares and flats have raised prices to
£7/10 a ton delivered Birmingham, which represents an advance of about
17/6 a ton. The advance in second-class bar iron is about 15/- to 20/-
a ton and the current quotation is £7/10 at works. Marked bar makers
decided to raise prices fro. £8/10 to £9. Wire makers, who get the
bulk of their raw material from abroad, declared an advance of £2 a
ton. Finished steel is now £1 dearer than it was a fortnight ago,
and billets 15/- a ton".(86)
The apparent failure of the United Ilngdoa iron and steel industry to
face up to increased foreign co.peti tion in the period before the First
World Var has occupied the attention of a nuaber of historians oyer the
last ten years or so.(87) Most haft aeoepted the findincs of Duncan Burn,
a1 though it has been pointed out that he tended to concentrate too muoh
upon the Bess.er steel sector to the neglect 'of open-hearth, a poin't,
in tact, which in no way affects Ms -.in conolusions• .l 811&11 nUllber of
writers, notab17 the Aaerican Peter~, have e.ereieed a aore illde-
pendent line of approach, ed I.e of Burn's conclusions have been turned
upside down. Basically, however, the pioture remaina the sue:
i. the Bntish industry uperienaecl coap.rattve s'taCZJ&tion 'because
of the su.llness in the growth of her hae -rat d...nd. Cons_ption of
(86) Collie17 Guardie,14!S/14.
(87) The list illOluduJ.C. carr, W. 'a})lin, !'.S. Or...., P.L. Pa7lle,
S.D. Saul, YeA. Siac1a1:r &lldP.'rea1D
l. '"
iron and steel per head of the population in the United Kingdom rose
only slightly in the period after 1880, complred wi.th substantial gains
in the United states and Germany.
Average Annual Production ot Pig Iron per Head of Population (eri.)
1889-3 1894-8 1899-1903 1904-8 1911 1912
U.K. 3.9 4.2 4.2 4.4 4.2 3.8
Germany
(inc. Lux.)
".7 4.7 5."1.9 2." ".0
BelgiUlll1 2.5 2.8 ".0 ".6 5.3 6.0
U.S~.. 2.6 2.6 4.1 5.0 5.1 6.2
Average Annual Production of Steel per Head of Population (Cwt.)
U.K. 1.8 2.0 2.4 2.7 2.9 ".0
Germany * * * 3.4 4.5 5.1Belgium 0.8 1.7 2.2 ".6 5.7 6.5
U.S.A. 1.3 1.8 .,.., 4.4 5.1 6.6 (88)
ii. this slow rate of growth in the UUi.ted X1!l8dOll, more than covered
by the surplus production capacities ot the United States, Gel"lAaJ1Y' and
Belgium, meant that there was little dynamio justitication tor the leadine
iron and steel manufaoturers to pullout ot the "Great Depression" doldruas
wi th large capital expenditure progrlmmes. Henoe, the opportunity to use
the latest technology was less eVident in the United Kingdom than on the
Continent or in the United States. Vera- fev new larse-scale plant. were
designed and put down and those that were tended to sutter froll incoaplete
innovation policies. Such a combination ot factors, nevertheless, led to
a oonsiderable increase in the _ount ot iron and steel imported 'by the
United Kingdom.
(89)
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(ee) 191" Board of 'hade Returu, p. 51.
(.89) Ibid, extracted from -terial on pace 68.
iii. this slow rate of growth also tended to disoourage men of real
managerial ability from oolling into the industry. Professor Habakkuk is,
indeed, the main exponent of this thesis, espeoia11y with regard to the
whole of British industry; the "Great Depression" was the oause of inferior
management in many seotors of British industry, not the result of it.
learer the truth as far as the iron and steel industry vas ooncerned,
however, vas the fact that entry into the industry vas extremely difficult,
even if it was possible to acquire the right type of training and scien-
tific expertise.
iv. Duncan Burn's close study of comparative labour costs and total
production costs both illustrates the difficulty of finding a complete
picture, and of the doubtful value of such a study towards explaining
the growth of foreign cOJllpetition in iron and steel
v. the difficulty of quantifYing the relevance of a nUllber of
factors can, indeed, encourap soae historians to diSDliss th_. Higher
freight rates, poor scientifio and technical education systeas, the
virtual non-existence of close scientific control in the production
processes, a social s7at. which ossified the relationahips between ..sters
and men and prevented the ea8Y movement of aki1led men upwards, the
failure in the united lincdoa to develop adequate marketine techniques
and structure., the apparent l.ck of underetand1 DC on the part of the
differentpvermaents of the period - theae are, neverthe1e••, all very
relevant factors towards uplaini. Why the lJDited KiqdOll tended to lag.
vi. occa.ioDa117, Ai.toriana writing about the iron and st..l industry
have fallen into the error of vie.iag the pertOl'llance of the 1Jnited
~iD«doa industry sole17 in the licht of what had lOne before. III other
word., too auch haa been _de out ot the dwindling percentages ot total
world production and trade in iron and st..l goods :ret&ined by the hited
nngdom industry. It ·woUl4 appear that the almost total dOllinationby
the l1Di ted XinId- illd1l8tr,r in the aid-Yictorian period was the nom. A
quite different picture emerges if the figures for 1885-191:3 are oompared
with those for periods after the First Vorld War:
Pig Iron Produotion (000 tons)
lear G. B. Gel'!&11l U.S.A. BelgiUll World
-
1870 5,960 1,240 1,710 560 1',BOO
1880 7,750 2,430 3,840 680 18,100
1890 7,900 4',030 7,600 820 26,700
1900 8,960 7,430 9,450 820 39,700
1910 10,010 12,890 27,300 1,820 64" 700
1920 8,960 6,930 36,930 1,100 62,900
1930 6,190 9,540 31,750 3,350 79,400
steel PToduotiOll (000 tOllsL
1870 220 130 40 510
1880 1,290 320 1,250 130 4,180
1890 3,580 2,100 4,280 l80 12,280
1900 4,900 6,360 10,190 630 27,830
1910 6,370 12,890 26,090 1,910 59,330
1920 9,070 8,400* 42,130 1,230 71,120
1930 7,330 11,360 40,700 3,420 93,330
, 4) (5) V.I.
~, :~ 1,m ~:~;
1,t~, \',046 902 6,""1,'~ 825 7'7 7,904-
1,766" 929 1,171 9,421
1,;52'1" 912 1,375 9,608
'" ·1,~, 7881 .m 1.0,012
beCf.U8e~i~J1Ib"~,~~,~~•.Co~u,;,....~ a larp
1865
1865
1875
1890
1899
1905
1910
'lb.e South staffordshireiroll' trade wa. alread.7 put it. peak, and bad
undergone _jor struotU1"a1 a1teratiolia, when the lJnited Kincd- indust17
as a whole had to faoe .troDe foreip co.petition. tTntoriUDat.17, the
lI'orkiDg. of co.petition only h.i_tened the weakne•••• of the local in-
~~~~L4-!y~~~L...,qs!!illlWlrL...P.2uID),
degree of concentration, industrial ownership remained dispersed. Too
many small units of production had come into being in the 'good years'
and at no time did the district throw up capitalists prepared to stamp
out local competition. Furthermore, apart from going outside the district
to secure supplies of coal and ironstone, the two largest producers of
steel in South Staffordshire, Round Oak and Spring Vale, remained local
firms. Wi thin the finishing trades, and apart froll' a few notable examples
of link-ups with firms in South Wales, South Staffordshire firms tended
to remain small, poorly organised and with only limited plant renewal.
Separate work-sites throughout the district were acquired by such firms
Local Distribution and Growth of Concentration (Pig Iron)
1873 1883 1912
District Firms Works J!!\lrns. J'irms Works Pums. Firms Wks. Punu
Cumberland
& Lans. 17 18 92 24- 25 105 10 17 64
Cleveland
& Durham 27 32 132 31 35 156 20 26 115
Midland
Counties 21 23 76 29 31 106 23 25 89
11. Riding 9 12 40 12 f' 46 7 7 22Scotland 21 27 156 20 27 147 12 17 102
Staffs ll:
Salop 2Q.
.7.1 za: ~ 21 1!1 ~ .!2. g
as Walker and Yates (Gospel Oak, Tipton Old Church Works, Regents Canal
Bridge Works, Limehouse, Mitre Works, Volverhampton) or J. Bagnall's
(Goldshill Ironworks, Oapponfield Works, I.eabrook Works), With fairly
large amounts of capital involved, but they remaiJled dispersed. It was
at this point that the internal transport systems proved expensively in-
adequate; at every boom period, the railway com18n1e. found it Virtually
impossible to keep the freight wagons running to schedule and goods piled
up on the wharve8l of the various works. Al thoUBh South Staffordshire
ironmasters cOllplained about supplies ot iron ore, and especially the
cost of transport, the district was, in fact, in a .oat favourable pos-
ition to receive ores from Iorthaaptonshire and other midland counties.
If supply difficulties were encountered it was in part because ot the
smelters' reluctance to receive tull train-loads ot ore; besides, theY'
'3o~ .
showed little initiative when they failed to acquire the ownership or
mining rights to ironstone workings in the East Kidlands. Their reliance
upon 'foreign' supplies of ironstone put them in sharp contrast wi th
producers on the Continent or in the United States. Perhaps even more
significant was South Staffordshire'. almost total dependence upon out-
side supplies of metallurgical coke. In tilles of nOl'lDal trade, this was
not too much of a problem; excellent coke could be obtained from South
Wales, Derbyshire and South Yorkshire. Hovever, in time. Of heavy demand
for coke reliable supplies for South Staffordshire proved both expenaive
and difficult to maintain. At Virtually every period of high. prices
for locally-produced pig iron, the profit. available to the blast furnaoe
operator were drastically' reduced by' ooke prioea which rose between 50
and 100 per cent. Indeed, dear ooke tended to push up the prio. of the
pig iron beyond the reach of the finiahinc trade., m_bers of whOll were
thellselves haTing to face severe foreigaand clo.eatic competition. It is
not surprising that the high.17-pricecl local product shoUld have .noouraged
compeUtlon from outside producers, and. .apeoial1.7 from the rapidly
expanding industries on the Cont1net. heq••ntly, .......nt vaa expreaaed
by cont.mporary obs.rvers that 10eal pic iroa prod••ra tail.d to expu.d
their productive oapacities 1Jl the periM. ot hiah deu.ndJ the oortap
ot reasoRably-priced 0....... til......1'. Ptarth.l'IIOre, be..... of this
s1 tuat10J1 the distriet '.,proclucerlhoowl4 IIOt •••t; the 4~4, til.
creatiDe adti tio:oal ••o......n* itlr tOZ'e1p 'P"Guoen to ooa. tnt.
the Birmingham and Black COlUlt17 market. It i8 ..1piflcant that III&D1'
Black Country firaa qppcl in the tiniahinc trad_ had, by 1900, beooae
tM*11ydependent ,~pOJl f.retp'i\:~.~;t~'''.''''1,.,to eta,. ali.... in a oompetitive
.....
Appendix 1: Coke Manufacture, 1850 - 1914.
The manufacture of coke for metallurgical purposes in Britain dates
from the practice of Abraham Darby in Coalbrookdale, Shropshire, in the
early eighteenth century. For various reasons, not least the Quaker
mentality of the Coalbrookdale ironmasters, the process was slow to show
development, but by the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning
of the nineteenth the 'hearth' process had been developed by DI&IlY' differ-
ent people on many different coalfields. Speaking as late as 1892, E.P.
Martin, in his Presidential Address to the Iron and Steel Institute,
pointed out that "to this day Abraham Darby's plan of coting in heaPS
is still carried on at Blaenavon". (1) Early in the nineteenth century, a
yield of 50 per cent "seems to have been oommon"(2), but at Grasebrook's
Betherton Ironworks, near Dudley, where the proc;ess was in use almost
until the Second World War, a 75 per cent yield "had been made possible".
(3) In Sco tland and parts ot South Wales, the 'hearth' process was never
very satisfactory, and it was totally' unsuitable for the "triable and
strongly-swelling coala" of the Durham area. '!he beehive oven, described
as "the first 'closed' oven to wbioh air vas adJl1tted tor the partial
combustion of the coa1"(4) was "developed as a uans ot utilizing the
swelling and caking properties of the smalls derived trom coals with a
carbon content of 85 per cent and upwards" .(S) Such coal. were tOIbe
found in Dllrbam (Victoria and Buty), South Yorbhire (Parkpte, Barnsle;y
and Si1kstone), Vest Yorksh1re (Halitax Sott and Winter), Lancashire
(Xountain Kine), Derby (Vaterloo) QC1 South Val. ('1'wo-Poot-.1ne) (6).
(1) J,I.S.I., 1892, p. 29.
(2) Ed. R.A. 1I0tt, !be H1stoUqt Cols.tlki., 19:56, p. 27.
(,) S.R. Beaver, op cit, p. 1,S.
(4) R.A. Kott, op cit, p. 29.
(S) S.H. ieaver, op cit, p. 1'6.
(6) W. SJDith, An BconoJlic GeOgrapbl ot (Jreat Brita1n, rep. 1961, p. '18,
extracted from RA. Xott and R.V. Wheeler, The Qual1tz ot Ooke.
The growth of the beehive oven in Britain became synonymous with Durham
coke manufacture and was in every way related to the tremendous growth
of the Cleveland iron and steel industry after 1850. As late as 185',
it has been estimated that the demand for coke throughout the BriUsh
iron industry was about one mlllon tons. This slI&ll figure was due to
the fact that raw ooal was used in JII8Il7 of the _in iron-producing areas,
especially Scotland(where 'splint' coal was used with the Ianarkshire
'blackband' ironstones), South Staffordshire, Shropshire, Derbyshire and
the Merthyr area of South Vales. Throughout the 1850's and 1860's, however,
the produotion of iron in north-eastern Ingland grev from 20,000 tons
in 1847 to 2,400,000 tons in 1880, whilst on the West Coast production
rose from 100,000 tons in 1860 to 1,600,000 tons in 1880. Inoreases also
occurred in Linoolnshire, lortbaaptonahire, South Yorkshire and Derbyshire.
The demand for ooke rose proportionately to this increased production
in the newer iron and steel area8. B7 1880, the figure for coke required
by the ironmaster had grown to seven million tons - "an 8.Ilount wbioh bas
satisfied the needs of the irolL indust1'7 even in modern ti.es" .(7)
Du-ham Coun't7, in fact, was pro4uciDf fiye mllion tone of cok. in 1880
whioh, in addition to the Coun't7 iroDllasters like Sir Lovthian Bell,
was supplied to other diatrictsaa tar ati.ld. as C'UIIlberland..
R.A. Mott has oorreot 17 arsu.c3. that tile coke =ekillCinduet17, "on the
scale of production pJ.'&cti,ed t~, deYeloPed. _1nly bet.en 1860 and
1880. Indeed, it vaa an 1n4U8t17 .....cl .pon prodl&OtiOll in the beehive
oven. Demand for ooke&1tared. ".17' Iittl_ over the u~t tvenv Jean for
the veZ7 good reuon 'tbattbe pro4.,eti.Q~ ot pic iron in Britaill inoreased.
on17 slight 17. In other lIOrdS, the oob producer .. taoed vith a stag-
nating market i». th.pel"i0d 1880 to"1900. IIott hrtber arpa that this
1IU ttimpo~t, to~ it., 1Il1;he-' later..~ t!ut.t the 'bJ-prod\&Ot oven
was developed". He points out that the developments made in Germany to
the by-product ovens came about because ot the great expansion of the
iron and steel industry there; using this line ot argument he suggests
that the lack of development in Britain arose because there vas no
corresponding expansion of the British iron and steel indllstry. However,
this is too much ot an over-simplification: in Belgium, tor example, where
pig iron production rose trom only 0.70 to 1.06 million tons annually,
there was considerable progress made with regard to by-product recovery
and non-recover,y retort ovens. Besides, in Britain between the periods
1900-4 and 191~1', when Mott admits that British manufacturers took a
much greater interest in by-product ovens, the prod11ction ot pig iron
rose only a 11ttle. Indeed, there were more fundamental and tar-reaching
reasons why Britain "fell behind" the practice of some Continental countries
in coke manutacture.
The by-product recovery oyen was introdllced into Britain at about the
same time as in France, Belgium and Gel'tl&D7. Twenty-tive SilDon-Ca1"l'es
ovens were erected by "ssrs. Pease and Partners at Crook in County
Durham in 1882, and the number vas doubled the following year.(S) In
France, the Societe Ca1"l'es had obtained the Knab patente(9) and in the
I1S60 s had led the field in the condensation ot tar and UIJIIonia. 'rhe
so-oa11ed Carves oYen was developed oYer the next decade or so at the
works ot the T'errenoire COIDpaJ11' near St. Itienne. When H. Simon addressed
the Iron and Steel Institute in the 1880's, he pointed out that the
•Simon-Carves' oven was then in use in Belgi\.111, Si1eeia, Auatria and
Prance. A 00ke-yie1d of 75 per cent "va. not uncoaaon, with 2.' per cent
(8) J.I.S.I., 1882, i, p, 189.
(g) Carl Kub of St. Denis, Dear Pari8, b\lilt an externally-heated oven
at Commentry in 1856.
of tar, besides ammoniacal liquor". )(ott states that the Carves oven
"may be accepted as the first oven which produced, at the same time, a
metallurgical coke and a high temperature tar".(10) '!'here is a little
doubt as to who was the first to introduce the by-product recovery oven
into Germany, but by 1882 there were two types in operation. Dr. C. Otto,
vho had been building Coppee non-recovery ovens sinoe 1867 , built some
ovens in Westphalia in 1881. '!'hey vere of an experimental Dature and were
not in regular operation until the foll,owing year. (11 ) Kott, however,
gives preference to Albert Hlss.ner as being the first successful builder
in GermaD.y'. He erected 50 KDab-Oarve. ovena.(12) The first satisfaotory
by-product oven with vertical fllaes - the Otto-Hoffmann - tollowed in
188' and a modified venion beO&lle the .o.t popular by-produot oven in
Gel"llan7 over the Dext ten ye&nt. By 1885, Gel'll8D1' had taken the lead in
having the highest nUJIber of by-prod.ct recovel"J' oveu.
lfWlber ot Otto-BottaannOYe. in Geraarq, 1881=1900.
Year .lUIber
1884 40
1885 210
1889 605
1892 1205 g~~1900 '000
Arrangements for the recove17 of by-produots .ere oertaiD1y not cheap.
Llrmann estimated that the oost of .. ba.tte17 otaiz ovena coaplete would
be £'6,000, but a saTi.J:IC ot '/9 parton of ooke __ po88ible. A fe.
,.ears later, IP. Si...ra~oh poi».te4 out.~t in the DorblUDd area the
, " .1
(11) J.r.s.r •• 1885, p.622.
(12) Ibid, and R•.l••~:tt", 9P oit, p. 72.
ce. oil< ,- ••
(1,) r.w. LIIw.~".~.~ ·~.~Lzii,(\;~, p. 194.
(t4) R.A•.1Iott,op c1*, p., 75•.
. -,-, »: r ~.,.,.
"number of the different tY'pes of coking-ovens in use (had) undergone
diminution" • (15) The Smet and Appol t ovens had disappeared and the Otto-
Hoffmann type was in general use. A lear later, he pointed out that the
"modern form of the Otto oven" was the one which had shown the maximum
annual yield - 1450 tons. (16) In the 1890' s, coke production in GermaI11
had increased bY' more than '.5 Ilillion tons, or 55 per cent, to 9,960,
740 tons in 1897. 70 per cent of all the coke made in GermaD1' was produced
in the Ruhr district, one-half of which output came trom the bY'-product
oven. By 1902, 42 per cent of Germanl's coke va. coming from 'b1-product
ovens, or 6,300,000 tons. In addition, there were 294,000 tons of tar
and 84,000 tons of s.lphate of a_onia.(17)
Belgian coke manufacturers vere forced in the 1850' s to tind cheaper
r-
coke supplies than trom the bituminoua coal in the Charleroi district
and Liege. Speaking in 187', II. A\IgU8te Gillon, Professor at the School
01' Kines at Liege, said that whereas Ingland was "only just concerniDB
herself with a system 01' ovens", Belgi\D "has long since passed through
the period of transformation". He vent on to 8&7:
"The old forms 01' ovens, with solid _lIs, which are known as bakers'
ovens and which are discharged 'b1 Ileana of a rabble, III&D1' of vhioh
are still to be seen in Ingland, have 10Dg since disappeared in
Belgium, where thq have been replaced b.J avena banDg flues, aDd
being emptied b.1 ste.. power-.(18}
!he SDlet syostem - "the OYen lf1th two doors and a uohazlioal raa" _
brought a saving of 2.45 traDC8 per ton tor the Belgian anutaoturer.
!he Dv.lait, Coppee and .Appo1t OYens nre all in •• in Belgi\a - the,
; '" ...~
(15) J.l.S.l.'- 1897, p. "387.
(16) Stahl und IiseD, mii, pp. 641 - 647.
(17) J.I.S.I., ii, 1902, p. 39.
(18) J.1 .S.l., 11, 187', p. "9.
were non-recovery ovens and they emphasise the point that, whilst Belgium
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had to take second place to Ge:rma.J1Y' in the case at by-prOdliCt recovery,
she led in the field ot making a s8otist8octol")" metallurgical coke trom
low volatile coals. Areas in Britain possessing similar low volatile
coals - South Wales and Konmouthshire especially - were slower to adopt
such ovens.
Following the efforts ot Henry Simon in 1882 to establish a by-product
oven in Britain, considerable attention was given to the subject but
1ittle material progress was made. The domiD8.ting force in the Cleveland
district, Sir Lowthian Bell of the Clarence Iron Works, admitted in 1885
that about one-sixth of the 'solid carbon was wasted in the beehive
oven, which amounted to an annual wastage ot £700,000 in the Durham area
8010ne.(20) Nevertheless, Bell believed that the extra expense did not
warrant abandoning beehive ovens tor Simon-CarYes ovens. He had experi-
mented wi th some 5,605 tons at coke from the Sillon-CarYes ovens at Bear-
park, and had reaohed the cono1usion that Salle 15 per oent more oote
was necessarr to produce a ton at pig iron than when beehive ooke was
used in the blast furnaoe. Sir BerDhard Samuelson, who had oonducted
his own trials with similar ooke, clisacreed With Bell's findings. ~e
latter had probably tailed to take the greater density at b7-prod~t
coke into full consideration and had not red.oed the &JI01IDt at' ook.
oharged. Charles Coohrane a1.0 ahrewd17 00llll1ente4 on Bell's experiments:
he pointed out that "bJ' emplOying only one ot the II&DJ' iIlprov_ent. and
(19) J.I.S.I .. i, 1885, p•. 58.
(20) Ibid.
using old equipnent" you v01l1d be most unlikely to obtain "satisfaoto17
reaults". One of the possible reasona for opposition to by-produot ooke
vas expressed by E. Willi_ of Bolcko,,-VaU8han in 1885. It aust be
stressed that Durham beehiye coke •• aD ezo.llent fuel for the blast
furnace, and any alteration would be frown.d upon, ••peoia11y it it
meant "saTing at the collieri.a &Dd 10.. at the blast f\U'DAo..... (21 )
In other vord., the iro~.ter wo1l1d not like to pal' the aaae prioe for
by-product coke .a he "oud pal' for beeh1ye oob. In 1898, J .B. Darby,
the managing director of the Br;rabo Steelworks, wa. auioWl to point 01lt
that retort coke "fetched the .... pri.... beeh1ye". Ge1'll&D producers
had neved the matter in a diU.rent lipt; the reoO'Ye17 ot by-produot.
was • meaDS of reduoiDg the f1_1 cost of the coke to the iroDllaater.
Williams, ho"eyer, .a not correet in -71. "that there .... not at
pr.sent JmOlf1l to thea U7 aore .tficient acde ot -k1DC oob thaD the
(i.proyed) old-faahioneel Durhaa beehi.e 0Ye.". (22 )
The nezt important address ciY8IL to the· Iron aDd Steel IDst1tute on
the subjeot of by-prodllOt reoO'9'.17 cmt_ .. 1a 1898 b.J J.I. DarbJ.
Between 1890 ad 1898, progre•• 1a 1r.l1ra11l had been pa1Jltv.llJ' alo".
~\lbale had '9'1B1ted the hrbaa a~ 111. 1:be aid.-1890'. ua4 ....u-pri.ed
to find that" the reoellt iaP1"O'9'._t. ia the ...truot1cm of ooke-o.,.eu
appears to haye reaa1ne4 to a oert&1a -teat -tleed". (2') 1eA17 Staon
bad fomed a lim.t.4 ooaJ1&B7 - _ Cob &lid Bp-proct...t. CoaJlU7,
Ltd. - to deaoutrate, the adftllt or 'the 118oa-earna O'YU, .... ill
1893 .eyell'ty _oil 0ftU nre tN:11t ·at ..1•• 0.111.17 1a I•••aabire. At
abollt the .... ti.., Sir JenIiaucl __1_t0W10~cl....a1.. to pat
his autecl diftereu•• of op1laioa·1I1ttl 8irLonla:l_ .U tato .tt..,.
alao put clown .......... 'tao~/"_. Iat894. DuQ "'ol4ecl to pat
(21) J.I.8.I., 1885. i, P."S'",
(22) Ibid.
(2') Ze1taollrin· ftz: du It....,t•• !!4 SaliMI,,", ill RlUai...
Staat., zliii, 1895. pp. '4-68.
down twenty-fiTe retort OTen8. In coll1.Dg to thia deciaioll, Darb7 showed
just how far his fellow iroDDl&8ters in Bri'tain were behind their Ge1"ll&D.
cOllDterparts. He "..s ot the opinoD that "well-made beeMTe coke left
1ittle to be desired from a blast-furnace point ot Yi.... , but he va8
then persuaded that "well-made retort coke" vas "econoll1.O&l in the
blast-furnace" • (24) A. Thie1eD, ~giDg director of the Phoell1z Steel-
works at RlIhrort, had a battel"J' of Simon-801ya,. oyens at the Phoeniz
works and he had s.pplied Darby with 8T1dace of the undoubted ezoe11ent
qulit,. of retort OTen coke. Darb,.' 8 own ezperiments at BrJIl'bo bad sub-
stantiated Thielen's evidenoe. Aa an additional faotor in Darby"s ezperi-
menta at Brymbo vas the point that "there are fuels which will Dot ooke
satisfaciori11 1D beeh1.ye oyella, but whioll produced a _rketab1e coke
ill the retort OyeD". HaYiDg operated hi. O'YeDa tor tov J8ara, Darby
cowJ.d speak wi th lIo.e authori ty betore the lnat1tllte. Be deali wi th
the TariO\UI British-held prej.dio.s abo.t retort cyen ooke, deD7!Dg that
••ob coke conta1Ded IlON .t.r thaD bee~Ye ooke. '!hi. id_ had ari•••
becau. of the practice of _teriBC er ,_DolUna out.i4. the r.tort oy.n•
.&. Kr. Charles I'bod, dllriJ1C tile 4180.&iOl1 whioh followed Darb7'& paper,
1Uisted that "h. had ee•• the ooke am•• at th. harDaoe. with wat.r
act_ll,. drippiDg o.t ot th. bott.. ot the truka". (25) fti. IarbJ atru-
tOul, delli.d aa be1ng tnn_1,ad he ._ .1Ipported by Sir Bel'llbard
8Ulll.1soll. Darby acbl1ttH that retori .... ooke .a IIOt 80 "brilbt ill
appearaDce .. beUiy., aDd 1t i. tift.ret 1a "pe", but the retort
o...en gaT. a better Jie14 ot oob ,.rtoa ot :t.l. It i. cI1ttiolilt to
acoept that practioal ... ahe1l1d .... telt .troacl7 abold the appearaoe
ot beehi.,.e aDd retort 0"''' oob, b1I.t 1t. POO2' .ppea.... •• ott.. the
_in grounds tor dial1kimc tile. l.'ter .'.rial. ODe opponent .,.oioe4 the
tollowiD« description: "creat bi, solid. eq..r ••, ••1"7 ott_ With a oruet
(24) 3.1.8.1. 1898, i, p. 44.
(25) Ibid, p. 57.
on it, perfectly sPODD on the top, and feartul17 hea..,. to handle". C.
Lowthian Bell referred to it as "the dir't7-10okiIlg t cindera'". Indeed,
these are adjectives used b.J prejudioed aen.
Despi te support from both Ge1'll&n and Belgian manufacturers, Darby
failed to oonvince Sir Lowthian Bell that the blast f\lrD&Ce did not con-
sume more retort oyen than beehiye cok•• A Belgian speaker, A. Greiner,
mentioned that 50lYa1 OyeDS had been in use at Seming for ten years
and "the coke was not very difterent tro. that produced in their other
oyens; practical11 they did not fiAd aD7 difterenoe". (26) The b7-products
brought in a saying of one and a halt to two trancs per ton 01' ooke.
Dr. Ludwig IIond was acre outspoke. in his oriticiem 01' Inglish producera.
He failed to understand wh1 they were so behind their Continental compet-
i tora, especial11'" EDcllU'ld atill _de more ooke than the rest 01' lurope
together. IIond stressed that the retort OyeD 01' aodem desip cov.ld be
adopted for yers poor coals, aa in BelgLa, "but also ill Silesia and
J.lI8tria, and lIore practically on the lbin., where b1 tlUliD01l8 coals w.re
used which were ver, auch the .....sthos...nerally \18.4 in this
oomtry" • (27) For fifteen Jura, •• olaiaecl, he had be.D produoi.
ooke at "vers nearly the oost at the fuel that h. put ill, ton tor tOil•••
That ought to be sufficient to ahew to &Q prao1:ioal ~ the creat ..viD«
which the n.. s;ret.. efteoted OTer the 014 apt.". Jell retlaaed to
accept this, and peey1ab1y .tat.4 "oeal Tarle4 ill it. qualltJ, an4 what
aipt sui. toile distriot at.t aot _ t aaothZ'".
J.n interestiIlg poillt to ••rp troa the diaouaa1onwb.1ab tollow.4
Darb;r'. paper was tile taot thatyth. Clareue lforka ha4 SpeDt soa. tiM
experimenting with the 14_ 01' rMOTm. "'-pro411O~. troa their beeb1Te
(26) Ibid, p. 56.
(27) Ibid, pp., 60-61 ..
ovens. J. Jamieson had for sOlle years been-- tryiDg to find a -7 of
doing just this(28), but had encountered too 1I&D7 ditficll1ties. He had
been told by Messrs. Bell Brothers that th.7 had intended tl"Jing to re-
cover the by-products from 100 of th.ir own beeh1...e o...ens but the)" had
then abandoned their intentions. Consistentl)" oyer the 7ears, Sir Lovthian
Bell had led the oppoaition to usiq coke trom which the by-products had
been recovered; he had nov moved Ava)" fro. this ...ie" but, instead ot
installing new, proTen retort OTens, he had. preferred to t17 wi th his
antiquated beehive oyens. Reluctantl)", it would seea, Bell had to turn
to the Continent for help. "Ma.n1 different type. ot retort oven" were
looked at by the management ot the Clarence Works, and ill 1904, C.
Lonhian Bell was able to aDllounce to the Iron and Ste.l Institute:
"At Clarence ve think we haye 8Ol....d the queation ot retort oyen ooke" .(29)
Somebod)" from the Clarenoe Works had nsit" Ge1'lla11J' ad the B....n.r
ovens working:: near Essen had bea bro.t "to o-.r II.Oti..". III Jan_ry
1901, after some T'tirsdale c01lie17 GOal, "1I&8hed and prepared tor ook:l.DC",
had been sent to Gerar17, 8ixty 1I\tae...r oYens had been put down at the
Clarence Yorks. '!'he plant •• doole4 Wi thin • tev 78.re, .0 .atistied
vere the7 wi th the ooke the,. vere pttt.. Bell.. aot ye17 generoua
to the Ge1"ll8ns wh.n he pointecl eut to ..bers ot the Iutit.te that the
"coke made at Clarence" wa_ "better tIaan that_de experiJl8ntall)" ia
aermal17" . It was 8qllal17 aa sood aa betb1Ye oote Ulcl, ":rea. baehiTe
coke took from 72 to 96 hove to bua, -aad thea it i. on. len 11l the
o...en for 10 or 12 hours betore bei. dawn", 1n the O&8e ot retort coke
the "operation is coapleted in about '2 holU'll".('O)
What surprised 80~ a.bers ot the IDetitll.te •• Bell '. claia that
(28) R.A. Kott, op oit, p. 54 and J.I,S,1" 1898, i, p. 67.
(29) J.I.S.I., i, 1904, p.201.
('0) Ibid, p. 191.
"at last the question vas solved of retort versus beehive ovens, and
than it was solved by the adoption of the H11ssener oven". ('1) 11. Hawdon,
of Middlesbrough, accused Bell ot suggesting that the Hlssener oven
was "the only one in opera.tion from which they could get those reSlllts" • ('2)
At the Newport Works, they had tor some time obtained similar results
wi th coke from the Otto oven. Hawdon claimed, and later developllents
support him, that the Otto-HilgenstoCk waste-heat vertically-flued oven,
which replaced the otto-Hottmann in Gel'lll&nJ' in 1896, was capable ot
better all-round results than the Hassener oven. Indeed, the latter oven
had not &1tered much since its introdv.ction in the early 1880's. F •.1.E.
Samuelson (later Sir Prancis Samuelson) vas just one ot many British
manufaoturers who had been sent by his fim to visit coking plant in
Germany. He had met Albert Hl.ssener in 1895, and had been impressed wi. th
the latter's oven, but he had sinoe tound that the Otto-Hilgenstock was
& better oven. His firm had put do'VJl 1'0 such ovens. SeTeral people
pointed out that the illustrations which accoapanied Bell's paper vere
ot earlier models than those in existence.
The year 1904 seemed to mark a t~ point in the developaent ot
retort ovens in Bri1o&in. Rapid develolD8nt toot plaoe in Torkahire,
followed by Lancashire, Sootland, Derb,1sh1re, Korth Staffordshire and the
West Coast. In South Vales, despite the tact that Windsor Richards had
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tor some considerable 1;i.. pushed 'ijua. retort OY811., preere.. •• alo".
10 doubt, this wasprimari11 du to the taot that the bJ'-pl'Oduct 11814.
(,,) Ibid, p. 205.
(:52) Ibid, p. 202.
(", R.A. Kott, opo11:, p. es.
~I"'" .
from the low-volatile coals were lower than in other areas. It was not
before the First World War that the Coppee non-recovery oven really gaye
way to the by-product oven. The growth of by-product ovens coincided
wi th the growth of a coking indust17 outside the Du.rhan area, and the
resulting relative decline of the latter area.
Hitherto, no mention has been made of coke production in the United
states. Indeed, apart fro. one lleaber quotiDg from the 1896 United states
Geological Survey in 1898 during the discussion whioh followed Darb7's
pape r on the retort oyen, the first time the American industry vas mentioned
at the Iron and Steel Institute with 8.n7 degree at feeling was in 1904.
Enooh Jones, of Cardiff, was a ooDVinoed opponent of the retort oyen
and he used the possible slow developnent of bJ-product ovens in the
United states to suppor~ his own news:
" • •• either they (the Americans) did not mow a good thing when they
saw it, or, having seen it, they were happy Without it. They toot
a baok seat compared with !ritish prodlloers with regard to the
adoption of by-produot ooke". (,.)
Dr. 11. Hiby, of London, ohose to oorreot Jone. when he pointed out that
the Un! ted Coke and Gas COJl~, who owned the patent right. tor the
otto OyeD in .Amerioa, "bad of late 78ara built tY.1.oe or thrioe as~
otto ovens in the State. and (fanada a. all the coke OyeD builders in
England dllring the same period". ('5)
Coke manufaoture in the trJ:dted state. bad, in the tirst halt ot the
,'to
nineteenth oentury, beoome oonoentrated in the Connellnille area ot
Penns71vania, looatedabollt tit'tJaile. trom Pi ttsbursh. eoke •• tirst
u.de there in 1831, but it was DOt mtil 1859 that pic iron va. made in
the Clinton blast f'1lrnao., Pitt.burgh, With Connellarille ooke. (:56) B7
('4) J.I.S.r.,i, 1904, p. 2".
('5) Ibid, p. 214.
(~) The Connellsrille ool:e 1"8ciOD "did not ri•• to the dipitr of a
business until 185C>", IrOn .1p,21/7/81 •
1880, the region had become the chief source of supply for the united
Statea iron and steel industI"1. The beehive oven was by far the most
popular type in use, and R.A. Wott bas argued that it vas chosen for the
development of the American ooke industry "in a period subsequent to that
in Britain" • <:37) As well as the Connells'Yille distriot, coke was produced
by 1900 or earlier in the following distriots:
West Virginia (Pooahontas region)
West Virginia (principally along the slopes of' Alleghe~ JIlts.)
Alabama (principally in the distriot around Birmingham)
S-E Kentucky
Illinois
Indiana
Colorado
Georgia
Missouri
'Pennessee
Virginia
Washington
The extent of the way in which Pennsyln.nia dominated the indllst17 is
seen in the fact that the state prod\lOed 1',798,89' tons of' coke in 1900.
Four Southern states - Vest Virginia, .llabaaa, Virginia and '!ennesse. _
produced a further 5,629,926 tons, or 27 per cent ot the total Onited
states ooke output per ann... (38) 388 ditferent cok8-ll&k1ng establishments
existed, produoing on aTerage 5',000 short tons each year. The aTerage
output per o'Yen in operation varied considerably, troll 572 tons in Penn-
sylvania (highest) to '06 tons in Tennessee.
In the Connellsville district, some twentJ' 78&rs earlier in 1880,
approximate1,. 6,680 beeMTe oTens were in use, ot which only 1,sao were
owned by blast furnace operators. This meant that 4,800 sold to outside
furnaoes and foundrie.. Hoyper, OTer the next deoa4e or 80, the Camelie
Steel Company caae to control a larae a_ber ot oob OYena. Andrew Ca1'J18g1e,
in fact, inTited R.C. Frick, ot H.C. Prick and COIIPfUl1', the largeat siDele
operator in the Connellsville district, to beoome a lanner at and to
assume a large me&S1U"8 of' oontrol oTer, the Carneg1e Steel COIIpaDJ. Wi th
('7) ReA. Kott, op cit, p. 75.
(38) BI~ Report, American Industrial Conditicma and COllpetitioa, 1902,
p. 29.
the formation of the Steel Corporation in 1902, some 18,000 coke ovens
had come directly under the control of blast furnace operators. Returns
for 1902 showed that only 2,719 ovens remained in the Connellsville dis-
trict free to sell their coke to operators outside the United States
Steel Corporation. In fact, on the evidence of Thomas Lynch, the President
of the Frick Coke Company, "outside of the Steel Corporation, which owns
55,000 acres of the coke-makinc lands, there are not more than 600 or
700 acres available in the whole region". (39) The capacity of the coking
plant under Lynch's control was about 875,000 tons per month, or veIl
over 10.5 million tons annually. This figure vas just a little short of
the entire British output and more than the entire output ot the whole
German industry. Much of this coke vas, indeed, oonsumed by the Steel
Corporation, but traditional markets like that of Chicago vere supplied
as well.
Describing the manufacture of coke in the Connellsville area in 1902,
J .S. Jeans thoU8ht that the British man\ltacturer "would hardly be likely
to find, in the equipnent, muoh improTemant on hi. om conditions. Praot-
ically, beehive ovens are the only ones employed".(40) In the early
1890 IS, the Friok Com~ had intr04\lQed the crushing at coke whiob
proved especially beneficial in foundry practioe. ~oh info~ed Jeans
that the Steel Corporatio:a.'. cokinc oonceru had DOt adopted ~ b7-
produot ovens for the siJlple ~oAthat the7 dic1 AOt t ••l justified in
running the risk of producing inferior coke for the purpose of realising
an advantage which, "having regard to the remarkably low price at which
they produced both coal {2/1 per net ton at the pit mouth} and coke {cost
of conversion 1/8}, appeared to be somewhat dubious" .(41 ) However. Lynch
aduli tted that they were "keeping their eye upon other by-prod.ct plants
in West Virginia and elsewhere, and aight find occasion to alter their
opinion". A.1. steavenson, writing in 1896, had defended the Wle of the
beehiTe oven against all other types on Tert similar grounds. (42 ) As
well as giving "good quality coke", the beehive oven eDabled the waste
gases to be used in raiaing steam. Beaid.s. S'teaTenaoll eapbasised that the
price of retort-oYen by-producta was st.adi11 decliniB«.
However, the by-product oyen had more than one supporter in the United
the l1n1ted Statell coat about 14 mllion clollan and' that to replao. them.
would cost 45 million. Against tide he 'gil.... the wast. in 1892 •• 24 mil-
lion. '!he Semet-801ft1 oyen di4.'flf'taM, colit £'15 ooapared With £6'
tor the beehive. but thetom.r lastea "e.7ttars .boapa-red wi'th tive for
the latte1". Besid••, .... Sea.WOl~Oft_ then in use in Syraouse,
Ifew York, produoed br-'lJIiOd-.ots _1.4'&"£36...pa"" witil £6 1n tlI.
beehive oven. Another ."rcmc nppot4Wro~ thereto..- O"hn .alo"}il D.
lIeeks, for~ ,..an ........r.aMI1.'~u~.. tIN attecl81:a.... _bin-
dus"'17. :En reoorGiD« "1.4•• 1..' t89f._. JOVDalct the Il'Ona1'Ml St••1
IDati tute stated that ......4 taare<.·••1T ..ti•• l*n"i. the il1tro-
duction 1n the Unit.d .. ot ~p8••i ........l.peI in Ivo~.(44)
,--.-0·""7$) ,·".,"0$''-'''·1···''·* t·'b' .•"'5'Y
(41) DI!I 1902·· RePOn., ._24.>
(j2) .....nO!! """'!f!£.' it'fU:Lti· ~'too.
(.,,) Proo. o~ ···ta A:1a--,lJ!IMtr1&l aa4' "i.Il't1n. SooieU. 5, PP. 10-19.
(44) J.I,S.I., i, 1897, p. '11.
~.
In fact, the Semet-So1vay ovens at Syracuse were the first by-product
ovens to be erected in the United States. Twelve were put down by the
Solvay Process Company in 189'. The Ca1lmlet Steelworks experimented with
by-product recovery oyens in the same year, and ovens were erected by
the National Coke and Fuel Company of Chioago. (45) Two years later, 120
Otto-Hoffmann ovens were in the course of erection at the Cambria Iron
Works, Johnstown, Pennsylvania. (46) The returns for the 1896 Geological
Survey showed that " more Samet-Solvay ovens had been added to the ear-
lier ones at Syracuse, 75 ot the same design had been built in Pennsylvania
together with ,0 Newton-Chambers ovens and , Slocum ovens. Coal mined
on the slopes of the Allegheny llountains in Western Pennsylvania had not
proved very suitable for coking in the beehive. It was soft "and generally
high in sulphorlt , but coke made in either the Otto-Hotfmann or the Semet-
Solvay oven could be ..ed in the blast fl1rD&oe, "together with Connells-
ville coke, volume for volUDle".(47) By' 1902, large installations of by-
product ovens vere being b1l11t for the p1lrpos. of coking PennsylVanian
"mountain coal" at the Xaryland St.el Works of Sparrows Point, 1Ja171and,
the Lebanon Furnaces and the Lacb1RU1D& ComplUq's new plant at BUtf'alo.
bel Sahlin, onoe an ironmaster in the lJnited States but then at 1I1110m
in Cumberland, described the prooe•• thus:
" The coal is orushed and waa.d at the mines, and is then shipped
to the colte ovens, whioh are looated at the ironworks. In this way,
the serious deterioration of the fuel by transport and. rebancUiDC ia
avoided. It is also recop1sed that the by-produot OTeD produces
from 12 to 15 per cent aore ooke from a ton ot coal than is do..
in the older and still lUl1versal17 eaplo78d ovena ot the beeh1ve
(~5) IroD ABe. xliii, p. 692.
(46) Stahl unci meen, xv, 1895, p. 6:36.
(47) BI'I.<l 1902 Report, p. 429.
and retort type" .(48)
A year later, it was estimated that there were 1,663 by-product ovens in
operation and a further 1,346 in course of construction. The output of
coke from by-product ovens in fact represented 5.44 per cent of the total
production. By 1910, there were 4,000 ovens producing 7 out of a total
of 34 million tons of coke.
It would appear, therefore, that the by-product recovery oven had won
its fight for re~ognition in both the United States and Britain at about
the same time. In both countries, there was a readiness to erect the ovens
at the blast fllrn&ce, rather than at the collie1"1. The added traasport
costs were accepted as a neoessary prioe to pay for a better product.
However, whereas the British manufaoturer was prepared more or less to
imi tate Continental praotioe, the Americans' began to set the pace. They
did not &1 ter the design of the ovens, but introduced what has been
described as the principle of the 'big make'. Thel' increased the ooke-
making capacit1 by increasing the dimensions ot the oTen, a trend that
was to influenoe development in all countries.(49) In Britain, the
quality of the refractories used in the construction of coking ovens
was sometimes interior, and foreign bricks had to be imported. Indeed,
maI11' OTens were builtin Bri tain by German contractors using Continental
brioks. Disappointingly, the British industl'7 had failed to make progress
wi. th the silica briok, and it was left t,o the Americans - especialll' the
Cambria Steel Compa~ - to pioneer the use of silioa briots (92 per oent
silica) in the earll' years ot the present oentUl",Y'. (50)
(48) Ibid, p.429.
(49) R.A. XOtt, op oit, p. 115.
(50) Britain's failure to develop the silioa':. briok - first manutaot\l1'84
at the old iieath worts in 1856 - was not due to interior geological re-
sources but to iaexperienoe in bll1linc - "a new material was being \\SeA
and i",s pl'Opert~e. were not well a4er_tood". (J. Laming, Betraotori•• in
the._ I~~Ut17.12o§,..,O. in Ce1'!!l1o•• .l S;rapo_1•• 1953, p. 674).
What were the reasons for the failure of the British coke produoer to
matoh developllents either on the Continent of Europe, in the period 1880
to 1900, or in the United states after 19051 Essentially, they are ident-
ical to those which accounted for many of the shortcomings in the iron
and steel industry in general. The 1828 SUlTey of the Ketal Industries.
compiled by the Balfour Committee on Indutr,r and Trade. stated that
iron and steel practice with regard to fuel eoonoll7 in this count1'7 fell
far behind German and Belgian deve10pnents because of Britain's "cheap
and abundant supplies of coal". (51) The Committee li.ted the three
technical developments as follows:
(1 ) The invention of chamber ovens with heat recuperation and bye-
produot reoover" for the production ot meta11urgioa1 ooke.
(2) The invention of an interJ1&l-combustion engine which could be
used with cleaned blast t~ce gas to generate electricity for
the purpose otoperating the ro11i;ag mills.
(,) The cleaning of blast furDace gas by water-washing or by electro-
statio methods.
These neV aethods of fuel eco~ neo••sitated the conoentration ot
coking oven.. blast fUrJ1&ce.. .te.l WOr.Es and rolliac mills all on one
site. Hovever:
"The Britisb iron and atee1 induat17. han_ croWD up for the BlOat
part in an earlier 18llerat i oD. betore the obaDces de.oribed aboYe V.re
for••••A. bad its ookiDC OveDB at the pit head .0 ... to aave oarriap
by JlO~nc oob instead at coal to the blast fUl'DaOe•• TAe, .ere.
aoreover, for the 1I08t part ot the old-taa:iloned "beehive" t,P8. 1fb1oh
did aot pronde for the reoOTer.r ..d 1I.tili8&tiol1 ot the t .......
Bla.t tVDILoe. t .t.el worke and rolllDc mill. Aa4 be reotecl wituut
Jluoh~re1at1oD to OQe ano'her".(52)
Relat.d to thi. sit\1&tioD was the taot that "nec••sitl for writiDC
{51} SU'Yez Of ""1 l!d"'heJ.... 1928, pp. 7-8.
(52) ~idf p. 8.
Vi·
off the heavy capital costs of the old plant, and the diffic~ty of
raising even greater amounts of capital for the construction of new
plant, were serious obstacles to Change".(53) Certainly in the case of
coke ovens the cost would have been high. The 760 ovens of Bell Brothers
were valued at £42,560 in 1885. To haye replaced them with Simon-Carves
ovens woll1d have cost £136,OOO.(5t) It was neTer a shortage of money
that caused British ironmasters to delay, as Sir Edward Carbutt stressed
in 1897:
" • •• there was no doubt tbat in this count1'1 manufacturers were a
little too ccnservatiye, and considering that they fomed part of &
count1'1 that had the money, and that money was so cheap that people
did not mow what to do with it, the,. need not be quite so frightened
as they had been ••• it waa a great pity to be frightened at going
ahead becsllse the,. had old machine1'7, &Ilddid not want to spend the
money"• (55)
R.A. Kott, indeed, has suggested that "the chiet reason why the bJ-product
cote oyen made 80 little head'Wa7 in thia oountry in the last twenty
years of the nineteenth oentUl7 was becallse a cl_r case could not b.
made out that it was 110re profitable than the beehi...e o...en, en account
of the lov cote-making capacit,. of the early oyens, in comparison with
the high cap!tal cost" .(5;) Yet, i8 thi8 reall,. the case? L~lU1 e.timated
that it was possible 80me '/9 per ton ot coke ...de could be AY", and
.ond pointed out that fof fittec years he bad prod1AOed hi. ooke at no
more than the co.t at hi. coal. »arbJ went 1Il'll_ turiher than this aDd.
caye a ye17 thoro. break-don ot the cost8-.tnob1"e tor both beehi....
and retort: OYena to theIren ud St.el Institllt•• (5~) !h••• three ••n,
in taot, pye a Ye17 oradi'tabl. aooount ot the financial adyantap. ot
the ReV sJ'8tea otooke OY.na o.... r the old - their oontemporari•• oho.e
(5') 1b1d, p. 8.
<- "1
(54) J.l,S,I., 1685, 1,
(55)·· t.;.s.iu 18?7, 1,
_J' i;:, ., \.~ _> -: '..•:':. .. -<i, "-'.,
('6 ) ~ Ita. 1101;1:, 01) 01t.~------"~
p. 92.
p. 109.
... 7'7 ~ (57) J,I,§.I" 1898, 1, pp. 46-7.
to ignore what they did not want to aooept.
As well as the spirit of oonser'l'atiSDl, which many writers have emphasised
as being the ohief reason why Britain fell behind in the applioation
of teohnologioal improvements to industry, was an attitude of mind whioh
Jeremiah Head summed up as follows:
"The ohief opposers of improved methods were generally those who had
not taken the tro\lble to make themselves aoquainted with them".(58)
Besides, beoa\lSe of the laok of growth in the iron and steel industry
generally in the period, fewer new faoes appeared - "the average age of
men at the top of existing firms was high and nepotism was most likel1'
to ooour".(59) It is perhaps not without signifioanoe that the Clarenoe
Works took the decision to change from the beehiye when it did. Sir
Lowthian Bell had beoome a fading figure in an industry whioh he had
greatly influenced from the floor of the Iron and Steel Institute for
almost two generations. C. Lowthian Bell was not slow to otter his thanks
to Greville Jones, who was then in charge ot the Clarence furnaoes, to
Weldon Hanson, "for the oare he exeroised in the analyses", and to Dr.
Roelofsen, "the manager of the Clarenoe ovens". (60) A further point which
Ilust be giYen i t8 due weight was the baokward position ot British II&nu-
faoturers in the applioation of soience to industr.r. Few people oould
~e a scientific case out &s an explanation as to why the recover" ot b,r-
"prod\lCts did not take "something whioh the beehive ooke retained. It i8
doubtful, too, if the labour force in the ooke ind\lStr.r oould adapt i tselt
thoro\lgh17 to aocept the aore complioated retort oven.~ writers have
stressed that the •••_s ot the retort oyen depended entire17 on the
skill ot the .en who operated It. Later on, trade union agre8Jllents were
to uke chaDce8 diffioult. finally, it wa. not atil 1915 that the format-
ion of the Cots Onll Jluapra t AssociatiOD cave the induatr;r, in i t8 own
right, a torua tor 4180u810n aJl4 to aeana ot furtherine new knOWledge in
the 1ndut1"J'.
(58) J.r.sr. 1897, i, p. 111.
(59) H.J. Habakkldt, American and British 'schnolog in the 19'th. Cent"
p. 21'. (60) J.I.S.I., 1904, i, P. 200.
Appendix 2. List of Railway Basins in the Black Country.
Railway Company .&me of Basin
London and lorth Western
Great Vestern
tidland
Monument Lane
Tipton
Kill Street
Ettingshall
Spon Lane
Bloomfield
Albian
~reat Bridge
Darlaston
)(oDmore Green
Saltley Sidings
Brolfllhills
Tipton Factory
Victoria
Shrubbery
Hockley
Oldbury
Bilston
Vithyaoor
Halesowen
Hawne
Vednesbury
Swan Tillage
Broaley
Prillrose
Great Bridge (with LIWR)
:lorse1ey Pie1ds - VolTerhaapton.
Appendix 3a State of the Pig Iron Departm.ent in 1852.
Furnaces
lame of Works Proprietors in blast
Furnaces
out
-
o
o
1
o
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
4
o
o
o
o
2
o
1
1
1
1
o
o
o
1
o
o
o
o
o
1
o
o
o
o
1
o
o
o
o
o
1
1
o
1
1
o
o
o
o
o
1
1
1
3
o
3
2
4-
3
3
3
2
2
2
:3
2
2
2
o
:3
2
3
2
3
1
1
2
2
:5
2
3
3
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
2,
:3
2
4-,
,
1
3,
1
1
2
"Ball, loloroft 4: Co.
Y...th...
Pia-tone 5 Co.
1aU, 101el"Ott 4: Co.
" "
aor'bya'. Ball
Lqs
Bretteillae
Old LeTel
LeTel
Pelsall Davis, Bloom.er &: Sons
Hatherton Woodall &: Smith
Old Birchhills F.C. Perr" &: Co.
lew" John Jones
Bentley Heath Riley &: Co.
Darlaston Green S. lUlls
Ifew Darlaston Addenbrooke &: Co.
Chillington Chillington Co.
Moseley "
Stow Heath W. Sparrow &. Co.
Osier Bed Osier Bed Co.
Priestfield Exe. of late Lrd.. Ward
lifillfield W. Riley 4: Son
Wolverhampton Poole &: Co.
Parkfield Parkfield Co.
Bilston Brook G. Hickman &: Son
" Ifew:Puma. Blackwell 4: Co.
Bo"'ereux Baldwin 4: Co.
Stonefield G. &: A. Biclalan
Bilston Jones 4: Murcott
Coseley J. &: T. Turley
Priorfields H.B. Whitehouse
Deeptield. Pemberton &: Co.
Capponfield J. Bagnall 4: Sons
Ittingshall T. Bank. & Son
Hallf1elds B. Gibbons, jun.
Ved. Old Park Lloycl, Poster &: Co.
Broadwaters Colbourn, Groucutt &: Co.
Wed. Oalt: P. Willi_s &: eo-.
Willingsworth Baines &: 00.
Crookha7 G. !ho.peon &: Co.
~lda1lill J. Bapall ci- Sons
'l"o11 &Del .otteraa &: Co.
Boraley Colbourn &: Co.
Tipton Ireen Gibbons & Roberts
Tipton Cresswell &: Sons·
Park Lane T••orris &: Son
Dudley Port Hipkins &: Son
Coneygree Lord Ward
Olelbury W. BeDJlitt
trnion P. Vill1u.1 4: Sons
Ruslell'. Ball Blackwell &: Co.
Oak Pam P:l.1"81tone 4: Co.
Shutt lB. J. Bradley &: Co.
Xetle7s B. tibbons
Corb7D ts Ball
.-. l'\lruo.'
" It
lame of Works Proprietors
Purnaces
in blast
Furnaces
out
o
1
1
1
1
1
o
2
o
o
o
o
o
o
~
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
o
o
1
o
126
-
""
Cochrane & Co.
M. &: W. Grazebrook
Evers &: Martin
J. Haden
Woodall &: Smith
Dawes &: Co.
lew British Iron Co.
II "
T. &: I. Badger
Fletcher, Solly &: Co.
Richards &: Co.
D. Jones
Heighway & Co.
'rOtal
Woodside
letherton
Parkhead
Dixon's Green
Windmill J:nd
Wi thymore
Bumble Hole
Dudley Wood
Corngreaves
Old srn
Villenhall
stour Valley F's.
Darlaston
Birchhi1Is
This list is taken from one in the Staffordshire Record Office (D 595/
Bundle 7); the details are those operating for »ecember• .l list, operating
for September 1857, gives 155 furnaces in blast with 25 out of blast.
Truran t s figllre (p. 17') for 1855 gives a total nUJllber of 169 furnaceS',
but he does not distinguish between those in and ou~ of blast. J. Beele
JUkes, in Memoirs Geological Survey of' Great Britain (section on the
South Staffordshire Coalfield) of 1858, gives a total of' 182 furnaces built,
147 of which were in blast in that year..
Appendix 3. b
state of the Pig Iron Department in 1864-5.
Name of Works.
Barber's neld, Bilston
Bircgills, Valsall
Kew Birchills "
Bloxwich "
Bradley, BilstOD
Brettell Lane, Stourbridge
Broadwaters, Wednesbury
Bovereux, Bilston
Bilston Brook "
Chillington, Wolverhampton
Moseley Hole
Bentley, Walsall
Capponfield, Bilston
Gold's Hill, West Bromwieh
Conygree, Dudley
!few Level, Brierley Hill
Cape, Smethwick
Corbyn's Hall, Dudley
Corbyn's Hall Iew, Dudley
Corngreaves, Birmingham
Coseley Hall, Bilston
Crookhat, West Bromwich
The Lays, Stourbridge
Darlaston Green, Wednesbury
Deepfields, Bilston
Dudley Port, Tipton
Dixon's Green, Dudley
Park Lane, Ti pton
Dudley Wood, 1)U~lell
Groveland, Tipton
Hallfields, BilstOD
Hatherton, Bloxwich
Herbert's Park, Bilston
Borseley, Tipton
Ketley's, Dudley
Old Level, Brierley
Millfields, Bilston
letherton, Dudley
letherton lew, Dudley
stour Valley, Tipton
Oak lam, Xingswinford
Oldbury
Old Hill, Dudley
Old Park 'Iedneabur;y
Osier Bed, Bilaton
Park Bead, Dudley
Parkfield, Wolverhaapton
Belaall, Valeall
Prie.ttield, Wolverhaapton
Pri••ttield, ••• "
Prior'. l1e14, Bil.ton
Roup BaT, Jarluton
Ruuell'. Ball, helle,.
Shut 14. nDpw1ntoft
SpriDg 'al., Biletoll
Stonefi.ld, lil.ton
Stow leath, "
Furnaces Built Furnaces in Blast
2 2
2 0
5 2
2 0
2 2
2 2
3 2
7 0
, 2
5 4
, 0
5 2
:3 ,
2 2, ,
3 3
1 1
4 ,
4 2
6 4
2 2
4 2
, 2
:3 :3
:3 2
2 0
1 1
2 0
:3 2
1 1
1 0
2 1
1 1
2 2
4 0
2 0
4 :3
2 2
2 2
2 2
2 0
4 ,
2 0, ,
:3 2
2 1
5 5
2 1
:3 ,
2 0
, 2
, 2
5 1
4 ,
, 2
1 0
4 2
Name of Works. Furnaces Built Furnaces in Blast
Tipton 2 2
Tipton Green 4 4
Wednesbury Oak, Tlpton 3 :3
Union, West Bromwich 3 :3
Wi1lenhall :3 :3
Willingsworth, Tipton 3 2
\folverhampton 3 2
Woodside, Dudley , 2
Withymoor, Dudley 2 2
Windmill End, Dudley :3 :3
'rotal 191 123 *
* Material taken from that supplied by J.Janes for the Birming-
ham meeting of the British Association. Some of the totals
for individual sites have been amended where Jones' list
was clearly at fault.
Appendix ~.
St~te""tf' th; Pig °I;on Grlment i!J. 1880. ... .', '.
Furnaces
Built In Blast
2. 1
{2.. 1 __ -,,,_ • 4
:3 0
1
4
1
o
o
o
2.
o
1
1
2
r
2
1
1
1
2
o
:3
1
1
1
o
11
o
o
1
o
1
o
o
1
1
o
2
o,
l'
1
1
r
o
o
o
o
o
45
:3
o
o
:3
4
3
3
:3
:3
1
Owners
StOlDt T. 0'.&1.. ao.
1Jh. C:re.
W. &: G. Firmstone
3. Bradley & Company.r
Bromley Coal &: Iron Co 4
S. Groucutt &: Sons ,
ltiltldon S & I Company1
W. Ward &: Sons 2.
Addenbrook & ptnrs. ,
Patent Shaft ,
W. Iron Company 2
David Rose 2
G.&: R. Thomas 2'
Pelsall 0'.&:1. Co. Ltd. 2
Walsall Iron Company 2.
Chillington Iron Co. 2.
'!he ¥. Furnaces' Ltd.. ,
C. Coal &: Iron Co. 2.
Roberts &: Company 4
Round Brothers 2.
J.Col~orn &: ~~ 4
fl.. !hu:rlq & Sona 2'
P. 8 1 11181DS .. Sbna. 1
G..a, RimeD 1
1...0n101Ur 2
N" 2
,
1
137
B.F. Company
Th. Holcroft
D.' Iron Company
The B. Furnaces
Iron Company
D. Jones & Sons
H.B. Whitehouse
& Son
W.& J. Sparrow
& Company
A. Hickman
J. Bagnall & Sons
Osier Bed Iron
W/ton& Staffs
Banking Company "
Ch. Iron Company 4
J. Bagnall &: Sons ,
H.O. Firmstone 4
w. Matth~ws' & Company ,
M&W. Grazebrook 2
J .H. Pearson 2
Phillips ~ McEwen 2
Cochrane &: Company 2
Sir Horl'lce St. Paul ,
'J.Jones'& Son 2
N. H!i.ngley &: Sons 2
New BritiSh Iron Co. 6
J~ Holcroft 2.
Earl ot' Dudley 5
" " ,,
4
Chillington
Golds Htill
Crookhay
Corbyn's HS.ll
Nell1herton Ironworks
Netherton Works,
Parkhead
Woodside
Windmill End
Buffery
Old Hlill
C'orngreaveB
Old level
New Level, Brierley mLll
Coneygre, Dudley Port
Lays', " "
Shut Bhd
Corbyn 's HiU.l, nr.
Dudley
Broadwaters, Wednea
Darlaston Steel & IroD
Priestfiel~, New
Rough Hills
Old Park,
Willingsworth Furnaces
Moxley
Hatherton
Palsall
Green laDe
Bentley
Willenhall
Castle
tipton (hoe_
Bange
Horseley
Park laDe:
Coseleyo~
lednesbU17 Oek
GraYeland. smethWiCl1t
Bradee Hall
Park Iant
lJilion Talley
Stonefieldl
!otal
Spring Vale
Capponfield
Horseley Fields
Old Park
Barbar's Field
Bo¥'sl'etlX
Deepfields
The Brook
Millfield
Herbert Park
Priorfield
Name of Works
. , f) ... b ?~~" S~"'"•~
\f(s
.. -.....
((, ,,.1/'......1.. ,, ~r/~ </Cl( t c;"" ~ '1: '" " f ct'/" .."
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2. Will amalgsmation
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ill what respect. ?
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Glossary of Black Country Terms.
All-mine pig
Part-mine pig
Cinder
Muck
Pottery
'Flue'
Hot-cold
Catcher
Heat
Paddle
Rabble
List Houses
Pig iron made from ore; two qualities were made
locally - best (local ores only) and ordinary
(mixture of ores).
Pig iron made partly from ore and partly from
cinder anq/or scrap; sometimes referred to as
Cinder pig.
Slag from the blast furnace, puddling and mill
furnaces. Referred to as Taps by some smelters.
Jorthampton ore.
Ore from lorth Staffordshire.
Flue dust. Used by Hickman (and others) in
the blast furnace and later as a fertiliser.
The dust tended to settle under the furnace
boilers and in the (Cowper) stoves.
A blast furnace blown With a mixture of hot
and cold blast.
'rhe back man at a stand of rolls. He catches
the iron as it issues from the rolls, and sends
it back ready tor the next pass.
The working of a puddling furnace from the time
it is charged until the cinder is cleared
A chisel-ended tool used at the puddling furnaoe.
A hook-ended tool also used at the pUddling furnace.
Makers of marked bars. i.e. the better qualities
of bar iron. The Bloomfield Ironworks, for
eXample, made a top quality bar iron which
was marketed under the brand name "Crown BBH".
A fuller list of Black: C"Olmtr,y terms used by the local iron and steel
industr,y 1s given by V.K.V. Gale, The Black Country Iron Industry, pp.166-89.
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